Chapter 4: Work for the Mitrokhin Commission in Italy

¶4.75 Vasili Mitrokhin was a senior KGB archivist who defected to the UK in 1992. He

brought with him a very large collection of handwritten notes of KGB records that he had made over many years. Much of the material contained in what became known as the Mitrokhin Archive has subsequently been published in books jointly written by Mr Mitrokhin and the British historian Professor Christopher Andrew.

¶4.76 The Mitrokhin Archive contained details of historic KGB operations throughout the

world. It included details of such operations in Italy. In 2002 the Italian Parliament established a Commission to investigate matters arising from the Mitrokhin Archive. It was known as the Mitrokhin Commission. Mr Litvinenko took part in its enquiries. Could anything that Mr Litvinenko did in relation to the Mitrokhin Commission have had a connection with his death?

¶4.77 Before considering the evidence available to the Inquiry that bears on that question,

it is important that I enter a number of caveats. It is apparent even from the limited evidence that I have heard about it that the Mitrokhin Commission was and remains highly controversial, both in Italy and beyond. It seems that there are many who have questioned both the legitimacy of its work and the value of its findings. I must make it clear at the outset that it is no part of my function to investigate, far less to make any findings, in relation to those controversies. The scope of this Inquiry's interest in the Mitrokhin Commission is sharply limited. Put simply, it is to investigate what it was that Alexander Litvinenko did for and in connection with the Commission, and whether there could have been any link between those matters and his death.

¶4.78 I heard oral evidence from two witnesses who had a direct connection with the

¶Mitrokhin Commission, and with the work that Mr Litvinenko undertook for it.

¶4.79 First, I heard from Mario Scaramella. Mr Scaramella is an Italian lawyer who has held

a number of posts during his career. He was a consultant to the Mitrokhin Commission and conducted certain investigations on its behalf. It was in this capacity that he was introduced to Mr Litvinenko; and Mr Litvinenko subsequently assisted Mr Scaramella by providing him with information. The two men became friends. Mr Scaramella also has a second part to play in the narrative because he met Mr Litvinenko in London on 1 November 2006, shortly before Mr Litvinenko's meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Pine Bar; I will return to his evidence about events on that day at a later stage of the Report (see paragraphs 6.293 – 6.300 below).

¶4.80 The second witness was Paolo Guzzanti. At the time of the events in question,

Mr Guzzanti was a member of the Italian Senate, having previously spent many years as a journalist, including a lengthy period as editor in chief of the newspaper La Republica. Mr Guzzanti was the Chairman of the Mitrokhin Commission.

¶4.81 I am aware that both these two men have been caught up in the controversies

surrounding the Mitrokhin Commission (to which I referred above), and that in that context questions have been raised in the public domain about their conduct and their credibility. Although the oral and written evidence that Mr Guzzanti and (in particular) Mr Scaramella have provided to the Inquiry has extended to cover a range of issues, the evidence that they have given that is of central relevance to this Inquiry – i.e. their evidence concerning their dealings with Mr Litvinenko and his dealings with the

¶Part 4 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko?

Mitrokhin Commission – is of a much narrower compass. Both men gave evidence to the Inquiry voluntarily – since they both live out of the jurisdiction, I could not have compelled them to give evidence. I accept that what they have said about the core issues to which I have referred was reliable. It is unnecessary for me to make any findings regarding their evidence as to wider matters.

¶4.82 There is also in evidence an Affidavit sworn by Mr Litvinenko in 2006 that provides an outline account of his dealings with the Mitrokhin Commission.71

¶Factual context 4.83 The evidence that I have heard enables me to make some outline findings regarding

the Mitrokhin Commission and Mr Litvinenko's involvement with it. I will set out those findings below:

¶a. The Mitrokhin Commission was established by the Italian Parliament in 200272

b. The Commission had 40 members – 20 from the lower house of the Italian Parliament and 20 from the Senate. Mr Guzzanti, a senator, was elected as Chairman of the Commission73

c. The Commission was initially tasked with investigating how the Italian secret service had dealt with papers and information from the Mitrokhin Archive after it had received them from the authorities in the UK. The Commission's report on that matter was completed in April 2004. However, the Commission then decided to widen the scope of its enquiries to cover all possible KGB activities in Italy – it continued investigating these broader issues until it was wound up in 200674

d. Mr Scaramella was not a member of the Commission. He was hired by the Commission in 2003 as a consultant to conduct investigations on its behalf. The scope of the investigations that Mr Scaramella conducted in this capacity appears to have been very broad; Mr Guzzanti told me that they covered matters such as the illegal financing of the Communist Party of Italy by the Soviet Union, the links between Russian secret services and organised crime and terrorism in Italy, and the KGB's power to manipulate Western media75

e. Mr Scaramella was introduced to Mr Litvinenko in late 2003 by a mutual acquaintance, Victor Rezun, also known as Victor Suvorov. Mr Scaramella asked for Mr Litvinenko's help in the enquiries that he was conducting for the Mitrokhin Commission, and Mr Litvinenko agreed76

f. Mr Litvinenko assisted Mr Scaramella by providing him with information. Their first meeting took place in Naples in January 2004 and lasted about five days.77 Mr Scaramella told me that they had a number of subsequent meetings at which Mr Litvinenko provided him with information. He thought that they met on three or four occasions in Italy and also on three or four occasions in London.78

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

Mr Litvinenko never met Mr Guzzanti, although they did once speak briefly on the phone79

g. Mr Scaramella arranged for Mr Litvinenko's expenses to be paid, but Mr Litvinenko did not receive any further remuneration for his assistance80

h. Mr Litvinenko introduced Mr Scaramella to Mr Limarev. Mr Litvinenko told Mr Scaramella that Mr Limarev knew more than he did about Russian organised crime. This introduction appears to have taken place in January 2004. Thereafter Mr Limarev became a further source of information for Mr Scaramella. The two corresponded regularly by email81

i. The Mitrokhin Commission was wound up in April 2006. Mr Scaramella and Mr Litvinenko ended their regular contact at that time82

¶4.84 It is apparent from the evidence that I have heard and seen that Mr Litvinenko

provided Mr Scaramella with a very large volume of information. There is a transcript of Mr Litvinenko's first meeting with Mr Scaramella, which runs to well over 100 pages and covers a wide range of topics.83

¶4.85 The information that Mr Litvinenko gave to Mr Scaramella included some on what might be thought to have been particularly sensitive topics. I will give two examples.

¶4.86 First, Mr Litvinenko made various claims to Mr Scaramella about a man called Semion

Mogilevich. The written closing submissions served on behalf of Marina Litvinenko describe Mr Mogilevich as: "one of Russia's most notorious [Organised Crime Group] leaders. … It is said he is responsible for contract killings and smuggling weapons."⁸⁴⁸⁴ Marina Litvinenko 3/114-116 Marina Litvinenko written closing submissions, page 46 paragraph 142 Goldfarb 5/132; Attew 13/22; Tabunov 13/139-140 Mascall 9/109-111 INQ019146 (pages 26-27 paragraph 83) Mr Mogilevich was, at least at one stage, one of the FBI's most wanted men.85 I have seen the text of a speech given by the US Attorney General in 2008 in which Mr Mogilevich is said to have, "exert[ed] influence over large portions of the natural gas industry in parts of what used to be the Soviet Union."⁸⁶⁸⁶ Marina Litvinenko 3/122-123 BLK000241 (page 4) Marina Litvinenko 4/35-37 INQ019146 (page 6 paragraph 18)

¶4.87 Mr Litvinenko passed on to Mr Scaramella information about Mr Mogilevich that he

said had emerged from the transcription of the Kuchma tapes. Mr Litvinenko told Mr Scaramella that Mr Mogilevich (whom he described as a "well known criminal- terrorist" ) was. "in a good relationship with Russian President Putin and most senior officials of the Russian Federation" ; that Mr Mogilevich and President Putin had, "a common cause, in my understanding a criminal cause" ; that Mr Mogilevich was an arms dealer who was selling weapons to Al-Qaeda; and that he knew: "beyond doubt that Mogilevich is FSB's long-standing agent and all his actions including the contacts with Al-Qaeda are controlled by FSB … For this very reason the FSB is hiding Mogilevich from FBI." These allegations were contained in a written statement that Mr Litvinenko sent by fax to the offices of the Mitrokhin Commission.87

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¶4.88 Second, in the course of his discussions with Mr Scaramella, Mr Litvinenko claimed

to have evidence that Romano Prodi, the senior Italian politician, was a KGB agent. Mr Scaramella said that: "Litvinenko presented this information as the most important information in his hands."⁸⁸⁸⁸ Hatjiosif 2/99-101 Scaramella 27/97-99; LUG000092 INQ021208 (page 3)

¶4.89 Information of this character was clearly highly sensitive. It is possible to imagine

that, if it became known that Mr Litvinenko was making this type of allegation to a formal body such as the Mitrokhin Commission, attempts may have been made to silence him. Mr Scaramella gave evidence that the files containing the information that Mr Litvinenko had given him were locked away, but that on at least one occasion there was a security breach and unauthorised copies were made of the files.89

¶4.90 Another person whom Mr Litvinenko discussed with Mr Scaramella was a man

named Alexander Talik. Mr Talik was a Russian living in Naples in or about 2005. Mr Scaramella said that he knew him, indeed that he had employed him to do some work for his organisation, the Environmental Crime Prevention Programme (ECPP). Precisely what took place between Mr Talik, Mr Scaramella and Mr Litvinenko is not at all clear on the evidence. I would add that these matters have also been the subject of proceedings in the Italian courts.

¶4.91 Mr Scaramella told me that he understood that Mr Talik was a former FSB officer;

he also appeared to believe that Mr Talik was connected to an incident when he (Mr Scaramella) had been shot at in Naples by hooded men. There is evidence that Mr Litvinenko also believed that Mr Talik had links with the FSB, and that he told Mr Scaramella this. I also heard evidence about a consignment of arms, which Mr Litvinenko thought may have been destined for Mr Talik, being intercepted in Italy.90

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry