THE TURNING POINT

¶699. February 2004 was the worst month for Coalition casualties since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. More than 200 people, mainly Iraqi citizens, were killed in suicide attacks. Attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces were increasing and concerns about Islamic extremists operating in Iraq began to grow. By the end of March, more than 200 attacks targeting Iraqi citizens were being reported each week.

¶700. In April, there was a sudden escalation in attacks by the Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM) in Basra, described by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE) as "like a switch had been flicked".²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ Public hearing Lamb, 9 December 2009, pages 67‑68. In Fallujah, a US offensive which followed the ambush and murder of four security contractors provoked an angry response from the Sunni community.

¶701. The significant worsening of security, coupled with revelations of abuse by members of the US military of Iraqi detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison, led many of the Inquiry's witnesses to conclude that the spring of 2004 had been a turning point.

¶702. At the end of April, Mr Blair's analysis was that the key issue in Iraq was not multi‑faceted, rather it was "simple: security".²⁴⁶²⁴⁶ Letter Rycroft to Owen, 26 April 2004, 'Iraq: 15 Reports for the Prime Minister'.

¶703. Despite the failing security situation in MND(SE) in spring 2004, Gen Walker was explicit that no additional troops were required for the tasks currently assigned to the UK.

¶704. The Chiefs of Staff maintained the view they had originally reached in November 2003, that HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) should not be actively considered for deployment to Iraq, even though:

Iraq was a higher priority for the UK than Afghanistan;

security in Iraq was clearly worsening and had been identified by Mr Blair as the key issue; and

there had been a specific US request for deployment of HQ ARRC.

Transition

UK INFLUENCE ON US STRATEGY POST‑CPA

¶705. In June 2004, the US and UK ceased to be Occupying Powers in Iraq and the CPA was disbanded. Responsibility for day‑to‑day interaction on civil affairs with the Iraqi Interim Government on civil affairs passed to the newly appointed British and US Ambassadors.

¶706. After the handover, the UK's priorities were to maintain the momentum of the political process towards elections in January 2005, and to ensure that the conditions for the drawdown of its forces were achieved.

¶707. Mr Blair and President Bush continued to discuss Iraq on a regular basis. It continued to be the case that relatively small issues were raised to this level. The UK took false comfort that it was involved in US decision‑making from the strength of that relationship.

¶708. Themes which Mr Blair emphasised to President Bush included the acceleration of Security Sector Reform and the Iraqiisation of security, UN engagement, better outreach to the Sunni community (often referred to as "reconciliation"), provision of direct support to Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and better use of local media to transmit a positive message about the coalition's intentions and actions.