Chapter 6: Who administered the poison?
Chapter 6: Who administered the poison?
¶Introduction 8.60 I have found that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 when he
drank tea in the Pine Bar on 1 November 2006. I have also found that he did not put the polonium 210 into the teapot himself – either by accident, or as a deliberate means of committing suicide.
¶8.61 There is an obvious question that arises. If Mr Litvinenko did not put the polonium 210 into the teapot that afternoon, who did?
¶8.62 The Metropolitan Police officers who have investigated this case believe that
Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko on 1 November. I heard evidence that warrants for the arrests of both men have been issued.7 Mr Horwell, in his closing submissions made on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service, asserted that: "the evidence points resolutely to Lugovoy and Kovtun and no one else as having administered the poison which killed Litvinenko."8 Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61
¶8.63 I stress, and it is of the first importance, that I have analysed this issue, like all others
in this Inquiry, in an entirely independent and dispassionate manner. Although I have had the great advantage of being able to consider the evidence gathered by the Metropolitan Police, their views as to where that evidence points have been accorded no special weight. I have approached the evidence with an open mind. I have considered it objectively. I have drawn my own conclusions as to what the evidence shows.
¶8.64 It will be helpful for me to summarise at this stage the findings that I have made.
¶8.65 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun placed the polonium 210 in the teapot at the
¶Pine Bar on 1 November 2006.
¶8.66 I am sure that they did this with the intention of poisoning Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.67 I am sure that the two men had made an earlier attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko, also using polonium 210, at the Erinys meeting on 16 October 2006.
¶8.68 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun knew that they were using a deadly poison
(as opposed to, for example, a 'truth drug' or a sleeping draught), and that they intended to kill Mr Litvinenko. I do not believe, however, that they knew precisely what the chemical they were handling was, or the nature of all of its properties.
¶Scientific evidence indicating Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.69 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have never disputed either (a) that they met Mr Litvinenko
193in the Pine Bar on the afternoon of 1 November 2006; or (b) that they ordered the tea which Mr Litvinenko says he drank when he met them there. There is, in any event, very clear independent evidence on both of these points (see Part 6, chapter 8).
¶Part 8 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Who killed Alexander Litvinenko?
¶8.70 Given the findings that I have made above regarding the time and place at which, and
the means by which, Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210, these matters are clearly sufficient to raise a question as to the possible involvement of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun in the poisoning. On their own, however, these facts do not establish anything more than that.
¶8.71 I have referred above to the forensic evidence of polonium 210 contamination found
in the Pine Bar in the context of my finding that the Pine Bar was the location of Mr Litvinenko's fatal poisoning. Similarly, it is the forensic evidence of polonium 210 contamination found in other places associated with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun that I regard as the most important evidence of their responsibility for the poisoning. There are three points that I make in this regard.
¶8.72 First, the extensive testing for radiation throughout the Millennium Hotel only revealed
one area of primary contamination apart from those found in the Pine Bar. That was in the plughole of the room occupied by Mr Kovtun and Mr Sokolenko.
¶8.73 Second, secondary contamination was found in Mr Lugovoy's bedroom and also (at
particularly high levels) in the gentlemen's lavatories close to the Pine Bar. CCTV footage shows that both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun visited those lavatories prior to the meeting with Mr Litvinenko. The same footage demonstrates that Mr Litvinenko did not visit those lavatories during his time in the hotel.
¶8.74 Third, these findings form part of a wider pattern. Primary polonium 210 contamination
was also found in the bathroom of room 107 of the Best Western Hotel, where Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun changed prior to their meeting at Erinys on 16 October 2006, and where Mr Lugovoy slept that night, and also in the bathroom of room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel, where Mr Lugovoy stayed between 25 and 27 October 2006. Secondary contamination was also discovered, as I have recounted in Part 6, in a large number of places associated with the two men during this period.
¶8.75 It will be recalled that A1 gave evidence to the effect that a finding of primary
contamination was only consistent with the surface in question being exposed directly to a source of polonium 210. In practical terms, this means that polonium 210 must have been handled in each of the three hotel bedrooms to which I have referred above. This amounts to highly compelling evidence of a connection between Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and the (extremely rare) isotope with which Mr Litvinenko was poisoned, including such evidence found in the very hotel where the poisoning took place.
¶8.76 I consider that this evidence on its own would have been sufficient to satisfy me
that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were responsible for Mr Litvinenko's poisoning, and in particular that one or other or both of them handled the polonium 210, which was used to kill Mr Litvinenko, in the bathroom of room 382 of the Millennium Hotel (i.e. Mr Kovtun's room).
¶8.77 But there is further evidence to consider, to which I shall next turn.
¶8.78 Before doing so, there is one further point to make about the pattern of primary
194contamination found in the hotel bedrooms. There is a striking similarity as to the location of the primary contamination found in room 382 of the Millennium Hotel and in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel. In both places, primary contamination was found inside the plughole in the bathroom. The natural inference is that polonium 210 had been poured down the sink. Since this appears to have happened in both rooms,
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
it is logical to assume that it was part of a routine, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the routine was connected with the preparation and/or the disposal of polonium 210.
¶8.79 I have already expressed my view that room 382 of the Millennium Hotel was used to
handle the polonium 210 that killed Mr Litvinenko. Given the similar findings in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel, it is a reasonable assumption that something similar occurred there. I have referred above to the scientific evidence which shows that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on an occasion prior to 1 November 2006, and to other evidence that tends to suggest that this occasion might have been the Erinys meeting on 16 October. Given, additionally, (a) my finding that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on 1 November by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun; and (b) the similarity between the findings of primary contamination at room 107 of the Best Western Hotel and room 382 of the Millennium Hotel, I make the further findings that Mr Litvinenko was also poisoned with polonium 210 by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Erinys meeting on 16 October 2006, and that the polonium 210 used on that occasion was prepared and/or disposed of in the bathroom of room 107 of the Best Western Hotel.
¶8.80 For completeness, I note that the primary contamination found in the bathroom of
room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel was found not in the sink, but in the bin. Primary contamination was also found on towels in the hotel laundry. It is perhaps significant in this regard that there is no other evidence of an attempt being made to poison Mr Litvinenko during this period (for example, no primary contamination was found in the Palm Court bar at the hotel, where Mr Litvinenko appears to have met Mr Lugovoy on two occasions during the latter's stay). There is insufficient evidence for me to make any findings about what happened at the Sheraton Hotel, but I observe that the primary contamination found there was consistent with Mr Lugovoy having spilled the polonium 210 in the course of handling it, and then mopping it up with the towels that were subsequently found in the laundry.
¶Other evidence indicating Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.81 I turn to consider the other evidential matters that I consider support my findings that
¶Mr Litvinenko was poisoned by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
¶Accounts given by Lugovoy and Kovtun 8.82 Neither Mr Lugovoy nor, in the end, Mr Kovtun, gave oral evidence to the Inquiry.
However, both have made public statements concerning the case since 2006 and Mr Kovtun provided the Inquiry with a witness statement. I admitted this material in evidence, and have referred to it extensively.
¶8.83 I should make it clear that I do not regard the simple fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun
did not give evidence before me as evidence that in itself supports the proposition that they poisoned Mr Litvinenko. There was some debate about this matter, but in the end all core participants agreed that I should not draw any adverse inferences from the fact that neither man has given evidence before me (see Appendix 1, paragraph 123). I do not do so.
¶8.84 That said, as I have observed on a number of occasions during my review of the
195evidence, the fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence means that I am left without answers to questions that they would have been asked had they
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attended. Put another way, I do not have their explanations for inconsistencies or gaps in their accounts. This may lead to me making findings against them that I would not have made had they given their explanation. There is no avoiding that.
from Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun that was available to me. I have referred to these deficiencies during my review of the evidence and it will suffice here to give four examples.
¶8.86 First, there are some striking anomalies in the accounts that both men have given of
their meeting with Mr Litvinenko on 1 November. Both men have stated, in insistent terms, that it was Mr Litvinenko who made the first contact on that day, and asked to meet up. Mr Litvinenko, on the other hand, said that Mr Lugovoy had telephoned him and suggested the meeting. It is plain from the telephone schedule that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were wrong about this (see paragraphs 6.275 – 6.282).
¶8.87 Mr Lugovoy initially declined to give an account of the meeting at the Pine Bar
because, he said, the room had been covered by, "high quality video equipment, which doubtless recorded the meeting". In fact, there was no such video equipment in the Pine Bar, and it is not credible that Mr Lugovoy, as a security professional, could have mistakenly thought that there was. One is left, therefore, with the conclusion that he was lying about this (see paragraph 6.315).
¶8.88 Mr Kovtun told a German newspaper in December 2006 (i.e. a few weeks after the
meeting in the Pine Bar) that he did not have a clear memory of the meeting and that at the time he had paid more attention to his cigar. More than eight years later, the statement that he provided to the Inquiry contained a detailed account of the meeting, including an assertion that Mr Litvinenko "grabbed the teapot on the table and, without waiting for an invitation, poured himself some tea" and that he "gulped down two cups of hot tea one after the other … [and] then had a coughing fit" (see paragraphs 6.318 – 6.319). There is no reason at all to think that Mr Kovtun's memory had improved dramatically so many years after the event. The only logical conclusion is that he was lying on one or other (or both) of the two occasions.
¶8.89 Second, in the years since 2006 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have given markedly
different accounts of a conversation that one or other of them is supposed to have had with Mr Litvinenko on 17 October 2006. I have set out the various accounts that they have given at paragraphs 6.144 – 6.149 above. A common theme of these accounts is the claim that Mr Litvinenko was trying to engage the two men in a blackmail scheme. However, the discrepancies between the accounts (for example, where the conversation took place, the target of the intended blackmail, and to whom Mr Litvinenko was speaking) are so great that they cannot be explained by confusion or loss of memory. In my view, they are only consistent with a deliberate attempt to mislead.
¶8.90 Third, the explanations that Mr Kovtun has given as to the purpose of his travel to
London on 1 November are profoundly unsatisfactory. For the reasons that I have explained at paragraphs 6.245 – 6.250 above, this appears to be another example of Mr Kovtun providing misleading information about an important issue in the case.
¶8.91 The deficiencies in the accounts that have been provided by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun,
196of which the matters set out above are only examples, lead to two conclusions. First, I do not regard the evidence that the two men have given about these events as
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
credible, and I will not accept any part of their accounts in the absence of corroboration from a reliable source of evidence. Second, and more importantly, I make a positive finding that both men have deliberately attempted to mislead the recipients of the various accounts they have given regarding crucial issues in the case. I infer that they have done so in order to conceal their own actions. These findings support my overall conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶Timing of travel bookings 8.92 The three key events that took place in this case during October and early November
2006 were the three visits to London that I have described in Part 6 above – the first visit made by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, the second by Mr Lugovoy alone and the third by a larger group including both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
¶8.93 As well as hearing evidence as to what took place during these visits, I also heard
evidence about the travel arrangements that had been made (e.g. flight and hotel bookings) for each visit.
¶8.94 There are two points that emerged from this evidence that are worthy of mention.
¶8.95 First, it was striking that the timing of the first visit seemed to turn on Mr Kovtun's availability to travel. I have touched on this issue above, at paragraph 6.64.
¶8.96 Mr Lugovoy was the senior of the two men in terms of their business relationships.
His visa had been renewed in the summer, and he was therefore able to travel to the United Kingdom (UK) whenever he wished. It is notable, therefore, that the bookings for the flights and hotel rooms, which were both made in the days after Mr Kovtun's UK visa was issued on 5 October 2006, appear to have been held up until it was known when Mr Kovtun would be able to make the trip. Although Mr Kovtun attended business meetings when the trip to London did take place, there was nothing in the evidence that I heard about those meetings to suggest that his attendance was in any way essential.
¶8.97 I have already made a finding that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko
with polonium 210 at their meeting in the Erinys boardroom on 16 October 2006, during this first trip. The evidence about the timing of the bookings is at the very least consistent with this finding, and I consider that it adds some weight to it. The evidence suggests that the true purpose of the trip was not to attend a series of business meetings at which Mr Kovtun would be no more than a mute observer, but rather, as I have found, to attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko – an operation in which Mr Kovtun was intended to play, and did play, a key role.
¶8.98 The second point concerns the timing of the decision that Mr Kovtun should join the
third trip to London. This is a point that is addressed at paragraphs 6.188 – 6.189 above. In the statement that he provided to the Inquiry, Mr Kovtun suggested that he had not even contemplated flying to London on 1 November to join Mr Lugovoy and the others until 30 October (see discussion at paragraph 6.244 above). That was not true – the booking for his return flight from London to Moscow had been made several days earlier on 27 October. I am satisfied that that was the time at which the decision was made that Mr Kovtun would go to London.
¶8.99 That date of 27 October was midway through the trip that Mr Lugovoy made to
¶London alone, when he stayed in room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel. I am satisfied that
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Mr Lugovoy had a quantity of polonium 210 with him on this occasion. As I have said, the forensic evidence is of primary contamination both in the bin in the bathroom of room 848, and also on two towels in the hotel laundry, which I am satisfied must have come from room 848. One possible explanation for the pattern of contamination is that Mr Lugovoy spilled the polonium 210 and mopped it up with the towels, or perhaps simply poured it into the bin. There is no evidence that there was any attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko during this trip, despite the fact that Mr Lugovoy met him twice in the Palm Court bar of the Sheraton.
¶8.100 Although there is insufficient evidence for me to make any positive finding on the
point, I regard it as possible that this pattern of events at the Sheraton explains why the decision was taken, on 27 October, that Mr Kovtun should travel to London on 1 November. It is at least possible that the decision was taken, in light of events at the Sheraton, that Mr Lugovoy would need Mr Kovtun's assistance on the next attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko, and that is why the return flight was booked for him on that day.
¶8.101 I do not suggest that this evidence relating to the timing of travel arrangements is at
the centre of this case, but it adds to the picture. And it offers some support for the conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶Did Mr Kovtun tell D3 that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko? 8.102 I now turn to a part of the case that is, on any view, of considerable significance. I
refer to the evidence concerning Mr Kovtun's conversation with D3 in Hamburg on the evening of 30 October 2006, and his subsequent attempts to contact C2.
¶8.103 I have set out the evidence relating to these issues at some length above – see in particular paragraphs 6.205 – 6.225 and 6.261 – 6.273.
¶8.104 There is no doubt that Mr Kovtun met D3 in Hamburg that evening. There is also no
doubt that on the following day,31 BLK000253 (page 4); Marina Litvinenko 3/50-51 Goldfarb 5/122-123; 26/17-18; 26/26 Bukovsky 26/91-92 Moughton 8/115-116 INQ020031 (page 4 paragraphs S17-S18) October 2006, Mr Kovtun obtained C2's phone number by telephoning D6, who got the number from D7 after he had spoken to C2. There is, finally, no doubt that Mr Kovtun telephoned C2 the day after that, from London, using Mr Lugovoy's phone.
¶8.105 There are two, connected, issues in respect of which I must make findings. The first
is whether D3 has told the truth about what Mr Kovtun said to him that evening. In particular, did Mr Kovtun tell D3 that he had "a very expensive poison" and that he needed a cook "to put poison in Litvinenko's food or drink"? Second, what was the reason for Mr Kovtun calling C2 in London on 1 November 2006?
¶8.106 I have come to the conclusion that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 that he was looking for a cook
to assist in poisoning Mr Litvinenko, and that in telephoning C2 he was attempting – unsuccessfully, as it turned out – to put that plan into operation.
¶8.107 The primary basis on which I have reached this conclusion is the utterly unconvincing
198explanation that Mr Kovtun has given for making the call to C2 on 1 November. I have analysed that explanation, together with Mr Kovtun's account of his conversations with C2 and Dr Shadrin, in some detail at paragraphs 6.261 – 6.273 above. I do not propose to go back over what I have said there, save to repeat that, despite not having had the advantage of hearing Mr Kovtun give oral evidence, I am quite satisfied that the explanation that he has given for making contact with C2, together
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
with his account of conversations with C2 and Dr Shadrin, is a total fabrication. The term that I used above, which I repeat, is that his story is a tissue of lies.
¶8.108 There must be a reason why Mr Kovtun has fabricated this elaborate story about
wishing to employ C2 to work in a restaurant in Moscow, and being unable to see him because Dr Shadrin told him that Stratford was 3-4 hours drive from central London. That reason is not difficult to deduce. I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did wish to enlist C2 as an accomplice in the plans that he and Mr Lugovoy were making to poison Mr Litvinenko. I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 in the course of their conversation in Hamburg that this was why he wished to make contact with C2, and that D3 has told the truth about that conversation. And I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun has fabricated the story about wishing to employ C2 – as well as his evidence about D3's unreliability – in order to conceal that truth.
¶8.109 There are three other matters that fortify me in these conclusions.
¶8.110 First, there is the forensic evidence, to which I have referred above, that demonstrates
that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were involved in a series of attempts to poison Mr Litvinenko. Mr Kovtun's boast that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko with "a very expensive poison" may have appeared outlandish to D3, but there is a wealth of independent evidence before me that shows that that is exactly what he was planning to do.
¶8.111 Second, my findings that, by the time Mr Kovtun spoke to D3 on 30 October, he and
Mr Lugovoy had already made one, and perhaps two, unsuccessful attempts to kill Mr Litvinenko are also of some significance here. Their previous lack of success makes it more plausible that they wished to alter their methods and enlist some support.
¶8.112 Third, it is impossible to overlook the fact that only a few minutes after Mr Kovtun had
phoned C2 on Mr Lugovoy's phone and discovered that he was too busy to meet that day,1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 November, a call was made from the same phone to Mr Litvinenko. The call to C2, which lasted one minute and 14 seconds, was timed at 11.33am. The call to Mr Litvinenko, which lasted nearly five minutes, was timed at 11.41am (see paragraph 6.251(e) above).
¶8.113 The apparent link between the call to C2 and the call to Mr Litvinenko is highly suggestive.
¶8.114 As I have recounted above, Mr Litvinenko told the police that Mr Lugovoy had
telephoned him during the morning of 1 November and said that, "he would like to meet for a short time" later that day. Mr Litvinenko said that it was during this conversation that the meeting at the Pine Bar was arranged. I am satisfied that Mr Litvinenko's account is accurate, and that the call in question was the call recorded as having been made to Mr Litvinenko from Mr Lugovoy's phone at 11.41am. I regard Mr Lugovoy's claim that in fact Mr Litvinenko called him and asked to meet, which is inconsistent with the telephone evidence, as a deliberate attempt to mislead.
¶8.115 Further, I think it likely that Mr Lugovoy called Mr Litvinenko at 11.41am and suggested
199a meeting later that day in direct consequence of the discussion that Mr Kovtun had had with C2 a few minutes earlier. Once it had become apparent to Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun that they would not get any help from C2, at least not in the short term, they decided to make another attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko themselves. Their plan,
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which they subsequently put into effect, was to make this attempt in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel.
¶8.116 In summary on this point, I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 in the course of
their discussions in Hamburg that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko, and that he telephoned C2 on the morning of 1 November in an attempt to enlist his support in carrying out this plan.
¶8.117 For the reasons that I have set out above, this finding is both consistent with and strongly
corroborative of the other evidence that points to the conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶The duration of Lugovoy's operation against Mr Litvinenko 8.118 I have referred at paragraphs 4.148 – 4.150 above to the evidence about the first
meeting in London between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko. As I have said, it appears that this meeting took place in October 2004. There was a divergence between the evidence of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko as to which of them had made the first contact. In light of my general findings regarding Mr Lugovoy's credibility, as well as my finding as to his involvement in poisoning Mr Litvinenko, I am satisfied that, as Mr Litvinenko said, it was Mr Lugovoy who first contacted him in 2004, and not the other way around. I would add that I regard it as entirely possible that Mr Lugovoy was already at that stage involved in a plan to target Mr Litvinenko, perhaps with a view to killing him.
¶Lugovoy and Kovtun's conduct since November 2006 8.119 I have already made it clear that I do not regard the fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun
have not given evidence to the Inquiry as something that amounts in itself to evidence of their responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.120 However, I did hear evidence on a number of other matters relating to Mr Lugovoy
and Mr Kovtun's conduct since November 2006 that I do regard as supportive of my finding that they poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.121 I have referred above (see paragraph 4.73) to the 2008 El Pais interview in which
Mr Lugovoy said that he believed Mr Litvinenko to have been "a traitor" and also, a little later, referred to Oleg Gordievsky (whom he knew to have been a friend of Mr Litvinenko) saying that, "if someone has caused the Russian state serious damage, they should be exterminated". The fact that Mr Lugovoy said these things does not, of course, mean that he killed Mr Litvinenko. But the fact that he held these views is certainly consistent with him having done so. I regard the fact that Mr Lugovoy expressed these views as supportive of my overall finding that he did poison Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.122 Of rather more significance is an incident described to me in evidence by Michael
Cotlick, who was Boris Berezovsky's personal assistant from 2005 until Mr Berezovsky's death in 2013.
¶8.123 Mr Cotlick told me about an incident that took place in Mr Berezovsky's London offices in July 2010.9 Mr Cotlick described how he had been called to Mr Berezovsky's
200¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
201personal office and went in to find Mr Berezovsky with two men. One of the men was Yuri Dubov, who worked with Mr Berezovsky. The other man was named Rafael Filinov. He was Russian, and had recently arrived in London from Moscow. Mr Cotlick was shown a T-shirt that Mr Filinov had given to Mr Berezovsky. Mr Filinov explained that he had been given the T-shirt in Moscow by Mr Lugovoy and, at Mr Lugovoy's request, had delivered it as a gift to Mr Berezovsky. There was writing printed on the T-shirt (which can be seen in the photographs of the T-shirt below). The writing was in extraordinary terms. The writing on the front of the T-shirt read "POLONIUM-210 CSKA LONDON, HAMBURG To Be Continued". The writing on the back of the T-shirt read, "CSKA Moscow Nuclear Death Is Knocking Your Door".10
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¶Police photographs of the T-shirt 11
202¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶8.124 Mr Cotlick said that he was aware that Mr Filinov had a personal relationship with
Mr Lugovoy. He said that he had "no doubt whatsoever" that Mr Lugovoy had himself handed the T-shirt to Mr Filinov, in order for him to give it to Mr Berezovsky.
¶8.125 Taken on its own (and without, of course, the benefit of oral evidence from Mr Lugovoy),
it would be difficult to know what to make of this T-shirt. On any view, it demonstrates that Mr Lugovoy approved of Mr Litvinenko's murder. It was also, clearly, a threat to Mr Berezovsky. Further than that, the T-shirt could be seen as an admission by Mr Lugovoy that he had poisoned Mr Litvinenko, made at a time when he was confident that he would never be extradited from Russia, and wished to taunt Mr Berezovsky with that fact. Alternatively, it could, perhaps, be seen as an extraordinarily tasteless joke.
¶8.126 However, the T-shirt does not stand alone. As I have indicated, I am satisfied on the
basis of other evidence (most importantly, the forensic evidence) that Mr Lugovoy did indeed poison Mr Litvinenko. Set against that context, this T-shirt can only be seen as Mr Lugovoy's gleeful acknowledgement of his part in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.127 There is one last matter to address under this heading, and it relates to Mr Kovtun.
I have referred above to the fact that, after Mr Litvinenko's death, Mr Kovtun had a conversation with his ex-wife's mother, Elenora Wall, about the radiation poisoning that he was suffering from. When interviewed by the German authorities, Dr Wall gave this account of the conversation:
"He told me that he had probably got some of the poison which killed Litvinenko. He said word for word, 'Those arseholes have probably poisoned us all'."12 Berezovsky 25/3-30 Marina Litvinenko 4/31-32; 4/41; 4/112-114 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 69) INQ021208 (page 6) Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ020031 No person shall produce or show to any witness any of the Schedule material, or ask any questions which tend to reveal the existence or content of such material, otherwise than in accordance with a procedure formulated by the Core Inquiry Team and agreed in writing by the Minister.
¶8.128 It seems to me to be at least possible that this comment made by Mr Kovtun to his mother-in-law, no doubt in an unguarded moment, was a revealing one.
¶8.129 The implication of his words is that a group of people, the unidentified "arseholes"
– had been responsible for poisoning both Mr Litvinenko and him – and possibly Mr Lugovoy as well. This would not be consistent with the case pursued by the Russian investigators, who accused Mr Litvinenko of having poisoned Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy. But it would be consistent with a scenario in which others had tasked Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy to kill Mr Litvinenko, and had given them a poison with which to do it, but had not told them what the poison was or what its properties were, with the consequence that the poisoners, through ignorance, ended up contaminating themselves.
¶8.130 If that is what Mr Kovtun meant, then it was certainly an unwise comment for him
to have made. But, as we have seen, making unwise comments is something that Mr Kovtun appears to have done from time to time.
¶Evidence apparently inconsistent with Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.131 I did hear some evidence that at least appeared to be inconsistent with Mr Lugovoy
203and Mr Kovtun having been responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death. I must, of course, address that evidence.
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¶The polygraph test 8.132 In 2012, Mr Lugovoy underwent a polygraph or so-called 'lie detector' test in Moscow.
The test was administered by a British man and his son – Bruce and Tristam Burgess – who are both qualified polygraph examiners. Mr Lugovoy was asked a series of questions about his alleged involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death, and he denied any such involvement. At the end of the test, Bruce Burgess, who took the lead role in conducting the test, announced the result to Mr Lugovoy in the following words,13 "I can tell you the result was conclusive, you were telling the truth, no deception indicated."
¶8.133 I received exhaustive evidence about this polygraph test. The test itself was filmed,
and I adduced both the recording14 and a transcript in evidence.15 I also had available to me the various charts produced by the polygraph equipment during the test.16 I commissioned an expert in polygraphy, Professor Ray Bull, to prepare a report about this test, and adduced that report in evidence.17 I also heard oral evidence from Bruce Burgess,18 from Tristam Burgess,19 and from Professor Bull.20 All those materials are available on the Inquiry website.
¶8.134 I will make it clear at once that I regard the polygraph test conducted on Mr Lugovoy
as having been seriously flawed. In consequence, I do not feel able to place any weight at all on the outcome of the test. My reasons are as follows.
¶8.135 By the end of his oral evidence I was left with general concerns about the levels
of professionalism and objectivity demonstrated by Bruce Burgess (to whom I shall refer hereafter simply as 'Mr Burgess'), and therefore his suitability to conduct what was, after all, a scientific examination relating to an allegation of murder. Mr Burgess accepted that he has a conviction for perverting the course of justice. More particularly, he stated during the course of his evidence that he did not think it would be improper to conduct a polygraph test on a person who had been charged with a criminal offence and was awaiting trial, on the basis that by that point the criminal investigation would have been concluded. He also said that in those circumstances he would try to obtain an admission if the individual 'failed' the test. Mr Burgess' view was that none of this risked interfering with the criminal process. In the present case, Mr Burgess accepted that he flew to Moscow having been told that the subject of the proposed polygraph test was involved in a murder case, but without asking who the subject was or what precise stage the murder investigation had reached. He accepted that he should have made further enquiries.
¶8.136 As I have said, these matters and others similar to them left me with concerns about
204Mr Burgess' professionalism and judgement. These concerns would not have justified me in rejecting the test without more, but they did lead me to examine with care the way in which the test was conducted.
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¶8.137 On examination, it became clear that there were a number of problems with the way in which the test was conducted.
¶8.138 The type of test that Mr Burgess conducted on Mr Lugovoy is known as the Control
Question Technique (CQT). Professor Bull told me that research suggested that the CQT has an 85% success rate in cases, such as this, where the result is that the subject is not deceptive. There were, however, some problems with the research techniques that had been used. Moreover, that figure assumed that the test was properly conducted and that the subject had not used countermeasures.
¶8.139 Put very shortly, the CQT operates by comparing the subject's response while
answering two sets of questions – 'comparison questions', which are intended to provoke a dishonest response but which are not related to the conduct that is the subject of the test, and 'relevant questions', which do relate to the subject of the test – here, Mr Lugovoy's alleged involvement in poisoning Mr Litvinenko. As Professor Bull explained, the CQT depends for its success on the examiner choosing appropriate questions and asking them in the correct manner. There were difficulties here on both counts.
¶8.140 Mr Burgess repeatedly told Mr Lugovoy that the comparison questions were not
really part of the test, that they were not a threat to him, and that he wasn't being tested on them. This was completely contrary to the principles underlying the CQT, as explained in scientific literature that I was shown. Professor Bull stated that this was, "inconsistent with… good practice in polygraph testing". Mr Burgess responded that downplaying the importance of the control questions would be likely to increase the chances of a negative result to the test, whereas Mr Lugovoy's result had been positive. I accept that there is a narrow logic to this proposition, but it does not answer the general concern. As Professor Bull stated, polygraph tests are multi-faceted. The outcome depends upon comparing a range of results across the piece. One cannot simply accept that one part of the process was faulty but assume that it had no wider damaging effect. The CQT process depends on the control questions being properly selected and asked. The deficiencies that were identified undermine the test as a whole.
¶8.141 There were, moreover, further difficulties relating to the relevant questions. One
question was whether Mr Lugovoy, "had ever performed any manipulations with polonium". Mr Lugovoy had told Mr Burgess prior to the test that he had been contaminated by polonium, and that in that sense he had had "some dealings" with polonium. Professor Bull observed that, in those circumstances, it was not clear why Mr Lugovoy's answer 'No' to that question was accepted as a truthful answer. I agree. This question was poorly selected, and further undermined the test.
¶8.142 There was a further difficulty with the relevant questions. The CQT process depends
on the subject of the test being put under pressure, and measuring the subject's nervous physical reaction to false denials. However, throughout the testing process, Mr Burgess sought to reassure Mr Lugovoy, telling him that he was not expecting him to give untruthful answers to the relevant questions. As well as demonstrating a lack of objectivity on Mr Burgess' part, this would have tended to reduce Mr Lugovoy's reaction to false answers he was giving. Professor Bull considered that this was a factor that could have undermined the test. I agree.
¶8.143 Professor Bull also made the more general point that the very fact that, by the time of the test, Mr Lugovoy had answered questions repeatedly, over a period of years, about
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his alleged involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death, may have made him an unsuitable subject for a test of this type and/or on this topic. He said that Mr Lugovoy's mind and body may have become 'habituated' to denying these allegations, so that the nervous reaction to false denials that the test measures would not have been produced even if he was lying.
¶8.144 Finally, Professor Bull gave detailed evidence regarding the risk of a polygraph test
being undermined by the subject of the test using countermeasures. He said that it has been recognised that people can be trained to defeat polygraph tests. In my view, this risk alone is sufficient to render this particular test valueless. Mr Lugovoy accepted that he was familiar with polygraph tests through his security work. I also bear in mind in this context his previous lengthy service in the Committee for State Security (KGB). Moreover, in the course of the test Mr Lugovoy was seen to move, which is a possible sign of countermeasures. He was told to keep still (as he had been instructed at the outset), but continued to move.
¶8.145 In my judgement, there is a very serious risk that Mr Lugovoy had been trained to defeat this polygraph test, and that he used countermeasures to do so.
¶8.146 In summary, I have no doubt that I should place no weight at all on the outcome of this
test – in part because of shortcomings in the way that the test was conducted, in part because of Mr Lugovoy's unsuitability as a subject of the test, and in part because of the risk that Mr Lugovoy took deliberate steps to defeat the test.
¶8.147 Mr Emmerson did suggest at one stage that I might rely on one part of the test which
suggested that Mr Lugovoy had lied in response to one of the relevant questions. In the end, rightly, he did not pursue this suggestion. I have concluded that the whole process was flawed, and it would therefore be wrong for me to rely on any part of it.
¶Contamination of Lugovoy and Kovtun and their families 8.148 It is a striking feature of the Pine Bar narrative that, as Mr Litvinenko was leaving,
Mr Lugovoy invited him to shake hands with his young son, who had just arrived back at the hotel. Mr Lugovoy has referred to this incident as evidence of his innocence – surely, he has said, he would not risk his own son being contaminated?
¶8.149 The point goes further. Mr Lugovoy's wife and son slept in a contaminated bedroom at
the Millennium Hotel, and sat in contaminated seats on the aircraft. Similarly, Marina Wall's flat in Hamburg was contaminated, leading her to say, "I really can't imagine that he [i.e. Mr Kovtun] would put my children in danger."21 Marina Litvinenko 3/41-43 Knuckey 7/38-44; see also Mr Knuckey's report and timeline relating to this incident: INQ019304; INQ019301 Marina Litvinenko 3/125-129 Marina Wall 32/63 Marina Wall 32/66-67 INQ016403 (pages 29-32)
¶8.150 I am prepared to assume that neither Mr Lugovoy nor Mr Kovtun would have wished
to harm their loved ones. But I do not consider that this assumption is inconsistent with my conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko with polonium 210.
¶8.151 In an article in the Sunday Times, Mr Franchetti quoted a Russian source named
¶Mr Kondaurov, who stated:22
206"Let's for the sake of argument, assume that I had been in charge of such an operation… and let's assume Lugovoy was involved. I would have told him as
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
little as possible. Agents are used all the time without knowing the full details of an operation."
¶8.152 I think that Mr Kondaurov's analysis was sound. I regard it as likely that, whilst
Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun knew that they were poisoning Mr Litvinenko, they did not know the name or the properties of the poison that they had been given to use. I note in passing that Mr Kovtun did not refer to polonium 210 in his conversation with D3.
¶8.153 Had Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun known more about the substance they were handling,
I am confident that they would have dealt with it more carefully. The fact that they did not know what they were handling explains why it was splashed around in hotel bathrooms and mopped up with hotel towels that were then left in the hotel. It explains why Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy allowed their families to be contaminated. And it also, perhaps, explains Mr Kovtun's comment to his mother-in-law after Mr Litvinenko's death that, "Those arseholes have probably poisoned us all."
¶8.154 I would, however, add one further point. I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun
were aware that the substance that they were administering to Mr Litvinenko was a deadly poison – as opposed, say, to a truth drug or a sleeping draught. As I have found, Mr Kovtun told D3 of a plan to poison Mr Litvinenko, and explained that he was being poisoned rather than shot in order to set an example. Those comments are only consistent with a plan to kill Mr Litvinenko.
¶Indifference in Alexander Litvinenko drinking tea 8.155 A further oddity about the events in the Pine Bar is that, on the account that
Mr Litvinenko himself gave to the police, Mr Lugovoy was extremely indifferent as to whether or not Mr Litvinenko should drink tea from the poisoned teapot. Mr Litvinenko's account was that Mr Lugovoy told him, "there is still some tea left here if you want you can have some".
¶8.156 If Mr Lugovoy was intent on poisoning Mr Litvinenko, wouldn't he have been keener on him drinking the tea?
¶8.157 I think that there are two answers to this question.
¶8.158 The first point is that Mr Lugovoy's conduct was quite explicable. As Mr Horwell stated in his closing submissions:
"Any display by either Lugovoy or Kovtun of eagerness or urgency or desperation would have appeared suspicious and counterproductive. Anything other than diffidence would have appeared very suspicious to Litvinenko and may well have brought an end to the plot to kill him. This was, after all, not the drink of the gods that was on offer at the Millennium Hotel, but an unexceptional cup of lukewarm tea. Any encouragement or enthusiasm from Lugovoy that Litvinenko should drink it would have been out of place and could have betrayed his murderous intent.
207Lugovoy could afford to be diffident for two reasons. First, Litvinenko was very keen to do business and associate with him. Litvinenko needed no encouragement to meet Lugovoy. There would have been many other opportunities to poison him. Even during that third visit to London, Lugovoy and Kovtun were due to meet Litvinenko the following day,2 Marina Litvinenko 3/20-23 INQ019146 (page 14-15 paragraph 45) A translated copy of the law provided to the Solicitor to the Inquiry by the Russian Embassy in London is at INQ018962 November, at RISC Management.
¶Part 8 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Who killed Alexander Litvinenko?
There would have been many other opportunities in the immediate future, both in London and in Spain where Lugovoy and Litvinenko were due to meet just nine days after their meeting at the Millennium Hotel.
In other words, the meeting in the Pine Bar was not the one and only opportunity Lugovoy and Kovtun were going to have to murder Litvinenko.
Secondly, of course, as far as Lugovoy and Kovtun were concerned, there was no shortage of this poison, whatever it might have been. Lugovoy had access to the very same poison in London on each of his three visits. There is no reason to suggest that it would not have been available to him in the future."23 Marina Litvinenko 3/31-35; INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 13) Bukovsky 26/86-90; 26/109-110 Marina Litvinenko 4/11 lines 11-15 Marina Wall 32/66-67 Horwell 33/16-17 INQ016403 (page 30)
¶8.159 I agree. That is enough to dispose of this point.
¶8.160 There is, however, a second observation that I would make. I have referred above
to the embarrassment that Mr Litvinenko appears to have felt at being poisoned by someone that he trusted (see paragraphs 3.133 – 3.139). Mr Shvets described the emotion as "wounded professional pride". This appears to have been the explanation for Mr Litvinenko's delay in telling his friends about the meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on 1 November, and the fact that he continued during that period, even to his friends, to blame Mr Scaramella for the poisoning. It seems to me to be at least possible that Mr Litvinenko carried this feeling of "wounded professional pride" into his interviews with the police, and that in the course of those interviews he exaggerated Mr Lugovoy's diffidence about the tea in order to mitigate what he would have seen as his own professional error in drinking it.
¶A set up? 8.161 It has been a frequent theme of Mr Lugovoy's press interviews over the years that he
has been the victim of a set up. He has stated that MI6, or perhaps some other British agency, must have killed Mr Litvinenko and then spread a trail of polonium in order to incriminate him and Mr Kovtun.
¶8.162 I will deal with this point shortly.
¶8.163 It is worth reflecting on what this allegation entails. Leaving to one side the allegation
that Mr Litvinenko was murdered by British officials, a set up of the kind alleged by Mr Lugovoy would have necessitated a series of public and private places in London and beyond being deliberately contaminated with radioactive material. It would have been a complex, expensive and extremely risky operation. Very large numbers of people would have been put at risk.
¶8.164 I will simply say that in all the oral evidence that I have heard during this process,
208in all the many thousands of pages of documents that I have seen, I have not come across anything that would even begin to substantiate the claims of a set up made by Mr Lugovoy. On the other hand, I have seen plentiful evidence that is wholly inconsistent with Mr Lugovoy's claims. That evidence, much of which I have attempted to summarise above, clearly establishes that, far from being set up, Mr Lugovoy did in fact, with Mr Kovtun, poison Mr Litvinenko.
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