Chapter 10: The Department for Communities and Local Government 2013–2017

Chapter 10: The Department for Communities and Local Government 2013–2017

Introduction

¶10.1 In his letter of 20 May 2013 responding to the coroner at the Lakanal House inquests the Secretary of State made a number of commitments which purported, for the most part, to address the coroner's concerns and recommendations.^10561056 {CLG00002788}. However, in the years that followed, the work that the department had undertaken to carry out in response to those recommendations was delayed and merged with other projects. As a result, by the time the Grenfell Tower refurbishment had been completed in mid-2016 very little progress had been made in reviewing Approved Document B, which had not been clarified in any significant respect.

The officials

¶10.2 In the period between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2017 responsibility for the Building Regulations and the statutory guidance relating to them lay with the Department for Communities and Local Government (the department). Robert (Bob) Ledsome was the Deputy Director in charge of the Building Regulations and Standards Division, assisted by Anthony Burd^10571057 Head of Technical Policy. until December 2013 and then by Richard Harral. Responsibility for the Building Regulations was entrusted mainly to Brian Martin, the principal construction professional. He reported to Anthony Burd and later Richard Harral and had a background in building control. He had taken primary responsibility for the Building Regulations and the Approved Documents since joining the department in September 2008.^10581058 Martin {Day250/29:23}-{Day250/30:5}; Martin {Day250/39:2-5}. Within the department Mr Martin was the person with the most detailed knowledge of those parts of the Building Regulations that related to fire safety and others (including those senior to him) would turn to him for advice on that subject.^10591059 Martin {Day250/38:15-25}. Between 2010 and March 2015 the late Sir Bob (subsequently Lord) Kerslake was the permanent secretary; from March 2015 the post was held by Dame Melanie Dawes.

The ministers

¶10.3 Between 2013 and May 2015 the Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP (now the Rt Hon The Lord Pickles) was Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. He was succeeded by the Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, who held office until July 2016, and subsequently by the Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP. Junior ministers with responsibility for the Building Regulations included the Rt Hon Don Foster MP, Stephen Williams MP, James Wharton MP (now the Rt Hon The Lord Wharton of Yarm) and Gavin Barwell MP (now the Rt Hon The Lord Barwell).

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Deregulation

¶10.4 One of the principal policies of the government that came to power in May 2010 was deregulation. The idea was not new and indeed the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is an example of an earlier initiative of a similar kind. The policy was based on the proposition that national productivity and economic growth were being held back by unnecessary regulation which needed to be swept away. The policy was best expressed in a letter dated 6 April 2011 from the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon David Cameron MP, to all government ministers, in which he described the government's ambitious deregulation agenda which included a new "one in, one out" rule relating to new regulations and a drive to reduce the overall burden of regulation. Ministers were told they were personally accountable for the number of existing and new regulations for which their departments were responsible.^10601060 {HOM00018307}. Although Lord Pickles characterised that letter as "veneer",^10611061 Pickles {Day262/6:14-15}. it was intended to send a serious message to ministers and we have no doubt that the Prime Minister intended it to be taken seriously.

¶10.5 The "one in, one out" rule was an administrative policy introduced within government in January 2011 under which no new regulation would be introduced without a compensating reduction in regulation being made.^10621062 "One-In, One-Out (OIOO) Methodology" {INQ00015131}; and "One-in, Two-out" in the "Better Regulation Framework Manual, Practical Guidance for UK Officials" dated March 2015 {INQ00015132}; Ledsome {CLG00019465/8} page 8, paragraph 29(a). For the purposes of the rule, a regulation was defined as

"a rule or guidance with which failure to comply would result in the regulated entity or person coming into conflict with the law or being ineligible for continued funding, grants and other applied for schemes."^10631063 {INQ00015131/4} paragraph 13.

¶The policy was extended to "one in, two out" in January 2013^10641064 As set out in the "Better Regulation Framework Manual, Practical Guidance for UK Officials" dated March 2015 {INQ00015132}. and to "one in, three out" in March 2016.^10651065 Ledsome {CLG00019465/8} page 8, paragraph 29(a).

¶10.6 The "Red Tape Challenge" was also launched in 2011 and ran until 2014. It was designed to obtain the views of business, other civil organisations and the public on whether existing regulations should be improved, kept or revoked. The main area of work resulting from that exercise so far as the department was concerned was the Housing Standards Review, which explicitly excluded standards relating to safety (including Approved Document B).^10661066 Ledsome {Day241/81:12-22}; {Day241/83:25}-{Day241/84:11}; Harral {Day243/55:14-21}. A Red Tape Challenge for construction was launched in 2012.^10671067 Ledsome {CLG00019465/9} page 9, paragraph 29(c); Harral {CLG00019487/10} page 10, paragraph 30. The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 was excluded from the Red Tape Challenge by ministers in 2012.^10681068 {CLG00018638}; {CLG00018639}; {CLG00019597}.

The department's response to the coroner's rule 43 letter

¶10.7 In her rule 43 letter the coroner recommended that DCLG review Approved Document B to ensure i. That it provided clear guidance on compliance with functional requirement B4, in

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particular in relation to the spread of fire over the external envelope of the building and the circumstances in which work might reduce existing fire protection.

¶ii. That it was expressed in a way that was intelligible to the wide range of people engaged in the construction and maintenance of buildings. iii. That it provided guidance of assistance to those involved in the maintenance or refurbishment of older housing stock. The response from the Secretary of State might therefore have been expected to deal directly with those three recommendations. Regrettably, however, that was not to be.

Submission to the junior minister

¶10.8 On 11 April 2013 a submission signed by Brian Martin^10691069 {CLG00000461}. was put up to the then junior Housing Minister, Don Foster, containing advice on how to respond to the coroner's letter in so far as it concerned the Building Regulations. It had been drafted primarily by Mr Martin with contributions from other officials, including Mr Burd and Mr Ledsome.^10701070 Martin {Day256/177:9-11}. Although her letter was annexed to it, the coroner's three recommendations were not summarised in the body of the submission itself. Mr Martin may have expected the minister to read the coroner's letter,^10711071 Martin {Day257/124:19-22}. but in view of what transpired we are not sure that he did.

¶10.9 The submission recommended that the minister respond to the coroner's letter by i. Acknowledging that Approved Document B could be difficult for inexperienced people to apply. ii. Commissioning a review of the guidance given to members of Competent

¶Persons Schemes.^10721072 Competent Persons Schemes are government-authorised schemes which monitor compliance with the building regulations of certain elements of construction, such as windows and doors. FENSA is the Fenestration Self- Assessment scheme. Certification of an installer of windows or doors under the FENSA scheme is intended to demonstrate that it is competent to carry out work which complies with the building regulations.Show full note iii. Setting out the government's intention to issue a revised version of Approved

Document B in 2016 or 2017 following a full review of the fire safety aspects of the Building Regulations that would take into account current research which was due to be delivered in 2014.

¶10.10 If the minister had read the part of the coroner's letter that concerned the Building Regulations and Approved Document B he would have realised that the recommended response did not properly respond to her recommendations in some important respects. In particular, a review of the Competent Persons Scheme, which occupied a significant part of the submission^10731073 {CLG00000461/2-3} paragraphs 7-9 and 12. and was said to have given rise to most of the problems relating to the Building Regulations,^10741074 {CLG00000461/3} paragraph 12. was not something she had called for, having concluded that there was no evidence that reliance on it had contributed in any way to the deaths at Lakanal House.^10751075 Lakanal House Coroner's Inquest {INQ00015074/77} lines 16-21. The submission also sought to place the blame for the criticisms the coroner had made of Approved Document B on the legal process and the evidence of the expert, Mr David Walker, which was described, with some justification, as "confused and conflicting". The submission suggested that, given the confusion in court, it was unsurprising that the coroner had criticised the clarity of the guidance given in Approved Document B.^10761076 {CLG00000461/2} paragraphs 9 and 10.

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¶10.11 The submission was disingenuous in that it did not make it clear that the coroner had been concerned about the clarity of Approved Document B even after Mr Martin had explained it in the course of his evidence. We have been left with the clear impression that in drafting the submission Mr Martin set out to give the minister to understand that the coroner's concerns were in fact groundless and that no criticism could be levelled at himself or the department for the structure or language of Approved Document B. In our view that was the result of a defensiveness born of a prolonged involvement in a technical field and an understandable, albeit misplaced, pride of authorship. He appears to have thought that, since the text was clear to him, it was clear enough for everyone.^10771077 Lakanal House Coroner's Inquest {INQ00015070/80} lines 5-11 and line 25.

¶10.12 In the submission Mr Martin advised the minister that re-writing Approved Document B would be a significant project and recommended that it be undertaken as part of a fuller review leading to the publication of a revised document in 2016 or 2017. However, the coroner had not recommended a full review of Approved Document B, only that part which contained guidance on the construction of external walls. As Mr Martin accepted in his evidence to us, the coroner's first recommendation was a narrow and focused one,^10781078 Martin {Day257/133:1-8}. and yet the option of carrying it out as a discrete piece of work was not canvassed.

¶10.13 Mr Martin told us that one reason why he did not recommend reviewing only those aspects of Approved Document B that related to functional requirement B4 of the Building Regulations was that he and others in the department had thought that the 2006 version had adequately addressed some of the coroner's concern about its clarity^10791079 Martin {Day257/134:1-16}; Martin {Day256/189:16-22}; Martin {CLG00019469/13} page 13, paragraph 38. and that as a result the work had not been urgent.^10801080 Martin {Day257/154:20}-{Day257/155:1}; Martin {Day256/189:16-22}. However, if officials thought that the coroner's concern was misplaced in the light of the 2006 revision to Approved Document B (of which she had been aware), they ought to have made that clear to the minister and given him an appropriate explanation. The failure to do so went on to shape the understanding of ministers (and later that of officials) both of the coroner's concerns and of the work that might be needed to address them.

¶10.14 Mr Ledsome^10811081 Ledsome {Day241/110:24}-{Day241/111:7}; {Day241/116:2}-{Day241/117:10}. and Mr Burd^10821082 Burd {CLG00019461/18} page 18, paragraph 45; Burd {Day240/186:4}-{Day240/187:9}. agreed with the approach taken in the submission. We accept that, when dealing with matters requiring technical expertise, such as the Building Regulations and fire safety, it may be appropriate for senior officials to rely on the detailed knowledge and expertise of more junior officials. Mr Ledsome described himself as a "policy professional" and did not profess to have detailed knowledge of technical matters.^10831083 Ledsome {Day241/6:10-24}. As the senior official involved in the discussions Mr Ledsome should have ensured that the submission summarised the coroner's recommendations accurately and offered suggestions for a response supported by appropriate explanations.

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¶10.15 The minister, Mr Foster, was invited to approve the recommendations with a view to their being included in a submission for the Secretary of State.^10841084 {CLG00000461/3} paragraph 13; {CLG00000485}. He approved the submission on 15 April 2013.^10851085 Martin {CLG00019469/9-10} pages 9-10, paragraph 26.

Submission to the Secretary of State

¶10.16 A submission was subsequently sent to the Secretary of State on 13 May 2013.^10861086 {CLG00002889}. It included a brief description of the background to the Lakanal House inquests and the coroner's rule 43 letter and the Secretary of State was informed that junior ministers, including Mr Foster, had already agreed recommendations for the response. The submissions to junior ministers were annexed to the submission.^10871087 {CLG00002889/1} paragraph 5. In the part dealing with the Building Regulations the evidence given by the expert witness and the nature of the legal process were said to have led to confusion and that it was therefore unsurprising that the coroner had criticised the clarity of the guidance in Approved Document B. In the final paragraph the Secretary of State was advised that a full review of Approved Document B would require significant resources and have a disruptive effect on the construction industry. Officials suggested that confirmation be sought from FENSA and other Competent Persons Scheme providers for replacement windows that their members were fully aware of the scope of the schemes and the requirements applicable to their work. That, it was said, could be completed by the end of the summer without the need for the department to divert significant resources away from other work. A new edition of Approved Document B was expected to be ready by 2016 or 2017.^10881088 {CLG00002889/4} paragraph 17.

¶10.17 The submission was formally sent to the Secretary of State by Louise Upton, but Brian Martin accepted that he had been the author of the section on the Building Regulations, and although he could not be sure who had suggested the particular wording,^10891089 See draft of the submission {CLG00000559/4}; Martin {Day257/137:15}-{Day257/138:12}. it drew heavily on the submission previously made to Don Foster. Mr Martin was unable to explain why different language had been used from that found in the submission to Mr Foster and in particular he could not explain the reference to the disruptive effect a revision of Approved Document B would have on the construction industry.^10901090 Martin {Day257/139:5-13}. He accepted that it might have been included to ensure that the submission received a warm reception in a department committed to deregulation and reducing costs.^10911091 Martin {Day257/139:14}-{Day257/141:2}. Both he and Mr Ledsome^10921092 Ledsome {Day241/150:3-18}; {Day241/151:4-12}. told us that any change to guidance, even if it involved no more than a need for industry to familiarise itself with new language, would be considered as imposing a cost because of the disruptive effects of such a change.^10931093 Martin {Day257/139:14}-{Day257/141:2}. Construction was an area of the economy in which the government was trying to reduce the burden of regulation and stimulate growth.

¶10.18 Mr Martin accepted that the department did not consider a review of the guidance in Approved Document B on the construction of external walls to be essential in the interests of safety,^10941094 Martin {Day257/153:15}. but it is clear that its view had been influenced by his initial misrepresentation of the position and his decision not properly to inform ministers of the coroner's concerns or the basis of them. He also accepted that the department had missed the opportunity to look beyond the coroner's recommendations to investigate the use of inappropriate materials on high-rise residential buildings generally and the fire risks associated with them.^10951095 Martin {Day256/184:6-21}.

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¶10.19 Lord Pickles gave evidence about what he had understood when he considered the submission, including discussions he had had with officials at the time. He said that his assessment of the need to clarify Approved Document B had been influenced by the suggestion that the coroner had been confused by the expert evidence.^10961096 Pickles {Day261/136:8-15}. He said that he had been told that the windows at Lakanal House had not been installed in accordance with the Building Regulations.^10971097 Pickles {Day261/142:5-6}. He had not been told that the officials in his department thought that the 2006 version of Approved Document B had cured the problems that had come to light at Lakanal House.^10981098 Pickles {Day261/145:14-15}.

¶10.20 Lord Pickles said that he had tried quite hard to bring forward the date of the review of Approved Document B but that the Permanent Secretary (Sir Bob Kerslake) had told him that it was not appropriate to do so and that the matter was complex.^10991099 Pickles {Day261/137:4-10}; {Day261/177:3}-{Day261/178:1}; Pickles {CLG00019471/17} page 17, paragraph 56. He also said that he had asked if part of the work on the Approved Document could be undertaken separately but had been told that the different parts of the document were interlinked and that it would cause difficulties if that were tried.^11001100 Pickles {Day261/179:1-8}. We understand that a Secretary of State has various conversations of an informal kind with the Permanent Secretary of his department which are not minuted. If he had voiced any significant objection to any aspect of the recommendations made to him, however, we think that that would have been recorded and would probably have led to a further submission. Since there was no record of any such objection, we conclude that he did not pursue one. Nor did any of the civil servants from whom we heard suggest that the Secretary of State had offered such resistance.^11011101 See, for example Martin {CLG00019469/10-11} pages 10-11, paragraph 28; Ledsome {CLG00019465/44-46} pages 44-46, paragraphs 173-177. Other aspects of Lord Pickles' evidence^11021102 Pickles {Day261/178:2-8}. suggested that he accepted the estimate he had been given of how long the work would take.

¶10.21 Before us Lord Pickles expressed dismay at the suggestion that officials had included in the submission an assertion that a full review of the Approved Document would have had a disruptive effect on the construction industry in order to make it more appealing to him.^11031103 Pickles {Day261/192:2}. However, there was a wealth of material that showed both that he was personally an ardent supporter of the government's deregulation policy and that the pressure within the department to reduce red tape was so strong that civil servants felt the need to put it at the forefront of every decision.^11041104 Martin {Day255/19:20-23}; {Day255/19:23}-{Day255/20:6}; {Day 255/19:25}; Harral {Day243/42:25}; Ledsome {Day241/80:11-12}; Pickles {Day262/8:14-17}.

¶10.22 Annexed to the submission was a draft letter of reply;^11051105 {CLG00002889}; {CLG00000589}. it was sent to the coroner on 20 May 2013.^11061106 {CLG00002788}. In relation to the Building Regulations, the Secretary of State said that he was aware that some of those involved in the inquests had encountered difficulties in interpreting Approved Document B and that the department was committed to a programme of simplification, but that the design of fire protection in buildings was a complex subject and should remain, to some extent, in the realm of professionals. He said that research had been commissioned to contribute to a review of the part of the Building Regulations relating to fire safety and was expected to lead to the publication of a new edition of Approved Document B in 2016 or 2017. He aimed to ensure that the guidance was capable of being more easily understood and the need to cross-refer reduced.

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¶10.23 As Mr Martin and Mr Ledsome accepted, the letter did not respond directly to the three recommendations made by the coroner in relation to Approved Document B nor even make it clear whether they had been accepted or rejected.^11071107 Martin {Day257/135:11-20}; Martin {Day256/181:21-25}; {Day256/197:6-17}; Ledsome {Day241/109:4}-{Day241/110:19}. Indeed, there does not seem to have been a clear view within the department about whether it should review Approved Document B to ensure that it provided the clear guidance that the coroner had wished to see. Lord Pickles thought that he had accepted the first recommendation^11081108 Pickles {Day261/138:13-16}. and in a sense he had, because he told the coroner that the department would review the relevant part of the Building Regulations and expected to publish a new edition of Approved Document B in 2016 or 2017. Mr Martin's initial response was that the first recommendation had been accepted, but then he was at a loss to explain how a ministerial submission he had sent to Don Foster's successor, Stephen Williams in June 2014,^11091109 {CLG00011293} paragraph 3. had stated in terms that the recommendation had been rejected.^11101110 Martin {Day256/197:10}-{Day256/198:17}. He put it down to a "bad choice of words",^11111111 Martin {Day256/198:11}. but that was not plausible because the words he used were clear. Mr Ledsome's understanding was that the first recommendation "was not absolutely accepted or absolutely rejected" because, although the department had agreed to review Approved Document B, it would be a fuller review to be completed by 2016/17. In the event, the decision to conduct a complete rather than a partial review of Approved Document B combined with departmental inertia to cause significant delay to the work.

¶10.24 When Mr Ledsome approved the ministerial submissions and the draft letter to the coroner, he thought that the best way to deal with her recommendations was to include them in a fuller review of Approved Document B, rather than carry out a specific review of the guidance relating to functional requirement B4.^11121112 Ledsome {Day241/113:6-12}. However, he accepted that a full review was not what the coroner had asked the department to undertake.^11131113 Ledsome {Day241/153:9-12}. He also accepted that the department should perhaps have been bolder and considered reviewing the guidance on the construction of external walls more quickly.^11141114 Ledsome {Day241/126:11-20}. He agreed that the Secretary of State should have been presented with two options: reviewing the guidance on the construction of external walls within a shorter time, or a wholesale review of Approved Document B by 2017.^11151115 Ledsome {Day241/145:6}. It is not clear whether anyone gave any thought to what would be involved in complying with the second part of the coroner's first recommendation.

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¶10.25 The department made a number of important admissions in its submissions to the Inquiry about the adequacy of its response to the coroner's recommendations.^11161116 DLUHC Phase 2 opening submissions for Module 6 (Government, FRA, Testing and Certification) {CLG00036387/36} page 36, paragraph 112(a) to (e). The submissions were repeated in its closing statement for the module: DLUHC Phase 2 closing submissions for Module 6 (Government, Testing, FRA) {CLG00036422/23} page 23, paragraph 81. In particular, it accepted that the advice given to ministers failed to make it clear that the work was not considered essential for safety or to explain how or why that view had been reached.^11171117 DLUHC Phase 2 opening submissions for Module 6 (Government, FRA, Testing and Certification) {CLG00036387/32} page 32, paragraph 97. The department accepted that the response to the coroner should have set out clearly in relation to each recommendation whether it had been accepted in whole or in part, together with any relevant reasons. It admitted that it had not done that. It also acknowledged that the Secretary of State's letter in response had not been well structured and had been unclear and difficult to follow when read against the text of the coroner's recommendations.^11181118 DLUHC Phase 2 opening submissions for Module 6 (Government, FRA, Testing and Certification) {CLG00036387/32} page 32, paragraph 95. It accepted that the department should not have worked on the basis that her first recommendation related to the 2000 rather than the 2006 version of Approved Document B; nor should it have concluded that the exercise to clarify and simplify the 2006 version of Approved Document B was not essential to safety, and therefore not urgent, without making its position clear in the response to the coroner.

¶10.26 Those admissions are justified as far as they go, but we do not think they go far enough. The department's response to the Lakanal House fire in the four years leading up to the inquests was complacent and short-sighted. Regrettably, its approach to the coroner's recommendations was little better. No one treated them with any sense of urgency, despite the fact that they had arisen out of an incident in which six people had died and the coroner had seen fit to make a number of recommendations with a view to preventing future deaths. Officials produced submissions to ministers which failed to describe accurately the points on which decisions were required or the courses of action open to them and significantly understated the importance of the criticisms of the existing guidance made by the coroner. Even worse, some officials within the department appeared to treat the coroner with disdain.^11191119 {HOM00047478}. In particular, Mr Martin displayed an arrogance and a lack of respect that was quite contrary to his assertion that recommendations from coroners were always treated seriously and accorded a high priority.^11201120 Martin {CLG00019469/8} page 8, paragraph 23. It was an attitude that should have had no place in any government department.

The appointment of Stephen Williams as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Richard Harral as Head of Technical Policy: 2013–2014

¶10.27 Stephen Williams replaced Don Foster as the Minister with responsibility for, amongst other matters, the Building Regulations on 7 October 2013.^11211121 Pickles {CLG00019471/4} page 4, paragraph 13(c). He was in post until May 2015. On joining the department he was provided with a series of briefings and although they included a briefing on the Building Regulations in general, he did not recall having been told about the progress the department had made in responding to the coroner's recommendations.^11221122 Williams {Day259/58:5-23}. He did not believe that he had ever read, or indeed that he had ever been shown, the coroner's Rule 43 letter.^11231123 Williams {CLG00034291/3} page 3, paragraph 6; Williams {Day259/52:5-16}. He had no detailed conversation with any officials about the Lakanal House fire.^11241124 Williams {Day259/50:11-12}. The impression he gained was that a contractor installing new windows had failed to comply with the Building Regulations and that the coroner had recommended that some action be taken in connection with the Competent Person's Scheme for window installers.^11251125 Williams {Day259/51:2-5}.

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¶10.28 In January 2014 Richard Harral took over from Anthony Burd as Head of Technical Policy at DCLG. He was given to understand that the coroner's first recommendation relating to the clarity of the guidance on the construction of external walls had been covered by the amendments made to Approved Document B in 2006.^11261126 Harral {Day243/78:2-10}. He also thought that the coroner's third recommendation, to provide guidance or assistance to those maintaining or refurbishing older housing stock, was never going to be addressed because it had been covered in 2011 by the LGA Guide on purpose-built blocks of flats.^11271127 Harral {Day243/108:15}-{Day243/109:12}. As a result, he appeared to think, based on what he had been told by Mr Martin,^11281128 {CLG00018930/1}. that the commitments made to the coroner following the Lakanal House inquests involved two things: the clarification and simplification of Approved Document B, and improving the Competent Person's Scheme.^11291129 Harral {Day243/91:18}-{Day243/92:14}. Mr Harral could not recall whether he had gone back to the coroner's letter to check what recommendations she had made and what commitments had been given in response.^11301130 Harral {Day243/92:16-19}. If he did not, plainly he should have done so.

¶10.29 Richard Harral never clearly understood what changes needed to be made to Approved Document B in order to implement the coroner's recommendations.^11311131 Harral {Day 243/83:5}-{Day 243/85:22}. He should have known what was required from the earliest days of his involvement. Part of the problem was that at no stage did Mr Martin or any other official prepare a proper briefing document identifying the criticisms expressed by the coroner in the course of the inquests so that they were clearly and consistently understood within the department.^11321132 Harral {Day243/88:3-9}. However, Mr Harral was also at fault in failing to find out exactly what the task of responding to her recommendations involved and in failing to ask Mr Martin to provide him with a detailed briefing.

¶10.30 The failure to make more rapid progress between 2014 and 2015 in responding to the coroner's recommendations was due in a large measure to a substantial piece of work that the department was doing on the Housing Standards Review. It was a large project that had absorbed much of the division's resources and delayed the work on Approved Document B.^11331133 Harral {Day243/89:7-16}. The Housing Standards Review was due to be completed in October 2014 but it was delayed until March 2015 and in turn delayed planning the review of Approved Document B.^11341134 Harral {Day243/129:17}-{Day243/130:3}; {Day243/134:3-7}; {Day243/144:11-14}.

¶10.31 By 30 March 2015 research relating to Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations was expected to be completed by the end of the first quarter of 2017 and work on the review of Part B was due to continue throughout 2018.^11351135 {CLG10006856}. The indication given to the coroner by the Secretary of State that a new edition of Approved Document B would be published by the end of 2017 was therefore not going to be met. Officials did not tell the minister at that stage that his previous indication had been over-optimistic, as they expected to put further advice before him before mid-July 2015 explaining how matters had developed.^11361136 Ledsome {Day241/217:11-14}. The general election due to take place in May 2015 was also liable to have an effect on the department's resources and new ministers might wish to determine priorities.^11371137 Ledsome {Day241/205:4-13}.

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Lord Wharton becomes a junior minister: May 2015

¶10.32 The Conservative government came to power on 7 May 2015 and shortly thereafter Lord Wharton was appointed as a junior minister within DCLG^11381138 His ministerial role was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Local Growth and Northern Powerhouse. with responsibility for the Building Regulations.^11391139 {CLG00019462}. There was no handover of any kind between ministers or any discussion between them about the work that was going on in the department.^11401140 Wharton {Day258/18:1-17}. On about 26 May 2015^11411141 Wharton {CLG00034289/1-2} pages 1-2, paragraphs 3-4. Lord Wharton received a briefing from Bob Ledsome on behalf of the Building Regulations team.^11421142 Wharton {CLG00030834/4} page 4, paragraph 13; Wharton {Day258/58:2-17}. It was a high-level briefing which included a one-page note and a pack of slides.^11431143 Wharton {CLG00034289/2} page 2, paragraph 5. Although one slide contained a picture of the Lakanal House fire,^11441144 {CLG10007022/8}. it does not appear that the briefing included any discussion of the fire or the coroner's recommendations.^11451145 Wharton {Day258/62:13-20}; Ledsome {Day241/211:21}-{Day241/212:24}. That is surprising, as he agreed.^11461146 Wharton {Day258/62:21}-{Day258/63:1}. Mr Ledsome accepted that the minister may well have been told that the system of regulating building work was working well, that the number of fires had fallen substantially over the years and that that was attributable in part to the efficacy of the Building Regulations.^11471147 Ledsome {Day241/212:8-15}; Wharton {CLG00034289/12} page 12, paragraph 29.

¶10.33 On 28 May 2015 officials sent the minister a note on Building Regulations identifying matters that were expected to arise in the future in relation to building regulation policy.^11481148 {CLG00019275}; Ledsome {CLG00019465/21} page 21, paragraph 75. Attached to the submission was a table which included a reference to the publication of a discussion document on technical changes to the Building Regulations, particularly changes needed to follow up previous government commitments to the coroner following the Lakanal House fire. However, the minister was given no further information about the fire or any pending review of Approved Document B; nor at that time was he given a copy of the coroner's recommendations.^11491149 Ledsome {Day241/214:20}-{Day241/215:24}. Despite Richard Harral's expectation that research into Part B of the Building Regulations would extend into 2017, the date of publication of the discussion document was said to be the end of June 2015. That was clearly over-optimistic, but Mr Ledsome said that he had hoped at the time that more detailed advice could be given to the minister before the summer recess, at which time more information would be provided.^11501150 Ledsome {Day241/216:2}-{Day241/217:18}.

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Merger of the review of Approved Document B with the review of Building Regulations policy and Building Control: summer 2015

¶10.34 In the summer of 2015 Bob Ledsome and Richard Harral proposed that the review of Approved Document B should be merged into a wider review of Building Regulations policy.^11511151 Harral {Day243/148:21}-{Day243/149:13}. They thought that making changes to Approved Document B alone might impose significant costs on the construction industry and that any changes would be more likely to be favourably received if they formed part of a package of proposals which covered Building Regulations more broadly. They hoped that by doing so they would be able to reduce regulation in one area to balance any increase in regulation in another and thereby enhance the prospect of obtaining ministerial approval.^11521152 Harral {Day243/149:9}-{Day243/150:15}; Ledsome {Day241/78:9-21}; Ledsome {CLG00019465/22} page 22, paragraph 80. According to Mr Harral, officials felt that they had no option but to proceed in that way because the prevailing policy on deregulation was designed to make it difficult to introduce new regulations, even where measures affecting the safety of life were involved.^11531153 Harral {Day243/152:1-20}. They also felt that it was more coherent to carry out the work on Part B as part of a broader programme, rather than to make piecemeal changes.^11541154 Ledsome {CLG00019465/21-22} pages 21-22, paragraph 77; Ledsome {Day241/152:6}-{Day241/153/6}.

¶10.35 On 15 September 2015 Richard Harral sent a submission to Lord Wharton and the then Secretary of State, the Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, in which he proposed to include the review of Approved Document B in a wider review and revision of the Building Regulations and statutory guidance expected to last over a period of four years.^11551155 {CLG00019302}; {CLG00019304}; Ledsome {CLG00019465/22} page 22, paragraph 79. The submission emphasised the government's commitment to deregulation and recommended that a broad based review of all aspects of building control should take place in order to deliver substantial savings to industry by way of reducing regulation and technical requirements.^11561156 {CLG00019302/2} paragraphs 5-7. Mr Harral recommended a two-stage programme of work in relation to the Building Regulations and Approved Documents, the detail of which was contained in Annex B to the submission.^11571157 {CLG00019302/2-3} paragraph 10.

¶10.36 Annex B proposed a two-stage process: a simplification of the Approved Documents, that was expected to take until October 2017, and a review of the technical requirements of the Building Regulations and Approved Documents, that was expected to take until October 2019.^11581158 {CLG00019304/7}. Mr Harral could not recall why the submission had not made it clear to ministers that that represented a significant departure from what the coroner had been led to expect by the previous Secretary of State.^11591159 Harral {Day243/162:18-23}. He said that he thought the reason why the submission did not make it clear that some of the matters to be reviewed affected the safety of life was because he thought that was implicit.^11601160 Harral {Day243/165:3-5}; {Day243/165:24}-{Day243/166:3}. We nonetheless consider it a significant failure on the part of officials not to have drawn ministers' attention to those matters in clear terms.

¶10.37 On 19 October 2015 three of the most senior officials responsible for the Building Regulations and Standards Division, Peter Schofield (the Director General), Sally Randall (the Director) and Bob Ledsome (the Deputy Director) attended a meeting with Lord Wharton to discuss the submission.^11611161 {CLG00019305}. Lord Wharton told us that he had been content to accept their advice that it was appropriate to proceed with a larger and more comprehensive piece of work.^11621162 Wharton {Day258/90:2-18}; {Day258/95:14-20}. He thought he might have questioned the time it would require, but was told that it was a complex matter which could not be carried out in a short time.^11631163 Wharton {CLG00030834/5-6} pages 5-6, paragraphs 15 and 17; Wharton {CLG00034289/7} page 7, paragraph 15; Wharton {Day258/114:15-18}.

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¶10.38 Lord Wharton told us that he could not conceive that the deregulation policy had prevented or delayed the simplification or clarification of those aspects of the Building Regulations that had a bearing on fire safety.^11641164 Wharton {CLG00030834/6} page 6, paragraph 18. However, the submission itself laid some emphasis on the opportunity that the review of the Building Regulations and Approved Documents provided for deregulation.^11651165 See in particular {CLG00019302/2} paragraph 5.

¶10.39 Dame Melanie Dawes, who had become the Permanent Secretary in March 2015, was not aware at the time of the decision to include the work on Approved Document B in a wider review, but defended it on the basis that it made for a larger, more coherent, and more visible piece of work that was easier to track.^11661166 Dawes {Day249/48:3-25}. However, despite those apparent merits, it appears that no one gave much thought to the countervailing disadvantages. Ministers were not presented with the option of carrying out some work more quickly; nor were they told that failing to respond promptly to the coroner's recommendations might adversely affect the safety of life.

The effect of deregulation on ministers and officials

¶10.40 We heard detailed and consistent evidence from civil servants about the effect of the deregulatory policies on the department in the period 2010 to 2017. They had all clearly understood that the "one in, one out" policy and its successors applied to changes to the Building Regulations and the Approved Documents^11671167 Ledsome {Day241/85:4-9}; Harral {Day243/47:6}-{Day243/48:3}. and they all spoke about the effect that those policies had had on their approach to their work and on the culture within the department at the time.^11681168 See for example {CLG10007289/2}. In his response to colleagues about a request in July 2015 that teams identify the cost per unit of individual regulations, Brian Martin commented "Ok ta. So let's spend a couple of years working out what the unit cost of the building regulations is. It's better than actually doing something I suppose…".

¶10.41 Anthony Burd told us that the "one in, one out" policy meant that he and his team spent an inordinate amount of time looking at how they could deregulate.^11691169 Burd {Day240/191:10-14}. He understood that the policy applied to the Approved Documents as well as to the Building Regulations.^11701170 Burd {Day240/191:15}-{Day240/192:7-10}. He felt that, as time went on, it had become increasingly difficult to oversee the Building Regulations because of the reduction in the number of staff and the changes involved in deregulation.^11711171 Burd {Day240/195:8}-{Day240/196:4-5}.

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¶10.42 Bob Ledsome also understood that neither the Building Regulations^11721172 Ledsome {CLG00019465/8} page 8, paragraph 29(a); Ledsome {Day241/73:14}. nor the Approved Documents^11731173 Ledsome {Day241/74:6}. were exempt from the "one in, one out"' policy, and no one considered seeking an exemption for them.^11741174 Ledsome {Day241/76:11}. It was only after the loss of life at Grenfell Tower that regulations affecting fire safety were exempted from the policy.^11751175 Ledsome {Day241/79:14-20}. Before that, he thought that the policy would have made any case for an exemption difficult.^11761176 Ledsome {Day241/80:11-12}. He also told us that energy efficiency had been an important consideration^11771177 Ledsome {CLG00019465/9} page 9, paragraph 30. and that the department's approach had been to look for areas where the regulations and guidance could be simplified in order to produce savings to offset the costs of introducing requirements for increased energy efficiency in Part L of the Building Regulations in 2013.^11781178 Ledsome {Day241/97:5-12}.

¶10.43 Richard Harral told us that under successive governments the approach to deregulation had become more rigorous, with increased scrutiny of regulatory proposals through various policies at different times.^11791179 Harral {CLG00019487/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraph 26. He said that as a result officials had been working in a policy environment in which regulatory intervention was regarded as a last resort^11801180 Harral {Day243/107:22-24}. and there had been a general view within government that regulation was bad.^11811181 Harral {Day243/42:25}. Mr Harral accepted that he had not considered seeking an exemption from the "one in, one out" policy for the parts of the Building Regulations or Approved Documents that had a bearing on the safety of life.^11821182 Harral {Day243/53:7-12}. He understood that the "one in, two out" policy applied to them, despite the fact that most of what they contained affected safety.^11831183 Harral {Day243/44:22}; {Day243/53:13-24}. He also said that he had assumed that even a simplification or clarification of an Approved Document would be caught by the policy because there would be a cost to industry in familiarising itself with any new version and that would be captured by the relevant impact assessment.^11841184 Harral {Day243/50:23}-{Day243/51:7}.

¶10.44 Brian Martin's evidence was to similar effect. He told us that there had been a great deal of pressure on the Building Regulations and Standards Division to reduce regulation.^11851185 Martin {Day255/19:20-23}. He said that after the 2015 election, there had been an even greater drive for deregulation and that any document issued by the department, even an answer to a frequently asked question, needed to have political approval.^11861186 Martin {Day255/19:23}-{Day255/20:6}. He said he had felt that committing more resources to fire protection or any other aspect of regulation was contrary to government policy and that strong evidence was required to justify any increase in regulatory requirements.^11871187 Martin {Day255/37:9-14}.

¶10.45 The evidence of these officials on the effect within DCLG of the government's deregulatory policies was strikingly different from the evidence we heard from most of the former ministers.

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¶10.46 Stephen Williams said that he had had an open and candid relationship with his officials and did not recall their saying that they felt under pressure to reduce regulation.^11881188 Williams {Day259/39:1-4}. He thought that, if officials had felt that they were being put under pressure to weaken health and safety standards, they would have found a way of resisting it.^11891189 Williams {Day259/42:20-23}.

¶10.47 Lord Wharton said that he had not felt that deregulation had imposed a particular pressure on his decision-making or his role as minister at the time.^11901190 Wharton {Day258/27:5-8}. He felt that clarifying Approved Document B would involve a reduction in regulation rather than new or additional regulation.^11911191 Wharton {Day258/30:6-7}. He was not aware that any officials in the Building Regulations and Standards Division had felt that their hands were tied by the "one in, two out" policy.^11921192 Wharton {Day258/41:7}.

¶10.48 Lord Pickles told us that he had not thought that officials within the Building Regulations and Standards Division believed that deregulation applied to the Building Regulations, and that he would have regarded that as being "ludicrous" and "wholly disproportionate".^11931193 Pickles {Day261/85:10-12}. He said that it was "utterly inexplicable" that officials in the division should have thought that Part B was subject to the deregulation policy and that he was "genuinely amazed" that that was the case.^11941194 Pickles {Day262/100:2}. Moreover, he rejected the suggestion that he might be out of touch with what was happening in the Building Regulations and Standards Division.^11951195 Pickles {Day262/101:4} Lord Pickles also told us that he was dismayed to find that officials in the division felt under pressure because of the policy on deregulation.^11961196 Pickles {Day262/96:18}. He blamed the officials, in particular Mr Martin, for making what he called "political assumptions"^11971197 Pickles {Day262/96:19-20}. and the senior officials for not easing the pressure or bringing it to the attention of ministers, who could then raise the problem with the Permanent Secretary.^11981198 Pickles {Day262/97:17-23}.

¶10.49 The differences of recollection between officials and successive ministers about the effect of the government's deregulatory policies on the work of the department in the years after the Lakanal House inquests is striking, but the contemporaneous documents support the evidence of the officials from whom we heard that those policies were a dominant influence in the department at the time. We saw a significant number of documents that showed that DCLG saw itself as a deregulating department, and indeed it described itself in that way in a Star Chamber internal briefing pack in May 2012.^11991199 {HOM00002080}; Ledsome {Day241/88:8}-{Day241/89:4}; {HOM00018307}; {LABC0009720}. Deregulatory policies and considerations were also highlighted in numerous ministerial submissions, including some put up in May 2012,^12001200 {CLG10005222/1} paragraph 8; {CLG10005223/2}. September 2015^12011201 {CLG00019302/2} paragraph 5. and November 2015.^12021202 {CLG10007804}. Dame Melanie's evidence was that the deregulatory imperative had "cast quite a shadow" and by 2015 had become, as she put it, "almost quite an extreme set of policy demands".^12031203 Dawes {Day249/49:12-16}. From the documents we have seen and the evidence we have heard, we accept what she said.

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¶10.50 A number of documents also illustrated the extent to which Lord Pickles was not only aware of, but supported, that approach, including the application of the policies to the Building Regulations.^12041204 {CLG10004826}; {CLG00018639}; {CLG00018602}; {HOM00002080/3}; {CLG00030973}; {CLG10004742}; {CLG00014665/4}; {CLG00013957}; {CLG00014724}; {HOM00018307/3}; {CLG10007280/2} paragraph 1. While he was Secretary of State deregulatory considerations appear to have permeated every aspect of the department's development, assessment and implementation of policy. Far from its being inexplicable that officials were under the impression that the Building Regulations and Approved Document B were subject to the various demands of the policy, the documents demonstrated in clear terms that their understanding was correct. Those documents included letters sent to ministerial colleagues by Lord Pickles, in which he specifically sought clearance from deregulation committees and others for changes to various parts of the Building Regulations and Approved Documents.^12051205 {CLG00014698}; {CLG00014462}; {CLG10005767}; {CLG10006068}; {CLG10006758}. They also included a letter he wrote to the Welsh Government in May 2013^12061206 {CLG00019243/7-8}. admonishing it for introducing legislation^12071207 {CLG00020138}. requiring the installation of sprinklers in all newly built and newly converted homes^12081208 {CLG00019216}; {CLG00020138}. on the basis that it was increasing the cumulative burden of regulation on the housing market in Wales. He also expressed fear that the burden of red tape would harm the Welsh housing market. It was not uncommon for those in the Building Regulations and Standards Division to receive emails thanking them for their support and for their efforts in meeting the Secretary of State's ambitions on deregulation.^12091209 {CLG10007394/2}. In this email from Justin Vetta of the Deregulation Team, templates capturing "ins and outs" were to be submitted by all policy teams, including the Building Regulations and Standards Division.

¶10.51 Although Lord Pickles sought to distance himself from those documents and play down their significance,^12101210 Pickles {Day262/36:19}-{Day262/40:20}; {Day262/76:14}-{Day262/80:22}. there was nothing to suggest that they were inaccurate or incomplete or gave a misleading impression. Lord Pickles' assertion that the exemption of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 from the policy showed that the Building Regulations as a whole were exempt from the policy^12111211 Pickles {Day262/63:5}-{Day262/66:5}. The submission dated 3 May 2012 {CLG10005222} and {CLG10005223} was clear that the Building Regulations were not receiving special treatment under the policy on deregulation. served only to reveal the limits of his understanding of the distinction between fire safety regulations on the one hand and the Building Regulations and Approved Documents as they related to fire safety on the other.

¶10.52 None of the documents or any of the witnesses, other than Lord Pickles, supported the conclusion that Part B of Schedule 1 to the Building Regulations or Approved Document B was exempt from the policy on deregulation. We have been unable to accept his evidence on that question, which was flatly contradicted by that of his officials and by the contemporaneous documents. Moreover, in its written closing statement the department accepted that the policy on deregulation being promoted across government since 2010 created an environment in which officials working on Building Regulations felt unable to propose regulatory interventions or refer their concerns to more senior managers.^12121212 DLUHC Phase 2 closing submissions for Module 6 (Government, Testing, FRA) {CLG00036422/3-4} page 3, paragraphs 6(h) and 10; DLUHC Phase 2 closing submissions for Module 6 (Government, Testing, FRA) {CLG00036422/35-38} pages 35-38, paragraphs 124-136. It is a matter of serious concern that officials in the Building Regulations and Standards Division were so affected by the deregulation policy that they were inhibited from giving candid and clear advice to ministers on the implications of not taking certain regulatory steps. It is impossible to know with certainty whether an exemption from the policy would have been granted, if it had it been sought, but it is clear that the limits of the deregulation policy and the process for seeking an exemption from it were not fully understood across government. Given the fact that many regulations affect public safety, that was a serious flaw.

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¶10.53 However well-intentioned the government's aim of reducing the burdens on industry may have been, it was not in the public interest to allow the policy on deregulation to impede the ability of officials to promote changes to regulations or statutory guidance that would improve public safety. If ministers were not fully aware of the extent to which officials felt constrained by the policy when giving advice, there was a serious failure of communication within the department. It is disappointing that when officials became aware of matters which posed serious risks to life, effective steps were not taken to draw those risks to the attention of ministers. The failure to foster a culture in which concerns could be raised and frank advice given represents a serious failure of leadership on the part of ministers and senior officials.

Ministerial submission: November 2015

¶10.54 On 10 November 2015, Alex Murphy, an official in what had become the Building Regulations and Energy Performance Division, sent a submission to Lord Wharton and the Secretary of State, Greg Clark, on the simplification of the Building Regulations, Approved Documents and the Building Control system.^12131213 {CLG10007804}. The submission recommended the publication of a discussion paper setting out an ambitious programme of deregulation, including consolidating and simplifying the Building Regulations and Approved Documents, and proposals to improve the building control system. The submission had been approved by Bob Ledsome. The proposed programme was to start with the publication of a discussion document in early 2016 and culminate in new Building Regulations and Approved Documents coming into force in 2018.^12141214 {CLG10007804/3}.

¶10.55 On 7 December 2015 Lord Wharton's private office sent an email to the Secretary of State's private office stating that he agreed with the proposed programme and the next steps.^12151215 {CLG10007855}.

Further delays in 2016

¶10.56 On 1 April 2016, a submission written by Richard Harral and approved by Bob Ledsome was sent to Lord Wharton setting out the proposed next steps in the programme of simplifying the Building Regulations.^12161216 {CLG00019344}. They recommended that officials should work with the Building Regulations Advisory Committee (BRAC) to develop a discussion paper for publication that would set out the government's ambitions to simplify the statutory guidance and reform the building control system (including the possible expansion of the role of approved inspectors).^12171217 {CLG00019344/1} paragraph 3. The date for publication of the discussion paper had now slipped to May 2016. Mr Harral explained that that had been caused by the need to give priority to other urgent matters.^12181218 Harral {Day243/176:5-19}. The dates for completing the revision of the Approved Documents and Building Regulations had also moved back to mid-2018 and 2019 respectively.^12191219 {CLG10008122}.

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¶10.57 The submission did not refer to the Lakanal House fire, the inquests or the Secretary of State's response to the coroner's rule 43 letter. Lord Wharton accepted that that was important information which should have been included, preferably in bold at the beginning of the submission,^12201220 Wharton {Day258/117:17-23}. since the minister could not reasonably have been expected to remember the contents of previous submissions.^12211221 Wharton {CLG00034289/5-6} pages 5-6, paragraph 13. He was unable to say whether he was, in fact, aware of what the Secretary of State had said to the coroner^12221222 Wharton {CLG00030834/17} page 17, paragraph 40(b). and Richard Harral was unable to recall whether the slippage had been communicated to the minister,^12231223 Harral {Day243/170:18}-{Day243/171:2}. but Lord Wharton was doubtful whether anything would have been done differently if the change in timing had been drawn to his attention. He might have asked for an explanation, but in his experience everything happened slowly in the civil service and he thought it unlikely that he could have done anything to speed up the review.^12241224 Wharton {CLG00034289/6} page 6, paragraph 14.

¶10.58 Mr Harral candidly accepted that the department should have been tracking the progress of the work far better and that he should have ensured that ministers were aware that the original expectation would not be met.^12251225 Harral {Day243/180:6-19}. One reason for having failed to do so was the absence of any procedure within the department for recording a coroner's recommendations and the progress made in responding to them.^12261226 Harral {Day243/102:6-8}. It appears that at about that time officials had been instructed to limit the length of submissions to ministers to two pages,^12271227 Harral {Day243/181:5-16}. but even so, the key points about the response to the coroner could have been conveyed in a sentence. It is also notable that the submission did not indicate that any sense of urgency attached to the project, despite Mr Harral's email to Mr Ledsome in January 2016 to that effect.^12281228 {CLG10007954}. Although officials were privately expressing frustration at the delay, they were not conveying that to ministers.

¶10.59 On 19 April 2016 Lord Wharton approved the submission.^12291229 Wharton {CLG00030834/17} page 17, paragraph 40(c). He said that he remembered having raised the delay with officials at around that time but had been persuaded that the work needed to be done comprehensively.^12301230 Wharton {Day258/133:2-24}.

Lord Barwell becomes a junior minister: July 2016

¶10.60 On 17 July 2016, Gavin Barwell MP, now Lord Barwell, took over ministerial responsibility for the Building Regulations and remained in post until a few days before the Grenfell Tower fire. He had introductory briefings with each of the teams in his policy areas, including an initial briefing on 21 July 2016 from Bob Ledsome on the work of the Building Regulations and Energy Performance Division.^12311231 Barwell {CLG00030960/3} page 3, paragraph 10; Ledsome {CLG00019465/26} page 26, paragraph 96. The introductory slides^12321232 {CLG00019362}. used by Mr Ledsome as part of the briefing did not refer to the coroner's recommendations or the Secretary of State's response and Mr Ledsome did not discuss any matters relating to fire safety with the minister at that time.^12331233 Ledsome {CLG00019465/26} page 26, paragraph 96. The new minister gained the impression that fire safety policy was working and that the number of fatalities from fires was decreasing.^12341234 Barwell {CLG00030960/4} page 4, paragraph 13.

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¶10.61 In mid-July 2016 Richard Harral proposed that a submission should be put up to ministers attaching the proposed discussion document on the simplification of the Building Regulations and seeking their agreement to start research into the "simplification, deregulation and maintenance of the Building Regulations".^12351235 {CLG00019359/1}. However, he was told on 14 July 2016 by Simon Gallagher, the planning director, that the department should not be rushing to put things to new ministers^12361236 {CLG00019359/1}. and in the event it was not until the autumn of 2016 that further submissions were put up to ministers on those subjects. By that time the delay was causing considerable frustration within the division, particularly for Richard Harral, who described himself as "pretty despondent".^12371237 Harral {Day243/198:11-13}.

¶10.62 On 15 September 2016, Andrew Newton, an official in the division, put up a submission to Gavin Barwell seeking the minister's agreement to procuring research contracts to support the simplification and deregulation [sic] of the Building Regulations.^12381238 {CLG00019370}. It indicated a completion date for the project of 31 May 2019.^12391239 {CLG00019370/8-9}. Again, no mention was made in the submission of the correspondence with the coroner.

¶10.63 Lord Barwell became aware of the coroner's rule 43 letter during an oral briefing in the autumn of 2016, probably given to him by Steve Quartermain, the director, on 18 October 2016^12401240 Barwell {CLG00030960/4} page 4, paragraph 11; Barwell {Day260/58:1-13}. to enable him to answer questions in the House of Commons on 24 October 2016.^12411241 Barwell {Day260/58:1-20}; Barwell {CLG00030960/4-5} pages 4-5, paragraphs 11 and 12. As part of that briefing Lord Barwell was given a note which said that in 2013 the coroner had recommended that the guidance in Approved Document B should be simplified.^12421242 {CLG10008654/3}. The briefing note went on to state that Lord Pickles had said that the government would review Part B "during this parliament" and that that would include simplification where possible.^12431243 {CLG10008654/3}. As a comprehensive summary of the coroner's recommendations and the department's response it was clearly inadequate, but it had been produced for a limited purpose. Lord Barwell said that one or other of two briefings he had received from Mr Quartermain had led him to understand that three out of four of the coroner's recommendations had been implemented by Lord Pickles when Secretary of State and that only the one relating to Part B of the Building Regulations remained outstanding.^12441244 Barwell {CLG00030960/4} page 4, paragraph 12. He understood that the three recommendations that had been implemented had been the most urgent^12451245 Barwell {CLG00034283/5} page 5, paragraph 11. and said it had been implicit in what he had been told that the remaining work was not urgent.^12461246 Barwell {Day260/116:22}-{Day260/117:11}.

¶10.64 Lord Barwell told us that if the briefing document had said that the review of Approved Document B had been promised to the coroner by March 2017, he would have realised the urgency of it. However, he had understood the reference to "this parliament" to mean the current parliament and that the deadline was therefore 2020.^12471247 Barwell {Day260/105:15}-{Day260/106:14}. He said that he had accepted the advice he was given by officials that the outstanding matter would be dealt with as part of a broader review of Building Regulations as soon as the Housing White Paper had been published.^12481248 Barwell {CLG00030960/4} page 4, paragraph 13. Apparently, he did not see the coroner's letter or the Secretary of State's response.^12491249 Barwell {Day260/111:2}.

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¶10.65 However, on 15 November 2016 Lord Barwell did receive a letter from the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service, Brandon Lewis MP, which referred to the government's longstanding commitment to review Approved Document B and reported that the Fire Sector Federation was concerned about a number of developments, including the increased use of combustible materials.^12501250 {CLG00019380}. Since that letter referred to a commitment on the part of Lord Pickles to the coroner, it should at the very least have prompted Lord Barwell to ask to see the coroner's rule 43 letter and the Secretary of State's response and that in turn should have prompted him to ask for an explanation for the delays which had occurred. Apparently, it did not.

Further delay in the publication of the discussion document

¶10.66 Obtaining ministerial approval for the discussion document was an important milestone because it effectively established the scope of the review of Approved Document B.^12511251 Harral {Day243/143:6-9}. Brian Martin's plan had been to publish the discussion document immediately after the new government had come into power, but he was not allowed to do that and the timetable drifted.^12521252 Martin {Day255/104:15-18}. Richard Harral thought that the discussion document had been ready for publication in early October 2016, but he was told by Lord Barwell's private office that the minister would not be looking at anything other than the highest priority submissions until the Housing and Planning White paper had been published. That White Paper had been originally scheduled for publication in late October or early November 2016 but in the event it was delayed and was not published until the middle of February 2017.^12531253 Harral {Day244/19:20}-{Day244/20:15}.

¶10.67 On 23 March 2017, Richard Harral sent a final draft of the discussion document, and a submission seeking approval of the proposed scope of work,^12541254 {CLG00019391}. to Lord Barwell and the Secretary of State, Sajid Javid MP.^12551255 {CLG00019392}. The submission had been cleared by Bob Ledsome. Under the heading "Key risks and Issues" it said that in 2013 the coroner had criticised the guidance in Approved Document B and that in response Lord Pickles had committed the government to reviewing it. The submission sought approval for officials to publish the discussion document which would enable them to engage with industry representatives, including by convening working groups under the aegis of BRAC.^12561256 {CLG00019392/5} paragraph 15. Thereafter proposals would be provided to ministers with recommendations on what work to take forward.

¶10.68 Lord Barwell told us that the discussion document had not been published before the Grenfell Tower fire because the day after he approved the submission in the spring of 2017 a general election had been called.^12571257 Barwell {Day260/112:1-3}. He explained that the department did not have sufficient capacity to deal with the Housing White Paper and the publication of the discussion document at the same time. He had not been told that the discussion document had originally been due to be published before the end of 2015, or that there had been several delays before he had taken office.^12581258 Barwell {Day260/157:8-16}. It is clear that by that time the department had lost sight of the urgency of the commitment made to the coroner and that everyone, including himself and the Secretary of State, had failed to appreciate how critical the work was.^12591259 Barwell {Day260/130:14-19}.

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¶10.69 On 18 April 2017, Lord Barwell told his private office that the submission had been approved,^12601260 {CLG00030961}; Barwell {Day260/214:16-17}. but there is no record of that having been communicated to Bob Ledsome and his team. Both he and Richard Harral told us that they had not received approval of the proposal from Lord Barwell's office.^12611261 Ledsome {Day242/88:10-17}; Harral {Day244/22:3}-{Day244/23:4}. Lord Barwell could not explain why the submission had not reached him in February 2017 as soon as the White Paper had been completed^12621262 Barwell {Day 260/220:10-20}. and candidly accepted that the delay in publication of the discussion document had been wholly unsatisfactory.^12631263 Barwell {Day 260/220:22}.

¶10.70 The policy of deregulation underwent a change in emphasis when the Rt Hon Theresa May MP became Prime Minister,^12641264 Barwell {Day260/81:14-24}. but it was not abandoned and officials were not told that it had been relaxed.^12651265 Barwell {Day260/145:21-24}; {Day260/84:2-10}. Although the Housing White Paper indicated a willingness in principle to impose new regulations where there was a case for making changes,^12661266 Barwell {Day260/87:22}-{Day260/89:1}. by that time four years had passed since the coroner's recommendations and little had been done in response.

Other work on fire safety

The seven workstreams

¶10.71 At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, not only had the discussion document on reform of the Building Regulations and building control system (including a review of Approved Document B) not been published, but the department had carried out very little other work in relation to fire safety, despite officials' being aware that the guidance in the Approved Documents was somewhat incoherent^12671267 Harral {Day243/99:15-23}. and that there had been a lack of investment in them over a very extended period.^12681268 Harral {Day244/37:16}-{Day244/38:1}.

¶10.72 A series of research papers (referred to as "the seven workstreams") had been commissioned by Brian Martin for the department in 2012 to support a review of Approved Document B.^12691269 Harral {CLG00019487/19-20} pages 19-20, paragraph 65; Martin {CLG00019469/15} page 15, paragraph 45. They related to 1. Periods of fire resistance. 2. Maximum fire compartment sizes. 3. Construction details, roof voids, cavity barriers and fire and smoke dampers. 4. Fire protection of basements and basement car parks. 5. Sprinkler provisions.

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¶6. Space separation. 7. Means of escape for disabled people.^12701270 Harral {Day243/121:19}. None of them specifically related to the spread of fire over external walls or the dangers posed by the use of combustible materials.

¶10.73 The research was delivered to the department in February 2015, but although ministers' approval for publication was sought in December 2015,^12711271 Martin {CLG00019469/15} page 15, paragraph 45. the research was not published until February 2019.^12721272 Harral {Day243/126:20-22}.

¶10.74 It was important that the work was carried out and published before the technical review of the Building Regulations and Approved Document B was launched so that the department could engage properly with industry.^12731273 Harral {CLG00019487/20-21} pages 20-21, paragraph 70. Until officials had clearance to share it, the review could not begin.^12741274 Harral {Day243/120:6-12}. A number of those reports, including the report on means of escape for disabled people, had implications for the safety of life and the team was therefore anxious to put them in the public realm where they could start to have an effect.^12751275 Harral {Day244/186:23}-{Day244/187:14}. The report on means of escape for the disabled included a survey which was highly critical of the adequacy of means of escape guidance for disabled people: {CLG00006270/17}; Martin {Day257/156:8-12}. However, none of them was directed to the problem of fire spreading over external walls or the dangers posed by the use of combustible materials.^12761276 Ledsome {Day241/192:3-4}.

¶10.75 Despite frustration on the part of officials at the delays in obtaining ministers' approval for the publication of the reports, none of the ministerial submissions put up by the officials emphasised the urgency. On the contrary, in each case the timing was marked "routine". None of the later submissions explained that approval had been outstanding for a long time.^12771277 {CLG10008140}; {CLG00019392}. Nor did they make it clear that without the publication of the research the review of Approved Document B promised to the coroner could not be undertaken. Again, there were serious failures in communication between officials and ministers. Lord Barwell told us that it was "absurd" that it had taken four years for the research to be published after it had been provided to the department.^12781278 Barwell {Day260/137:22-23}. We can only agree.

¶10.76 In addition, some ministers appeared to be under a misapprehension about the nature of the reports. Lord Pickles did not know that none of them related to the spread of fire over external walls. He merely assumed that, because the coroner had recommended it, the research would cover it, since he had accepted the coroner's recommendations.^12791279 Pickles {Day261/171:3-8}. Stephen Williams was under the impression that the seven workstreams had been commissioned in response to the coroner's recommendations.^12801280 Williams {Day259/84:7}. He too was unaware that none of the workstreams dealt with the spread of fire over external walls or the refurbishment of older housing stock.^12811281 Williams {Day259/138:21}.

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Research on the spread of fire over external walls

¶10.77 In 2014, Brian Martin instructed BRE to carry out research on the spread of fire across the external walls of multi-storey buildings.^12821282 Crowder {Day230/129:1-10}; Martin {CLG00019469/30} page 30, paragraphs 88-89; Martin {CLG00019469/50} page 50, paragraph 141. That was in addition to the work being done on the seven workstreams. The experimental research, managed principally by Dr Crowder and approved by Dr Smith, was completed in January 2015.^12831283 {BRE00043751}. Note that the report is dated January 2014 in error; Crowder {Day230/129:20}-{Day230/130:8}. It made its way into the public domain in a shorter form in April 2016 in the form of an article^12841284 {CLG00019444}. on the BRE website^12851285 Martin {CLG00019469/30} page 30, paragraph 89. and in an industry journal.^12861286 Building Engineer magazine {CLG00031088}; Martin {CLG00019469/50} page 50, paragraph 142. The article was less detailed than the research report itself but the findings remained.^12871287 Crowder {Day230/133:3-9}. Published alongside the article was a second article covering background research into external fire spread with accompanying case studies.^12881288 {CLG00019445}.

¶10.78 The experimental research purported to assess the performance of three different types of external spandrel panels (with glazing) in fire ("fire-resisting" panels, "Class 3" panels and "Class B-s2 d0" panels) using a test method similar to BS 8414 on a specially modified test rig.^12891289 {BRE00043751/3} paragraph 4. In fact, both the fire-resisting panels and the Class B-s2 d0 panels used in the tests had achieved those classifications as part of systems^12901290 {BRE00043751/10} paragraph 2.2; Crowder {Day230/200:7-20}; {Day230/202:21}-{Day230/203:14}. that were not used in BRE's experiments, making the classifications meaningless. The panel referred to as national Class 3 was simply assumed to be Class 3.^12911291 {BRE00043751/10} paragraph 2.2; Crowder {Day230/205:7}-{Day230/206:1}. In all three experiments, the glazing failed, the fire-resisting and Class B panels behaved in a similar manner and remained intact for the duration of the test and the Class 3 panels burned through.^12921292 {BRE00043751/35-36} paragraph 5.

¶10.79 Even on the basis that it was a simple scoping study,^12931293 {BRE00043751/3}; {BRE00043751/6} paragraph 1.2. as both Dr Crowder and Mr Martin told us,^12941294 Crowder {BRE00043716/33-24} page 33, paragraph 105; Crowder {Day230/215:21}-{Day230/216:15}; Martin {Day257/162:16}-{Day257/163:7}; {Day257/164:6-23}. Dr Crowder accepted that the research had been flawed.^12951295 Crowder {BRE00047668/47} page 47, paragraph 186; Crowder {Day230/147:19}-{Day230/148:14}. He told us, however, that it had been carried out under difficult circumstances^12961296 Crowder {BRE00043716/74} page 74, paragraph 278; Crowder {Day230/220:9-22}. and would have been improved if greater resources and more time had been available.^12971297 Crowder {Day230/148:7}-{Day230/149:18}. That was an understatement. In truth, both the research and the articles based on it were fundamentally flawed in almost every respect. The experiments had no properly defined purpose, did not test the materials they purported to test, were not carried out within proper parameters or in accordance with an approved method and were not subjected to any meaningful analysis. The background article was superficial at best and both the research and the articles were riddled with errors.^12981298 See for example {BRE00043751/35} paragraph 5, where the Class B panels were described as Class 0 panels; Crowder {Day230/209:11}-{Day230/210:13}; {CLG00019445/5} Case Study 3, where an acrylic render system was described as non-combustible; Crowder {Day230/174:18}-{Day230/175:9}; {Day230:181/5}-{Day230/182:1}; {CLG00019445/6}; Crowder {Day230/190:14-25}, where Dr Crowder accepted that none of the "potential risks" referred to are identified anywhere within the work.Show full note In summarising the relevant provisions of the Building Regulations and Approved Document B, the background article repeated the technically incorrect language used by Dr Crowder and Mr Martin at the Lakanal House inquests which confused the concepts of Class 0 classification and combustibility.^12991299 {CLG00019445/3}; Crowder {Day230/160:22}-{Day230/162:21}. Most significantly, it purported to reach the conclusion that there was adequate guidance available in the public domain to ensure that buildings were designed and constructed so that the spread of fire across the external surface and within the external façade was inhibited, as required by the Building Regulations.^13001300 {CLG00019444/9}. That conclusion could not, on any view, sensibly be drawn from any of the work that had been undertaken. We do not agree with Dr Crowder's view that that conclusion (which, although he was listed as one of the article's authors,^13011301 {CLG00019445/1}. he told us he had not written)^13021302 Crowder {Day230/160:15-16}; {Day230/189:7-9}. was simply "too broad".^13031303 Crowder {Day230/214:3-19}. In fact, the work as a whole had no scientific or other value. The conclusion bore no relation to the work the BRE had actually carried out; it was unfounded and misleading. There was no basis on which Mr Martin could reasonably have regarded that research as supporting the view that the Building Regulations and statutory guidance were sufficient to minimise the danger of the spread of fire over external walls,^13041304 Martin {CLG00019469/50} page 50, paragraph 142. even if, as he later explained, he had been really concerned only with matters of fire resistance.^13051305 Martin {Day257/167:16}-{Day257/168:19}.

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Usability study

¶10.80 The only other research carried out for the department during the period 2013 to 2017 was a usability study commissioned by Mr Martin in 2015 from RIBA Enterprises,^13061306 {CLG10006615/1}; Martin {Day255/24:20}-{Day255/25:8}. the publishers of the Approved Documents.^13071307 Harral {Day243/92:25}-{Day243/93:1}. The objective of the project was to carry out a review of a number of the Approved Documents, including Approved Document B. However, it was not technical research or a review of the substantive content of the Approved Document.^13081308 Martin {Day255/25:9-12}; Ledsome {Day241/130:8-10}; {Day241/195:8}-{Day241/196/10}. The study, which was carried out in various stages and included interviews with users of the document, was specifically limited to the way in which the content could best be delivered to users considering matters such as style, internal consistency, plain English and the development of a digital version.^13091309 {CLG10006383}; {CLG10006616/2}; {CLG10007016/1}; {CLG10007686/1}; {CLG00002962/1} an email from the afternoon of 14 June 2017 in which Brian Martin noted his concern about the use of the word "research" to describe the user survey in a draft press statement about the Grenfell Tower fire, commenting that this "may be overplaying it".

Engagement with the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fire Safety

¶10.81 In the years before the Grenfell Tower fire the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Fire Safety had regular correspondence with the various ministers responsible for fire safety. In particular, following the Lakanal House inquests and between March 2014 and April 2017, the Group wrote to the department at least 14 times, raising concerns over the need to review Approved Document B and important matters affecting the safety of life.^13101310 {CLG00019243}; {CLG00019248}; {CLG00011290}; {CLG00030867}; {CLG00019411}; {HOM00043035}; {CLG00019298}; {CLG10007860}; {CLG10008064}; {CLG00019334}; {CLG00019398}; {HOM00002220}; {CLG10009024}.

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¶10.82 Throughout the correspondence some of the concerns raised by the Group displayed a prescience about what was later to occur at Grenfell Tower. They included the danger posed by the use of Class 0 as the sole criterion of suitability for external wall coverings,^13111311 {CLG00019243}. research that showed that Approved Document B was out of date,^13121312 {CLG00019248}. aspects of the guidance in Approved Document B that required immediate attention,^13131313 {CLG00011290}. significant consequences for the safety of life if Approved Document B were not reviewed more quickly,^13141314 {CLG00019298}. the increased use of combustible material,^13151315 {CLG10007860}. the risk to life caused by the use of combustible materials,^13161316 {CLG10008064}. the dangers created by the use of modern materials and methods of construction,^13171317 {CLG00019398}. and the need to review Approved Document B in a timely manner.^13181318 {CLG10009024}.

¶10.83 The Group sent at least five letters to Stephen Williams between March 2014 and March 2015. He told us that he thought that the problem at Lakanal House had been that the windows had not been installed in compliance with the regulations and therefore the plastic had melted and run down the building.^13191319 Williams {Day259/161:13-25}. It is possible that his misunderstanding of what had occurred influenced his approach to the matters being raised by the Group. Mr Williams could not be sure that he had read all the letters from the Group to which replies went out in his name because it was not his practice to do so in every case.^13201320 Williams {Day259/100:23}-{Day259/101:4}. Brian Martin told us that in each case he had provided the minister with a copy of the Group's letter and a draft reply and we have no reason to think otherwise.^13211321 Martin {CLG00019469/60} page 60, paragraph 173.

¶10.84 Mr Williams told us that he thought that the All-Party Parliamentary Group had raised some reasonable points about the time for the review of Approved Document B and that he therefore wanted to meet them.^13221322 Williams {Day259/114:11-22}. Brian Martin prepared a briefing note^13231323 Martin {CLG00019469/62-63} pages 62-63, paragraph 174(f). for the meeting, which took place on 17 June 2014.^13241324 All Party Parliamentary (Fire Safety & Rescue) Group Meeting Minutes dated 17 June 2014 {RKI00000012/3}. The correspondence reveals that before the meeting officials had been dismissive of the Group's concerns.^13251325 {HOM00048451}.

¶10.85 On 5 August 2014, the Group sent a detailed letter to Stephen Williams identifying three ways in which they thought Approved Document B needed to be amended. The letter contained a long history of Class 0 and what they thought was wrong with it.^13261326 {CLG00011290}. However, Mr Williams' letter of reply was curt and dismissive. In essence it simply said that he had neither seen nor heard anything to suggest that consideration of specific potential changes to Approved Document B was urgent.^13271327 {CLG00019439}. That was despite the fact that he had never been given any advice on changes to Approved Document B which went beyond simplification of the wording.^13281328 Williams {CLG00034291/10} page 10, paragraph 19. The response had been drafted by Brian Martin. His explanation was that none of the changes suggested by the Group had been consistent with government policy.^13291329 Martin {CLG00019469/64} page 64, paragraph 174(h). Mr Williams told us that he regretted having sent that letter.^13301330 Williams {Day259/178:14}-{Day259/179:7}. He said that he had tried to soften its effect by adding a handwritten note to Sir David Amess that read "Happy to have a chat in the lobby, as always".^13311331 Williams {Day259/178:22}-{Day259/179:3}.

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¶10.86 Lord Wharton received at least four letters from the Group between September 2015 and February 2016. The first, from the late Sir David Amess MP, referred to the previous correspondence with Stephen Williams and pointed out that three matters of particular concern to the Group had been raised which it thought deserved immediate attention.^13321332 {CLG00019298}. Lord Wharton replied on 23 October 2015 and agreed to meet the Group.^13331333 {CLG00019454}. Brian Martin briefed him before the meeting^13341334 {CLG10007718}. and provided him with a note of the meeting when it was over.^13351335 {CLG10008066}. Lord Wharton confirmed that at the meeting he had understood clearly that the Group considered that the guidance in Approved Document B was out of date and required revision, that the regulations themselves were incoherent and in places outmoded, and that a unified and all-encompassing system of regulation was required.^13361336 Wharton {CLG00034289/10} page 10, paragraph 23. Lord Wharton recalled raising the flammability of materials with officials but was told that the matter would be considered as part of the review of Approved Document B.^13371337 Wharton {CLG00034289/10} page 10, paragraph 24.

¶10.87 Lord Wharton responded to the Group in writing on 6 January 2016 saying that he hoped to set out the government's intentions regarding the Building Regulations in the next year.^13381338 {CLG10007862}. He agreed that his letter could have been more fulsome.^13391339 Wharton {Day258/181:11-15}. Following another letter from the Group on 1 February 2016,^13401340 {CLG10008064}. he wrote again on 14 February 2016,^13411341 {CLG10008061}. saying merely that he was sorry that the Group was unhappy and hoped that the department could continue to work closely with it. That was not a satisfactory response. Lord Wharton accepted that it had been curt, but said that it reflected his frustration, since he had instructed his officials to involve the Group in the review process and felt that its concerns were premature.^13421342 Wharton {Day258/188:15-25}.

¶10.88 However, the defensive and dismissive attitude of the department's officials towards the All-Party Parliamentary Group was evident from their internal communications.^13431343 See Brian Martin's comments on Ronnie King of the APPG in emails dated 8 December 2010 {CLG10004547} "Bob Neill signed a slightly toned down version of my letter to Ronnie. Still quite funny though…."; Email dated 10 November 2014 {CLG00002824} "Ronnie will not listen to reason so I just ignore him". In an email to Richard Harral on 16 March 2016 Brian Martin referred to the Group's correspondence as "increasingly tetchy"^13441344 {CLG10008060}. but failed to acknowledge that it might have some justification in wanting to see progress with the review of Approved Document B. The internal communications at that time reveal that the department's officials, particularly Brian Martin, were becoming tired of dealing with the constant stream of letters from the Group and as a result had become increasingly defensive and personal in their reactions. Unfortunately, that was not picked up by any of the more senior officials in the department.

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¶10.89 For his part, Lord Barwell received at least four letters from the Group between October 2016 and April 2017.^13451345 Barwell {CLG00030960/11-12} pages 11-12, paragraphs 27-32. Gavin Barwell thought that the first letter did not arrive and therefore it was re-sent on 17 October 2016. Although he was aware that it had previously written to Lord Wharton, he was unaware that the correspondence had a much longer history.^13461346 Barwell {CLG00030960/11} page 11, paragraph 27. He ought to have been told about it by his officals. He also ought to have asked to see the earlier correspondence, or asked that someone review it to enable him to obtain a better appreciation of the strength of the Group's concerns.^13471347 Barwell {Day260/182:4-10}. He initially rejected a meeting with it^13481348 {CLG10008717}. on the advice of Brian Martin, on the basis that the discussion document was still outstanding at that time (as it was).^13491349 Martin {CLG00019469/67-68} pages 67-68, paragraph 174(t). Lord Barwell assumed that the Group's concerns were being taken into account in formulating the discussion document and accepted the advice of his officials that it was better to have a meeting once that document had been drafted.^13501350 Barwell {Day260/188:9}; {Day260/189:2-7}.

¶10.90 Lord Barwell wrote to the Group again on 5 April 2017.^13511351 {CLG00020106}. He went as far as to provide his telephone number so that it could arrange a meeting with him without further delay. In the event, no meeting occurred because a general election was called before it could take place.^13521352 Barwell {CLG00030960/12} page 12, paragraph 32.

¶10.91 In the days immediately after the Grenfell Tower fire, Simon Ridley, the department's Director General for Decentralisation and Growth, was instructed by Helen MacNamara to review the correspondence between the department and the All-Party Parliamentary Group. At her request, he provided her with his immediate impressions.^13531353 Ridley {CLG00034719/2-3} pages 2 and 3, paragraphs 5 and 10. Simon Ridley confirms in the latter paragraph of his statement that the work was carried out before 19 June 2017. He concluded that the Group had warned ministers about cladding and combustibility and about more general problems with modern construction materials, none of which had been acknowledged or addressed in the department's responses.^13541354 {CLG00030840/7}. He was scathing in his criticism of the department, describing the correspondence as "appalling – delayed, partial and … chaotic".^13551355 {CLG00030840/7}. Having reviewed the correspondence, we agree with his assessment, even though it was made in haste and with a degree of hindsight after the fire.

¶10.92 The way in which the department dealt with the All-Party Parliamentary Group was unacceptable. Correspondence was lost, important matters were ignored, ministers either refused, or at any rate failed, to engage with the material or understand the serious issues being raised. They relied entirely on officials, who appeared to have been given almost free rein to decide on timing and policy, were dismissive both of the coroner and the MPs on the Group and displayed a marked lack of appetite to embark on a review of Approved Document B within a reasonable time. Mr Martin's attitude is epitomised by his email to Anthony Maude^13561356 Maude {CLG00034279/1-2} pages 1-2, paragraphs 5-6, an official in the Fire and Resilience Directorate. in November 2014, commenting on the repeated requests for amendments to Approved Document B by Ronnie King, the Secretary to the All-Party Parliamentary Group, as follows: "Yes, he's very annoying. Basically, we will not be changing the AD [Approved Document] as and when Ronnie asks – we'll do it when we're ready".^13571357 {CLG00002824}. The department never did do it and was never ready. Its failure was profound.

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The management of the department

¶10.93 Between 2006 and 2015 the number of staff within the Building Regulations Division had been significantly reduced. In 2006 there had been 14 construction professionals and three Grade 6 civil servants in a division whose responsibilities were narrower than they later became. By 2015 that had fallen to five technical specialists and one Grade 6 official.^13581358 Harral {Day243/144:17}-(Day243/145:4}. Richard Harral explained that the numbers of personnel had increased again since the Grenfell fire: Harral {Day243/145:4-7}. As a result the department's capacity was significantly below that which some officials thought was really required.^13591359 Harral {Day243/145:8-15}; Ledsome {Day245/122:11}-{Day245/123:9}; Burd {Day240/195:8}-{Day240/196:4-5}. A ban on instructing consultants meant that it was no longer possible to engage experts to carry out key work, including the management of research programmes.^13601360 Harral {Day243/145:16}-{Day243/146:5}. Mr Harral did not feel able to raise the constraints on resources with senior management because the department's policy was to concentrate on manifesto commitments and legal requirements. He did not think that he would be able to obtain more staff until ministers had committed themselves to a plan of work for a review of the Building Regulations.^13611361 Harral {Day243/147:9}-{Day243/148:1}. A shortage of staff also made it difficult for the department to engage with industry in a way that enabled it to develop the Building Regulations and the Approved Documents.^13621362 Harral {Day243/124/18}-{Day243/125:3}; Ledsome {Day245/114:14-25}. The department had neither the ability nor the capacity to issue practical guidance to industry because its systems for reviewing guidance had become obsolete.^13631363 Harral {Day243/60:11}-{Day243/61:4}; {Day243/137:19-22}.

¶10.94 The Division's ability to recruit and retain qualified technical staff was significantly hampered both by insufficient salary levels and by the lengthy process involved in taking on new staff.^13641364 Ledsome {Day245/114:18-25}; {Day245/122:17}-{Day245/123:9}; Harral {Day243/17:4}-{Day245/18:16}; {Day243/191:24}-{Day243/192:8}. One result of the increase in work and reduction in staff numbers was that the Building Regulations and Energy Performance Division felt itself to be something of a Cinderella. By 2015 and following further cuts to staff,^13651365 Harral {Day243/17:4-16}; {Day243/143:15}-{Day243/147:7}. the team was seriously overworked,^13661366 Harral {Day243/172:10-22}. and struggled to meet the demands of its very broad workload.^13671367 Harral {Day243/102:21}-{Day243/103:4}; {Day243/20:24}-{Day243/21:13}; {Day243/64:21}-{Day243/65:6}; {Day243/91:4-11}; {Day243/101:25}-{Day243/103:4}; {Day243/144:17}-{Day243/147:7}; {Day244/55:16-23}. It was under-valued and no longer able to be forward-looking.^13681368 Harral {Day243/11:23}-{Day243/12:1}; {Day244/144:5-9}. The team's sense that it was always at the back of the queue^13691369 Harral {Day243/11:11}; {Day243/12:25}. for submissions to be put up to ministers^13701370 Harral {Day243/11:12-14}. was acknowledged by Mr Ledsome, who recognised that it had been his responsibility to press for a fair allocation of the resources available to the department. Mr Ledsome accepted that in that respect he had failed to discharge his responsibilities as well as he would have wished.^13711371 Ledsome {Day245/116:21}-{Day245/117/14}.

¶10.95 Following the Lakanal House inquests, the engagement of the members of the Building Regulations and Energy Performance team with officials at director level was sporadic and with more senior officials virtually non-existent.^13721372 Harral {Day243/12:18-22}. Before the Grenfell Tower fire, Dame Melanie Dawes, Permanent Secretary from March 2015 to 2020, had not met any members of the team and had very little knowledge of its work.^13731373 Dawes {Day249/30:7}-{Day249/31:19}. She had not heard of Lakanal House or the coroner's recommendations.^13741374 Dawes {Day249/69:13-17}. Dame Melanie confirmed that both she and Helen MacNamara, Director General from September 2016 to 2018, should have been made aware of the coroner's recommendations.^13751375 Dawes {Day249/73:1-4}. She put the omission down to the fact that somehow their importance had not been appreciated by the team and to the fact that the department did not have a system for monitoring recommendations. She said that as a result, the team had lost sight of how important they were.^13761376 Dawes {Day249/73:7-14}.

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¶10.96 All that strongly suggests a failure of leadership within the department at the highest levels stretching back over some years. Dame Melanie said that she had been struck by the fact that her predecessors appeared to have had no inkling of the problems that had started to appear when she was in post.^13771377 Dawes {CLG00030839/6-7} pages 6-7, paragraph 18. The fact that some of the most senior officials were not aware how demoralised and demotivated the Building Regulations team were is indicative of serious structural defects. Although Mr Ledsome must bear considerable responsibility for failing to communicate effectively with those above him, the most senior officials in the department ought to have been aware of the failure of the more junior officials to take effective action in response to the coroner's recommendations within the time indicated by the Secretary of State in May 2013. They ought also to have realised that the deference paid to Brian Martin by those around him in relation to technical aspects of the Approved Documents, his sense of ownership of Approved Document B and the absence of any proper peer review of his work all stood in the way of critical thinking and were obstacles to progress. Senior officials should have taken a closer interest in the working of a small, but important, part of the department that was responsible for significant matters affecting the safety of life.

173