CONTENTS — The 9/11 Commission Report

List of Illustrations and Tables — ix
Member List — xi
Staff List — xiii-xiv
Preface — xv
1. "WE HAVE SOME PLANES" — 1
1.1 Inside the Four Flights — 1
1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense — 14
1.3 National Crisis Management — 35
2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM — 47
2.1 A Declaration of War — 47
2.2 Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World — 48
2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) — 55
2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) — 59
2.5 Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) — 63
3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES — 71
3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing — 71
3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation-in the Law Enforcement Community — 73
3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration — 82
3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community — 86
3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department — 93
3.6 . . . and in the White House — 98
3.7 . . . and in the Congress — 102
4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS — 108
4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania — 108
4.2 Crisis: August 1998 — 115
4.3 Diplomacy — 121
4.4 Covert Action — 126
4.5 Searching for Fresh Options — 134
5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND — 145
5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs — 145
5.2 The "Planes Operation" — 153
5.3 The Hamburg Contingent — 160
5.4 A Money Trail? — 169
6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT — 174
6.1 The Millennium Crisis — 174
6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 — 182
6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole — 190
6.4 Change and Continuity — 198
6.5 The New Administration's Approach — 203
7. THE ATTACK LOOMS — 215
7.1 First Arrivals in California — 215
7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States — 223
7.3 Assembling the Teams — 231
7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics — 241
8. "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED" — 254
8.1 The Summer of Threat — 254
8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM — 266
9. HEROISM AND HORROR — 278
9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 — 278
9.2 September 11, 2001 — 285
9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon — 311
9.4 Analysis — 315
10. WARTIME — 325
10.1 Immediate Responses at Home — 326
10.2 Planning for War — 330
10.3 "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq — 334
11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT — 339
11.1 Imagination — 339
11.2 Policy — 348
11.3 Capabilities — 350
11.4 Management — 353
12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY — 361
12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge — 361
12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations — 365
12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism — 374
12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks — 383
13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT — 399
13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide — 400
13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community — 407
13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information — 416
13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress — 419
13.5 Organizing America's Defenses in the United States — 423
Appendix A: Common Abbreviations — 429
Appendix B:Table of Names — 431
Appendix C: Commission Hearings — 439
Notes — 449

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES

FAA Air Traffic Control Centers — 15
Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector — 15
Flight paths and timelines — 32-33
Usama Bin Ladin — 49
Map of Afghanistan — 64
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed — 148
The 9/11 hijackers — 238-239
The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 — 279
The World Trade Center radio repeater system — 284
The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations — 288
The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 — 312
The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77 — 313
American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania — 313
Unity of effort in managing intelligence — 413

COMMISSION MEMBERS

¶Thomas H. Kean, CHAIR

¶Lee H. Hamilton, VICE CHAIR

¶Richard Ben-Veniste

¶Bob Kerrey

¶Fred F. Fielding

¶John F. Lehman

¶Jamie S. Gorelick

¶Timothy J. Roemer

¶Slade Gorton

¶James R. Thompson