Chapter 7: Russian State responsibility – the source of the polonium 210
Chapter 7: Russian State responsibility – the source of the polonium 210
¶9.46 It is self evident that the isotope polonium 210 is a very rare substance. I also heard
evidence that the isotope is difficult to produce and dangerous to handle. Moreover, whilst polonium 210 is routinely manufactured and sold commercially, it is only publicly available in minute quantities that are embedded within sealed containers.
¶9.47 Since polonium 210 is such a rare and specialised commodity, the question arises as
to whether evidence relating to the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko might assist in establishing responsibility for his death. Can the source of the polonium 210 be traced? If so, what inferences can be drawn?
¶9.48 I received valuable evidence on these issues from Professor Norman Dombey.
Professor Dombey was Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Sussex from 1989 until his retirement in 2003, and since that time has been Emeritus Professor. He has extensive experience in the field of nuclear physics. He also has a level of practical knowledge, in part through his international contacts, about the production of polonium 210 in Russia. In August 2007 Professor Dombey wrote a review of Death of a Dissident in the London Review of Books.10 Following that, he was commissioned by Alex Goldfarb to prepare an expert report for the purposes of the claim brought by Marina Litvinenko before the European Court of Human Rights. That report was dated 12 November 2007.11 Professor Dombey thereafter provided a supplementary report for the purposes of this Inquiry,12 and also attended to give oral evidence.13
¶9.49 A certain amount of the evidence relating to the possible source of the polonium 210 was uncontroversial.
¶9.50 It is not in any doubt that polonium 210 is, and was, throughout the relevant period,
manufactured in Russia for commercial purposes. Professor Dombey assisted me by providing detailed evidence about this industry.14 He explained that the programme of polonium 210 production in Russia uses facilities at two former closed cities, both of which were initially established in connection with the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It was his understanding that all Russian production of polonium 210 came from this programme.15
¶9.51 The process by which large scale production of polonium 210 is undertaken was described in evidence by both Professor Dombey and witness A1.
¶9.52 Put shortly, a target of bismuth 209, which is a stable isotope, is inserted into a reactor
217where it is bombarded with neutrons. During the bombardment, bismuth 209 atoms capture neutrons and thereby become bismuth 210 atoms. Bismuth 210 is an unstable isotope, which decays by emitting a beta particle, so that one of its neutrons changes into a proton. That converts the bismuth 210 atom into a polonium 210 atom. When the target is removed from the reactor, a process has to be undertaken to isolate
¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
or remove the polonium 210 that has been created in this way from the remaining bismuth target.
¶9.53 Professor Dombey explained that in the Russian production programme the first stage
of this process – i.e. the irradiation of the bismuth target – takes place in a nuclear reactor at the Mayak facility (formerly known as Chelyabinsk), near Ozersk. The second stage of the manufacturing process, i.e. the recovery of polonium 210 from the irradiated bismuth, is undertaken at a special production plant at the Avangard facility in Sarov (formerly known as Arzamas-16).16 For convenience, I shall refer to this production programme as 'the Avangard programme'.
¶9.54 Professor Dombey stated that the Avangard programme manufactured 0.8 grams of
polonium 210 every month, and that this entire amount was routinely exported to the USA.17
¶9.55 He further explained that on arrival in the USA, the polonium 210 was split and placed
in tiny amounts into sealed sources that were then sold for use in devices such as anti-static guns.
¶9.56 The police made enquiries into the export of polonium from Russia to the USA, and
DI Mascall gave evidence about the results of those enquiries.18 His evidence was consistent with the more detailed evidence given by Professor Dombey.
¶9.57 It follows from all of this (and again, I think that this is uncontroversial) that Russia,
i.e. the Avangard programme, could unquestionably have been the source of the polonium 210 ingested by Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.58 However, during the course of the Inquiry, various lines of evidence and argument
were raised which, potentially at least, took the matter further. The logic of these different theories was that the polonium 210 used to kill Mr Litvinenko either probably came, or even must have come, from Russia.
¶9.59 Taken at their highest, these lines of evidence, which are independent of each other,
suggested that there might be a direct link between the polonium 210 ingested by Mr Litvinenko and Russia as its place of production. Evidence was called in relation to each of these theories, and I shall address them in turn below.
¶Forensic matching/fingerprinting of polonium 210 samples 9.60 In Death of a Dissident, the book that they published in 2007, Alex Goldfarb and Marina
Litvinenko advanced what has been described as a 'fingerprint' theory, suggesting that every batch of commercially produced polonium 210 contains characteristic and detectable impurities, by which it can subsequently be traced and identified. What they said was as follows:19
218"When Polonium-210 decays – its half-life is 138 days, meaning that half of any given amount decays in the first 138 days, followed by a fourth in the next 138 days, and so on – it turns into lead, a nonradioactive metal. As the amount of polonium decreases, the amount of lead increases. By measuring the proportion of
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
lead in a sample of polonium, an investigator can figure out how old the sample is and establish the precise date it was produced. Moreover, the production process leaves characteristic isotope impurities in every batch. By comparing the lead content and the impurities present in two samples of polonium, an investigator should be able to say whether they came from the same batch, produced in the same laboratory on the same day.
Samples of Russian polonium have presumably been available to British law enforcement from American sources. The Polonium-210 found in Sasha's body has by now undoubtedly been checked against the Polonium-210 exported to the United States. From the level of lead and the isotope composition, the investigators should have been able to unequivocally establish the batch and production date of the poison. ..."
¶9.61 A similar argument was advanced by Professor Dombey in a written Declaration that he signed in November 2007.20
¶9.62 It will be seen that this 'fingerprint' theory is founded on two premises.
¶9.63 The first premise is that all commercially produced polonium 210 contains detectable
impurities that vary from reactor to reactor, so that these impurities amount to a unique signature that can be used to identify the reactor used to manufacture any particular sample of polonium 210.
¶9.64 The second premise is that analysis of the lead content of a sample of polonium 210 can be used to calculate the precise date on which it was manufactured.
¶9.65 A1 addressed both these issues in her report dated 26 June 2013,21 and also in her oral evidence.22
¶9.66 A1 rejected the first premise. She explained that a sample of commercially produced
polonium 210 had been analysed at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and found to be entirely pure. There were no signature impurities. In her report, A1 described the process of irradiating bismuth 209 by which the commercial production of polonium 210 is undertaken. She then continued:23
"The final product is pure Polonium 210. The fact that Polonium 210 can be made free of detectable gamma emitting radionuclides was demonstrated at AWE by conducting a gamma spectrometric analysis of a sample of commercially available Polonium 210. The single gamma active peak was observed at 803 keV attributable to Polonium 210. The other gamma peaks observed in the spectra were due to alpha and neutron activation of the packaging and detector system generated by the alpha particles interacting with the containment vessel, and the intrinsic background of the detector system. No gamma peaks were attributed to likely impurities in the Polonium 210.
219As the only radionuclide detected in the commercial sample was Polonium 210 it is not possible to derive ratios that can be used as a distinguishing radionuclide fingerprint for different 'batches' of Polonium 210.
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No radionuclides other than Polonium 210 were identified by gamma counting of the exhibits supplied by MPS once peaks due to detector background system were removed. Thus the exhibits also had no fingerprint to distinguish the polonium 210."
¶9.67 It follows that the first premise for the 'fingerprint' theory that I have set out above is flawed and must be rejected.
¶9.68 Turning to the second premise, A1 accepted that the age (and, therefore, the
manufacture date) of a sample of polonium 210 could in principle be calculated by reference to the lead content in the sample. She referred in this context to the equation that is used to make this calculation. However, A1 also added a number of important qualifications.
¶9.69 First, she explained that due to the form of the equation and the expected uncertainties
of the measurements, it is only possible to use this method to determine the age of polonium 210 samples up to seven months old. Beyond that period, the changes in the amount of lead become too small for reliable calculations to be performed.
¶9.70 Second, A1 said that even for samples still within the first seven months of manufacture,
this process cannot provide an exact date of manufacture. Rather, she explained, the process can only be relied upon to differentiate between samples manufactured at least 13 or 14 days apart. As A1 explained in her report, it followed that: "if two batches of Polonium 210 were purified on two consecutive days or even ten days apart this could not be differentiated by analysis of Lead 206".24
¶9.71 Turning from the limits of this process in theory to its limits in practice, A1 stated that
most of the exhibits in the present case were not suitable for age dating in any event because they had been heated and/or cleaned after the date of contamination, which would have rendered the dating process unreliable.
¶9.72 In summary, the claims made about the 'fingerprint' theory in the passage from Death
of a Dissident that I have quoted above are not supported by the expert scientific evidence that I have heard. The analysis conducted at AWE does not support the assertion that all commercially produced batches of polonium 210 have characteristic impurities, and although there is a process by which such samples can be aged by reference to their lead content, the process is far from precise and in any event the samples in this case had not been sufficiently well preserved to enable meaningful calculations to be made.
¶The Potemkin evidence 9.73 This issue arises from evidence given by Mr Goldfarb about information and documents that he received in unusual circumstances from a man calling himself Alexei Potemkin.
¶9.74 Mr Goldfarb provided lengthy written evidence about this issue and also answered
some questions about it when he gave oral evidence.25 The tale that Mr Goldfarb related was a complicated one, and I will summarise it as briefly as I can.
¶9.75 Mr Goldfarb explained that he had first been contacted by Mr Potemkin in June
¶2010, by email. Thereafter they had exchanged several emails. In the first instance,
220¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
Mr Potemkin had merely stated that he had information connected with the polonium in the Litvinenko case. In due course, he became more forthcoming. He said that he was a Major in the FSB who was living as an undercover agent of the Russian government in Austria. He also said that he could provide information as to how the polonium that had been used to poison Mr Litvinenko had been transported to the UK from Russia, and that he had in fact been part of the transportation chain.
¶9.76 Mr Goldfarb described what he did next. He continued to communicate with
Mr Potemkin, as well as informing the police about the information that he had received. In August 2010 Mr Goldfarb met Mr Potemkin in Innsbruck. The two met on further occasions later that year.
¶9.77 Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that in 2004 he had been assigned by the FSB to travel
to Austria and claim asylum as a deserter from the Russian army, and thereafter to live in Austria as a refugee, with a view to monitoring the large population of Chechen refugees present in that country. He said that he now wished to live in the UK, and that he was willing to provide the UK authorities with sensitive information and documents in order to facilitate this.
¶9.78 The story that Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb about his involvement in the Litvinenko
case was brief. He said that in 2006 a courier from the FSB had delivered to him a sealed container with radioactive markings. He had believed that it contained polonium 210. He had been instructed to put the container in a locker at Innsbruck railway station and to hide the key in a prearranged place in the station. He said that he had done this.
¶9.79 Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that the courier who had given him the package was not
an FSB officer, but a Chechen freelancer whom he knew only as Sultan. He believed that Sultan was involved in arms and drugs smuggling as well as working for the FSB. Mr Potemkin said that Sultan had also been involved in a previous shipment of radioactive material in 2004.
¶9.80 Mr Potemkin's account was that when he received the container in 2006, he put it in
the locker at the railway station and never saw it again. He did not open the container, nor did he see any transit documents. He said that he believed the package contained polonium 210 on account of the markings that it bore; he said that he had previously dealt with shipments of polonium 210 in 2002 as a member of a Russian special forces unit.
¶9.81 Mr Goldfarb produced several documents that he said Mr Potemkin had given to him.
For most of the documents, Mr Goldfarb provided both a copy of the Russian original and also an English translation. Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that these documents had been obtained in Moscow by a man named Sergei Ploshkin, who he said was his former superior officer in the FSB.
¶9.82 I do not propose to set out the detailed contents of these documents. I have adduced
221all the documents into evidence and they are available on the Inquiry website.26 In summary, the key documents appear to evidence a consignment of radioactive material, possibly polonium 210, being transferred in August 2006 from Balakovo Atomic Power Station in Russia to the FSB Research Institute in Moscow. There is
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a further document dated 17 September 2006,27 which records FSB orders relating to the delivery to Mr Potemkin of material described only as 'Chemistry', as well as documents and currency. On the document, the purpose of this delivery is stated to be: "for carrying out further activities related to investigation, possible neutralization and return to RF of certain members of Chechen ethnic criminal groups in position Austria". The document further states that; "further instructions related to the material "Chemistry" will be given to [Mr Potemkin] via existing channels of communication". Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that he received his further orders to put the container in a locker at the railway station through "communication channels".
¶9.83 In his witness statement dated 20 May 2013,28 Mr Goldfarb stated that he had stayed
in touch with Mr Potemkin since 2010 in order to facilitate meetings with the police and also with a journalist. He also referred to the fact that Mr Potemkin had recently been convicted in Austria for fraud; he reported the explanation that Mr Potemkin had given him for this conviction, namely that he had in effect been set up by the FSB.
¶9.84 In the same statement, Mr Goldfarb recorded his own views as to the reliability of the account that Mr Potemkin had given. He said this:
"While I felt obliged to report Potemkin's story to the police, I am of two minds about his credibility. On the one hand, his story is too sophisticated, elaborate and detailed to be a simpleminded hoax. On a more personal level, he left a positive impression, both on me and on two seasoned journalists that I brought to interview him. On the other hand, there are inconsistencies in his story, which he could never explain, and the documents that he provided, raised many questions. With the revelation of the Austrian fraud case, I became even more doubtful whether Potemkin should be believed. I defer final judgment to the police."
¶9.85 In his oral evidence to me at the Inquiry hearings, Mr Goldfarb adopted very much the
same line. He said that the story "may be true, it may be false". He added that he had reservations stemming both from inconsistencies in Mr Potemkin's account and from the fraud conviction.29
¶9.86 I have reached the clear view that I should not place any weight on the evidence
emanating from Mr Potemkin. Put very briefly, the uncertainties both about the substance of his evidence and about his credibility are so great that the only proper course I can take is to disregard this material in its entirety. My more detailed reasons are as follows.
¶9.87 First, there are real doubts about Mr Potemkin's credibility. He is, on his own account,
222both a man who has spent years working as an undercover agent informing on those around him, and also a man who has more recently betrayed his own organisation. This is not a promising starting point, and the position has been compounded by Mr Potemkin's conviction on fraud charges. It does not follow from any of these matters, of course, that the story Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb is untruthful. But, given this context, I am bound to approach Mr Potemkin's evidence with great caution. It does not assist in this respect that I have not heard him give evidence, and am not therefore in a position to form an independent view of his reliability.
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.88 Second, Mr Potemkin's account is on any view far fetched. Again, that does not of
course mean that he is lying. But there are many further questions to which I would have needed an answer before being sufficiently confident to conclude that the extraordinary story that he has told is true. To give only a few examples, if the container was to be brought to Innsbruck by Sultan and left in a locker at the railway station, why did Mr Potemkin need to be involved at all? Why couldn't Sultan have left the container at the station? On a further point, how confident was Mr Potemkin that the package contained polonium 210? How did his earlier special forces experience assist him in identifying the contents of this package? Did the markings on the package specifically state that it contained polonium 210, and if not, how did Mr Potemkin know that it did not contain (for example) some other radioactive material? Finally, why did Mr Potemkin's (presumably secret) orders state that he was to receive this package in connection with: "carrying out further activities related to investigation, possible neutralization and return to RF of certain members of Chechen ethnic criminal groups" ? On the account that he has given, this would appear to be simply inaccurate.
¶9.89 Third and in any event, I observe that even if Mr Potemkin's account was to be accepted
in its entirety, it would be of only limited assistance to this Inquiry. Put at its highest, the account amounts to evidence that in September 2006 the FSB was clandestinely moving a package of polonium 210 around Europe as far as Innsbruck. There is no evidence to connect the container that Mr Potemkin claims to have deposited in a locker at Innsbruck station with London, Mr Litvinenko – or, for example, with Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun.
¶Professor Dombey's analysis 9.90 When he gave his oral evidence to the Inquiry, Professor Dombey appeared to
advance an argument that was both simple and, if true, of great significance to this case.
¶9.91 In summary, this argument was (a) that the polonium 210 that was used to kill
Mr Litvinenko must have been made in Russia, since the Mayak/Avangard facilities were the only place in the world in which the quantity of polonium used on 1 November 2006 could have been made; and (b) that since the facilities at Mayak and Avangard were controlled by the Russian State, any diversion of the polonium 210 produced there must have been authorised by state officials. Unsurprisingly, some emphasis was placed on this evidence by Mr Emmerson in his closing statement.
¶9.92 There were a number of steps to Professor Dombey's reasoning, which I will address
in turn. After the conclusion of the Inquiry hearings, A1 produced a further statement in which she gave her own opinion on several of these points, and Professor Dombey responded by way of a further statement.30 I am grateful both to A1 and to Professor Dombey for their assistance in this regard; the further written material that they have provided has been of considerable assistance in resolving this issue.
¶The amount of polonium 210 that was used 9.93 Professor Dombey estimated that at least 50 micrograms of polonium 210 was put
223into the teapot at the Millennium Hotel on the afternoon of 1 November 2006. His reasoning was that the 4.4GBq that Mr Litvinenko was considered to have ingested equated to 26.5 micrograms, and the higher figure of 50 micrograms was chosen
¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
as a conservative estimate to allow for the extra polonium 210 that had been in the teapot but which Mr Litvinenko had not ingested, i.e. the polonium 210 mixed with the unpoured tea in the pot and the undrunk tea in the cup.31
¶9.94 A1 agreed with Professor Dombey's calculation.32
¶9.95 I note at this stage that, given the findings I have already made both as to the fact
that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on 1 November by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, and as to the fact that they had been responsible for the other deposits of polonium 210 found, for example, at the Erinys offices, in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel and in room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel, the amount of polonium 210 that they must have had available to them over the period 16 October to 1 November 2006 was in fact considerably in excess of 50 micrograms.
¶Could the polonium 210 have been extracted from uranium or anti-static devices? 9.96 Professor Dombey next considered the process by which whoever poisoned
Mr Litvinenko (on my findings, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun) might have obtained the hypothetical quantity of 50 micrograms of polonium 210.
¶9.97 He discounted two sources from which, at least in theory, the polonium 210 might have come.
¶9.98 First, he stated that it would have been extremely impractical to extract that quantity
of polonium 210 from uranium ore.33 A1 agreed with Professor Dombey on this point.34 This possibility can therefore be dismissed.
¶9.99 Professor Dombey next considered the possibility that a quantity of 50 micrograms of
polonium 210 might have been amassed by breaking down commercially produced anti-static devices containing very small amounts of polonium 210. He calculated that it would have been necessary to extract the polonium 210 from about 450 such sources in order to make up this amount. In his written evidence, Professor Dombey expressed the view that any bulk purchase (or bulk theft) of that number of these devices would have been noticed.35 He also observed that the extraction of polonium 210 from these devices would have been extremely dangerous without specialist training and equipment. It was this factor that he emphasised in his oral evidence, stating that, "it certainly would be impossible for a thief or a gang to extract Polonium 210 from these samples".36 He therefore excluded this possibility on those two grounds.
¶9.100 A1 did not consider herself competent to express a view on whether the loss or theft
224of 450 or so devices would have been noticed, in particular since the total production of such devices could have been numbered in the millions per month. But she did provide some additional reasoning regarding this possible source of the polonium 210. She stated:37
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
"In my view, there is a different and entirely independent reason why it is extremely unlikely that the Po-210 used to poison Mr Litvinenko was obtained by extraction from such devices. When these devices are manufactured, the Po-210 is bonded to a substrate, as Prof Dombey describes. Whilst it is possible that Po-210 could be extracted there is also the possibility of cross-contamination from impurities. Such impurities would be detectable on analysis. However, the Po-210 used to poison Mr Litvinenko was of extremely high purity, and I think that this fact excludes the possibility that it was extracted from such devices."
¶9.101 Having excluded these two possible sources, Professor Dombey and A1 were agreed
that the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have been obtained directly from a supply manufactured in a reactor through the process (that I have described above) of irradiating bismuth. Professor Dombey added that since the polonium 210 in question must have been soluble, it must have been transported, "in metallic form, or something similar".38
¶9.102 A1 and Professor Dombey took different views, however, regarding the type of reactor
in which the polonium 210 at issue in this case must or could have been produced. It is to that question that I now turn.
¶Which reactor(s) could have been used to produce the polonium 210? 9.103 As I have indicated above, at the time that he gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, it
appeared to be Professor Dombey's analysis that the only place where the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko could have been produced was at the Mayak and Avangard facilities in Russia.
¶9.104 The starting point for Professor Dombey's argument was his contention that, as a
matter of fact, the Avangard programme was the only commercial producer of polonium 210 in the world. Beyond that, he argued that the Lyudmila reactor at Mayak was one of only a handful of reactors worldwide that were sufficiently powerful to irradiate the quantities of bismuth 209 needed to produce the 50 micrograms (or, more likely, more) of polonium 210 involved here.
¶9.105 Professor Dombey listed the other high power reactors – located in places such as
the UK, Canada and India – and gave evidence that these reactors were not used to produce polonium 210. He supported this evidence with documentary evidence to a similar effect. Professor Dombey accepted that less powerful research reactors could be used to irradiate bismuth and thereby make polonium 210, but he said that these reactors were limited to making far smaller amounts of polonium 210 than the 50 microgram quantity in play here.
¶9.106 This led him to the conclusion that the polonium that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have been produced at the Avangard programme.
¶9.107 A1 took issue with this analysis. She accepted (more accurately, she said she had no
225reason to doubt) that the Avangard programme was the only commercial producer of polonium 210 in the world. She did not agree, however, that the reactors on Professor Dombey's list of high power reactors were the only reactors capable of producing a quantity of 50 micrograms of polonium 210. In fact, A1 contended that the characteristic of a reactor that was of most relevance to its use for the production of polonium 210
¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
was not its thermal power, but rather its neutron flux39 (a point to which Professor Dombey had alluded in the course of his oral evidence).40
¶9.108 A1 expressed the view that very many research reactors had a sufficient level of
neutron flux to produce 50 micrograms of polonium 210 by means of irradiating bismuth 209. Moreover, she said that the process involved was relatively straightforward. She stated that, because the bismuth target can be inserted into a reactor core in place of a fuel rod, "it would be easily possible to insert a bismuth target ... into very many reactors."41 INQ017734 (pages 7-8 paragraph 23) INQ014928 Shvets 24/65 Mascall 9/35-37 INQ022423 (page 7 paragraph 30)
¶9.109 Witness A1 summarised her opinion on this issue in these terms:42
"I therefore think that on a technical level, it would be entirely possible for the quantity of Po-210 under consideration to have been produced in many reactors. All that would be required is an appropriate bismuth target, access to a suitable reactor for an appropriate period of time, and suitable facilities with appropriate radiological protection for the relatively simple chemical process of isolating the Po-210 from the irradiated bismuth target. While it is of course possible that the Po-210 was simply diverted from that which is routinely produced at Avangard, I do not agree with Prof Dombey that that must have been the source of this Po-210."
¶9.110 In the further statement that he provided in response to A1's statement, Professor
Dombey clarified his position. He stated that, although he regarded it as "highly likely" that the polonium 210 that had been used to kill Mr Litvinenko had been prepared at the Avangard facility, he accepted that it was "possible to envisage circumstances" in which it could have been prepared elsewhere. It seems to me that this clarification of his position by Professor Dombey means that there is no material difference of opinion on this issue between him and A1. They share the view that the polonium 210 that killed Mr Litvinenko could have been produced at Avangard (and it is fair to say that Professor Dombey puts the matter considerably higher than that). Crucially, however, they also both accept that the polonium 210 could in principle have been made somewhere entirely different, including a research reactor outside Russia.
¶Conclusion 9.111 My conclusion, for the reasons that I have set out above, is that none of these theories
or lines of evidence relating to the source of the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko amount to a secure basis for me to conclude, without more evidence, that the polonium 210 in question either must have come, or even probably came, from Russia.
¶9.112 That does not mean that the fact that polonium 210 was used to poison Mr Litvinenko is of no significance to the question of responsibility for his death.
¶9.113 First, the use of polonium 210 is at the very least a strong indicator of state involvement.
226That is in part simply because ordinary criminals might have been expected to use a more straightforward, less sophisticated means of killing. It is also because, on the evidence, the polonium 210 used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have come from a reactor, and such reactors are, in general, under state control.
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.114 It is also true, as I have said, that the Avangard programme in Russia was a possible
source of the polonium 210. That is significant, even though the matter cannot be put any more strongly than that.
¶9.115 Finally, I would add in passing that the open market cost of polonium 210 would not
appear to be a factor of any great significance. At the outset of the inquiry hearings, Mr Emmerson asserted that:43
"... the quantity of polonium of this purity used in the assassination of Mr Litvinenko would have cost tens of millions of dollars if it was purchased... by end users on the commercial market."
Mr Emmerson went on to assert that the extremely high cost of polonium 210 was a factor that argued strongly in favour of state involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.116 However, the evidence that I received on this issue was to the effect that the commercial
price of polonium 210 in 2006 was in fact very much lower than Mr Emmerson suggested. DI Mascall gave evidence that a consignment of polonium 210 containing many times the quantity that Mr Litvinenko ingested was sold in 2006 for US$20,000.44
¶9.117 Put shortly, I think that the issue of cost is a red herring. It does not assist in either tending to prove or to disprove state responsibility.
227¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?