Chapter 6: Private security work
Chapter 6: Private security work
¶4.101 Mr Litvinenko was not, on the evidence that I have heard, readily employable following
his arrival in the UK. His English was poor and the skills that he had developed over 20 years in the FSB and before that the KGB were highly specialised. In the early years, it would appear that Mr Berezovsky funded the family more or less entirely. He provided accommodation, paid for Anatoly's school fees and made regular payments to Mr Litvinenko, for example, for his work on the two books. Mr Berezovsky was, however, keen that Mr Litvinenko should become more self sufficient. As we shall hear, he encouraged Mr Litvinenko to try to obtain other work. He also cut the level of payments that he made to the Litvinenko family.
¶4.102 I shall return to this point in due course because it relates to the question of whether
there was a falling out between the two men in mid 2006, and if so whether this could be relevant in any way to Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶4.103 The important point for present purposes is that in 2005 and 2006, in part no doubt
due to Mr Berezovsky's encouragement and the reducing payments, Mr Litvinenko appears to have started undertaking more work in what might loosely be described as the private security field.
¶4.104 Some of the work that Mr Litvinenko undertook in this field involved the preparation
of so called 'due diligence' reports. I heard that these reports were at the time (and, no doubt, continue to be) routinely commissioned by one company or businessman seeking to find out more information about another company or businessman. Such reports were often obtained at an early stage of a proposed transaction. I heard that such reports might be sought because of a genuine wish to find out more information about the target, but might also serve a more formal compliance purpose. Either way, a negative report might lead to a proposed transaction being cancelled.
¶4.105 The evidence I heard was that in the period 2005-6, there was a strong demand in
London for 'due diligence' reports to be prepared on Russian targets. As we shall see, Mr Litvinenko sought to establish himself as someone who could provide such reports, using both his own knowledge and his contacts in their preparation.
¶4.106 Could it be that Mr Litvinenko's death was connected in some way to the work that he
undertook in this sphere? Is it possible that a disgruntled subject of a negative report prepared by Mr Litvinenko might have wished to punish him? Or might Mr Litvinenko's need to establish a network of sources in order to assist with this work have drawn him into the company of people who wished him ill for other reasons?
¶4.107 I heard evidence that there were three private security companies with which
Mr Litvinenko became involved in this period. They were RISC Management Limited, Titon International Limited and Erinys UK Limited. I propose to review the evidence relating to each in turn.
¶RISC 4.108 RISC Management Limited (RISC) was a private security company that had grown
75out of an earlier business named ISC Global. I heard evidence from Keith Hunter, who was CEO of RISC in the period 2005–6.98 He explained that ISC had been set up in
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2000 by Stephen Curtis and Nigel Brown. Mr Curtis was a lawyer with a large network of high net worth clients, whom he introduced to ISC. Mr Curtis' clients included the so called oligarchs Mr Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky. Mr Curtis was killed in a helicopter crash in 2004. As I understood the evidence, the business of ISC was thereafter split between Mr Brown, who went to work in Israel, and Mr Hunter, who set up RISC in London.99
¶4.109 Mr Hunter's evidence was that he first met Mr Litvinenko in 2001 or 2002, when
introduced to him by Mr Berezovsky. He recalled that Mr Berezovsky thought that Mr Litvinenko might be useful to his business. He remembered meeting Mr Litvinenko on subsequent occasions, such as at other meetings with Mr Berezovsky. He appears to have formed a fairly low opinion of Mr Litvinenko's value as a possible source of intelligence – his view was that Mr Litvinenko's sources were likely to be historic and also that the views he offered might contain a political slant.100
¶4.110 There was evidence from others that Mr Litvinenko did undertake some work for RISC
in 2005 and 2006. Mr Hunter said that he had not been directly involved in such work, and that it would have been handled by Mr Knuckey, RISC's managing director, and by Garym Evans and Daniel Quirke, the investigators who were, successively, the people at RISC with whom Mr Litvinenko dealt on a day to day basis.
¶4.111 Written evidence of Mr Knuckey was read to the Inquiry. He recalled first meeting
Mr Litvinenko in the summer of 2004, when he conducted an investigation into the firebombing attack against the houses of Mr Litvinenko and Mr Zakayev (see above at paragraph 4.26). He added, "I believe he was known by the CEO Keith Hunter before then."101 Marina Litvinenko 4/53-54 Knuckey 7/36 INQ006389
¶4.112 Later in the same statement, Mr Knuckey stated that, "during 2005 our company
decided to use [Mr Litvinenko] as a source".102 Cole 17/119-122; Schofield 17/122-124 Knuckey 7/45 Shadrin 14/137-218 He said that he asked a member of his staff, Mr Evans, to manage Mr Litvinenko, and that when Mr Evans left RISC in February 2006, he "passed the management of Litvinenko to Dan Quirke",103 Marina Litvinenko 4/54 lines 22-23 Knuckey 7/45-46 Gorokov 13/142-155 another member of staff at RISC.
¶4.113 Mr Evans gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, and his evidence was broadly consistent
76with that of Mr Knuckey. He recalled being introduced to Mr Litvinenko by either Mr Hunter or Mr Knuckey, or both, in about the middle of 2005.104 Although he was told that he would be working with Mr Litvinenko, and the two met at the RISC offices in London about seven or eight times over the next few months, it does not appear that Mr Litvinenko was actually engaged to conduct any enquiries for RISC during the time that Mr Evans was managing him. Mr Evans said that when the two met they spent time discussing Russian politics. Mr Evans thought that Mr Litvinenko was keeping himself occupied, and also trying to build a relationship with RISC.105 There must have been some substance to the relationship between RISC and Mr Litvinenko, because Mr Evans remembered giving Mr Litvinenko two mobile phones and SIM cards at the latter's request – Mr Evans assumed they were to help him keep in touch with his "network of contacts."106 Marina Litvinenko 4/55-56; Baxter 17/125-127 Evans 7/26 INQ021208 Mr Knuckey's evidence was that RISC had gone further and
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
paid Mr Litvinenko £1,000 in cash to mark the start of their relationship. He said that Mr Evans would have made the payment, but, whilst Mr Evans did have a "vague recollection" of paying Mr Litvinenko a much smaller amount for expenses, he had no memory of this.107 The other notable feature of Mr Evans' evidence was that he remembered meeting Mr Lugovoy, with Mr Litvinenko, at the RISC offices in London at some stage in the last quarter of 2005.108
¶4.114 Mr Quirke also gave oral evidence to the Inquiry. He said that he was introduced to
Mr Litvinenko in February or March 2006, shortly before Mr Evans left the company, and took over as Mr Litvinenko's handler from that time.109 His understanding was that Mr Litvinenko was:
"… trying to establish a business, he was working hard, I think he was short of money. I think monies that he'd previously got from – as like a retainer from Mr Berezovsky had ceased and that left a hole in his finances."110 Virchis 18/13 Quirke 11/68 Shadrin 14/170-171
¶4.115 Mr Quirke said that he met Mr Litvinenko five or six times after the handover meeting.
The last of those meetings was on 17 October 2006, a meeting to which I shall return in due course.
¶4.116 The evidence I heard was that Mr Litvinenko was formally tasked with his first piece
of investigative work for RISC at around the time of the handover from Mr Evans to Mr Quirke. Mr Knuckey asserted in his statement that he gave Mr Litvinenko this piece of work at some point in the first quarter of 2006.111 Mr Quirke's evidence was broadly consistent – he thought that the tasking had commenced shortly before he took over from Mr Evans.112 The case on which Mr Litvinenko was tasked was a long-running case in which RISC acted for Stolichnaya vodka. Mr Quirke explained that RISC were undertaking investigations on behalf of Stolichnaya into what he described as a scheme sponsored by the Russian government to put the company out of business by, as he put it, "flood[ing] the market with knockoff versions of the brand." The task that Mr Litvinenko was given, apparently by Mr Knuckey, was to make enquiries into the Russian agriculture minister, named Mr Gordeyev.113
¶4.117 Mr Litvinenko did not conduct this investigation alone. Rather, he enlisted the
77assistance of Mr Lugovoy. The evidence of both Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke was that Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy attended a meeting at RISC's offices in London in about April or May 2006 when they presented the fruits of their investigation. Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke were not impressed. Mr Quirke explained that the information, "was not up to the standard we expected … [it] appeared to have been culled from Russian internet sites." Mr Lugovoy demanded US$10,000 for the information – Mr Quirke said that Mr Knuckey agreed to make a payment of US$7,500 to an account operated by Mr Lugovoy in Cyprus, in part because, "We wanted to cultivate and build this relationship."114 Virchis 18/20; 18/26-31 Quirke 11/82; Knuckey 7/46-49; Hunter 11/45-46 Mascall 11/126
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¶4.118 As we shall see, this would not be the last occasion on which Mr Lugovoy would
provide Mr Litvinenko with substandard material when purportedly assisting him in making enquiries into Russian targets.
¶4.119 Mr Quirke's evidence was that he had one further formal meeting with Mr Litvinenko
and Mr Lugovoy. That meeting took place on 17 October 2006.115 Also present on that occasion was Mr Kovtun. I shall return to that meeting in due course.
¶Erinys/Titon 4.120 The other two London private security companies with which Mr Litvinenko became
involved in the last year of his life were linked to each other. The two companies shared a director and also a suite of offices in Mayfair – offices that were to play an important part in the events that led to Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶4.121 Mr John Holmes, who gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, was a director of a large
multinational security company named Erinys International. He operated its UK subsidiary, Erinys UK. He was assisted in doing so by Mr Tim Reilly, who was employed by Erinys UK as a consultant. The major business of both Erinys companies was the provision of physical security services to the oil industry.116
¶4.122 Mr Holmes was also a co-director of an investigative due diligence business called
Titon International Limited. The other director, who managed the day to day work of the company, was called Mr Dean Attew.
¶4.123 Both companies were based in offices at 25 Grosvenor Street, Mayfair.
¶4.124 Mr Attew's evidence was that he first met Mr Litvinenko in 2004; thereafter the two men
became close personal friends and, latterly, business associates.117 Mr Attew stated that he saw Mr Litvinenko from time to time after they first met, and they became friends, but that they did not start to work together until about six months before Mr Litvinenko died – that is, about May 2006. It is clear that during those six months the two men became even closer – Mr Attew said that Mr Litvinenko would often pop into the Mayfair offices for a short chat – something that he sometimes did several times a week.118
¶4.125 Mr Attew described how another investigator for whom he sometimes worked needed
78some enquiries conducted on Russian targets, and that he asked Mr Litvinenko to undertake the work. He said that he probably requested the first of these reports from Mr Litvinenko in August 2006. Mr Attew's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko produced a total of four due diligence reports.119 It was apparent from the evidence of Mr Attew and others that, as with the work that he did for Mr Quirke relating to Mr Gordeyev, Mr Litvinenko obtained assistance from others in preparing these reports. For the first draft of one of the reports, Mr Litvinenko sought assistance from Mr Lugovoy. For the second draft of that report, and for all the others, Mr Litvinenko was assisted by Yuri Shvets.120
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶4.126 Mr Shvets was a former member of the Committee for State Security (KGB) who
emigrated to the United States (US) in 1993. From there, he wrote and published a book that was highly critical of what he described as the Russian "system", which, he told me, he regarded as "more dangerous to the country than any external enemy". He received threats following the publication of the book and he subsequently claimed and was granted asylum in the US.121 As I have described at paragraph 4.51 above, Mr Litvinenko and Mr Shvets had met and become friends in 2002 when they were both involved in the project relating to the so called 'Kuchma tapes'.
¶4.127 Mr Shvets told me that he had a telephone conversation with Mr Litvinenko in about
July 2006. Mr Shvets was already producing due diligence reports and he suggested to Mr Litvinenko that he should try and find customers for the reports in London. He said that he would pay Mr Litvinenko 20% of the fee for each report.122
¶4.128 One of the reports that Mr Attew commissioned Mr Litvinenko to provide is of particular
interest to this Inquiry. That was the report of which Mr Lugovoy prepared the first draft and Mr Shvets the second. The target of that report was a senior Russian politician named Victor Ivanov. Mr Attew explained that Mr Litvinenko had introduced him to Mr Lugovoy prior to the report being commissioned, and he had disliked him.
¶4.129 The view of Mr Attew and others was that the reports prepared by Mr Shvets were of
very high quality. Mr Litvinenko appears to have been paid thousands of pounds for each report,123 although the evidence was that the larger part of that money was sent by Mr Litvinenko to Mr Shvets.
¶4.130 Mr Reilly, who was employed by Mr Holmes as a consultant to Erinys UK, was a
specialist in oil and gas and a Russian speaker. His evidence was that Mr Attew introduced him to Mr Litvinenko at some point during the early summer of 2006 in the offices that the two companies shared. They spoke together in Russian and subsequently Mr Litvinenko would often drop by his office so that they could talk in Russian. Mr Reilly thought that he was one of the few people whom Mr Litvinenko knew who could speak Russian but was not a member of the Russian community in London. He estimated that he saw Mr Litvinenko between 20 and 30 times in 2006, between the early summer and November when Mr Litvinenko was taken ill.124
¶4.131 Mr Reilly's role at Erinys UK at the time was to attempt to secure contracts for the
Erinys companies in the Russian oil and gas fields, and in particular was attempting to cultivate contacts that he had made in the security department at Gazprom. According to Mr Reilly, Mr Litvinenko told him that he had a Russian friend who might be able to help, and that he should meet him. He put it in this way:
79"[Mr Litvinenko] mentioned he had a friend from his time in Russia who was also ex-KGB who had contacts in the security world and indeed had a security company himself amongst other businesses that he had, and that it would be useful perhaps to meet this guy who may be able to introduce me to Russian oil and gas industry in terms of its security departments."125 Michenina 18/89-93 Reilly 10/61-62 Mascall 11/132-136
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¶4.132 Mr Lugovoy duly came to the Mayfair offices with Mr Litvinenko to meet Mr Reilly.
Mr Reilly said that the first of these meetings took place in June or July 2006.126 The next meeting, at which Mr Lugovoy was accompanied by Mr Kovtun, took place on 16 October 2006; that is a meeting to which I shall return.
¶4.133 Mr Reilly's evidence was that, although the question of money was never discussed
between him and Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy, it was understood that they would be paid if, and only if, Erinys won a contract.127
¶Might this work have been linked to Mr Litvinenko's death? 4.134 As I suggested at the beginning of this Part, Mr Litvinenko's apparent keenness
to develop his work with private security companies in the period 2005-6 may well be explained by a desire, and/or a need, to establish sources of income that were independent of Mr Berezovsky. I heard evidence that Mr Litvinenko was exploring other similar ventures – for example, he asked for Mr Reilly's advice about a project to import ethanol from the Ukraine,128 and also discussed a possible deal involving copper trading with Mr Attew.129
¶4.135 Mr Litvinenko's life, then, was starting to move in a new direction. He was meeting
and doing business with people outside the close circle around Mr Berezovsky. He was investigating people, often influential people, in Russia, and seeking to sell the fruits of those investigations to their business partners and rivals.
¶4.136 The question that I must address is whether, in taking these steps, Mr Litvinenko
was placing himself at risk. In particular, I must consider whether the new work that Mr Litvinenko was undertaking was in any way connected with his death.
¶4.137 The first point to make is that I heard clear evidence that those who commissioned due
diligence type work from Mr Litvinenko took careful steps to preserve his anonymity as the source of information that they then relayed to their clients. Mr Quirke stated that the names of sources were kept confidential even within the office, and that Mr Litvinenko's name would not have been written on any report or mentioned orally to any of their clients.130 Mr Evans131 and Mr Hunter132 gave evidence to similar effect, and the same basic principle was implicit in Mr Attew's evidence.
¶4.138 It follows that, at least as regards most of the reports that Mr Litvinenko was involved
80in preparing, there is no particular reason to think that his role in providing what may have been damaging information ever became known to anyone affected by it. One exception to this is the Ivanov report that I have referred to above. There is reason to think that this report might have found its way back to Mr Ivanov and others in the Kremlin, together with the fact that Mr Litvinenko had been responsible for preparing it. I will return to this particular report in the next Part (see below, Part 5, chapter 4).
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶4.139 Moving on, the question that I posed at paragraph 4.106 above was whether
Mr Litvinenko's need to establish a network of sources to assist him in this investigative work may have led him to associate with people who wished him harm.
¶4.140 The summary of the evidence relating to Mr Litvinenko's private security work
that I have set out above contains references to Mr Litvinenko seeking to involve Mr Lugovoy in a number of different projects. Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy were old acquaintances; but the evidence is clear that it was this work that led to them becoming closer in the period 2005.
¶Andrey Lugovoy 4.141 Mr Lugovoy is a central figure in the issues to which this Inquiry give rise. Although
he did not give oral evidence, I heard a good deal of oral evidence about him. I also admitted into evidence a number of the accounts that he has given about the events in question. It will be convenient to say a little by way of introduction about him at this point.
¶4.142 I heard that Mr Lugovoy was born in Baku in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) in 1966, which made him four years younger than Mr Litvinenko.133 Not unlike Mr Litvinenko, Mr Lugovoy was born into a family that was proud of its military history and its record of service to Russia. At a press conference in May 2007, Mr Lugovoy said this about his family:
"I was born into a family of a military person. My grandad fought in the Russo- Japanese war of 1904. He was awarded a St George's Cross, one of the highest military honours of the Russian empire. My other grandad took part in the storming of Berlin. My father served in the army for 39 years. My brother is a steersman on an atomic submarine and I am a professional military man by training. I was brought up in the tradition of a real Russian officer. I am proud that for the last few years in my opinion Russia started to gain its place in the world as a stage of geopolitical importance, which has always influenced politics and I hope will influence politics. It was so before the October revolution, and after it. There was a small period of time when nobody took Russia into account for ten years. Now, gentlemen, you will have to take Russia into account."134 Berezovsky 25/19 lines 20-21 INQ001886 (page 21) INQ001788 (page 21)
¶4.143 In the passage that I have quoted Mr Lugovoy said that he was a military man by
training, and I heard some further evidence on that subject. I heard that he attended military college, and then joined the Ninth Directorate of the KGB, which was responsible for providing protection for senior state officials. Like Mr Litvinenko, on the break-up of the KGB Mr Lugovoy continued to undertake the same work, albeit for a differently named organisation. In Mr Lugovoy's case, he was a member of the Federal Protection Service (FPS), which was the successor organisation to the Ninth Directorate.135 It appears that Mr Lugovoy was never a member of the FSB.136
¶4.144 I heard that in 1996 Mr Lugovoy resigned from the FPS to become Head of Security
81at ORT, the television station that was run at that time by Mr Berezovsky and his business partner Mr Patarkatsishvili. Mr Lugovoy remained in that job until 2001, when he was required to leave the company. It will be recalled that that was at about
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the time when Mr Berezovsky left Russia and gave up control of ORT, having fallen out with President Putin. I heard that Mr Lugovoy's explanation for his departure from ORT at this time was that he was required to leave the company because he was perceived to be one of Mr Berezovsky's associates.137
¶4.145 Unlike Mr Berezovsky, Mr Lugovoy did not leave Russia. Rather, he developed various successful business interests, including a security company named Ninth Wave.138
¶4.146 I also heard evidence about an event in Mr Lugovoy's life that took place shortly
after his departure from ORT, and which is of considerable potential significance to the issues that arise in this Inquiry. The evidence I heard was that Mr Lugovoy was arrested and convicted in 2001 of attempting to assist another of Mr Berezovsky's associates, named Mr Glushkov, to escape from prison. The evidence was that he was released in 2002, after 15 months' imprisonment.139
¶4.147 As we shall see, questions have been asked about this chapter of Mr Lugovoy's story.
The underlying theme of these questions has been the possibility that Mr Lugovoy was, or became, an FSB agent tasked to act against Mr Berezovsky and his associates. It has been suggested that Mr Lugovoy's conviction and imprisonment were fabricated in order to add to his credibility with Mr Berezovsky. Mr Glushkov, for example, stated that Mr Lugovoy had never been seen in the Lefortovo prison during the time that he was supposedly detained there.140 Another suggestion has been that Mr Lugovoy may have been recruited by the FSB whilst in prison. One focus of speculation in this regard has been Mr Lugovoy's successful business career following his release from prison, in particular in the security business, which was closely monitored by the FSB. I heard evidence that Andrei Vasiliev, the editor of the Russian newspaper Kommersant, had put the matter in this way:
"There is a saying 'there is no such thing as a former KGB man'… I find Lugovoy's story a little strange. He was in prison, had a criminal record and suddenly he is okay, is allowed to do business, still having contact with Berezovsky. It raises questions."141 Nathwani 18/103 Mascall 8/47-48 Mascall 12/10-12
¶4.148 As I have described, both Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy were associates of
Mr Berezovsky in Moscow during the late 1990s, and both gave an account of having met occasionally at that time.142 They also gave consistent accounts of not having had any contact with each other for some years following Mr Litvinenko's departure from Moscow, and of then meeting again in London in 2004 or 2005. However, their accounts differ in what may be significant respects as to the timing and circumstances of their first meeting in London.
¶4.149 As to the timing of their first meeting in London, Mr Litvinenko said twice during the
82course of his interviews with DI Hyatt that the meeting had taken place in 2004. He also said that Mr Lugovoy had been in London at the time to watch either CSKA Moscow or Spartak play Chelsea.143 Mr Lugovoy's account (in the witness statement that he gave in the Terluk litigation) was that the meeting had taken place in October
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
2005, but he also said that the meeting had coincided with his trip to London to watch CSKA Moscow play Chelsea.144 There is evidence before the Inquiry that CSKA Moscow played Chelsea in London on 20 October 2004; there were no matches between the two teams in 2005 – nor were there any matches between Chelsea and Spartak in either year.145 It therefore appears very likely that Mr Litvinenko's account was accurate and that the two men first met in London in October 2004.
¶4.150 There is also a divergence between the accounts of the two men as to how the
meeting was arranged. Mr Litvinenko told DI Hyatt that Mr Lugovoy contacted him and suggested that they meet. Mr Lugovoy, on the other hand, stated in the witness statement to which I have referred above that Mr Litvinenko had contacted him and asked to meet. Since this was the occasion on which the relationship between the two men was renewed, the question of who initiated the process is of some importance. I will return to this question in Part 9 below.
¶4.151 Following that meeting Mr Litvinenko drew Mr Lugovoy into his business activities,
often describing him as his 'Moscow contact'. On the evidence that I have heard, the first occasion on which Mr Litvinenko took Mr Lugovoy to a business meeting in London was the meeting with Mr Evans in late 2005. That was followed by the meeting with Mr Quirke and Mr Knuckey in April/May 2006, then the meetings with Mr Attew and Mr Reilly, and the further meeting with Mr Quirke, later in the year. Marina Litvinenko gave evidence that she recalled meeting Mr Lugovoy at Mr Berezovsky's 60th birthday party, held at Blenheim Palace in January 2006. She also recalled that Mr Lugovoy and his wife had visited Mr Litvinenko at their home in north London during July 2006, whilst she and Anatoly were away on holiday.146
¶4.152 As I have explained above, neither Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke, nor Mr Attew, were
at all impressed by the due diligence reports compiled by Mr Lugovoy. Mr Attew also stated that he took a strong personal dislike to Mr Lugovoy when he met him with Mr Litvinenko at Heathrow Airport in June 2006. Mr Attew's evidence was that, on meeting Mr Lugovoy, he disliked and distrusted him. He added:
"I have met many different people from many different countries, and you on occasions meet people that worry you, concern you, scare you, and in this instance, there was something I would describe as cold, scarily cold about Lugovoy. It wasn't that I felt frightened; it wasn't that I felt in harm's way in any way. I just didn't like the characteristics of the individual or the profile that was sitting in front of me."147 Nathwani 18/113 Attew 13/85-86 INQ001788 (page 22)
Mr Attew also stated that he returned to the Erinys/Titon offices after meeting Mr Lugovoy and recounted his experience to Mr Holmes and Mr Reilly. He also advised his colleagues that they should not allow Mr Lugovoy into the offices and, more importantly, that they should not do any business with him.148 As I have explained, Mr Reilly ignored both pieces of advice.
¶4.153 But it is striking that Mr Litvinenko appears to have had a very different opinion
83of Mr Lugovoy to that of Mr Attew. Mr Attew told me that Mr Litvinenko described Mr Lugovoy to him as "a good friend."149 Nathwani 18/123-124 Attew 13/45 Glushkov 17/6-21 Mr Quirke's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko described Mr Lugovoy to him as "someone… that he trusted and who was in Russia
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and could help us",150 and Mr Reilly's impression of Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy's relationship was that they were, "fairly frank and open with each other, very comfortable in each other's presence".151 Nathwani 18/124 Reilly 10/65 Felshtinsky 23/160-161
¶4.154 Mr Shvets also told me that Mr Litvinenko trusted Mr Lugovoy. He recalled that he
and Mr Litvinenko discussed whether Mr Lugovoy could be trusted after Mr Litvinenko told him that he had given a copy of the Ivanov report that Mr Shvets had drafted to Mr Lugovoy. The conversation, as Mr Shvets recounted it, is a telling one:
"Then it was dangerous, because I didn't know who that guy was, this Russian guy was, and basically it was dangerous for – it could be dangerous for my network. And this is why I said: Sasha, do you understand what you are doing, because it may be dangerous for us both. And this is when I started asking questions, do you really know this guy, and he told me what he could tell me about him. Basically he told me that he had known him for more years than he knew me. He said that don't worry, I trust this guy entirely, because – and basically he told me his four criteria. First, this Russian guy, Sasha said, he had worked with the KGB, as we did, all right, so we are from the same league. Then he said that, like I, that's Sasha, and this guy, we worked with the Russian security agencies. Okay. Third criteria, he said that this guy, like Sasha, worked for Boris Berezovsky. And the fourth criteria was that this guy, he had served time in jail for his association with Boris Berezovsky, like Sasha did. So for Sasha, these two last criteria, they were essential for him to trust this guy entirely. Sasha said, like, you know, this guy, he is like me, he has served time in jail for Boris Berezovsky, I trust him entirely. I said: okay, it's your choice, you did it, but let's see what happens next."152 Henry 18/139-140 Shvets 24/74-75 Glushkov 17/11-12
¶4.155 Whether Mr Litvinenko was right to trust Mr Lugovoy, and whether Mr Lugovoy was
84connected to what did "happen next" to Mr Litvinenko, are issues that lie at the heart of this Inquiry.
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85¶Part:5 Marina Litvinenko 3/15 lines 14-16 Service 28/71 lines 1-4 INQ019194 Marina Litvinenko 4/8-9 Alexander Litvinenko's final months
Chapter 1: Introduction
¶5.1 The summer and early autumn of 2006 saw a number of developments in the themes
86that I have set out above, developments that I will consider before turning in the next Part to the events that immediately preceded Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry