Part 2: The path to disaster

Chapter 3: Introduction to Part 2

¶3.1 One of the primary purposes of our Inquiry has been to find out how a relatively modern building like Grenfell Tower could have fallen prey to a fire of such magnitude and ferocity as to destroy it almost completely, taking the lives of so many of its occupants. Although a disaster of that kind may appear to some to have come out of the blue, there is inevitably an important history of events that provide not only the context in which it occurred but also part of the explanation for it. In this Part of our report we describe the background to the fire and identify the main events that set the scene for what later occurred.

¶3.2 In a modern society one of the functions of the government is to introduce and enforce effective measures to ensure that the built environment is reasonably safe for those who live and work in it. For many years building work in England and Wales has been subject to regulation and in his Phase 1 report the chairman provided a summary of the primary and secondary legislation affecting the construction and the later refurbishment of Grenfell Tower and the statutory guidance relating to it. If it is to be effective, however, legislation and guidance of that kind must be kept under review and revised from time to time to ensure that it responds to developments in materials and methods of construction. In this Part of our report we examine the part played by the government and certain other organisations in responding to developments in the construction industry and the growing body of knowledge about the behaviour of certain materials, particularly when exposed to fire. We also examine the broader approach of the government to intervening in aspects of commercial activity in order to protect its citizens from the harmful effects of fire.

¶3.3 This Part of our report complements Part 3, in which we examine the way in which some of the products used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower were tested and marketed. The conclusion we have drawn from the facts described in Parts 2 and 3 is that in this case there were serious failures in the system designed to keep people safe. We describe those failures in Chapter 29.

Chapter 4: The development of the regulatory regime

Introduction

¶4.1 In Chapter 5 of the Phase 1 report the chairman briefly described the regulatory context in which the original construction of Grenfell Tower in the early 1970s and the refurbishment carried out between 2012 and 2016 each took place.¹⁵¹⁵ Phase 1 Report Volume I paragraphs 5.1 - 5.7. In this chapter we set out in more detail the key changes which occurred in the regulatory regime in the 20th century and which help to explain the nature of that regime at the time Grenfell Tower was refurbished. In Chapter 5 we have described the reaction to fire tests which supported the regulatory framework relating to the fire safety of external walls in the years leading up to the Grenfell Tower fire and in Chapter 6 we have set out how the requirements relating to the construction of external walls changed over time. Given the central role played by the external wall in the fire at Grenfell Tower, our summary of the legislative context concentrates on the regulations relating to the construction of the external walls of tall buildings, although we have also touched on other important aspects, where relevant.

¶4.2 In producing our summary we have had the benefit of reports from two of the experts instructed to assist the Inquiry. In his report entitled Legislation, Guidance and Enforcing Authorities Relevant to the Fire Safety Measures at Grenfell Tower, dated March 2018, Colin Todd described the development of the two main branches of legislation dealing with fire safety in England and Wales, one directed to ensuring proper standards of construction, the other directed to ensuring fire safety in occupied buildings. In this chapter we concentrate on the first of those areas. The second is addressed in Chapter 13, in which we consider the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the Fire Safety Order) made under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001. In his report entitled Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell, dated 10 November 2021, Professor Luke Bisby described the background to the fire testing regime which underpinned the Building Regulations 2010 in force at the time of the refurbishment.

¶4.3 In their reports Mr Todd and Professor Bisby have described the history of the legislation and the development of the tests by which it is supported. The relevant material is all available in its original form, whether that be primary or secondary legislation, approved documents or other publicly available standards, but in producing this summary we have been particularly assisted by the passages in their reports referred to in the footnotes.

Terminology

¶4.4 Before we begin discussing the development of the regulatory and testing regimes, it may be helpful to clarify two expressions, the meaning of which has sometimes not been clearly understood but which ought now to be firmly established. "Fire resistance" (which is always expressed as a period of time) describes the ability of an element of construction, such as a door, floor or wall, to withstand exposure to heat in a standard test without the occurrence of specific failure criteria set out in the test specification. The failure criteria relate to the ability of the element to resist the passage of flame or provide thermal insulation or, in the case of a loadbearing element, to maintain its ability to support a test load. "Reaction to fire" describes the behaviour of a material or product when exposed to heat in a standard test, such as the fire propagation test (BS 476-6), the surface spread of flame test (BS 476- 7) or the European single burning item test (BS EN 13823).

Local Acts and Byelaws: prescriptive building regulation

¶4.5 For many years building work in England and Wales was regulated at a local level under a patchwork of local acts and byelaws.¹⁶¹⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/50} paragraph 228. Local byelaws were often based on model byelaws produced by central government, adapted as appropriate to accommodate local customs. Consequently, local authorities and municipal fire services created and enforced their own fire safety provisions and construction professionals had to adapt their work to meet local demands.¹⁷¹⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/50} paragraph 228.

¶4.6 In London, building legislation took the form of a series of London Building Acts.¹⁸¹⁸ Todd {CTAR00000001/26} paragraphs 4.1.1 - 4.1.2. The London Building Acts 1930–1939 and associated byelaws were in force at the time Grenfell Tower was built.¹⁹¹⁹ Phase 1 Report Volume I paragraph 5.1. The London Building Acts themselves gave local authorities powers to require fire safety measures to be put in place, without specifying any measures in detail,²⁰²⁰ Todd {CTAR00000001/29} paragraph 4.2.1. but the byelaws made under them contained detailed requirements for the fire performance of roofs, externals walls and other elements of construction.²¹²¹ Todd {CTAR00000001/28} paragraph 4.1.14. The design of buildings tended to follow local guidance, such as that published by the Greater London Council, or codes of practice, such as the British Standards Institution (BSI) Code of Practice CP3 1971, which was probably the guidance which most influenced the designer of Grenfell Tower.²²²² Phase 1 Report Volume I paragraph 5.1; Todd {CTAR00000001/29} paragraphs 4.2.1 - 4.2.3. In London guidance was issued by the Greater London Council, including guidance under section 20 of the London Building Act 1939, known as "section 20 guidance". Section 20 enabled the Council to require additional fire precautions in buildings with a storey or part of a storey more than 100 feet above ground.²³²³ Todd {CTAR00000001/26} paragraph 4.1.6.

Creation of the first testing standard for building construction

¶4.7 In the early 20th century the Royal Institution of British Architects (RIBA) pressed for a standardised method of testing the reaction of construction products to fire. Practitioners were frustrated by the use of ill-defined terminology, with no universal agreement on what was meant by expressions such as "fire-resisting" or "incombustible", despite those terms appearing in legislation, including the London Building Acts.²⁴²⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/52} paragraphs 237 - 239. In 1929 RIBA urged the British Engineering Standards Association (which soon after became the British Standards Institution (BSI)) to produce standard definitions of reactions to fire and methods of assessing them. The outcome was the publication in 1932 of the first version of BS 476, entitled British standard definitions for fire-resistance, incombustibility and non-inflammability of building materials and structures (including methods of test).²⁵²⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/53} paragraphs 240 - 241. That original version of BS 476 contained four distinct testing methods, including a test for "incombustibility". The test involved heating a small sample of material to 750°C at the rate of 500°C per hour. If the specimen did not flame or exhibit what was described as "glowing combustion", it was regarded as non-combustible. The assessment of its performance was therefore purely visual.²⁶²⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/54} paragraph 248. The Fire Offices' Committee was established in 1868 by the major fire insurance companies.

¶4.8 Although it was published in 1932, it was several years before BS 476 began to make its mark on regulations and guidance. Moreover, a new research facility was required to carry out the larger "fire resistance" tests then included in BS 476. It was constructed at Borehamwood, Watford, by the Fire Offices Committee.²⁷²⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/57} paragraph 252. A revised version of the London County Council Constructional Byelaws in 1938 made explicit reference to the recently published BS 476,²⁸²⁸ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/57} paragraph 253. which was an important step for the construction industry. Previously a manufacturer would have had to lobby for its product to be included in an approved list of "fire-resisting" materials and then wait for the next revision of the legislation. However, the introduction of BS 476 enabled a product that had been tested and met the defined criteria to be used without further inquiry.²⁹²⁹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/57} paragraph 254.

State-sponsored fire research organisation

¶4.9 In 1944 the government decided to create an organisation to conduct research into aspects of the behaviour of fire and the response of materials to it, and so in January 1947 the Joint Fire Research Organisation was created, which brought together in a single organisation various disparate branches of fire safety research.³⁰³⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/60} paragraph 270.

The move towards functional requirements

¶4.10 From as early as the 1920s there had been a demand from the architectural profession for greater flexibility in the application of building legislation.³¹³¹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/51} paragraphs 236 - 238. In response, in 1936 the Building Research Board³²³² In 1917, the then Department of Scientific and Industrial Research proposed the creation of an organisation to investigate various building materials and methods of construction suitable for use in new housing following the First World War. In June 1920, the Building Research Board met for the first time – see https://bregroup.com/about-us/our-history. set out its vision for the replacement of the existing byelaws with legislation which described the result to be achieved without prescribing the means by which it was to be achieved.³³³³ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/61} paragraph 275; Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/65} paragraph 304.

¶4.11 In the early 1950s the Department of Housing and Local Government in England (and the equivalent body in Scotland) created a new form of building regulation. It involved a new set of model byelaws for use by local authorities as precedents when drafting their own byelaws.³⁴³⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/61} paragraph 276. The model byelaws described in general terms certain requirements to be met by all buildings, together with certain "performance standards" that were deemed to achieve those requirements. In addition, a series of "deemed to satisfy" clauses were included under which materials meeting certain requirements were "deemed to satisfy" the requirements of the byelaws and were assumed to provide an acceptable standard of performance. The intention was that basic standards of safety would be maintained but that the legislation would be flexible enough to take account of developments in building materials, products and techniques.³⁵³⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/61-62} paragraph 277. Although the model byelaws did not apply in London, they marked an important shift in the way that fire safety in buildings was regulated.

¶4.12 One effect of that change was that testing standards and codes of practice became relevant to compliance with legislative requirements. Once functional standards had been adopted, it became necessary to have a means of assessing whether the relevant standard had been reached and testing standards and codes therefore became increasingly important.³⁶³⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/62} paragraph 281. Furthermore, whereas previously a committee had decided which products could or could not be used in specific applications, the model byelaws allowed manufacturers and designers to demonstrate by reference to individual tests that products were suitable for use.³⁷³⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/65} paragraph 303.

¶4.13 In the late 1950s the Guest Committee³⁸³⁸ This committee was established by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1954 and was chaired by Mr C. W. G. Guest QC. It was tasked with examining the regulation of building in Scotland – see Hansard at https://hansard.parliament. uk/Commons/1954-01-27/debates/3119ce49-a62d-4264-8f21-12b3623be4d1/BuildingControl(InquiryCommittee). recommended that the patchwork of local building laws be replaced with a new national Building Act.³⁹³⁹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/65-66} paragraph 306. At the time there was a range of views about the extent to which functional standards ought to be underpinned by codes of practice or "deemed to satisfy" clauses that would demonstrate how compliance with the functional requirements could be achieved.⁴⁰⁴⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/66} paragraphs 307 – 314. Some, including RIBA and the British Research Station,⁴¹⁴¹ In 1921 a central government-funded laboratory – the Building Research Station – was formed to carry out research work for the Building Research Board. envisaged a flexible approach, under which the link between functional requirements and technical standards was severed so that only the functional requirements were mandatory. There was a concern that performance standards could be overtaken by new ideas and technology and become as restrictive as the former byelaws. However, RIBA did recognise that complete flexibility could lead to inconsistency in the application of the legislation.⁴²⁴² Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/66} paragraphs 308-309.

¶4.14 During the Second World War a method was developed for testing the effectiveness of "incombustible" products at resisting incendiary bombs. It was recognised that some materials which failed the incombustibility test could still afford a degree of protection against such bombs. That led to a series of full-scale tests in corridors lined with different types of wallboard, which in time evolved to become the BS 476-7 test for surface spread of flame.⁴³⁴³ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/58} paragraphs 259-261. In 1953 BS 476 was revised to incorporate the test, which had been added as an appendix in 1945.⁴⁴⁴⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/62} paragraph 282. We describe the test in detail in Chapter 5.

The Building Regulations 1965

¶4.15 The Building Regulations 1965⁴⁵⁴⁵ {INQ00015096}. contained a mixture of functional requirements, performance standards and "deemed to satisfy" provisions. The provisions relating to fire performance were mostly statements of performance standards, with few statements of function.⁴⁶⁴⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/68} paragraph 318. Codes and standards became an important means by which innovation and flexibility were embedded in the new functionality-based system of building regulation, although many of the testing standards did not change at that time.⁴⁷⁴⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/68} paragraphs 321 - 323. Unlike the London Building Acts of the 1930s, the 1965 Regulations contained no requirements for means of escape in case of fire until they were amended in 1974, following a recommendation from the Holroyd committee (discussed below) that they should do so.⁴⁸⁴⁸ Todd {CTAR00000001/39} paragraph 5.1.1. As noted further below, the Building Regulations did not apply to Inner London until January 1986.⁴⁹⁴⁹ Todd {CTAR00000001/39} paragraph 5.1.2.

¶4.16 The 1960s also saw the Building Regulations Advisory Committee (BRAC) expressing dissatisfaction with the binary nature of the existing BS 476 (1953) test for the combustibility of materials, since it was felt that relaxing the requirement for external walls and cladding to be non-combustible could sometimes be appropriate.⁵⁰⁵⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/69} paragraph 325. Innovations in building materials and techniques meant that a broader range of construction materials were becoming available, including plastics. The kinds of buildings that were being proposed were also changing and high-rise flats were becoming increasingly popular among architects and housing developers.⁵¹⁵¹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/61} paragraph 274. As we discuss further in Part 6, in the 1960s national Class 0 was introduced into the Building Regulations, which permitted non-combustible external wall products to be covered with a combustible surface and combustible products to be covered with non-combustible linings.⁵²⁵² Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/70} paragraphs 328-333.

The Agrément Board (later the British Board of Agrément (BBA))

¶4.17 In 1964 BRAC suggested that a third-party organisation might provide approval for new building materials, products and methods.⁵³⁵³ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/72} paragraph 339. It was recognised that a significant number of new materials and products were entering the building industry and it was difficult for building professionals to assess their performance in use.⁵⁴⁵⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/72} paragraph 339. Consequently, it was suggested that an independent third party might be created to approve materials and products, and in 1966 the Agrément Board was established for that purpose. The existing Building Research Station and Fire Research Station became the laboratories of the Agrément Board.⁵⁵⁵⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/72-73} paragraph 343. The Agrément Board issued its first certificate in January 1967.⁵⁶⁵⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/73} paragraph 347. In 1982, it was renamed the British Board of Agrément.⁵⁷⁵⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/92} paragraph 449.

Dissatisfaction

¶4.18 The new system of building regulation soon encountered a number of problems. In particular, the checks that had to be performed by local authorities were taking longer than under the old byelaws. As a result, in 1967 the Ministry of Housing and Local Government's own Building Legislation Committee recommended the establishment of a body to administer the regulations centrally. In particular, it advised that compliance with the regulations should be checked by an organisation large enough to have competent staff with the required range of skills, supported by a network of local enforcing officers.⁵⁸⁵⁸ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/73} paragraph 348. RIBA also complained that the 1965 Building Regulations were complex and the language obscure; there were demands for regulations written in plain English with the use of diagrams to convey information more quickly.⁵⁹⁵⁹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/73} paragraph 349. There were also criticisms of the first BBA certificates and concerns were expressed by ministers that it was taking too long for the BBA to issue certificates.⁶⁰⁶⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/73-74} paragraph 349.

¶4.19 During the 1970s revision of the Building Regulations brought more dissatisfaction, due to the number of documents to which reference had to be made to understand them. By 1971 there had been seven amendments to the regulations and they were reissued in full in 1972 and 1976.⁶¹⁶¹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/74} paragraph 350. By the late 1970s there were numerous proposals for reform and a degree of dissatisfaction with the BBA.⁶²⁶² Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/74} paragraphs 351 – 352.

The Holroyd report

¶4.20 In May 1970 Sir Ronald Holroyd, chairman of the Parliamentary Fire Service Departmental Committee, delivered a report which had been commissioned by the Home Secretary.⁶³⁶³ See Hansard https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1970-07-14/debates/f5a42851-fe75-4485-ad22- f3afb15db306/FireService (Departmental Committee). The primary focus of the report was the organisation of the UK's fire services, but he also addressed fire safety legislation and fire research.⁶⁴⁶⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/74} paragraphs 353 – 354. The Holroyd report⁶⁵⁶⁵ Holroyd, Report of the Departmental Committee on the Fire Service {CTAR00000002}. recommended that fire safety regulation be divided into two main branches, one applying to new buildings and alterations to existing buildings and another applying to occupied buildings after construction or alteration. The committee recommended that enforcement of the second branch should be the responsibility of fire authorities, who should use the services of their fire brigades for that purpose.⁶⁶⁶⁶ Todd {CTAR00000001/23} paragraphs 3.3-3.4. The concept of two branches of legislation, which for some time thereafter was known as the "Holroyd Divide", has largely been adopted in England and Wales from the time of its proposal.⁶⁷⁶⁷ Todd {CTAR00000001/20} paragraph 3.6.

¶4.21 As a result of the Holroyd report, changes were made to the government's research capability. Accordingly, in 1972 the Building Research Station, the Fire Research Station and the Forest Products Research Laboratory were combined to create the Building Research Establishment (BRE).⁶⁸⁶⁸ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/74-75} paragraph 355. In 1976 the Joint Fire Research Organisation was dissolved.⁶⁹⁶⁹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/74-75} paragraph 355.

¶4.22 The 1970s also saw the introduction of new fire tests and the relaxation of requirements relating to the construction of external walls.⁷⁰⁷⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/75-80} sections 10.2 and 10.3. In particular, research by the Joint Fire Research Organisation had shown that materials and products that achieved the same classification in the surface spread of flame test sometimes behaved very differently in 1/5th scale compartment tests.⁷¹⁷¹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/75} paragraph 356. A new test method was therefore developed which eventually became BS 476-6. It was introduced as a British Standard in 1968. We have described it in detail in Chapter 5.⁷²⁷² Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/75} paragraph 359.

Move to functionality-based building regulations

¶4.23 In December 1979, the Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment, Michael Heseltine, gave a speech to the National House Building Council (NHBC) in which he set out his vision for the reform of the system for regulating building work. He identified four criteria for his new system: (1) maximum self-regulation, (2) minimum government interference, (3) self-financing, (4) simplicity in operation. In February 1981 a White Paper on the future of building control in England and Wales was published.⁷³⁷³ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/81} paragraph 385. At the time there was general agreement that the Building Regulations needed to be revised.⁷⁴⁷⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/81} paragraph 386.

¶4.24 The White Paper proposed that the functional requirements should be supported by a wide range of approved guidance, including British Standards Institution (BSI) standards and codes and Agrément certificates.⁷⁵⁷⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/81} paragraph 387. Part of the motivation for changing the system was the Secretary of State's conviction that local authority building control was attracting too much liability for defective buildings. He suggested that architects might themselves be allowed to certify that their plans met the functional requirements and that certification could be carried out by private bodies. He also suggested that the NHBC might become a private building control authority.⁷⁶⁷⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/82} paragraph 390.

The Building Act 1984, the Building Regulations 1985 and the Approved Documents

¶4.25 After much debate about the nature of the legislation required,⁷⁷⁷⁷ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/82} paragraph 393. the Building Act 1984⁷⁸⁷⁸ {HOM00035068}. and the Building Regulations 1985⁷⁹⁷⁹ {INQ00015097}. were enacted. The new legislation resulted in a radical change to the system of building regulation in England and Wales.⁸⁰⁸⁰ Todd {CTAR00000001/40} paragraph 5.1.8; Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/90} paragraphs 441 – 442. The new regulations extended to only 25 pages (in contrast to the 306 pages of the Building Regulations 1976).⁸¹⁸¹ Todd {CTAR00000001/39-40} paragraphs 5.1.5 and 5.1.9. All technical requirements were eliminated from the regulations, which were now cast purely in functional form.⁸²⁸² Todd {CTAR00000001/40} paragraph 5.1.9.

¶4.26 The Building Regulations 1985 contained only four functional requirements in relation to fire safety, namely, means of escape, internal fire spread (surfaces), internal fire spread (structures) and external fire spread.⁸³⁸³ Schedule 1 {INQ00015097/11-13}; Todd {CTAR00000001/40-41} paragraph 5.1.12. Requirement B4(1) relating to external fire spread provided that "The external walls of the building shall offer adequate resistance to the spread of fire over the walls … having regard to the height, use and position of the building".⁸⁴⁸⁴ {INQ00015097/13}.

¶4.27 The Building Act 1984 gave legal status⁸⁵⁸⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/84} paragraphs 402 – 405. to Approved Documents, which were produced by the relevant government department responsible for the Building Regulations and contained guidance on the means by which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the functional requirements could be achieved.⁸⁶⁸⁶ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/83} paragraph 400. In 1985 the first version of Approved Document B on fire safety was published.⁸⁷⁸⁷ Todd {CTAR00000001/52} paragraph 5.2.4. In fact, the content of the new Approved Documents was remarkably similar to that of the previous regulations and in their first editions it was intended that the requirements should change more in form than content.⁸⁸⁸⁸ Todd {CTAR00000001/42} paragraph 5.1.19; Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/83} paragraph 396. The performance standards defined in the new Approved Documents also remained largely unchanged from the pre-existing regulations.⁸⁹⁸⁹ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/90} paragraph 441. There was a belief that, by moving them out of legislation and into statutory guidance, the Approved Documents could be revised more frequently to take account of innovation.⁹⁰⁹⁰ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/83} paragraph 396. However, some mandatory measures remained, such as the requirement to follow the parts of CP3 Chapter IV dealing with means of escape.⁹¹⁹¹ Todd {CTAR00000001/11} paragraph 2.26; Todd {CTAR00000001/42} paragraph 5.1.20; Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/83} paragraph 397.

¶4.28 Unfortunately, many in the construction industry treated the Approved Documents as if they were prescriptive and many were confused about the difference between the regulations and the Approved Documents. It is still not uncommon for professionals in the construction industry to refer to the Approved Documents as if they were regulations. Indeed, we saw many examples of that during this Inquiry.⁹²⁹² Todd {CTAR00000001/42} paragraph 5.1.16.

¶4.29 The Building Act 1984 also allowed private persons and commercial bodies to carry out building control functions, subject to the Building (Approved Inspector etc.) Regulations 1985. Unlike local authorities they were not required to be non-profitmaking.⁹³⁹³ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/83} paragraph 394.

¶4.30 Apart from the shift away from linking functional requirements to mandatory standards of performance, the Building Act 1984 and the Building Regulations 1985 did not introduce any fundamental changes to the testing standards which underpinned the approved documents, the majority of which were retained.⁹⁴⁹⁴ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/90} paragraph 442. Since the standards of performance and tests previously applicable were no longer seen as constraints, the need to review and revise the tests regularly became less urgent. If a new product failed to meet the standard set out in the relevant approved document, the manufacturer or designer could simply look for other ways of demonstrating that its use would not prevent compliance with the functional requirements. Devising ways to comply with the Regulations without following the guidance in the Approved Documents was therefore not an exercise in finding loopholes; it was in accordance with the spirit of the new regulatory system.⁹⁵⁹⁵ Bisby, Regulatory Testing and the Path to Grenfell Report {LBYP20000001/90} paragraphs 443 - 444.

¶4.31 Where the new, more flexible, regime might lead was not lost on some at the time. We were struck by the prescient opinion of H. L. Malhotra, a veteran of the Fire Research Station, who in 1986 wrote:

"Historically over the last three centuries we have moved from strict constructional specifications to functional or semi-functional requirements with performance-oriented objectives as and when feasible. Rigid controls are being replaced progressively by a more flexible system which permits alternative solutions to be considered. The burden of responsibility is being shifted from the central or the local authorities to the individual or corporate designer/contractor for the adequacy of his system … It will be perhaps another 2 or 3 decades before the consequence of this approach can be seen."⁹⁶⁹⁶ Malhotra, Fire Safety in Buildings {HOM00035070/15} paragraph 1.20.

The Building Regulations applied to London

¶4.32 In January 1986 the Building (Inner London) Regulations 1985 came into force. Thereafter the Building Regulations 1985 (with certain limited exceptions) applied to Inner London.⁹⁷⁹⁷ Todd {CTAR00000001/38} paragraph 4.3.2. Building control remained the responsibility of the Greater London Council until its abolition by the Local Government Act 1985 on 1 April 1986, when the responsibility was transferred to the London Boroughs and the Corporation of the City of London.⁹⁸⁹⁸ Todd {CTAR00000001/38} paragraph 4.3.2.

¶4.33 The Building (Inner London) Regulations 1985 also introduced in London the Building (Approved Inspectors etc.) Regulations 1985, under which approval of plans under the Building Regulations could be granted by an approved inspector, rather than the building control department of a local authority. However, approval of work under section 20 of the 1939 Act (relating to fire safety in tall buildings) continued to rest solely with the local authority until repeal of section 20 by the Building (Repeal of Provisions of Local Acts) Regulations 2012 in January 2013.⁹⁹⁹⁹ Todd {CTAR00000001/38} paragraph 4.3.3.

The Building Regulations 1991

¶4.34 The Building Regulations 1991 came into force in June 1992. They revoked and replaced, with amendments, the Building Regulations 1985.¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ Todd {CTAR00000001/43} paragraph 5.1.26. The main changes brought about by the 1991 Regulations were that functional requirement B1 relating to means of escape was no longer mandatory and a new functional requirement B5 relating to access and facilities for the fire service was introduced.¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ Todd {CTAR00000001/43} paragraph 5.1.27.

¶4.35 Although functional requirements B1 to B4 remained largely unchanged, some small changes were made to their wording and in some places the word "adequate" was either added or removed.¹⁰²¹⁰² Todd {CTAR00000001/43-44} paragraph 5.1.28. In the case of functional requirement B4, the word "adequately" was removed, so that it read "The external walls of the building shall resist the spread of fire …".

¶4.36 The 1991 Regulations were amended on a number of occasions before being revoked by the Building Regulations 2000.¹⁰³¹⁰³ Todd {CTAR00000001/45} paragraph 5.1.29. During that time the only changes affecting fire safety were those made by the Building Regulations (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 1999, which introduced into functional requirement B1 a requirement for the early warning of fire (a change which brought the provision of fire detection and fire alarm systems within the scope of the Building Regulations for the first time),¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ Todd {CTAR00000001/45} paragraph 5.1.30. and reintroduced into functional requirements B2, B3 and B4 the word "adequate". Functional requirement B4 therefore restored the qualifier, eliminated in 1992, that external walls "shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls…".¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ Todd {CTAR00000001/45-46} paragraph 5.1.35(iii). Functional requirement B5 was also amended so that facilities to assist the fire service and the provision for access to fire appliances should be "reasonable".¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ Todd {CTAR00000001/46} paragraph 5.1.36. "Adequately" and "reasonable" are both words whose effect depends on the context in which they are used. It was therefore left to the person carrying out the work and the building control officer or approved inspector to decide as best they could whether the particular work did or did not meet the functional requirement.

The Building Regulations 2000

¶4.37 The Building Regulations 2000 came into force on 1 January 2000, revoking the Building Regulations 1991.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ Todd {CTAR00000001/46} paragraph 5.1.38. The functional requirements were identical to those set out in the 1991 Regulations (as amended). They were subject to various amendments between 2001 and 2010,¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ Todd {CTAR00000001/47} paragraph 5.1.40. an important one being the amendment of functional requirement B3(3) on internal fire spread to require a suitable automatic fire suppression system to be installed where reasonably necessary to inhibit the spread of fire within a building, either as an alternative to, or in addition to, the sub-division of the building with fire-resisting construction.¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ 2006 Amendment (No. 2) Regulations; Todd {CTAR00000001/48} paragraph 5.1.43. As a result, it became necessary to install sprinklers in newly built blocks of flats over 30 metres in height.¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ Todd {CTAR00000001/48} paragraph 5.1.44. A further amendment introduced in 2006 required a person carrying out work on a building to give fire safety information to the responsible person under the Fire Safety Order on completion of the work or occupation of the building or extension to assist that person to operate the building or extension with reasonable safety.¹¹¹¹¹¹ Todd {CTAR00000001/48} paragraph 5.1.45. This requirement became Regulation 38 in the Building Regulations 2010.

The Building Regulations 2010

¶4.38 The Building Regulations 2010¹¹²¹¹² {INQ00015098}. came into force on 1 October 2010 and revoked the Building Regulations 2000 (as amended).¹¹³¹¹³ Todd {CTAR00000001/49} paragraph 5.1.51. The Building Regulations 2010 were amended on a number of occasions between 2011 and 2015, however, none of those amendments are relevant to this report – see Todd {CTAR00000001/51} paragraph 5.1.65. Apart from largely editorial amendments to functional requirement B3 on internal fire spread, the functional requirements were unchanged.

¶4.39 We consider the Building Act 1984 and the Building Regulations 2010 in greater detail in Chapter 48, in which we discuss the legislative regime as it applied to the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower between 2012 and 2016.