Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report, Volume 1 · 2024
Chapter 12: Regulation of fire risk assessors
Chapter 12: Regulation of fire risk assessors
¶12.1 The Fire Safety Order introduced a requirement for responsible persons to carry out fire risk assessments, and in many cases they engaged commercial fire risk assessors to produce such assessments on their behalf.
¶12.2 By about 2009 it had become clear to those working in the government fire safety policy team and the fire sector generally that there were significant grounds for concern about the competence of some commercial fire risk assessors. Those concerns were set out in a series of reports produced by and for the government.
The Initial Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Fire Safety Order (March 2009)
¶12.3 In March 2009, the Department for Communities and Local Government (the department) published an evaluation of the Fire Safety Order entitled Initial Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005.1779 {HOM00046062}. By that time, the Fire Safety Order had been in force for almost three years.1780 The Fire Safety Order generally came into force on 1 April 2006. The department considered it good practice periodically to evaluate how well legislation of that kind was functioning and becoming familiar to the enforcing authorities, responsible persons and the fire safety sector.1781 Upton {Day247/15:14-23}; Louise Upton {HOM00046040/4} page 4, paragraph 14. The aim of the report was to obtain views from as broad a constituency of consultees as possible.1782 Upton {Day247/18:14-19}. It was based on a series of interviews with a range of interested organisations, including 20 enforcing authorities, representatives from bodies concerned with fire safety, consultants and 45 businesses of various kinds.1783 {HOM00046062/8} paragraph 2.
¶12.4 The report's findings revealed that some fire and rescue authorities were concerned about the work of independent consultants and other commercial fire safety organisations.1784 {HOM00046062/43} paragraph 6. The main problem was a variation in the level of competence.1785 {HOM00046062/46}; {HOM00046062/12}. By the time of the report, some organisations had set up voluntary registers of fire risk assessors, whose competence they certified.1786 Davis {Day246/136:1-11}. Although fire and rescue authorities welcomed that development, the report noted that some authorities and responsible persons thought that a national scheme of accreditation or licensing would be preferable.1787 {HOM00046062/12}.
¶12.5 Dennis Davis of the Fire Sector Federation told us that, at the time, unqualified fire risk assessors were a serious concern for the fire and rescue authorities.1788 Davis {Day246/137:10-23}. Mr Davis described a call from the sector that in the case of more complex buildings there should be some assurance that a fire risk assessor was competent.1789 Davis {Day246/138:10-20}. We conclude from that evidence that the worries about the competence of some fire risk assessors were well known to the government.
202Sir Ken Knight's report on the fire at Lakanal House (July 2009)
¶12.6 In July 2009, Sir Ken Knight produced a report for the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government on a number of matters affecting fire safety that had emerged from the fire at Lakanal House.1790 {HOM00001092}; Sir Ken Knight {HOM00046025/5-6}, pages 5-6, paragraph 17; Knight {Day245/149:9-18}. In it he recognised that in the early years after the introduction of the Fire Safety Order there had been problems in ensuring that fire risk assessors had the necessary level of competence, particularly for assessing the risks posed by more complex buildings.1791 Knight {Day246/28:23}-{Day246/29:5}. He was aware of the concerns that had been expressed in the Initial Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Fire Safety Order (March 2009),1792 Knight {Day246/51:8-17}. but he did not give any advice to ministers about them because he saw his role as working mainly with the fire and rescue services.1793 Knight {Day246/52:12-20}.
¶12.7 Sir Ken Knight's investigations had revealed that there was a need for some kind of formal requirement to ensure that fire risk assessors undertaking assessments of high-risk premises were competent.1794 Knight {Day246/36:2-7}. He considered that article 9 of the Fire Safety Order should be amended to include an express duty on the responsible person to use a competent person to carry out a fire risk assessment in relation to any high-risk property.1795 Knight {Day246/36:3-13}. He thought that the broad approach in the Fire Safety Order was inappropriate because in some respects high-rise buildings required a greater level of expertise, for instance if an invasive assessment was required.1796 Knight {Day246/36:23}-{Day246/37:4}; {Day246/37:16-24}. Sir Ken's report also said that it was important that both the responsible person and the enforcing authority should have confidence that any fire risk assessment, particularly one in relation to a high-risk building, had been carried out by a competent person.1797 {HOM00001092/36}.
¶12.8 However, on 28 July 2009, shortly before the report was due to be completed, Louise Upton, the official leading the fire safety policy team, discussed the proposed recommendation with Peter Wise, a fire safety engineer working with Sir Ken.1798 {HOM00011611}. He told Sir Ken that she was disinclined to recommend any revisions to the Fire Safety Order so soon after it had come into force.1799 {HOM00011611}. Ms Upton told us that she and her line manager, Sandy Bishop, had thought that it was too soon to amend article 9 and that there were other ways, such as working with the fire safety sector and introducing competence standards, to address the concerns of business.1800 Upton {Day247/34:21}-{Day247/36:18}; {Day247/38:10}-{Day247/39:2}.
¶12.9 Ms Upton proposed an alternative course, namely a broader review of how responsible persons could satisfy themselves that fire risk assessments were suitable and sufficient, particularly if the premises are higher-risk.1801 Upton {Day247/38:7-9}, and email correspondence from Peter Wise to Sir Ken Knight dated 28 July 2009 {HOM00011611}. Sir Ken adopted Ms Upton's proposal almost entirely and recommended that consideration should be given to conducting a review into how the responsible person under the Fire Safety Order can be assured that a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment has been carried out, particularly in the case of high-risk premises.1802 {HOM00001092/37}. He also recommended that the guidance on how to comply with the Fire Safety Order should be amended, where appropriate.1803 {HOM00001092/37}.
203¶12.10 Louise Upton's intervention effectively frustrated the purpose of Sir Ken Knight's independent review. She thought that amending the Fire Safety Order would not be welcome because the government did not want to increase regulation and the department had insufficient resources to support more legislation.1804 Upton {Day247/34:18-25}; {Day247/30:22}-{Day247/31:7}. Instead, it was thought that the sector should resolve the problem itself and that the government's role was to encourage it to do so.1805 Upton {Day247/31:20-24}. That approach did not have the formal approval of ministers; it was simply adopted by Louise Upton and her policy team1806 Upton {Day247/33:10}-{Day247/34:8}. and as a result no proposal to amend the Fire Safety Order was put forward for consideration by ministers. We cannot tell whether such a proposal would have been accepted but Sir Brandon Lewis, who later served as a minister in the department from September 2012,1807 Lewis {Day257/2:22}-{Day257/3:3}. said that if he had received such advice he would not have considered it unfavourably,1808 Lewis {Day257/25:21}-{Day257/26:25}. and that he would have given a recommendation from an expert like Sir Ken Knight very serious consideration.1809 Lewis {Day257/26:20-25}.
¶12.11 Sir Ken Knight was worried that people are often unaware of their own lack of competence and thereby put other people at risk.1810 {HOM00011612}. Nevertheless, he did not press his recommendation because it was an early and short report and he felt that the recommendations he had made were there for others to take forward.1811 Knight {Day246/41:8-13}. However, he accepted that as Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser he should have ensured that the amendment of article 9 of the Fire Safety Order remained at the front of ministers' minds1812 Knight {Day246/42:16-20}. and that instead he had allowed policy officials, such as Louise Upton, to take control.1813 Knight {Day246/43:1-9}. Although he denied that he had changed his mind as a result of the discussion with officials,1814 Knight {Day246/49:20-22}. we find that difficult to reconcile with the significant change of direction following their intervention. Sir Ken said that, on reflection, he could and should have been more robust with policy colleagues.1815 Knight {Day246/56:21-25}. We agree.
¶12.12 We would go further. It was unacceptable for officials to influence the outcome of Sir Ken Knight's report and not to seek the minister's view on the merits of amending article 9 with the benefit of objective advice from the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser. Equally, given the sector's clear concern about the lack of competence of fire risk assessors and the risks to life that posed, Sir Ken should have recognised the importance of his function as an expert adviser and should have insisted on placing his conclusions before ministers irrespective of the views of officials. His failure to do so reflects poorly on his independence of mind and frustrated the object of creating the position to which he had been appointed. The practical result was that unqualified and incompetent fire risk assessors were able to continue in practice despite mounting concern on the part of many in the sector.
204¶12.13 Following the publication of his report, Sir Ken played no further part in advising the government on the competence of fire risk assessors.1816 Knight {Day246/59:11}-{Day246/60:6}. Although he was optimistic that the sector would take the issue forward to the benefit of the industry,1817 Knight {Day246/62:19}-{Day246/63:5}. the basis of his optimism is not obvious, and it was not identified by Sir Ken in his evidence to the Inquiry.
London Assembly Report – Tall and Timber-Framed buildings
¶12.14 In December 2010, the Planning and Housing Committee of the London Assembly published a report entitled Fire Safety in London: Fire risks in London's Tall and Timber Framed Buildings.1818 {INQ00014711}. The report was prompted by a series of fires that included the Lakanal House fire.1819 {INQ00014711/11}. The investigation drew on a considerable base of evidence and 45 written submissions, including submissions from 16 London boroughs, six housing providers, seven trade organisations, four fire brigades, four consultancies and two insurers.1820 {INQ00014711/22} paragraph 1.32.
¶12.15 The committee was concerned that "the desire to remove prescriptive regulation and replace it with non-mandatory guidance may have created a situation where the fire authorities do not have sufficient capacity to ensure the risk management process is always robust."1821 {INQ00014711/35} paragraph 4.12. Its recommendation was that DCLG, with relevant bodies such as the Local Authorities' Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services and the Chief Fire Officers Association, should "draw up national guidance to ensure mandatory minimum standards of competence for training and accrediting fire risk assessors."1822 {INQ00014711/35} recommendation 7.
¶12.16 Very similar concerns were set out in a report published in December 2010 by the Fire Sector Federation following the Fire Futures review entitled Decentralisation in the fire sector: Empowering and protecting the citizen.1823 {FSF00000037}. The report had been prompted, in part, by the Federation's concern to ensure that the government involved all relevant sectors in identifying and mitigating risks relating to fire safety. It described perceived low levels of competence within the fire sector in relation to fire safety and the built environment that was not helped by the absence of a common framework of qualifications.1824 {FSF00000037/10}.
205¶12.18 The first recommendation was that the sector should take the lead in formulating standards of competence and the introduction of certification and other related measures.1828 {FSF00000037/11}. The authors also recommended that the government should ask the Federation to produce a formal plan of action. However, nothing came of that.1829 Upton {Day247/117:17-18}.
The government's initial response
¶12.19 By March 2009, government officials had become aware of the concern among some enforcing authorities and responsible persons about the competence of some commercial fire risk assessors.1830 Upton {Day247/22:12-22}. Following the publication in March 2009 of the government's initial evaluation of the effectiveness of the Fire Safety Order and the delivery of Sir Ken Knight's report in July 2009, the fire safety policy team concentrated on designing and implementing a programme of work in response to the findings.1831 Louise Upton {HOM00046040/5} page 5, paragraph 16; Louise Upton {HOM00050082/3} page 3, paragraph 7. Initially there was no settled view about how a system of accrediting fire risk assessors would work in practice.1832 Upton {Day247/22:25}–{Day247/23:3}.
¶12.20 Notably, the concerns had persisted despite the existence of certification schemes, two of which, the schemes run by British Approvals for Fire Excellence (BAFE) and Warringtonfire Testing, were accredited by UKAS.1833 Davis {Day246/136:20-25}. The aim of the schemes was to provide independent assurance of the competence of fire risk assessors,1834 Davis {Day246/136:23-25}. but it was not necessary to be a member in order to work as a commercial fire risk assessor.
¶12.21 On 11 June 2009, there was a meeting of the Chief Fire Officers Association's working group on enforcement.1835 {HOM00012153}. At that meeting it was noted that although the department recognised that many would welcome a nationally-recognised accreditation scheme for fire risk assessors, it was not something that government intended to develop.1836 {HOM00012153/2} paragraph 11. Instead, it encouraged the sector to establish a register to help businesses identify competent fire risk assessors.1837 {HOM00012153/2} paragraph 11.
Jayne Boys's review
¶12.22 In order to investigate and assess the options for developing a nationally recognised quality assurance scheme for fire risk assessors, the department engaged a consultant from the In-House Policy Consultancy Service, Jayne Boys.1838 Louise Upton {HOM00050082/3} page 3, paragraph 9; Project Specification {HOM00012290}. The fire safety policy team did not have the capacity to carry out the work itself.1839 Louise Upton {HOM00050082/3} page 3, paragraph 9. The project was managed by Louise Upton.1840 Louise Upton {HOM00050082/3} page 3, paragraph 9; Upton {Day247/53:9-17}. Consultees included businesses and fire and rescue authorities.
¶12.23 At a meeting of consultees on 14 December 2009, some of those present again described the lack of understanding among responsible persons of the nature and extent of their obligations under the Fire Safety Order and the shortcomings of the existing guidance.1841 {HOM00012752/12}.
206¶12.24 It was clear from the review carried out by Jayne Boys that some consultees wanted to establish a single nationally-recognised scheme.1842 Upton {Day247/53:3-8}. Although some (including the Institution of Fire Engineers, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, and BAFE) wanted a mandatory scheme under which responsible persons would be required to use accredited fire risk assessors, that desire was not shared by the department,1843 Upton {Day247/59:2}-{Day247/60:6}. which thought that much could be achieved by voluntary methods. That meant, however, that responsible persons were not expressly required to use competent fire risk assessors.1844 Upton {Day247/60:20}-{Day247/61:3}. Ms Upton rightly accepted that there was no evidence that voluntary methods would achieve the aim of ensuring competence among fire risk assessors.1845 Upton {Day247/61:4-9}.
¶12.25 Those present at the meeting agreed that there was a need to establish a body (referred to at the meeting as a "Fire Risk Competency Council") that could set standards of competence required for carrying out fire risk assessments in different circumstances and would be accredited by UKAS.1846 {HOM00050090/4}. Louise Upton thought that there was a benefit in bringing together a number of disparate schemes to make good the absence of a set of agreed common standards.1847 Upton {Day247/57:9-15}. The department does not appear to have opposed the proposal for UKAS accreditation at that time, but it later became concerned that to require all fire risk assessors to be certified by bodies accredited by UKAS could present a disadvantage to professional bodies that were not subject to UKAS accreditation but who considered their members to be no less competent. It feared that might distort the market, reduce choice and increase costs.1848 Louise Upton {HOM00050082/11} page 11, paragraph 37. However, no formal assessments had been carried out that supported those fears1849 Upton {Day247/66:23}-{Day247/67:9}. and no research at all had been done into the extent to which the introduction of UKAS accreditation might distort the market.1850 Upton {Day247/68:11-14}. Ms Upton accepted that a UKAS-accredited scheme represented the best available means of addressing concerns about the competence of fire risk assessors.1851 Upton {Day247/69:13-23}; {Day247/70:12-18}.
The Fire Risk Assessment Competency Council
¶12.26 On 9 March 2010, the Fire Risk Assessment Competency Council held its inaugural meeting,1852 {HOM00013530}; Upton {Day247/76:13-5}. at which the agreement to publish an overarching set of criteria by which to establish competence supported by UKAS accreditation was affirmed.1853 {HOM00013530/2} paragraph 4; Upton {Day247/77:9-17}.
¶12.27 However, the minutes fail to reflect a more contentious discussion between the members. Louise Upton acknowledged that their interests differed,1854 Upton {Day247/81:10}. which made it difficult for them to agree on the best way to ensure the competence of fire risk assessors.1855 Upton {Day247/81:11-17}. In truth, their interests were fundamentally opposed and their different views reflected their particular positions.1856 Upton {Day247/79:2-21}; {Day247/80:7-11}. The difficulties of looking to a fragmented group of organisations to produce a method of ensuring the competence of fire risk assessors are neatly illustrated by the email Jayne Boys sent to Louise Upton following the first meeting, in which her advice was to keep the note of the meeting as short as possible because every word was one more to argue over.1857 See, for instance, email correspondence between Jayne Boys, Brian Martin, and Louise Upton dated 10 March 2010 {HOM00013486/1}. That inability to reach agreement effectively thwarted the department's hope that the sector would find a way to ensure the competence of fire risk assessors. Unwisely, in our view, the department never threatened the Competency Council that, if it failed to make significant progress towards introducing an effective scheme, it would reconsider the question of regulation.1858 Upton {Day247/83:3-8}.
207¶12.28 Another question to be resolved was whether membership of the scheme should be mandatory. The view of most members of the council was that few would adopt any new scheme unless it was compulsory,1859 Upton {Day247/91:3-6}. but Louise Upton and Brian Martin did not share it.1860 Upton {Day247/91:10-14}; {CLG10004360/1-3}. In the light of the department's evaluation of the effectiveness of the Fire Safety Order in 2009, Ms Upton thought that responsible persons did not want to be compelled to use an accredited fire risk assessor1861 Upton {Day247/91:10-14}. and she maintained that view despite the findings of the report on Tall and Timber-Framed Buildings and the Fire Futures review.1862 Upton {Day247/109:1-15}; {Day247/118:11-15}. As a result, in July 2010 and February 2011 she sent submissions to Bob Neill MP, the then Fire Minister, that did not argue in favour of either a single national register or accreditation by UKAS.1863 {HOM00000884}; {HOM00001003}.
¶12.29 In the first of those submissions Ms Upton sought the minister's approval for the department's approach of encouraging the sector itself to respond to the concern of business that some form of quality assurance for commercial fire risk assessors would be helpful.1864 {HOM00000884/1} paragraph 2. She said that businesses were unlikely to welcome further regulation, but that was no more than an assumption on her part for which she had no evidence.1865 Upton {Day247/104:4-9}.
¶12.30 The second submission of 7 February 2011 sought the minister's approval to offering continued support to existing attempts to manage the risks posed by low levels of competence among fire risk assessors by exploring the options for creating one or more schemes to certify fire risk assessors.1866 {HOM00001003/3} paragraphs 11-13. The department proposed to offer continued support to the sector to allay any concerns that existing certification bodies, including the professional institutions, might have about applying for UKAS accreditation and to develop agreement on the basis of any future scheme.1867 {HOM00001003/3} paragraph 12. In reality, that meant little more than being available for discussions and attending meetings.1868 Upton {Day246/119:6-9}. Ms Upton warned that there was a risk that the sector would do nothing without the department's continued involvement, leading to criticism of the government. Although she recognised the risk that its efforts might fail, she was over-optimistic about the Competency Council's ability to tackle the problem of ensuring the competence of fire risk assessors.1869 Upton {Day247/121:25}-{Day247/122:9}.
¶12.31 By that time over a year had passed since the establishment of the Competency Council in December 2009. There had been no significant progress in agreeing standards of competence or a means of imposing them, despite repeated warnings and successive calls from industry for the introduction of a mandatory regime. That was partly because the department's policy at that time was not to become actively involved in organising schemes of that kind and partly because it did not have the resources necessary to do it.1870 Upton {Day247/120:3-9}; {Day247/121:3-5}. A similar picture was painted by others in the department responsible (at least from 2013) for reviewing and revising the Building Regulations. In our view, the minimalist approach adopted by the department between 2011 and 2017 and its antipathy to regulation enabled the risk identified by Ms Upton to eventuate. The Competency Council failed to complete its work and it left responsible persons without the means of identifying competent fire risk assessors.
208The Competency Council guides
¶12.32 On 21 December 2011, the Competency Council published Competency Criteria for Fire Risk Assessors (the "Competency Criteria").1871 {HOM00033347}. The guidance contained standards relating to various matters (for example, means of escape and fire prevention) against which fire risk assessors could be judged.1872 {HOM00033347/2} paragraph 6. Its use was entirely voluntary and to that extent reflected the government's preference to allow the industry to draw up its own guidance to assist those engaging fire risk assessors.
¶12.33 On 1 February 2013, the Competency Council published a second guide, entitled Guide to Choosing a Competent Fire Risk Assessor,1873 {HOM00025548}. which offered advice to responsible persons in relation to the appointment of specialist fire risk assessors and listed several existing competency schemes.1874 {HOM00025548/5}. Louise Upton said she had viewed the publication of the guide as a positive development and a first step towards creating a professional fire risk assessor industry.1875 Louise Upton {HOM00050082/11} page 11, paragraphs 38-39.
¶12.34 Dennis Davis said the publication of the Competency Criteria was one of the key elements needed to improve the competence of fire risk assessors.1876 Davis {Day246/142:4-11}. Together with previous guidance, it created a procedure for fire risk assessors to follow,1877 Davis {Day246/143:13-24}. but it did not provide a means of assessing the skills and thoroughness of individual fire risk assessors.
¶12.35 In our view, reliance on voluntary guidance was the wrong response to the well- documented and frequently repeated warnings about the competence of fire risk assessors. No guides of any kind could exclude the risks posed by those fire risk assessors who chose to operate outside the certification schemes or who chose not to follow the prescribed standards. Responsible persons were not required to make use of the guides, which did not prevent unqualified and unregulated fire risk assessors continuing to practise.
¶12.36 On 9 January 2013, the Fire Sector Federation agreed to take responsibility for monitoring the operation of the guides to determine whether the Competency Council needed to be reconvened to consider or respond to developments.1878 {HOM00001351/5}.
209The Lakanal House inquests
¶12.37 Following the inquests into the deaths at Lakanal House, the coroner wrote to the Fire Sector Federation on 30 March 2013 expressing the view that it was well-placed to shape national policy on the scope of fire risk assessments and how they should be carried out. She also encouraged it to consider whether it might offer further guidance on the training of fire risk assessors.1879 {HOM00004356}.
¶12.38 The Fire Sector Federation was split into groups, known as "workstreams", which concentrated on different aspects of fire safety.1880 Dennis Davis {FSF00000036/5} page 5, paragraphs 23-24. A Competency and Accreditation workstream, chaired by Dennis Davis, was formed in about April 2013 in anticipation of the coroner's letter and to build on the work of the Competency Council.1881 Davis {Day246/118:5-6}; {Day246/125:5-12}; Dennis Davis {FSF00000036/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraph 34; {FSF00000036/11} page 11, paragraph 42; {FSF00000199/1}.
¶12.39 Mr Davis told us that the guides published by the Competency Council had provided a method for carrying out fire risk assessments and had been a key element in addressing the problem of competence among fire risk assessors.1882 Davis {Day246/143:17-21}. However, he had thought that further work was required to combine the advice provided by different guides into a single set of principles and that some form of regulation of commercial fire risk assessors was required.1883 Davis {Day246/144:20-25}. In our view, that is an important point. Although guidance may have been useful for those who chose to have regard to it, there remained no regulation of fire risk assessors, including those who chose to disregard the various guides produced by the Competency Council and others.
¶12.40 At the workstream's first meeting on 12 April 2013 its members decided that the Competency Criteria needed to be extended in several respects, among which were the following:1884 Davis {Day246/146:4-20}. a new section was needed drawing attention to the risks posed by the modification or refurbishment of a building;1885 {HOM00001351/6}. greater emphasis was needed on the risks posed by the introduction of new materials, building design, modern engineering practice and building methods; and greater emphasis needed to be laid on the importance of gaining access to individual premises, rather than merely common areas, to establish whether compartmentation had been weakened, for example, by changing entrance doors or removing self-closing devices.1886 Davis {Day246/148:21}-{Day246/149:5}. {HOM00001351/6}. Mr Davis said that the second reflected in particular a concern that the sector was not keeping up with innovations in the construction industry.1887 Davis {Day246/147:12-15}. Those present also decided to review the LGA Guide and to promote its use in relation to high-rise premises.1888 {HOM00001351/6}, Davis {Day246/149:18-22}.
210¶12.41 The members decided that a "passport" scheme should be established for fire risk assessors1889 Vice Chairman's Report on Activities dated 1 May 2013 {HOM00001351/7}. with the object of creating a quality assurance body that would police compliance1890 Vice Chairman's Report on Activities dated 1 May 2013 {HOM00001351/7}. and recommended that specific recognition be offered in the nine areas of competence covered by the Competency Criteria.1891 Vice Chairman's Report on Activities dated 1 May 2013 {HOM00001351/7}. On satisfying those requirements, a fire risk assessor would receive a passport, grading competence in each area.1892 Vice Chairman's Report on Activities dated 1 May 2013 {HOM00001351/7}.
¶12.42 The intention behind those proposals was to establish an overarching system of quality assurance.1893 Davis {Day246/151:2-9}. It was recognised that fire risk assessors who had not joined one of the existing certification schemes would not be subject to its requirements,1894 Davis {Day246/151:10-18}. but it was seen as a start.1895 Davis {Day246/151:17-18}. The only way to enforce compliance was by legislation.
¶12.43 A copy of the proposal was sent to Sir Ken Knight and was circulated among the department's officials, including Louise Upton and Brian Martin.1896 {CLG00000526}. Mr Martin wrote to colleagues on 29 April 2013 saying that it appeared that the Fire Sector Federation was in danger of trying to do more than was necessary or desirable or indeed within the scope of its ability.1897 {CLG00000526}. In an email to Sir Ken Knight Louise Upton used the expression "control freakery" to describe the proposed passport scheme.1898 {CLG00000527/1}. Although it is not clear why Sir Ken had continued to be involved after his retirement as Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser in January 2013, he took a similar view and was concerned that the Federation was going beyond what was required.1899 Knight {Day246/85:1}-{Day246/86:5}.
¶12.44 On 10 October 2013, the members of the workstream met to discuss the proposed passport scheme. They identified several obstacles to its work, including the government's general opposition to regulation, continuing austerity and the existence of well-established self-certification schemes,1900 Competency Workshop, draft note of meeting dated 10 October 2013 {FSF00000407/2}. that made a scheme involving formal certification, although desirable, impractical.1901 Competency Workshop, draft note of meeting dated 10 October 2013 {FSF00000407/2}; Davis {Day246/162:24}-{Day246/163:2}. They therefore decided instead to focus their efforts on the role and competence of fire safety managers, who were the people responsible for ensuring compliance with statutory fire safety requirements.1902 Competency Criteria for Fire Safety Managers {FSF00000041}; Competency Workshop – Draft Note of Meeting {FSF00000407/2}; Dennis Davis {Day246/172:5-9}. Those who were involved in the existing certification schemes considered that the Competency Council documents and PAS 79 were sufficient.1903 Davis {Day246/163:15-20}. They considered that the problem lay not so much among fire risk assessors already covered by the existing schemes as among responsible persons who did not know when to seek advice from a competent fire risk assessor.1904 Davis {Day246/163:21}–{Day246/164:1-4}.
211¶12.45 The consequence of that decision was that the Federation offered no further guidance on the scope of fire risk assessments or how such assessments should be carried out.1905 Davis {Day246/165:10-18}. Dennis Davis said that the rationale was to direct responsible persons towards competent fire risk assessors who were members of existing schemes.1906 Davis {Day246/165:19-24}.
¶12.46 Even allowing for opposition from government and others to a regulatory regime, there was no good reason following the Lakanal House inquests not to amend the existing guidance to deal with the risks posed by refurbishment, modern methods of construction, and the importance of gaining access to individual flats when carrying out fire risk assessments. On any view, an amendment would have raised awareness within the industry of the importance of those matters.
The persisting problem
¶12.47 Concern about the competence of some fire risk assessors persisted in the years after the publication of the Competency Council guides. In August 2013 the government published a further review of the Fire Safety Order entitled Focus on Enforcement Review: Enforcement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005,1907 {BEI00001317}. which said that businesses had reported that some fire risk assessors had been overstating the need for their services, that a number of fire professionals had questioned the quality of some commercial risk assessors, and that in practice a third-party assessment offered no guarantees to businesses.1908 {BEI00001317/19}.
¶12.48 In December 2013, Louise Upton drafted a paper to identify options in response to the review, one of which was the creation of a national regulator for fire safety with broad responsibility for setting and communicating safety standards and developing standards for fire risk assessors.1909 {HOM00046039}; Upton {Day247/174:22}-{Day247/175:3}. In that paper she discussed the possibility of additional resources to develop, or obtain from third parties, expertise in fire safety, so that the department could provide independent and high quality advice to businesses and enforcing authorities on how to discharge their duties under the Fire Safety Order.1910 {HOM00046039/4}. At that time the Fire Safety team did not have the expertise or resources to provide advice of that kind and it had become increasingly difficult to obtain it from others on anything other than a temporary basis.1911 Upton {Day247/177:8}-{Day247/178:20}.
¶12.49 At a meeting on 17 July 2013, Sir Brandon Lewis had expressed reluctance to pursue the idea of a national fire safety regulator1912 {HOM00046059/2}. because he was not attracted to the idea of introducing additional regulation.1913 Lewis {Day257/73:15-18}. He was more interested in making existing schemes more efficient1914 Lewis {Day257/72:15-25}. and devolving power away from central government.1915 Lewis {Day257/76:13-14}. However, given that the fire sector had failed to solve the problem of the competence of fire risk assessors since work on the matter had begun some years earlier, the basis of his optimism was not clear. His views appear to have been of the most general kind and not directed to the particular merits of introducing a national fire safety regulator.
212¶12.50 After that, there was very limited ministerial consideration of the risks to safety posed by the continuing problem of the lack of competence of some fire risk assessors. Louise Upton could not tell us why the proposals in her paper had not been discussed any further.1916 Upton {Day247/181:5-10}. Sir Brandon Lewis told us that the competence of fire risk assessors was not the most important matter the department had to consider1917 Lewis {Day257/86:14-17}. and that he was happy to defer to the approach suggested by officials as his focus was on other things.1918 Lewis {Day257/86:24}-{Day257/87:10}.
Further proposals: 2016 onwards
¶12.51 Mr Davis, however, remained concerned about the quality of fire risk assessments and competence of fire risk assessors.1919 Davis {Day246/186:22-25}. In January 2016, he and Neil Gibbins, then acting chief executive of the Institute of Fire Engineers, prepared a strategy note suggesting that the Fire Sector Federation establish a licensing system applicable across the sector to provide the public with an assurance that the holder was competent to perform the tasks covered by the licence.1920 {FSF00000420/1}.
¶12.52 In January 2016 responsibility for fire safety policy was transferred from DCLG to the Home Office and the team of officials responsible for fire safety policy moved to the new department.1921 Brandon Lewis {CLG00031121/5} page 5, paragraph 15. In June 2016 Sir Brandon Lewis MP became Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service.1922 Lewis {Day257/10:25}-{Day257/11:3}. The change of department appears to have had little or no effect on policy relating to the competence of fire risk assessors and the previous concerns persisted right up to the time of the Grenfell Tower fire. On 8 June 2016, the coroner at the inquest into the death of Stephen Hunt, a firefighter who had died at a fire in Manchester in July 2013, wrote to Sir Brandon Lewis suggesting that the Secretary of State should consider measures to ensure the competence of fire risk assessors.1923 {HOM00033384}.
¶12.53 However, on 25 August 2016 a submission was sent up to Sir Brandon Lewis by officials the thrust of which was that the government had already taken action to ensure the competence and accreditation of fire risk assessors.1924 {HOM00043184/3} paragraph 7. The minister's reply to the coroner enclosed a paper written by the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser which referred to the Competency Council guides but made no proposals for additional steps to be taken to ensure the competence of Fire Risk Assessors.1925 {HOM00043186}. The response was criticised by Matt Wrack, the General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, who asked why the steps taken by the department had failed to bring about an improvement and why no further proposals had been forthcoming.1926 {INQ00014699/5} section 9. He observed that, in the three years since the publication of the Guide to Choosing a Competent Fire Risk Assessor, there had been no steps to find out whether it had had any discernible effect.1927 {INQ00014699/5} section 9. That was a very fair question.
¶12.54 In his reply Sir Brandon said that the use of guidance was a recognised practice in relation to health and safety matters,1928 {INQ00014700/2}. a trite observation that failed to respond to Mr Wrack's point that, several years after the publication of the Competency Council's guidance, concerns about the competence of fire risk assessors remained. The fact was that despite those repeated concerns, the senior coroner's recommendation and Mr Wrack's pointed question, the department appears to have set its face against reconsidering whether mere guidance was capable of improving the competence of those who chose not to comply with it. That was so, even though those to whom it had looked for a cure for the problem had pointed out several years earlier that legislative intervention was required. The department gave no good explanation for its failure to act.
213¶12.55 There were further, unfortunately fruitless, attempts by the Fire Sector Federation to make progress on the problem. On 16 June 2016, the chairman, Brian Robinson, wrote to the Home Secretary expressing the Federation's concern about the competence of fire risk assessors1929 {CLG00035514/3}. and in October 2016, the Federation produced a further paper, entitled the Fire Competency Registration Scheme, which effectively repeated its earlier proposal for the introduction of a licensing scheme.1930 {HOM00043195}. Ms Upton did not recall having seen that document1931 Upton {Day248/6:3-6}. and it does not appear that the department took any action in response to it.
¶12.56 In the summer of 2016, Anthony Maude, the official from the department who had usually attended Federation meetings, retired.1932 Maude {CLG00034279/9} page 9, paragraph 36. No one from the department was sent to Fire Sector Federation meetings in his place1933 Upton {Day248/6:14-16}. and as a result regular contact with the Federation lapsed.1934 Upton {Day248/8:3-7}.
¶12.57 The weakness in the system was that although the Fire Sector Federation was active in discussing how to improve the competence of fire risk assessors, its views and recommendations were never taken seriously by the government.1935 Davis {Day246/179:7}-{Day246/180:11}. It is not surprising, therefore, that the initial enthusiasm and support for its work in that area waned over time.1936 Davis {Day246/179:9-20}. Whatever the merits of encouraging the sector to take effective steps to address a widely recognised problem, by 2016 it had become obvious that the Federation had not found any common ground with the government about the right answer to the problem of incompetence among fire risk assessors. By that time it should have been clear to the department that the Fire Sector Federation itself could not produce an answer. Given the scale of the risks resulting from the continued existence of incompetent fire risk assessors the government should have taken effective measures to regulate the industry. For no good reason, it failed to do so.
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