SHUTTLE W 0 3 E C T S FRR REQUIREUENTS

L R c v l c v C o n c e ~7he Shuttle Prciects F R R v U I employ a d e l t a review concept D horn prior r e v ~ e vand ~ previous STS mimi-. n m

b. kberdule: TheShittUe Projects F R R will be held prior m the C c n t e r F R R c w ," l"

¶c. The major agenda i t e r r s and responsibilities ua

. (1) Introduction Prgrunr P ~ M and Management SystemsOffice

389

¶SOP 8000.1

(0) Solid Rocker Boaster h!awger, So!id RockTt 6ooster Projecr O f f i c e

¶(5) Flight Engine Manager, Flight Engine Project

¶Office

¶(6) Action ItemdReadlness Program Plena and Mancgement

¶Poll Syrte.~ O f~f i c e d Presentation E m o h a s i s The presentation of agenda items vil! n o r m d t y inc)vde a brief status summary with appropriate sv;.p>:ting detaU on significant items m d c o n d u d e with a readiness asxsrrnent. The p-esen:ation -pic% &nd scope should be developed from the Prcjec: FRR's m d s?wld:

¶(I) k that required t a p u v i d e t h e S ! ~ ~ : t i eP r o ) c c t s h!mAger and Review T e a m

v l t h t h e informatior. needed to make M iniependent judgement u to flight readiness

¶(2) review recent significant rcsc!ved proS!erns and p-ior fiight anomalies when necessary to establish confiderre;

¶(1) cover alI problem& technical iswes, open items, and a m z r r a i n t r remaining to be resolved before r4e flight;

¶(0) establish the flight baseline c o n f i g u a t i o n in t e r m s of all d g n i f i c m t changes since the last flight d o r applicable STS fllghht.

¶Within Chc above g d d e l i n a , t h e rope of the review should w v e r status, chuigger - . and issues in a r e a s such as:

H a r d w r r d S o f t v a r e A n m d i c r , Failures including development and acceptance test failures L a m c h Commit Criteria Flight PlantlRules Vchicie Checkout Shortages and Opt? Fork Prior Flight Anomalies As-bui!? Hardware Configuration versus Certified H a r d v u e L i s t Critical Item L i s t ( C L W i a u r d s bevelo~ent, .Qua.!ifiCAtiOn, and Reliability Tating (CwtifiutionlVeriflcati~) V L v e n ud Deviations Limited L i f e Components LarnFh Critical Sparer S n u k Circuits Plight Margitu PAS Assessment Safety Process Olanger Cc':&-,, smu!.>ctxing, checkout m d Lunch processing

390

¶SOP 1000.1

s. Shuttle Proiccts FRR McmbcrshiDr The MaNger, Shuttle Projects v l l l establish revicv membership and K r v e As Chairman. k k m b e r h l p viU comprise representation from the foilowing organirationu ProxramlProjcct Offices S c l n r e & t n r i n r t r i n i Directorate Rellabillty & Quality Assuraxe

S.Ir(y Contractors bSB1, MMC, Thiokol, Rocketdyne

¶t Documentation R m i r e m e n t s

(I) Presentations Vugraphs will be w e d for F R R presentations ud paper cup~esvrll be provided to the rcvicving officials.

(2) Statement of Fliiht Readiness Statement of Flight Readiness r i l l b e executed by all Probect Mam8ers and submitted at the conciulion of t h e review. _-

¶g. FRR Action Itemlopen Item Closeout Reportin&Rmuiremcnts

u (1) Subsequent m lhe condusion of the Shuttle Projects FRR, a copy of aui8ncd action Items v1U be provided to each actionee by the Program Plans ud Management Systems Office. 0 ) T h e FRR wcrcUry will track dl action items ud provide status to me Shuttle Project3 M a N 6 n .

(3) Closeouts to FRR action I t e m 5 vill be u b m l t t e d to lhe Program Plara and Management Systems Office in writins and will state fully the baais for closeout, that is action taken, results obtained, and &terminations made. The Program Plans and Management Systems Office vlll u b r n i t closures to the Manager, Shuttle Projects Q NS designated reprerentative lor signature.

¶h. Procedures

u CI

(I) SinKlc Points of C o n t a c c FRR planning and procecturca will be coord.nated through a aingle point of contact in the Program P h n s and M a n y e m m i Systems Office. OD I4 D

lncflvldurl d e m e n t for points of contact vlll be &sigrurcd by chc responsible Project M ~ Ner and the m n provided to the Program Plans and Management t y r t c r n l Office. These individuals will be responsiblc for these duties outlined in paragraph 6.b.

¶. . .. ..

0 Guidelines Approximately * r e mb prior to the USFC Shuttle Projects FRR, guiaelimr rill be prepared by Procram P h s ud U u u p m m t Systems O f f h and Issurd by h e Y a n p r , Shuttle Project& atabllshln~ Projects FRR &te, Shuttle Projects FRR &a, wlth appliuble memkrshlp, and my specld requiremmts not s v c r e d by l h i s prardvc

tFFECWEDATC

¶TNs procedure i s effective on date of l u u .

¶R& t. LIndrtrorn Y a q e r , Shuttle Projects

392

¶SOP 8000.1 ca S A O I I b . idvlngood SAOl/Mr. Askew S h O b / M r . Harden S A I IIMr. Lombudo SAJIIMr. Brldwrll SA1IIMr. Mulloy SAYIIMI. Taylor Sh711Mr. Bore S M I/*. ioiler LhOIIMr. Kingsbury EAOIIDr. T h m m EEOlIMr. Hardy EEI IIMr. Horron EC21IYr. Thomaron EE3IIMr. Nichols tE51fMr. Goerr ECOIIMr. Brook LGO3IMr. B u m EBOIIMr. Bradford EHOIIYr. Jchwingbmer EfOllDr. Deader EPOIIMr. McCool EPC3IMr. W o r l d EL0 IIMr. Hop- E W 1lDr. McDonough ElOl/Yr. Taylor PWIIMr. Manhall TMI/Mr. Odom NAOlIMr. ThanU JAOIIMr. born). DAOIILZ. L u a s DmllMr. Lee DEOllMr. B e h y DROlIMr. S n n d

. -0 n

393

¶VIII-D

Diotr:but i o~ DAOl/Y. R. Lucaa USFC Flight Readiness Revieu (FRR) Board for USFC Elements for Eirslon 51-L

¶An USFC FRR Board of senlor RSFC manageaent personnel u i l l convene at 8:30 a . ~ . on January 1 3 , 1986, in Building 4663, HOSClUCR, to revieu and assess the resd:ness status of t h e USFC Fission 51-L eleaents for flight. This aeetlng u i l l be held at the SECRET level and Bll documentation u l l l b e handled and prezented in accordance with the NASA Security regulations. Attendance uill be restrlcted and all Prcjccts are t o coordinatr this activity through the Program Planning and Uanagement S y S t e m Office, Ton S t a p l e s , 5-0338. The Center Board is composed of the followlng:

DAOl/W. R. Lucas: Chmirman DDOl/T. J. Lee Vice Chairman EAOl/J. E. Kingsbury DSOl/F. A . Specr ECOl/J. P. Uadole JAOtlJ. A . Oouncy PAOl/U. R. WarSh.11 ESOl/J. C . Walker ,k7t/S. G . Herderson: SecrcLariat

¶Each project manager musL certify t h e fll&ht readiness o f hir harouare ane present supportin& r8tlon8lc 8nd d8t8 so the Board can independently 8ssess t h e fli&ht readiness. The Shuttle Projects Office manager l r responsible f o r preparation and coordinatlon o f the reetlng, p r e s m t l n g a n overall ss$essment of flight readlners, recordlna o f minuter ant action items, and tracking action items for closure by the Review B o a r d . 0 fl

c, b

394

¶Errhasis w i l l h e p l a c e d on s b i e t y o r f l : g , h t end tr~z5icrl

¶~ U C C C S S , inc1ud:rp p o t t ~ t ! a l impact of prior f'lJSht a n o n e l i e s ; g r o u n d t e s t a n ~ c a 1 : e s ; rrv!sions to h a r d h ' a r e , l o f t w a r e , l a u n c h c o c c i t c r : t t r i r , o r r e d l i n e s wh:-& h s v e n o t been f l i g h t v e r i f i e d ; r e v i s i o n s Lo SRP r e c o v e r y r i s k s Z i n c @ t h e p r e i i o u s f 1 i E t . t ; s c y w n i v e r u h l c t , has n o t t e e n f : l g L ) t verlfivd o r w h i c h regu;rez e x : r ~ r " a : sj,;.rc.va!; and any rev1s:ons t o r.?za!-d or cr:ticel i:err, l i ~ ~ c T. c r n C t ' r n z , an: r i z i ~3 b j . ? t : i , ' i p c:terl,v :dt.r:Ci!-ieC P Z h me:hcd: of c i c f ; r e .

¶I n a n e f f o r t t i n!r im:.-c s d r r l n > s t l 8t:!ir cintrol :f.<:ijr a s s o c i a t e d w i t h tlhe d i s s e a i n a t ~ o n o f c : e s s i f ~ e d d a t a , a n e f f o r t 1 3 t o b e r~.acie t o p r e s e n t c l s s r i r i e d i n f o r m a t i o n o r l y through viewgraphs. I f Frojects elect to lncorpol2te c l a s s i f i e d d z t s w i t V , l n t h e i r h a n d o u t s , l t Is t h e P r o J t C t . ' S r e s y o n s l b j l i t y t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e h a n d c u t s a r e ~ a r h e . ! and h a n d l e d ir, a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e RASA S e c u r i t y r e g u l z t l o n s .

¶If a r y s s s i s t a n c r i s n r e d e d i n t t . : J r r . a t t e r , p l e a s e c c n t a c t t h e KSFC Security D i v i s i o n a t ? - S ? l o .

¶A pre!lminary a p e n d a is e n c l o s e d .

¶F.,/+

¶-Y/'R. Lucas A Director

¶Enclosure

¶Distribution:

¶S e e Fage 3

395

¶PC 014660

¶PC 014737

¶E

0 0 0 0 — 0

399

¶PC 014740

0 0 — 0

PARACHUTE SEPARATION SYSTEM

FUOMT 0REClW)L; PAMo(vTL FLOAT U C u t E U

¶n / I e t Y aY

¶Q

¶N (Y N .

NOMINAL SRB REENTRYllPROnLE (138 FOOT MAINS) I

¶0 a I 3 'Y a.

¶m . n u em N

a w

. - 7. tl : r; . -7

¶l b 0 w pC 014746

405

¶'a. i! -I B

I I

¶I

0 STS 6 1 4 FLIGHT ANOMALIES 0 HMOR ISSUES/PROBLMS 0 HAJOR CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES

¶0 CERTIFICbTION/VtRIFICATION STATUS

0 READINESS STATMENT

¶SRB-2

/. J

STS 51-L SICNIf ICAHT CONfICURATION DIFFERENCE CHANGE REASON BASIS FOR ClRTIFICATION . ** ------ ------- -._____------

¶IIPtEKNTS CAPABILITY TO 0 NOZZLE SEPARATION 0 ANALYSlS SEPARATE $RH NOZZLE AT 0 PRECLUDE FRACMENTS FROM - STRUCTURAL

AWCEE AND TO SEPARATE NOZZLE EXTENSION DESTROYING - DYNAHIC HAIN PARACHUTES AT UATEB DROCUE PARACHUTE - FKA IWQACT 0 REDUCE DESICN LOAD 0 QUAIIFICATION EXCEEDANCES ON M I N TEST PARACHUTE SYSTEH 0 MAIN PARACHUTE SEPARATION 0 F M L PWCDR 0 SRB RETRIEVAL PERSONNEL 0 DCR SAFETY

¶SRB-I

U L4 Y E

¶0 sd

NOMINAL SRB REENTRY PROHLE

¶51 (136 FOOT MAINS) c. I .²² Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 199. N

¶0 0 I

¶51 03

¶.- L"

¶I

P SRB-7 U

414

¶.. CrJ e z U E 3 B

0 — 0

415

¶Ln c ¶ a c Ln c CT W V

z W =c w a 0, 0 Q

¶" PLNOINC SATISFACTORY COHPLETION Of NORHAL OPERATIONS FLMl (OtlASo) Iuo OPEN ITfHS IOWTIfIEOi WE CERTIFY THE SRB FLIGHT HARWIARE RfMY 10

SUPPORT HISSION 51-L /S/ HR. KILNINSTER /S/ HR. HURPHY

KILHINSTEb HTI C. HURPHYt USBI-BPC

VICE PRESIOENT EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIOENT SPACE BOOSTER PROCRAHS

¶n

v SAM Lt G1 W n

¶VIII-G

¶TWR- 15284C

FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW

¶SRH-24 (STS-6lC)

02 DECEHBER

¶L. 0. WEAR

¶I .

I I.

¶3 w> OIu L

fl u c +

CL

¶Iz v)

s1 W -1 m

r. Q

¶~- ---_- -\

¶STS-618 OUICKLOOK EVALUATION

SRY-23 PERFORMANCE

(CHART NO. 3-1) - -. - W&TFD f73.a

¶o AVERAGE X A D PRESSURE (5-20 SEC, P S I A )

o LEFT MOTOR 901.0 926.2 o R!C'IT MOTOR 899.7 928. I

¶o WEE TIME (SEC)

o LEFT MOTOR 109,7 108.11 o RIGHT MOTOR 109,7 108.0

¶o ACTION TIME (SEC)

o LEFT MOTOR 121.4 121.6 o RIGHT MOTOR 121.5 120.6

¶0 SEPARATION COf'PiAND TIME BASED ON 50 124.9 123.9

¶P S l A ON LAST SfUl + 5.7 SEC o PROP. BURN RATE ( I P S )

o LEFT !40TOR ,372 6369)' o RIGHT MOTOR ,372 (.369)'

¶ALJUSTED TO A TEMPERATURE 3F 60'F AND PRESSURE OF 625 PSIA

420

+.'
m 'f

¶Y

3TS-61B ( S T S - 3 1 ) (SRN-23) PERFORMANCE (CHART NO. 3 - 2 1

¶PaaaLECl m'!ERN BESQLUTlOY

ALL THREE STIFFENER REUSE OF SRM HARDWARE ACCEPTABLE RIIIGS ON BOTH SRM'S

¶EXPfRIENCED WATER

IYPACT DAMAGE. CRACKS

¶All0 B U C K L t S OBSERVED 111 ALL THE RINGS. t t l N E OF T!iE 18 S T I F - r M R RIt4G SEGMENTS WILL HAVE TO RE RE- ,*LACED.

NO REPORTABLE POCKETS, SIM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

¶GOUGES, OR WASHES It4

THE I N L E T RINGS FOR

¶BOTH NOZILES. lb

¶N ALL A B L A T I V E RINGS I N SRM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO N PLACE BUT SOME D I S - PLACEMENT FORWARD.

APPARENTLY DUE TO WATER IMPACT. HAS CAUSED LOCAL R A I S E D AREAS AT SOME OF

¶THE RING INTERFACES.

SOOT OBSERVED ON SRN-23A SRM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

¶( L H ) AFT E X I T CONE SEAL-

ING SURFACE BUT THERE WAS NO APPARANT DAMAGE

¶TO O-RING.

SRM-23A ( L H ) HAD NO GAS SRM PERFORMANCE 'ACCEPTABLE NO PATHS THROUGH THE PUTTY

¶AT AIlY F I E L D JOINT

(SEE SKETCH ON SUBSEOUENT CHART

423

¶-m w m z

¶V

¶0 h(' zz I 0 a v)+t -9 -?⁵⁵ bid. 0 %id. iNm.-The nozzle to case joint design is significantly different than the case field joint design w ich caused the Challenger accident. However, it is cited here because some of the prob- l e m are relevant to the failure of the aft field joint.] +u I- m- L

¶4 v) +- z?

STS-61B (STS-31) (SRN-23) PERFORNANCE (CHART NO. 3-3)

SRN-23B (RH) HAD ONE SRN PERFORHANCE ACCEPTABLE NO GAS PATH AT THE AFT/ AFT CENTER JOINT AT 58' BUT IT D I D NOT PROGRESS

¶TO THE PR IHARY 0-R ING.

PERFORNANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

¶P

ACCEPTABLE — 110

426

¶PC 0 3 7 7 1 1 w

b — 4

c f U Y Y ' F

¶8ZP

¶" W w am J1U EIIDSIUN L E N O I H IINCHEB) 1.0 7.0 IIEAT AYFECTEU L f N U l l f . 22.0 23.0