Reports that Matter

Investigation of the Challenger Accident · 1986

Notes not linked in the text

Section 49 of 49

Original document ↗

Notes not linked in the text

These notes appear in the source but the pipeline could not place their reference in the body. They are listed here so nothing is lost.

  1. 1 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. K-12 and K-28.
  2. 1 Ibid., Volume I, p. 170-71. Memo from W. R. Lucas, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, to James M. Beggs, Administrator, dated August 21, 1981; subject: "ET/SRB Productibility/Cost Reduction"; the relevant sentence reads: "I wholeheartedly agree with your statements that Shuttle performance requirements and design should be frozen so that we can concentrate all efforts on bringing the system to a cost-effective operational status." 11' Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 5-31 1 1 8 Ibid., Volume I, p. 170.
  3. 2 On April 13, 1971, Apollo 13's Command and Service Modules were disabled by an oxygen tank explosion en route to the Moon. The crew waa recovered safely.
  4. 2 6 bid.,Volume I, pp. 160-161
  5. 3 NASA, "Report to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident," July 14, 1986. (Hereafter r e ferred to as NASA Response to Rogers Commission.)
  6. 64 - 4 2 0 0 - 86 - 2
  7. 64 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 37-40. bid., p. 12.
  8. 64 -420 0 - 86 - 6
  9. 64 -420 0 - 86 - 9
  10. 4 bid., Volume 11, p. K-24.
  11. 5 Ibid., Volume I, p. 148.
  12. 8 Ibid., p. F-2.
  13. 8 NASA, D.M. Germany, STS 511 Incident Investigation. Integrated Events Time line, Johnson Space c h t Center, June 4, 1986, as modified. (c) Problems Discovered The design of the joint was based on the successful design of the joints used on the Titan I11 booster r ~ c k e t . ~ That design was simi- lar except that the tang pointed upward, instead of down, and the clevis pointed downward, instead of up, as in the case of the Shut- tle booster. Another difference was that the design of the Shuttle joint included two O-rings instead of one as provided for in the NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," December 17,1982, p. A-6A, Sheet 1.
  14. 8 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 917-18.
  15. 8 84 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV. p. 721 85 Ibid., Volume V. pp. 843-45. 86 Ibid., Volume I, p. 101.
  16. 10 Ibid., Volume I, p. 182. 64-420 0 - 86 - 4
  17. 10 bid. 1 ' Ibid. - Readiness 1 2 Robert Lindstrom. NASA. Marshall Soace Flight Center. "Shuttle Proiect Flight Review,i'~SOP~8000.1,~&cemb& 29, 1983, p 2. See Xppendix VIII-C. l
  18. 11 I
  19. 11 Discussions with personnel from Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, and Aerojet General, August, 1986. l
  20. 11 01s Channel 216, p. 355. 117 "Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report," 5. NASA, "Hazard to Orbiter Tiles Posejby the Vertical Structure Ice: Mission 51-L," January 30, 1986, p. 3.
  21. 12 2 These include the destructive failures of engine 0204 in September 1981; engine 2013 in April 1982; engine 2208 in August 1982; engine 0108 in February 1984; and engine 2308 in March 1985. l
  22. 13 NASA, letter from John Miller, MSFC. "Evaluation of TWR-14359, 'Program Plan, Protec. tion of Space, Shuttle SRM Prima Motor Seals,'" EP 25 (84-49). M a y 23, 1984.
  23. 13 NASA, MSFC, Problem Assessment S stem Record No. A07934, January 23, 1986, p. 6.
  24. 13 3 William Lucas, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "MSFC Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Board for MSFC Elements for Mission 51-L," January 7, 1986, pp. 1-2. See Appendix . vm-n _*-
  25. 14 Rogers Commission %port, V X m e XI, p. H-1.
  26. 14 Hearin s before the House Science and Technology Committee, "Investigation of the Space Shuttle Chaflenger Accident," 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as Cmte Hgs).
  27. 14 I . 14 Discussion with Mr. McDonald, September 4, 1986. Ibid.
  28. 15 Ibid.
  29. 15 14 Rogers Commission Report,Volume 4 p. 1510. Cmte H Transcri t, June 18, 1986, 51.
  30. 16 Ibid.
  31. 16 15 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. K-27. After further investigation, the Commlttee has learned that some qualifying remarks are required for Dr. Feynman's characterization of the FAA engine qualification procedures to be totally accurate. The FAA does not permit cracks in what it calls 'critical" engine components. However, cracks located at, or above, the base of a turbine blade are not considered critical by the FAA because: (1) commercial jet engines possess adequate internal shielding to contain any Continued
  32. 16 Morton Thiokol, TWR-10212 (CD), Table 4-9, Typical Propellant Design Data.
  33. 16 Larry Mulloy, NASA, Marshftll Space Fight Center, "Center Board STS-51L Flight Readi- new Review Solidlkocket Booster, January 13,1986, Chart SRB-3.
  34. 16 degree range and the waiver that we wrote yesterday for 51L only gives us allow- ance down to 28 degrees F. UKN. Yeah, we'll have to rewrite that waiver. D. OK. You don't think we'll have any trouble getting that signed? UKN. No, as long as our pressure transducers are OK.
  35. 17 Ibid., p. H-2.
  36. 17 Ibid.
  37. 18 Ibid.
  38. 18 Ibid.
  39. 18 a 3 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 117. I84Ibid., June 17, 1986, pp.215-16
  40. 18 NASA, "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM Li htweight Cylinder Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980",EP 25 (80-701, June 1 6 , 1 9 8 , p. 2.
  41. 18 Ibid, Chart SRB-28.
  42. 19 Ibid.
  43. 19 Rogers Commission, "Meeting of Challenger Commission; NASA, JSC", Halloway, T. et al., March 9, 1986, p. 313; and Bobko, K . et al., March 24, 1986, p. 152.
  44. 19 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, 1051, testimony of Jesse Moore. A somewhat different version of the enesis of the August 1 briefing waa presented by Allen McDonald, Thio kol's Director of Solif Rocket Motor Project, in testimony before the Rogers Commission (Bid., pp. 1591-92): Mr. MCDONALD. The meeting that occurred on August 19 came about aa a result of this problem with the nozzle eroding through, and that is what drove that meeting. Headquarters wanted to hear about that. We lost the runary seal and eroded some secondary. We all sat down together a n i f o t together with the engineering people and put together that presentation and collective1 sai , you know, we ought to address the whole seal issue, not Just that failure, because we alf felt that if that ever happened in the field joint we were in bad trouble because the nozzle has a much better cyondary sea! than the +Id joint does. Mr. Sumn. At this meeting on August 19th a t headquarters, that was called because of Thiokol's concern that the joint was reall in trouble? Mr. MCD~NALD. No,, it was cald-we had had another meeting scheduled a t Washington headquarters a t that time that had a problem with the mixer fire earlier in the year, and there was a review of that. I believe Mike Weeks either called Joe or I or one of us and said well, you're here, you ought to come and address a couple of other issues that have happened recently that we are very interested in. One of them is we had broken the structural test article on the filament would case I believe in July down a t Marshall, and they wanted to hear about that. The other one was they were made aware that we had violated the primary seal in the nozzle and wanted to hear about that and what our rationale waa to continue. See also, Cmte Hgs, Transcri t, June 17, 1986, pp. 98-101. 170 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, Juyy 24, 1986, p. 97.
  45. 20 Ibid., Chart SRB-4.
  46. 23 NASA, MSFC, Memo from Mr. Alex McCool, "Request for Initiation of Testing to Provide Data for Resolving the Burned O-Ring Seal Problem on the Space Shuttle SRM," EPOI (86-481, MtFh 7,1985.
  47. 23 NASA, "Shuttle Flight Data and Infli ht Anomaly List, Revision H," Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, January, 1986, pp. 2-f and 2-9.
  48. 23 NASA, Irving Davids, "Case to Case and Nozzle to Case 'O' Ring Seal Erosion Problems," July 11 1985. 23a Mr. Weeks, Dep. Assoc. Administrator for Space Flight (Technical); Mr. Hamby, Dep. Dir., STS Program Integration; Mr.Herrington, De Dir. of Launch & Landing Operations; and Mr. k. Winterhalter, Acting E r . , Shuttle Propulsion
  49. 23 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11. See Chart 15 (p. H-10) and Chart 19 (p. H-12).
  50. 24 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. H-2.
  51. 24 Ibid., pp. 2-6 and 2-7.
  52. 24 Ibid., p. 2.
  53. 24 Ibid., p. H-13.
  54. 25 Ibid., pp. 2-16 and 2-17.
  55. 25 Ibid.
  56. 25 Ibid., Chart 30 (p. H-18).
  57. 26 Ibid.
  58. 26 Rogers Commiasion Report, Volume I, p. 148.
  59. 26 Ibid.
  60. 26 Ibid., p. H-42.
  61. 27 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. F-2.
  62. 28 Ibid.
  63. 28 Engmeering consultants to the Committee have serious questions 88 to how this test relates to actual O-ring performance in flight hardware.
  64. 28 NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," Page A-6A, December 17, 1982, Sheet I
  65. 29 Ibid.
  66. 29 Ibid.
  67. 30 Ibid., p. H-3.
  68. 30 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 834.
  69. 31 Thiokol, Roger Boisjoly, "Progress Report: Applied Mechanics Center," July 22, 1985. 6 4 - 4 2 0 0 - 86 - 3 31a Thiokol, Roger Boisjoly, "SRM 0-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality," Memo 2870 FY 86:073, July 31, 1985.
  70. 31 Cmte Hgs., Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 185.
  71. 32 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. H-73.
  72. 323 John Wark, "Bitter Freeze is Expected to Clobber State Tuesday," The Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 26, 1986,p. B-3.
  73. 33 s3 Ibid.
  74. 33 A type of, utty made b another company that also was considered for use in the SRM.
  75. 35 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 42
  76. 35 Most military and civilian aircraft engines are designed from the bottom-up approach, in which each component, starting with the material used all the wa through engineering testing of subsystems and subcomponents, is evaluated prior to the finardesign of the entire engine.
  77. 35 Cmte H Transcript, June 17, 1986, pp. 203-206.
  78. 36 Ibid., Volume 11, p. L-23.
  79. 36 Ibid.
  80. 36 Section VI.B.1.c. of this report.
  81. 37 Ibid., Volume I, p. 41
  82. 37 Ibid.
  83. 37 Ibid., Chart 2-2.
  84. 37 "The second breakdown in communications. . . ," Mr. Aldrich testified before the Commis- sion, "is the situation of the variety of reviews that were conducted last summer between the NASA Headquarters Organization and the Marshall Organ+tion on the ljoint eal.problem] and the fact that that waa not brou h t through my office in elther dlrectlon-that IS, it was not worked through by the NASA Heatquartera Organization nor when the Marshall Organization brought these concerns to be reported were we involved. And I believe that is a critical break- down in process and I think it is also against the documented reporting channels that the prc- gram IS sup to o rate to." Ro era Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1490. JmLarry N&, Marshall &ace F1' h t Center, "Fli ht Readiness Review SRM-24 (STS 6143,'' December 2, 1986, Charta 3-2; 3-2B. %e A pendix VfrI1-G. 30 y r ' O b i s ammission &port, Volume 11, p. . H-P
  85. 38 Ibid., Volume 11, p. L16.
  86. 38 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. F-2.
  87. 38 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, pp. 10-12, 61. Discussion with NASA personnel, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1986.
  88. 38 Ibid., Chart 3-1.
  89. 41 Ibid., Chart "Conclusions."
  90. 42 s Cmte Hgs,Transcript,June 17, 1986, p. 205.
  91. 43 Ibid., Volume 11, p. K-23.
  92. 43 a Thiokol, S. Stein, "Analytical Evaluation of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor Tang/ Clevis Joint Behavior", TWR-12019, October 6, 1978, p. 1.
  93. 44 This memo was part of a package release, NASA, 86-100, draft, July 21, 1986.
  94. 44 Thiokol, S. Stein, "Analytical Evaluation of Space Shuttle SRM Tang/Clevis Joint Behav- ior", TWR-12019, October 6, 1978.
  95. 45 44 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 192-93. Ibid,. Volume 11, p. K-23. 46 Ibid. 4 7 NASA, The Apollo Spacecraft, A Chronology, 1978, Volume IV, p. 319, Appollo 12.
  96. 45 Ibid.
  97. 21 The two events mentioned in this and the preceding paragraph involving Main Engines on STS-51F were separated by 17 days, with the ad abort due to an actuator failure occurring on July 12, 1985, and the inflight abort due to a cfouble thermocouple failure occurring on July 29, 1985.
  98. 21 Larry Mulloy, NASA, Marshall Space Fli ht Center, "STS-51L Level I1 Flight Readiness Review,'' January 14,1986. See Appendix VIII-g.
  99. 22 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 129-31.
  100. 22 Discussion with Allan McDonald, September 4, 1986.
  101. 34 Ibid., pp. K-23 through K-27; K-31.
  102. 34 Thiokol, SRM O-ring Task Force Status and QM-5 Recommendations," TWR-15349, No- vember 20, 1985.
  103. 40 Ibid., Chart 4-2.
  104. 48 Michael Isikoff, "Major Flaws Ruled Out in Two Rockets," Washington Post, July 3, 1986, p. A-1.
  105. 48 481bid.rp. 5.
  106. 49 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 121.
  107. 49 American Society for Metals, Handbook Edited by H.E. Boyer and T.L. Gall, November, 1984.
  108. 49 Robert Lindstrom, NASA, Marshall Space Fli ht Center, "Assigning Launch Constraints on dpen Problems Submitted to MSFC PAS," Septem%er 15,1980, p. 1. See Appendix WI-J. 6 1
  109. 50 David E. Sanger, "Flaw in Titan's Boosters is Identified," the New York Times, June 4, 1986, p. A-23.
  110. 50 NASA, John Miller, "Concerns with Randolph Vacuum Putty," EP-25 (84-35), April 12, 1984.
  111. 51 Isikoff, pp. A-1, A-20.
  112. 51 NASA, John Miller, "Zinc Chromate Putty Installation in Nozzle to Case Joint Discrepan- cy," EP-25 (84-53), June 18, 1984.
  113. 52 Sanger, p. A-23
  114. 52 e2 Ibid., p. K-31.
  115. 52 Thiokol, "Vacuum Putty Telecon," June 29, 1984.
  116. 53 Ibid.
  117. 53 See also "Safety, Reliability and ality Assurance," Section VLB.Z.c(2)of this report.
  118. 54 NASA, L.M. Thompson, "SRM/SRB Putty Evaluation," July, 1985.
  119. 54 This is documented in Section VI%Z.dl) of this report.
  120. 55 53 Poise is a measure of viscosity or resistance to flow.
  121. 55 BM-Chemical Division, "Viton Fluoroelastomer," Undated, p. 1.
  122. 55 PAS Record A09288, p. 1.
  123. 56 3 Ibid., p. K-31.
  124. 56 Ibid. 67 Department of Defense, "Milita Specification: Rubber, Fluorocarbon Elastomer, High Tern rature, Fluid, and Compreasion%t Resistant", MILR-83248A. February 17,1984. "rigid, p. 1. 6 9 Ibid p. 3. 6 0 N d A memorandum, William Ra "Visit to Precision Rubber Products Corporation and Parker Seal Company",EP 25 (19-23). JAbruary 6, 1979, p. 1. 6 1 Ibid. 6* bid., p. 2. 8s Ibid.
  125. 56 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 159.
  126. 57 s' Cmte Hgs Transcri t, June 17,1986,pp. 284-85.
  127. 58 Ibid., p. K-31.
  128. 58 PAS Record A0928$ p. 3.
  129. 59 58 Sbff meeting with NASA personnel, Head uarters, Washington, D.C., May 13, 1986.
  130. 59 Solid Rocket Motor Igniter and Final k m b l y Manager, Thiokol.
  131. 60 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 2-31,
  132. 60 Thiokol, Robert Ebeling, Interview before the Presidential Commission on the Space Shut- tle Challenger Accident, March 19, 1986,
  133. 61 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, !; . 715.
  134. 61 67 Ibid., p. 791.
  135. 63 O3 Ibid.,p. K-3.
  136. 66 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 95.
  137. 67 Ibid., p. 96.
  138. 68 Ibid., p. 98.
  139. 69 Ibid., p. 50.
  140. 70 Ibid.
  141. 71 Ibid.
  142. 72 Ibid.
  143. 73 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-16.
  144. 73 Ibid., Volume IV, p. 717.
  145. 74 Ibid.
  146. 74 Ibid., Volume IV, p. 604.
  147. 75 Cmte Hgs Transcript, July 16, 1986, p. 42.
  148. 76 Rogers Commission Report, V o l u m e I, p. 173.
  149. 76 '6 Supervisor of Structures Design, Thiokol. '
  150. 77 7 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, pp. 792-93.
  151. 78 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. K-32.
  152. 78 Ibid.
  153. 79 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, p. 85.
  154. 80 Cmte Hgs, Transc+pt, July 15, 1986, p. 62.
  155. 80 The Committee has learned that (apparently due to an error in duplicating the relevant chart) the copy of this telefax that was sent to the Rogers Commission did not contain the stand- ard caveat that was printed below the company logo on the original telefax. The caveat reads, "Information on this page was prepared to support an oral presentation and cannot be consid- ered complete without the oral discussion." At the Committee hearings on June 18, 1986, Mr.U. Continued
  156. 83 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 16, 1986, p. 24.
  157. 84 NASA, documents on the SPC contract, sup lied to the Committee in July, 1986.
  158. 85 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. 6-2-3.
  159. 89 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-15. 9 0 bid. p. 1-14,
  160. 89 w 9 01s Channel 245, p.
  161. 91 Hearings before the House Committee on Science and Technology, FY 1978 NASA Authori- +ion, %p,Fmber 14, 1976, Volume I, Part 1, 394; NASA, "Space Shuttle Payload Flight As- signments. August 15, 1983. NASA "Space Jhuttle Payload Flight Assignments," November, 1%.
  162. 92 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 164-77.
  163. 92 Ibid., p, 574.
  164. 93 Ibid., p. 201.
  165. 93 Ibid, pp. 574-76.
  166. 94 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, Jul 14, 1986, pp. 30-31.
  167. 95 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 17f.
  168. 95 516. Ibid., pp. 577-78.
  169. 96 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, p. 31.
  170. 96 98 bid., p. 578.
  171. 97 Ibid., p. 33.
  172. 97 Ibid.
  173. 98 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-14,
  174. 98 Ibid. pp. 579-81.
  175. 99 NASA Response to Rogers commission, July 14, 1986, p. 40.
  176. 99 Ibid., pp. 581-82.
  177. 100 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 5-31, 64-420 0 - 86 - 5
  178. 101 Ibid., Volume I, p. 170.
  179. 101 "Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report," p. 4.
  180. 102 Ibid., p. 174.
  181. 102 *02 01s Channel 245, p. 595. 1 0 2 a Rockwell rsonnel appearing in House transcripts are identified as follows: RI: Kennedy &ce Center liaison. RTI: Director of Technical Integration. Continued
  182. 105 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-15
  183. 105 1O5 01s Channel 245, pp. 600-601.
  184. 106 lo8 01s Channel 216, p. 345.
  185. 107 Ibid., p. 5-38.
  186. 107 lo' 01s Channel 245, pp. 603-604.
  187. 108 Ibid., pp. 5-7-12,
  188. 108 OIS Channel 2 1 6 , ~ ~ . 345-48.
  189. 109 Ibid., p. 5-42.
  190. 109 NASA, Johnson pace Flight Center, "Presidential Commission Action Item (A-301) Re- sponse," DDATF-86-36, April 7, 1986, p. 1.
  191. 110 0 NASA briefing on STS Production Process by Elaine Hofstetler-Presented to Committee Staff on May 19, 1986.
  192. 110 OIS Channel 216, p. 353.
  193. 111 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 166-73; Volume 11, pp. 5-26-29,J-33-51. l
  194. 111 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1013
  195. 112 1 * NASA briefing, May 19, 1986. 1 1 5 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 5-46.
  196. 112 Ibid.
  197. 114 Ibid., p. 5-38,
  198. 114 Ibid., p. 1025. 115 Ibid.
  199. 120 lZo Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1455.
  200. 120 Mr. Richard Davis, President, Martin Marietta Michoud Aerospace.
  201. 121 Briefing to Committee Staff, May 28, 1986, "Report of the First Stage Abort Options Histo- ry Task Group Chartered by the Mission Planning and Operations Team '-Barney Roberts, Ad- vanced Programs Office,Johnson Space Center.
  202. 121 Mr. George Murphy, Executive Vice President and General Manager, United Technologies Booster Production Company.
  203. 122 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 25, 1986, pp. 132-35, 1 3 - 4 1 , Former astronaut, General Thomas Stafford. testified strongly in favor of crew escape systems but seemed to represent a minority view
  204. 123 123Douglas B. Feaver, "Succeea Relaxed NASA's Vigilence", Washington Post, May 26, 1986, pp. A-1, A-10.
  205. 124 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 186.
  206. 125 Ibid. p. 187.
  207. 125 OIS Channel 245, p. 217.
  208. 126 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 106.
  209. 126 Ibid., p. 218.
  210. 127 It is the prime responsibility of the design engineers working with reliability analysts to nerform the FMEA in accordance with guidelines established in NASA documents (Apuendix b1-0. These documents are provided as part of each statement of work submitted to the con- tractor. From such FMEAs, a Critical Items List is established in which particular components under the responsibility of the contractor are categorized in accordance with their criticality to the mission, crew, and/or spacecraft. Included as Appendix VI-D is NASA's document 100-2G entitled Reliability Desk Instruction, Flight Hardware Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). 128 Rogers Commlsslon Report, Volume 11, p. F-4.
  211. 127 OIS Channel 245, pp. 219-20.
  212. 129 Ibid.
  213. 130 130 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. K25-26 NASA Briefing on July 10, 1986.
  214. 130 "Launch Commit Criteria and Background," p. 5.1-4.
  215. 132 5.1-4. 1 3
  216. 133 3 Ibid., p. 1590; note: Yet it was Mr. McDonald who wrote a letter to the SRB Project Office recommending that the O-ring problem be dropped from the Problem Assessment System (PAS), which was in fact equivalent to removing the launch constraint. L 3
  217. 134 4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1513. 1 3
  218. 135 5 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 151.
  219. 136 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. F-1.
  220. 136 Jbid., p. 297.
  221. 137 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. 522-23.
  222. 137 Bid., p. 299.
  223. 138 lJsIbid., p. 302. ISs
  224. 139 lS8 bid., Volume I, pp. 114-17. Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, pp. 83-84.
  225. 139 Bid., p. 305.
  226. 141 Ibid., p. 98.
  227. 142 Ibid. June 25, 1986, p. 78.
  228. 142 Ira hid., p. G-1 143 hid.
  229. 143 bid.: June 18. 1986, P. 100.
  230. 145 bid., July 15, 1986, pp. 71-72.
  231. 145 Discussion with Carver Kennedy, Thiokol Wasatch Operations, Brigham City, Utah. Sep tember 4.1986. General Kutyna also noted this in the Commission's hearing on February 14. Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, p. 660).
  232. 146 bid., p. 73.
  233. 146 166Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 161.
  234. 146 OIS Channel 245, p. 218. p.
  235. 147 *7 Ibid.,June 25, 1986,p. 42. Ibid.,p. 44.
  236. 147 157Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80-81.
  237. 148 149 Ibid., p. 49.
  238. 148 158Ibid., pp. 117-18. IsoIbid., June 11, 1986 p 61 2 Former Shuttle Pro am Manager, Robert Thompson, indicated the need for this &a&&, k t i n g : . . and I thinrthe matter of being sure you have the I'. proper people selected and that those people are roper1 indoctrinated and trained for their position and they clearly understand the respnsibiet andrreporting channels of their positions, I think those are all areas for improvement. -Cmte hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, p. 121. 160Material submitted for the record in response to wrltten questions from Chairman Roe (letter dated 9/18/86). That submission includes the following table: NASA LOSSES FISCAL YEAR 1981-86 [In fial years] 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ~ ~~ Total ...................... .......................................... 1,983 1,556 1,176 1,530 1.494 1.169 .......................................... 32 26 13 19 9 5 AST ngineern................... .......................................... 665 503 386 576 569 457 Life scientists...................................................... ............ 6 6 0 3 2 4 .......................................... 261 207 161 156 204 180 "on-Aempace Technologist.
  239. 152 hid., p. 54-55.
  240. 155 153 Ibid., p. 55. 154Ibid., June 11, 1986, pp. 59-70. Ibid., p. 60 material supplied for the record.
  241. 165 Ibid.
  242. 166 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 119-23
  243. 167 Ibid., pp. 123, 125.
  244. 1868 lsaSee,e.g., testimony of L. Michae; Weeks, Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 130; Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 120-140.
  245. 172 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 138.
  246. 173 113 Letter from Brian Russell, Manager MTI SRM Ignition System to James W. Thomas, Marshall Space Flight Center, August 9, 1985.
  247. 176 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 148.
  248. 178 Ibid., June 17, 1986, pp. 97-8, 101.
  249. 179 181 The issue of whether communications are filtered so that important information is prevented from reaching decision-makers is addressed in Section VI.B.2.b. 1 8 1 Cmte Hgs,Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 207.
  250. 185 Rogers Commission &port, Volume I, p. 159.
  251. 187 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1490.
  252. 188 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80, 87. 189 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 128.
  253. 190 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
  254. 191 Ibid., p. 99.
  255. 192 Ibid., July 23, 1986, p. 10.
  256. 193 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 101.
  257. 194 Ibid.
  258. 195 196 Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 69-70 19e Ibid., p. 17.
  259. 197 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 11. 1g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
  260. 199 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 52.
  261. 200 Ibid., July 24, 1986,p. 94.
  262. 208 Ibid. 2 0 8 Rogers Commission Report., Volume 11, p. H-95.
  263. 208 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, p. 20.
  264. 207 Ibid., Volume I, p. 152.
  265. 209 *OQDiscussionwith the NASA Chief Engineer's Ofice, May 13, 1986. Also, Cmte Hgs, response to question by Mr. Roe,Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60. 2 1
  266. 210 0 Cmte Hgs, response to question by Mr. Roe, Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60. 2 1
  267. 211 1 Telephone Conversation, August 13, 1986.
  268. 214 Rogers Commission Re rt, Volume I, p. 152. 21bDiacussion with the N E A Chief Engineer's Oftice, May 13, 1986.
  269. 220 While this discussion focuses on possible contract penalties related flight anomalies, it to is also interesting to note that Thiokol has never been penalbed for numerous safety and proc- ess violations at its Utah facilities. Several of these violations have resulted in serious fim and/ or explosions.
  270. 221 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 249-51.
  271. 222 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, p. 18.
  272. 46 Ibid.
  273. 47 Discussion with Dr. Richard Feynman, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Cali- fornia, September 3, 1986. 48 1000 pounds per square inch equals 1 ksi.
  274. 710 .5A, p. 3.
  275. 62 Ibid.
  276. 65 66 Ibid.
  277. 88 Conversations were recorded from the Kennedy ipace Center Operational Intercommunication System (OW, which permits members of the launch crew to discuss problems that occur during the countdown, and permits them to contact various mission support facilities around the country. The transcripts provided to the Committee do not indicate the exact times at which the referenced conversations occurred, and so the flow of conversations has been reconstructed in an attempt to provide logical consistency. Most of the transcripts in this section are drawn from OIS Channel 245, identified as the coordination channel for JSC/MSFC/KSC Engineering personnel in the Engineering Support Area at Kennedy Space Center. Conversations among Rockwell International personnel were obtained from 01s Channel 216, described as the coordination channel for JSC personnel at Johnson and Kennedy centers and Rockwell engineers in Downey, California. Tranacript page numbers a re those supplied by NASA. Continued
  278. 90 570. mid., pp. 570-72.
  279. 104 01s Channel 216, pp. 340-41.
  280. 113 Ibid., p. 1014.
  281. 1222 122 Mr. George Jeffs, President, North American Space Operations, Rockwell International. 123 Cmte. Hgs, Transcript, July 25, 1986, pp. 71-74.
  282. 128 See Appendix VIII-L.
  283. 131 Ibid., p. 5.1-4B. See Appendlx VIII-K.
  284. 1330 p bid., 13301SCiannel245, pp. 220-21.
  285. 1340 '3'01s Channel 161, p. 289. Channel 161 is identified as an Engineering channel used for troubleshooting and systems integration.

Newsletter · From the archives