Front matter — The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko

¶Chairman: Sir Robert Owen

¶January 2016

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

Report into the death of Alexander Litvinenko

¶Chairman: Sir Robert Owen

¶Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 21 January 2016

¶HC 695

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¶Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.

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¶| Contents

¶Contents Introductory

Part 1 Preface — 7
Part 2 Introduction — 9

¶Open narrative evidence

Part 3 Alexander Litvinenko – his life in Russia and the — 13

¶United Kingdom, his illness and death

Chapter 1 In Russia — 13
Chapter 2 Leaving Russia — 26
Chapter 3 In the United Kingdom — 29
Chapter 4 Illness and death — 33
Chapter 5 Scientific examination of Alexander Litvinenko's body — 45
Part 4 Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko? — 51
Chapter 1 Introduction — 51
Chapter 2 Enemy of the Russian State? — 52
Chapter 3 Work for UK intelligence agencies — 63
Chapter 4 Work for the Mitrokhin Commission in Italy — 68
Chapter 5 Work for the Spanish security services — 72
Chapter 6 Private security work — 74
Part 5 Alexander Litvinenko's final months — 85
Chapter 1 Introduction — 85
Chapter 2 The 2006 Russian laws — 86
Chapter 3 Continued opposition to President Putin — 92

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

Chapter 4 Did Alexander Litvinenko fall out with and/or attempt — 94

¶to blackmail Boris Berezovsky?

Chapter 5 The Ivanov report — 100
Chapter 6 The murder of Anna Politkovskaya — 104
Chapter 7 British citizenship — 106
Chapter 8 Alexander Litvinenko's state of mind in October 2006 — 108
Part 6 The polonium trail – events in October and — 109

¶November 2006

Chapter 1 Introduction — 109
Chapter 2 Introduction to the scientific evidence — 110
Chapter 3 Dmitri Kovtun — 113
Chapter 4 Visa applications — 117
Chapter 5 Events in London 16-18 October — 121
Chapter 6 Events in London 25-28 October — 141
Chapter 7 Events in Hamburg 28 October – 1 November — 148
Chapter 8 Events in London 31 October – 3 November — 155

¶Closed evidence

Part 7 The closed evidence — 181

¶Findings as to responsibility for death

Part 8 Who killed Alexander Litvinenko? — 183
Chapter 1 Introduction — 183
Chapter 2 Medical cause of death — 184
Chapter 3 Where did Alexander Litvinenko ingest polonium 210 — 186

¶on 1 November 2006?

Chapter 4 Was there an earlier ingestion of polonium 210? — 187

¶| Contents

Chapter 5 Did Alexander Litvinenko poison himself? — 189
Chapter 6 Who administered the poison? — 192
Part 9 Who directed the killing? — 209

¶Chapter 1

Introduction — 209

¶Chapter 2

Boris Berezovsky — 210

¶Chapter 3

UK intelligence agencies — 211

¶Chapter 4

Organised crime — 212

¶Chapter 5

Mario Scaramella, Chechen groups, Alexander Talik — 213

¶Chapter 6

Russian State responsibility – introduction — 214

¶Chapter 7

Russian State responsibility – the source of the — 216

¶polonium 210

¶Chapter 8

Russian State responsibility – motive and evidence of — 227

¶similar deaths and killings

¶Chapter 9

Russian State responsibility – links between Andrey — 234

¶Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun and the Russian State

¶Chapter 10

Russian State responsibility – events since Alexander — 235

¶Litvinenko's death

¶Chapter 11

Conclusions regarding Russian State responsibility — 239

¶Chapter 12

Russian State responsibility – involvement of Nikolai — 241

¶Patrushev and President Vladimir Putin

¶Conclusions

Part 10 Summary of conclusions — 245

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Appendices

Appendix 1 The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted — 247
Appendix 2 Terms of Reference — 265
Appendix 3 List of Issues — 267
Appendix 4 Chronology — 271
Appendix 5 Dramatis personae — 283
Appendix 6 Abbreviations — 295
Appendix 7 Restriction Notices and Orders — 297
Appendix 8 Key documents — 315
Appendix 9 List of witnesses — 319
Appendix 10 List of Inquiry staff and counsel — 323
Appendix 11 List of core participants and legal representatives — 325
Appendix 12 Closed appendices — 327

¶Part 1: Preface

¶1.1 On 22 July 2014 the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP, announced, in a written statement laid before the House of Commons, that an Inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 was to be held into the death of Alexander Litvinenko. I was appointed to chair the Inquiry.

¶1.2 The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry, upon which I was consulted prior to my appointment, are to be found at Appendix 3 to this Report. I was invited by the Secretary of State to complete the Inquiry by December 2015. I opened the Inquiry on 31 July 2014. The oral hearings were completed on 31 July 2015, and my Report was duly delivered to the Secretary of State in January 2016.

¶1.3 The Inquiry has been completed substantially within the budget prepared by the secretariat, and adopted by the Secretary of State in setting a budget cap.

¶1.4 I am indebted to Counsel to the Inquiry, Robin Tam QC, Hugh Davies QC and Andrew O'Connor QC, and to the Solicitor to the Inquiry, Martin Smith, and his assistant, Abigail Scholefield, for their invaluable assistance in the collation, analysis and presentation of the evidence, and in the preparation of this Report.

¶1.5 I must also record my appreciation of the work of the Inquiry secretariat, Lee Hughes CBE, Secretary to the Inquiry, his deputy Frances Currie, Press Officer Mike Wicksteed and Paralegal Amy Nicholls. They have organised the administration of the Inquiry in a most efficient and professional manner.

¶1.6 I am indebted to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, who authorised his officers to continue to provide the investigative and evidential services that had been provided to me as Assistant Coroner charged with the conduct of the inquest into the death of Alexander Litvinenko following the establishment of the Inquiry. I place on record my appreciation of the work of the officers of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) who carried out an exemplary investigation into the death of Mr Litvinenko, and who provided the greatest assistance to me in providing investigative and evidential services in the course of the Inquiry. I should in particular pay tribute to the work carried out by Commander Ball, Detective Inspector Craig Mascall, Detective Chief Inspector Mike Jolly and all members of the Operation Avocet team.

¶1.7 I was greatly assisted by Solicitors and Counsel for the Core Participants who took part in the Inquiry: Ben Emmerson QC, Adam Straw and Elena Tsirlina for Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko; Richard Horwell QC, Saba Naqshbandi, Jenny Leonard and Prit Mandair for the MPS; Neil Garnham QC, Robert Wastell, Paul Bishop and Catherine Turtle for the Secretary of State; and David Evans QC, Alasdair Henderson and Simon Ramsden for AWE plc.

¶1.8 My conclusions on the central issues in this Report are to be found at Parts 8,⁹⁹ Marina Litvinenko 3/3-6 HMG000078 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 68) Cotlick 25/76-81 and 10. Those Parts of the Report, and the conclusions they contain, are based on the totality of the evidence that I have heard – that is, both the 'open' and the 'closed' evidence. The conclusions are mine and mine alone.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Part 2: Introduction

¶2.1 In August 2012, over three years ago, I was appointed to conduct what were then the inquest proceedings concerning the death of Alexander Litvinenko.

¶2.2 I have described the procedural history of both the inquest and this Inquiry in some detail at Appendix 1, but I propose shortly to summarise the position by way of introduction.

¶2.3 The inquest proceedings into Mr Litvinenko's death had been resumed by Dr Andrew Reid, the then Coroner for Inner North London, in late 2011. A considerable amount of work was undertaken in preparation for the inquest, both prior to and following my appointment. However, the inquest proceedings ran into difficulties. In the end, and at my request, the inquest was replaced by the Public Inquiry that I have now conducted. The preparatory work was not wasted – almost all of it was simply carried over to the Inquiry.

¶2.4 The difficulties with the inquest centred on the existence of sensitive government documents that were relevant to the investigation that I was conducting. More particularly, the documents raised an arguable case that the Russian State bore responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.

¶2.5 The law does not allow evidence to be taken in what are known as 'secret' or 'closed' sessions at an inquest. But the government material was so sensitive that it could not be adduced in any form of public or 'open' session. The material was therefore excluded from the inquest proceedings under the legal principle known as public interest immunity.

¶2.6 It has always been my view that the question of possible Russian State responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death is one of the most important issues arising from his death. It was an issue that I had intended to investigate at the inquest, but it did not seem right to me to investigate this issue in the knowledge that government material that was of great relevance had been excluded – albeit that it had been excluded for a good reason.

¶2.7 I therefore asked the Home Secretary to establish a Public Inquiry to replace the inquest. The advantage of a Public Inquiry over the inquest was that the rules governing an inquiry allow for sensitive evidence to be heard in closed session.

¶2.8 The Home Secretary initially refused to establish a Public Inquiry. She subsequently agreed to do so after her refusal had been successfully challenged in the High Court by Mr Litvinenko's widow, Marina Litvinenko. I agreed to serve as the Chairman of the Inquiry.

¶2.9 The Inquiry was formally set up on 31 July 2014. I was at that time a serving High Court Judge; I retired from that post in September 2014.

¶2.10 The Inquiry's Terms of Reference are to be found at Appendix 2 to this Report. In broad terms, the issues that have been investigated by the Inquiry pursuant to the Terms of Reference replicate the matters that I would have investigated at the inquest. The issue of Russian State responsibility, in particular, has been fully examined. The sensitive government material that was excluded from the inquest on the ground of public interest immunity has been considered.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶2.11 The Inquiry sat to conduct open hearings at the Royal Courts of Justice on 34 days in January, February, March and July 2015.

¶2.12 Closed hearings were also conducted.

¶2.13 As I trust the detail of this Report will demonstrate, I took evidence from a very wide range of sources. The witnesses who gave evidence to the Inquiry included not only Mr Litvinenko's family, friends and business associates, but also medical professionals, nuclear scientists, police officers and experts in fields as diverse as Russian history and polygraphy.

¶2.14 Transcripts of the open hearings, together with the very considerable volume of documentary evidence that I adduced, are available on the Inquiry website.

¶2.15 There were, however, several important witnesses from whom I did not hear.

¶2.16 Boris Berezovsky, who was a close friend of Mr Litvinenko and whom some have blamed for his death, died himself in 2013. I did, however, have access to a large quantity of documentary material – principally police witness statements and interview transcripts which contain detailed accounts given by Mr Berezovsky regarding the matters under investigation. I adduced all this material into evidence.

¶2.17 Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun, both of whom are wanted by the British authorities for the murder of Mr Litvinenko, declined my invitation to give evidence to the Inquiry. That is a matter of regret to me. Both men took some part in these proceedings. Mr Lugovoy was represented for a time during the preparations for the inquest, but declined to take any further part when the inquest was converted into an Inquiry. Mr Kovtun made contact with the Inquiry towards the end of the scheduled hearings and indicated that he wished to give evidence. He provided a witness statement and arrangements were made for him to give oral evidence by videolink from Moscow. In the end, however, he decided not to do so.

¶2.18 The decision was, of course, a matter for them. Since both men were out of the jurisdiction I could not compel them to attend the Inquiry and give evidence. Their decision not to give oral evidence means that I do not have the answers to the questions that they would have been asked, and I have noted in the course of the Report several points in the evidence that demand an explanation from them.

¶2.19 Finally on this point, I should emphasise that, in the end, the fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence does not undermine the findings that I have made about their involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death. The findings are clear. I am entirely confident in making them.

¶2.20 As I have explained at paragraphs 122-123 of Appendix 1, in making findings of fact I have adopted the 'flexible and variable' approach to the standard of proof that was formulated by Sir William Gage in the Baha Mousa Inquiry. I add that where in this Report I state that 'I am sure' I will have found a fact to the criminal standard. When I use such expressions as 'I find' or 'I am satisfied' the standard of proof will have been the ordinary civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. Where it is obvious that I have found a fact but I have not used one of these terms, the standard will have been the civil standard. All other expressions, such as a reference to a state of affairs being 'possible' will not be a finding of fact, but will indicate my state of mind in respect of the issue being considered.

¶Part 2 | Introduction

¶2.21 References in the footnotes such as 'INQ123456' or 'HMG345678' are to documents that I have adduced in evidence and that can be found on the Inquiry website. A reference such as 'Mascall 30/83-92' is to the hearing transcript, which is also available on the website; that particular reference is to the evidence of Detective Inspector Mascall on Day 30 of the hearings, at pages 83 to 92 of that day's transcript.

¶2.22 The structure of this Report reflects the fact that I have received both open and closed evidence relating to the issues that I must determine.

¶2.23 Part 3, Part 4, Part 5 and Part 6 contain an analysis of the open evidence that I have heard regarding Mr Litvinenko's life in the United Kingdom and Russia; theories and evidence as to who may have had a motive to kill him; the events of the final weeks of his life, including the so called 'polonium trail'; and the circumstances of his illness and death.

¶2.24 Part 7 concerns the closed evidence that I have received. Because of the sensitivity of this evidence, I do not anticipate that any of this Part (other than the introductory section) will be published. This Part also contains the single recommendation that I have made. Because the recommendation relates to the closed material, I do not expect it to be published.

¶2.25 Part 8 and Part 9 contain my findings on the two linked questions of who killed Mr Litvinenko and who directed his killing. Part 10 contains my final conclusions. The analysis and conclusions in these Parts are founded on the totality of the evidence that I have heard – that is, both the 'open' and the 'closed' evidence.

¶2.26 I have had the provisions of section 2 of the Inquiries Act 2005 very much in mind in formulating my conclusions in this matter. The core factual findings that I have made, which are summarised in Part 10, are those which I consider it necessary to make in order to discharge my responsibility under paragraph 1(ii) of the Terms of Reference to identify where responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death lies. I have no power to determine any person's civil or criminal liability and I have not done so.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Part 3: Alexander Litvinenko – his life in

¶Russia and the United Kingdom, his illness and death Chapter 1: In Russia 3.1 I received detailed evidence regarding the history of Alexander Litvinenko's life in Russia before he left to travel to the United Kingdom (UK) with his family in November 2000. Very little of this evidence was contentious and much is already in the public domain. For example, a detailed account of Mr Litvinenko's life in Russia is to be found in Alex Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko's book Death of a Dissident, and I am of course aware of other books that have been written about Mr Litvinenko's life, such as Martin Sixsmith's The Litvinenko File and Alan Cowell's The Terminal Spy.

¶3.2 Although many of these matters are well known, I have set them out here in outline as they are of considerable contextual significance to the questions that I have been charged with investigating. The events that took place during Mr Litvinenko's life in Russia, and in particular the last years before he left, cast a long shadow over his life in the UK. Many of those who played a part in the events of the final weeks and months of Mr Litvinenko's life in 2006 were old friends and adversaries from his days in Russia.

¶Childhood 3.3 Alexander Litvinenko was born on 4 December 1962 in the Russian city of Voronezh. His parents, Walter and Nina Litvinenko, divorced when he was very young, and it appears that his childhood, in consequence, was not easy. I heard that as a young child Alexander spent periods of time living with his father and his father's parents in Nalchik in the North Caucasus, with his mother in Moscow and with an aunt in another city called Morozovsk. When he was about 12 he returned to Nalchik to live with his grandparents, with whom he spent the rest of his childhood.1 Nalchik is located towards the south of the old USSR, in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains. It is close to Chechnya. This region and its people would later play an important part in Mr Litvinenko's life.

¶3.4 Both Mr Litvinenko's parents remarried. His mother had a daughter, Svetlana, with her new husband. Mr Litvinenko's father, Walter, had three children with his new wife, of whom the youngest was a son named Maxim.2 As we shall see, Maxim lived in Italy later in his life, where he spent some time with his older half-brother Alexander.

¶3.5 Mr Litvinenko finished his schooling in 1980 at the age of 17. The evidence of Marina Litvinenko (who of course had not yet met Mr Litvinenko at that time) was that he applied to go to university, but did not get a place,3 and decided instead to go to military college. He took that decision in part because he would have been required to undertake military service at some point in any event. However, she said that he was also influenced, even at that young age, by a desire to serve and defend his country.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶She said that he regarded his grandfather, who had fought in the Second World War, as a model in this respect. I note this evidence because Mr Litvinenko's sense of duty to his country – initially to Russia and latterly also to the United Kingdom – is a strong theme of the evidence that I heard about him.

¶Early military career 3.6 The military college that Mr Litvinenko attended was a training centre for Interior Ministry forces, located in a city in North Ossetia then called Ordzhonikidze (now called Vladikavkaz). It is about 80 miles from Nalchik – as Marina Litvinenko observed, not too far in Russian terms. Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that he spent five years training at Ordzhonikidze, graduating in or about 1985 as a lieutenant.

¶3.7 Mr Litvinenko then served in the Dzerzhinsky Division of the forces of the Interior Ministry between 1985 and 1988. His duties appear to have included intelligence work relating to the protection of trains carrying gold bullion. In 1988 Mr Litvinenko was recruited to join what was then still called the Committee for State Security (KGB). He underwent a period of intelligence training at a KGB facility in Siberia, and in 1991 was posted to KGB headquarters in Moscow.4

¶3.8 During this period, as well as securing professional advancement, Mr Litvinenko had started a family. He married his first wife, Natalia, whilst he was still a student. His first child, a son named Alexander, was born in January 1985.5 His daughter Sonya was born in August 1991.

¶KGB officer 3.9 These were times of considerable instability in Russia. 1991, the year in which Mr Litvinenko was posted to KGB headquarters in Moscow, saw the attempted coup against President Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The KGB was dismantled in November 1991. A series of successor organisations inherited much of its staff and took over responsibility for Russian internal security and counterintelligence. Mr Litvinenko worked for each of these organisations throughout this period. The last of these organisations, which was created in 1995 and which still exists, was the Federal Security Service (FSB).

¶3.10 In 1991 Mr Litvinenko was assigned to the Economic Security and Organised Crime Unit of what was then still the KGB. He continued to work in that department until about 1994, when he was transferred to the Anti-Terrorism Department of what had by then become the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK).6

¶3.11 The evidence I have heard is that one of the main focuses of Mr Litvinenko's work during this period was in combating organised crime. In her witness statement, Marina Litvinenko refers, by way of example, to Mr Litvinenko investigating crimes that were then being committed against wealthy Georgians who had moved to Moscow to escape the civil war in their newly independent country. She describes Mr Litvinenko's part in saving the life of a 19 year old boy who had been kidnapped and ransomed for

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶US$1 million. She stated; "I saw that Sasha gave himself to his job without reservation and helped people who found themselves in difficulties."⁷⁷ INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 8) INQ016642 (page 7) INQ017734 (page 23 paragraph 80) Mascall 8/2-4

¶3.12 I heard that it was whilst working for the Economic Security and Organised Crime Unit that Mr Litvinenko first began to investigate the activities of the Tambov criminal group. This was an organised crime group based in St Petersburg. It was led by Vladimir Kumarin, also known as Barsukov, and another man called Alexander Malyshev. In the course of his investigations, Mr Litvinenko discovered evidence that the Tambov group was engaged in smuggling heroin from Afghanistan via Uzbekistan and St Petersburg to Western Europe. Even more significantly, he became convinced that there was widespread collusion between the Tambov group and KGB officials, including both Vladimir Putin and Nikolai Patrushev.

¶3.13 This was the start of what was to become one of Mr Litvinenko's abiding concerns. As we shall see, he continued to investigate and to seek to publicise links between the KGB/FSB and organised crime both before and after he left Russia. Following his arrival in the UK, he made these allegations in his book The Gang from the Lubyanka, and also in the shorter essay The Uzbek File.8

¶Marriage to Marina Litvinenko 3.14 It was in June 1993, and as a result of another case on which he was working, that Mr Litvinenko met his future wife Marina.

¶3.15 Marina Litvinenko has been an interested person and a core participant throughout the life of, respectively, the inquest and Inquiry proceedings. As I have described at paragraphs 46 and 50 of Appendix 1, it was her action in bringing a judicial review against the Home Secretary (at considerable financial risk to herself) that resulted in this Inquiry being established. Marina Litvinenko's legal team has engaged with both sets of proceedings in a most constructive manner, and I have been impressed throughout by the dignity and composure that she has shown during what must have been at times a deeply distressing process. Above all, she has demonstrated a quiet determination to establish the true facts of her husband's death that is greatly to be commended. When she gave oral evidence before me, which she did over the course of two days at the Inquiry hearings, I found her to be an impressive witness who gave careful and considered responses to the questions that she was asked, many concerning events that took place ten years and more ago.

¶3.16 In 1993 Marina Litvinenko was a dance teacher living in Moscow. She had been born in Moscow in 1962 and had grown up and been educated there. She had studied at university for five and a half years, graduating as an engineer economist, but by the time that she graduated, she had already become heavily involved in dancing. On leaving university she became a professional dancer. She married her dance partner and for several years the couple took part in competitive ballroom dancing and also worked as dance teachers. The marriage ended in 1989. She stopped competitive dancing at that point, but carried on with her teaching job.9

¶3.17 Two of Marina Litvinenko's friends from her dancing days, a couple, were receiving demands for money and threats of violence from a former business associate. They had reported the matter to the authorities and Mr Litvinenko was investigating the

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry case. The couple got on well with Mr Litvinenko and invited him to a dinner at Marina's flat to celebrate her birthday in June 1993. Mr Litvinenko was still married to Natalia at this time, but the marriage was in difficulties, and ended in divorce shortly thereafter.10

¶3.18 Mr Litvinenko and Marina began a relationship. Their son Anatoly was born in June 1994. Alexander and Marina Litvinenko married in October 1994.11

¶Developing friendship with Boris Berezovsky 3.19 It was at about the same time – 1994 – that Mr Litvinenko first met and started to develop what was to become a close friendship with Boris Berezovsky. Mr Berezovsky is one of the key figures in the events that form the subject matter of this Inquiry, and it is appropriate to say a few words of introduction about him at this point.

¶3.20 Boris Berezovsky was born in Moscow in 1946. He was a mathematician by training. For the first part of his life he worked as a government scientist; he also conducted research and published academic articles. Mr Berezovsky became an extremely successful businessman during the liberalisation of Russia's internal market, first under President Gorbachev and then under President Yeltsin, with whom he had a close relationship. His first business, which he founded in the late 1980s, was a car dealership named LogoVAZ, but his business interests diversified into broadcasting, airlines and the oil industry.

¶3.21 During the 1990s Mr Berezovsky acquired both great wealth and considerable political influence. He was one of the foremost of the so called 'oligarchs' of that period. At the end of that decade, Mr Berezovsky apparently played a role in facilitating the rise to power of Vladimir Putin. However, he fell out with Mr Putin shortly after the latter's election as President in March 2000. He left Russia permanently at the end of 2000 and claimed asylum in the UK. Thereafter, Mr Berezovsky became a vociferous critic of Mr Putin. Repeated attempts by Russia to secure his extradition were unsuccessful, and Mr Berezovsky was granted asylum in the UK in 2003. He spent much of his wealth in opposing President Putin's regime, and in supporting others who did the same – one of whom, as we shall see, was Mr Litvinenko.

¶3.22 When the inquest into Mr Litvinenko's death was resumed in 2011, Mr Berezovsky was granted interested person status. He was entitled to such status not least because, as we shall see, allegations had been made that he had been involved in Mr Litvinenko's death. Those acting for Mr Berezovsky played a constructive part in the early stages of the inquest proceedings, making submissions at directions hearings and disclosing documentation. Mr Berezovsky's involvement in these proceedings was, however, cut short by his own death in March 2013.

¶3.23 Had Mr Berezovsky been alive at the time of the Inquiry hearings, he would undoubtedly have been an important witness. Although I was not able to hear Mr Berezovsky give oral evidence, I did adduce a substantial quantity of documentary evidence emanating from and relating to him.12 It included statements given by Mr Berezovsky to the Metropolitan Police team investigating Mr Litvinenko's death and transcripts of interviews. In considering this documentary evidence, I have of course taken account of the fact that I did not have the benefit of hearing Mr Berezovsky's account being tested in oral evidence. I have also borne in mind the fact that Mrs Justice Gloster

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko found Mr Berezovsky to be a highly unreliable witness in the proceedings that he brought against Mr Roman Abramovich in the High Court in London.13 In fact (and in contrast to the Abramovich case), a large proportion of Mr Berezovsky's account has been either uncontentious or well supported by the evidence of others. In reaching my conclusion on the question of Mr Berezovsky's alleged involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death (see Part 9), I have been able to rely on a considerably wider array of evidence than Mr Berezovsky's own (untested) denial.

¶3.24 Returning to Moscow in 1994, the account that Mr Berezovsky gave of his first meetings with Mr Litvinenko was in the following terms:

¶"I first met Alexander Litvinenko, also known as Sasha Litvinenko, in 1994 when he was an FSB officer for the Russian security services (KGB). He came to my offices as he had orders to look into the workings of my company. It was not to investigate me personally, but an investigation into how my business was operating. This was because at the time the FSB were trying to establish how Russia was being transformed.

¶In June 1994 I was subject to a terror attack against me in Moscow. It was a car bomb. When I left my office the car exploded. My driver was killed, my bodyguard and I were both injured and I spent two weeks in hospital in Switzerland. This incident resulted in Litvinenko and I becoming close friends."¹⁴¹⁴ Berezovsky 25/6-7 Felshtinsky 23/128-131 Service 28/48 lines 3-9 Hohne 32/51 INQ015781 part 1, INQ015781 part 2; INQ015777 part 1, INQ015777 part 2; INQ015778; INQ015779; INQ015780 [videos] Dombey 23/13-39

¶3.25 Marina Litvinenko had only known Mr Litvinenko for a year in June 1994, but in her oral evidence she recalled that he had been involved in investigating the assassination attempt against Mr Berezovsky, which she described as having been front page news at the time.15 She also stated that Mr Litvinenko had been ordered at that time to (as she put it in her witness statement) "maintain regular contact" with Mr Berezovsky.16 The precise scope and purpose of this duty was not clear – Marina Litvinenko did not think, for example, that he was acting as a bodyguard. It may be that this was simply a continuation of the attempts by the FSB (or FSK as it was at this time) to keep tabs on Mr Berezovsky, which he described in the first of the two paragraphs quoted from his statement above.

¶3.26 Marina Litvinenko recalled that at that time Mr Litvinenko had a number of meetings with Mr Berezovsky, and that he accompanied Mr Berezovsky on a trip to Switzerland in 1995. Her evidence was that Mr Litvinenko travelled on that occasion on a diplomatic passport provided by the FSB; so it would appear that the trip had the blessing of his superiors.

¶3.27 Putting the matter shortly, the evidence seems to support Mr Berezovsky's assertion that the assassination attempt in June 1994 was the start of the process by which he and Mr Litvinenko became close friends.

¶3.28 A second important incident in the development of the relationship between the two men took place in March 1995, following the murder in Moscow of a man named Vlad Listyev. Mr Listyev was at that time the most popular TV presenter in Russia; he was also the head of the independent television station ORT, which was controlled by Mr Berezovsky. Marina Litvinenko's account of this episode was that police came

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry to Mr Berezovsky's office to arrest him for Mr Listyev's murder; Mr Berezovsky got a message to Mr Litvinenko, who came to the office and prevented the police from taking Mr Berezovsky away. She explained that both Mr Berezovsky and Mr Litvinenko feared that Mr Berezovsky might be murdered in police custody had he been arrested. In Mr Berezovsky's account of this incident, he said that Mr Litvinenko had taken out his gun and said to the police, "If you try to catch him now I'll kill you."¹⁷¹⁷ Berezovsky 25/7 Goldfarb 26/122 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Mascall 8/75 INQ019031; INQ019054 Dombey 23/24-30; INQ020031 (page 2 paragraphs S9-S10) Marina Litvinenko emphasised that Mr Litvinenko's intervention on behalf of Mr Berezovsky had been authorised by at least one of his superiors, namely General Anatoly Trofimov, who was then the head of the Moscow regional directorate of the FSK.

¶3.29 I am clearly not in a position to make any findings regarding the rights and wrongs of this affair, including as to whether Mr Berezovsky was in fact involved in any way in Mr Listyev's death (a subject which I am aware remains controversial). Nor is the determination of such matters within the proper scope of this Inquiry. What I think can be said, which certainly is of relevance for present purposes, is that this episode marked a further stage in the developing friendship between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky. More than that, it put Mr Berezovsky in Mr Litvinenko's debt. As Marina Litvinenko put it during her oral evidence, "After that, Boris Berezovsky said many times Sasha saved his life, and he was very grateful."¹⁸¹⁸ Marina Litvinenko 3/40 lines 24-25 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 79) BLK000134 Mascall 8/76 Bruce Burgess 21/1-171 Mascall 29/77-78 The repayment of that debt is an important backdrop to the story of Mr Litvinenko's subsequent escape from Russia to the UK, and his life here.

¶Involvement in the First Chechen War 3.30 The First Chechen War started at the end of 1994. By this time, Mr Litvinenko was attached to what Marina Litvinenko described as the Anti-Terrorist Centre of the FSK.

¶3.31 It would appear that he had considerable involvement in the Chechen conflict, although not for the main part in combat operations. Marina Litvinenko described Mr Litvinenko making frequent operational trips during this period to Nalchik, the city where he had grown up. Nalchik was situated close to but away from the fighting in Chechnya, and in her written evidence Marina Litvinenko stated that Mr Litvinenko, "did analytical work and ran agents from the FSB headquarters in Nalchik". She added that he was well suited to that type of work, knowing as he did the customs and traditions of the region from his childhood.19

¶3.32 This account tallies well with the evidence received by the Inquiry from Akhmed Zakayev.

¶3.33 By the time of Mr Litvinenko's death in 2006, he and Mr Zakayev were neighbours in London and close friends. A decade earlier they had been on opposite sides of the conflict in Chechnya. Mr Zakayev's evidence was that he was at that time a senior official in the Republic of Ichkeria, as the breakaway Chechen republic was then known. Following the death of the Chechen President Ozhokhar Dudaev in April 1996, his widow left Chechnya and was then detained by Russian authorities in Nalchik. Mr Zakayev explained in his oral evidence to the Inquiry that the Chechen leadership had been concerned at that time to discover which FSB officer was interviewing Mrs Dudaev; he said that they had established through informants that she was being interrogated in Nalchik by Mr Litvinenko, who was using the pseudonym

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶Alexander Volkov. Mr Zakayev added that when, years later, the two men met on friendly terms, Mr Litvinenko had confirmed to him that he had indeed interviewed Mrs Dudaev in Nalchik at that time.20

¶3.34 Mr Litvinenko's immediate superior in the anti-terrorist unit at this time was a man named Alexander Gusak. Marina Litvinenko remembered him well. She said that he and Mr Litvinenko had had "a very turbulent relationship". The difficulties between the two men appear to have arisen from their very different styles of work. Mr Litvinenko had, she said, a careful and precise approach to his work, whereas Mr Gusak, in Marina Litvinenko's words, "was more like a hero man and fighting man, and he didn't like to do some job in a very precise and a very correct way". Although they clashed at work, it appears that the two men got on well on a personal level – Mr Gusak attended Alexander and Marina Litvinenko's wedding in 1994 and in 1996/7 the two families built dachas close to each other, making them neighbours.21 Mr Gusak was subsequently to play an important role in the events that led to Alexander and Marina Litvinenko's flight from Russia.

¶3.35 Although Mr Litvinenko's principal involvement in the hostilities in Chechnya appears to have consisted of conducting intelligence operations from FSB headquarters in Nalchik, the evidence is that there was at least one occasion when he took part in combat.

¶3.36 I am aware of allegations reported in at least two of the books that have been written about Mr Litvinenko's life and death to the effect that he physically mistreated prisoners whilst serving in Chechnya. It would appear that the source of those allegations was Mr Gusak, who, at least by the time he made them, had a declared animosity towards Mr Litvinenko. I have no further evidence one way or the other regarding these allegations.22

¶3.37 As I have said, the evidence is that Mr Litvinenko did spend at least some time on combat operations inside Chechnya. He was present at the siege of Pervomayskoye in January 1996. Marina Litvinenko recalled that Mr Litvinenko sustained frostbite to his hands and feet at this time. She also stated that Mr Litvinenko's experiences at Pervomayskoye caused him to start to change his views about the rights and wrongs of the Chechen War. She referred in particular to Mr Litvinenko interrogating a 17 year old Chechen prisoner and realising that all the pupils in the boy's class had taken up arms. She said that he began to compare the Chechen defence of their country with the heroic actions of the Russian army, including his grandfather, in the Second World War.23 Mr Zakayev also recalled this incident, which he had discussed years later with Mr Litvinenko in London. He said that it was at this time that Mr Litvinenko, "started to understand what the Chechen people wanted and what they're fighting for."²⁴²⁴ Zakayev 26/142 lines 9-11 Service 28/30-31; 28/69-70; Felshtinsky 23/175-177 Goldfarb 5/102-107 Elenora Wall 32/77 INQ016403 (page 31)

¶Department for the Investigation and Prevention of Organised Crime 3.38 In the summer of 1997, Mr Litvinenko was transferred within the FSB to the Department for the Investigation and Prevention of Organised Crime, known as URPO.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.39 The evidence that I have heard is that URPO was a secret unit. Its offices, for example, were not situated at the 'Lubyanka', the main FSB headquarters. In her witness statement, Marina Litvinenko stated that URPO members, "were tasked with special operations, which were on the borderline of legality".25 In his police interview Mr Litvinenko himself put the matter rather more directly. He described URPO as a "top secret department of KGB" whose role was, "killing political and high business men… without verdict."²⁶²⁶ INQ002076 (page 4) Felshtinsky 23/135-137; Goldfarb 5/113-114 Reilly 10/23-26 Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ014604; INQ014605; INQ014607; INQ014608; INQ014609; INQ014610; INQ014611; INQ014612; INQ014613; INQ014620; INQ014621; INQ014623; INQ014624 3.40 When he moved to URPO, Mr Litvinenko was put in charge of a section of some eight or ten officers.27 Some of these men, in particular Victor Shebalin and Andrei Ponkin, were to play an important role in the events that brought Mr Litvinenko's career in the FSB to an end. Mr Litvinenko found that his immediate superior in his new unit was to be Alexander Gusak, with whom he had served in Chechnya. The head of URPO was a man named General Khokholkov, and his deputy was Captain Alexander Kamyshnikov. The overall head of the FSB at the time was Nikolay Kovalyev.28

¶Order to kill Boris Berezovsky 3.41 Marina Litvinenko stated that, by the end of 1997, Mr Litvinenko had been tasked with the conduct of a number of URPO operations that he regarded as unlawful. This account is supported by claims that Mr Litvinenko himself made at the time. 3.42 Marina Litvinenko referred to three operations in particular. 3.43 The first concerned a former FSB officer named Mikhail Trepashkin. Mr Trepashkin was a critic of the FSB, as Mr Litvinenko was subsequently to become. In 1997 Mr Trepashkin had recently resigned from his post and had brought proceedings against the FSB. The evidence before me was that Mr Litvinenko and his URPO section were ordered to assault Mr Trepashkin, and to take his bag and his FSB identity card away from him.29 Mr Trepashkin and Mr Litvinenko subsequently became friends, and I will refer to him further below. 3.44 The second of these operations concerned a man named Umar Dzhabrailov. Mr Dzhabrailov was a wealthy Chechen businessman living in Moscow. In his book The Gang from the Lubyanka Mr Litvinenko described his section being tasked: "to kidnap a prominent businessman Umar Dzhabrailov [to get money] to pay ransom for our officers in Chechen captivity…".30 The book went on to assert, and Marina Litvinenko also made this point in her oral evidence, that Mr Litvinenko and his section were authorised to shoot policemen who had been tasked with guarding Mr Dzhabrailov if it became necessary in the course of the kidnapping.31 3.45 The last, and most important, of these three operations related to Mr Berezovsky. In legal documents that he filed in Russia in 1998, Mr Litvinenko was very clear about what he had been told to do on this occasion. Referring to "the order to assassinate B.A. Berezovsky", Mr Litvinenko stated: "I was instructed by A.P. Kamyshnikov to physically exterminate Berezovsky and considered his words an order. I disobeyed the order only because it was an illegal order."³²³² HMG000115 Goldfarb 26/19-21; Felshtinsky 23/153-157 Cotlick 25/41-47 INQ006218 INQ022423 (page 2)

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶3.46 Marina Litvinenko's witness statement describes Mr Litvinenko being tasked with "looking into the possibility of assassinating Berezovsky"³³³³ INQ017734 (page 6 paragraph 16(c)) Goldfarb 26/20-21 Voronkov 16/193-194 Fitzgerald 8/116-123 INQ020031 (page 4 paragraphs S20-S21) and in her initial oral evidence before me she stated that she did not believe that Mr Kamyshnikov had given Mr Litvinenko a formal instruction to kill Mr Berezovsky; the substance of the exchange, in her view, was limited to Mr Kamyshnikov asking Mr Litvinenko whether he could kill Mr Berezovsky.34 In later questioning, Marina Litvinenko took a firmer line, accepting the proposition from her counsel that Mr Litvinenko understood that he had received, "an unequivocal instruction to commit an act of murder by his superior within the FSB in a secret, unaccountable unit".35

¶3.47 I do not regard these distinctions as being of great importance. I am not in a position to make any findings about the precise terms in which Mr Kamyshnikov may have discussed the killing of Mr Berezovsky with Mr Litvinenko and his section in late 1997. And that issue, moreover, is not of central importance to this Inquiry. Of much greater importance for my purposes are the decision that Mr Litvinenko took to expose what he regarded as an FSB plot to murder Mr Berezovsky, and the events that were then triggered – events that, as we shall see, may have contributed to Mr Litvinenko's death in London nine years later.

¶Whistleblower 3.48 The evidence I heard was that Mr Litvinenko and his colleagues, including Mr Gusak, were unhappy with the orders they had been given. They were particularly concerned about the orders relating to Mr Berezovsky. They took a number of steps in response, the culmination of which was the well known press conference on 17 November 1998, in which Mr Litvinenko and others publicly denounced the FSB in front of the world's media. Before dealing with the press conference, I will briefly outline the evidence that I have heard regarding the escalating events that led up to it.

¶3.49 Marina Litvinenko stated that Mr Litvinenko's first act, after considering what to do for several weeks, was to go to see Mr Berezovsky, and tell him about the orders that he had received. It seems that Mr Berezovsky did not initially take the matter seriously, but this changed when Mr Litvinenko went to see him again (in March 1998), accompanied by some of the officers in his section.36

¶3.50 Acting on Mr Berezovsky's advice, Mr Litvinenko and his colleagues raised their complaints with Evgeny Savostianov, who was at that time President Yeltsin's Deputy Chief of Staff. He referred the case to the Military Prosecution Service, and told them that they should file an official complaint.37

¶3.51 Mr Litvinenko and his colleagues were concerned at what steps might be taken against them. There were discussions as to what to do. The men decided to make a video record of their allegations, which could be released, as Marina Litvinenko put it in her oral evidence "in case somebody will be arrested or, worse, somebody will be killed".38 Mr Berezovsky arranged for this to be done by means of a filmed interview conducted by Sergei Dorenko, who was a well known broadcaster at his television station ORT. The interview was filmed during the night of 19 April 1998 at Mr Berezovsky's dacha.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Marina Litvinenko was there. The interview (which featured Mr Litvinenko, Andrei Ponkin and Alexander Gusak) was not, in the event, broadcast until November 1998, shortly after the press conference.39

¶3.52 In his account in The Gang from the Lubyanka, Mr Litvinenko stated that by this stage both he and Mr Berezovsky had spoken separately to Mr Kovalyev, the head of the FSB, about the order to kill Mr Berezovsky. Mr Litvinenko recorded that after his meeting he heard from Mr Gusak that Mr Kovalyev was "very unhappy" that he had told Mr Berezovsky about the order: "He said it was – a betrayal of the interests of the security services. To go and give everything to a stranger."⁴⁰⁴⁰ BLK000253 (pages 7-8) INQ017384 Attew 13/27-28 Mascall 9/11-12; 9/18-20; INQ019202 Dombey 23/33; 23/39-40

¶3.53 On Marina Litvinenko's account, Mr Kovalyev summoned Mr Litvinenko and all the URPO officers who supported his claims to his office on the day after the filming with Mr Dorenko had taken place. He demanded that they withdraw their allegations. They refused to do so.41

¶3.54 Mr Litvinenko next followed the advice of Mr Savostianov and filed an official complaint with the Military Prosecution Service. Some of the official papers relating to that complaint are in evidence before me. They show that Mr Litvinenko complained of having received illegal orders relating to Mr Trepashkin, Mr Dzhabrailov and Mr Berezovsky.42 It would appear that at this stage both Mr Litvinenko and his colleagues and URPO commanders, including General Khokholkov, were suspended from the FSB. In May and June 1998 Mr Litvinenko gave evidence to the Military Prosecution Service.43

¶3.55 On 7 June 1998 President Yeltsin dismissed Mr Kovalyev as head of the FSB and replaced him with Vladimir Putin. Mr Berezovsky arranged for Mr Litvinenko to meet Mr Putin, in order that he could tell him what he knew about FSB corruption and unlawful conduct. The meeting between the two men took place in or about July 1998. Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko had not been confident that Mr Putin would be an agent of change within the FSB. His view, she said, was that Mr Putin was inexperienced, and also probably mixed up in criminal activity himself from his days in St Petersburg.44

¶3.56 Mr Litvinenko described his first and only meeting with Mr Putin in The Gang from the Lubyanka. He said:

¶"He came out from behind the desk… to greet me. Apparently, he wanted to show an open, likeable personality. We, operatives, have a special style of behaviour.

¶We do not bow to each other, do without pleasantries – and so everything is clear.

¶Just look into each other's eyes and it becomes clear, do you trust the person or not. And I immediately had the impression that he is not sincere. He looked not like an FSB director, but a person who played the director."⁴⁵⁴⁵ BLK000253 (page 10) HMG000308 Attew 13/37 Mascall 9/27-28 INQ019146 (page 15 paragraph 46)

¶3.57 The evidence was that in October 1998 the URPO investigation by the Military Prosecution Service was closed. The conclusion of the investigation was that no

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko crimes had been committed. Put shortly, as I understand it, the allegations made by Mr Litvinenko and the others had been rejected.46

¶3.58 Although Marina Litvinenko did not recall this when giving oral evidence,47 the documents before me indicate that Mr Litvinenko almost immediately made a formal application to have the investigation reopened.48

¶3.59 On 13 November 1998 an open letter from Mr Berezovsky to Mr Putin was published in the Russian media. A copy of this letter is in evidence. The letter detailed the allegations made by Mr Litvinenko and the others and was critical of what it described as an attempted cover up. In the final paragraphs of the letter, Mr Berezovsky made a direct appeal to Mr Putin:

¶"Vladimir Vladimirovich, no doubt, the legacy you received from your predecessors is not easy. Criminals and corrupted functionaries at different levels, even in your institution, are hitting those who do not want to go back to the pigsty. The wave of criminal terror is rising in the country. Mafia and the 'red-brown' elements are striving for power. They do not understand that there is no place for people like them in a free country where democracy is firmly secured by law.

¶I do not consider the facts and problems raised in my letter isolated, I see a tendency here and this tendency is mortally dangerous for Russia.

¶I am asking you to use the power vested on you to secure the constitutional order."⁴⁹⁴⁹ BER002661 Goldfarb 5/123 Shvets 24/100 Scott 9/43-44 Marina Litvinenko 3/141-142

¶3.60 Mr Berezovsky's open letter made a clearly worded request to Mr Putin to reform the FSB. A few days later, on 17 November 1998, Mr Litvinenko went public with his criticisms of the FSB at a press conference in Moscow that was attended by the world's media. It appears likely that the press conference was part of a larger reform strategy directed by Mr Berezovsky.

¶3.61 The press conference was held at the RIA Novosti international news agency in Moscow. Mr Litvinenko appeared before the press without a mask and was the main speaker. Also present and unmasked was Mr Trepashkin, with whom Mr Litvinenko had by this time struck up a friendship.50 Four of Mr Litvinenko's fellow officers from URPO, including Mr Shebalin and Mr Ponkin, also appeared, wearing either skiing masks or sunglasses. Marina Litvinenko described the press conference in the following terms:

¶"Never in the history of the Russian security services has the FSB experienced such a public exposure. [Mr Litvinenko] and the others talked about corruption, criminalisation of the FSB and the fact that the system that was set up to protect people was turning into the system from which people needed to be protected.

¶They also aired the details of extrajudicial acts that the FSB conspired to undertake against Trepashkin, Dzhabrailov and Berezovsky."⁵¹⁵¹ INQ017734 (page 10 paragraph 33) Goldfarb 5/125; 26/21-22 Shvets 24/102 INQ017809 (page 58) INQ019146 (page 19 paragraph 61)

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.62 The press conference received widespread publicity in the broadcast and print media.

¶3.63 At the time of the press conference, Yuri Felshtinsky was in Moscow, undertaking preparatory work on a biography of Boris Berezovsky. In his evidence he emphasised that Mr Berezovsky and Mr Putin were still friends at this point. He said that Mr Berezovsky was, "hoping that he will use Putin in order to make major changes within the FSB". According to Mr Felshtinsky, it was Mr Berezovsky's hope: "that as a result of that press conference, all those old KGB generals would be fired from the FSB and the new generation, new people, like Litvinenko, would replace them."⁵²⁵² Felshtinsky 23/127 lines 11-17 Goldfarb 26/25 Marina Litvinenko 4/6 Reilly 10/83 INQ019146 (page 20 paragraph 62) Mr Putin's reaction to the open letter and the press conference was not, however, as Mr Berezovsky had hoped. 3.64 Professor Robert Service was until 2014 Professor of Russian History at Oxford University; he gave expert evidence to the Inquiry on matters of Russian history (see below 9.41 – 9.43). He suggested that, far from seeing the press conference as a welcome step towards reform, Mr Putin probably regarded it as the first of a series of occasions on which Mr Litvinenko was guilty of breaching the FSB code of loyalty.53 As we shall see, there were some in the FSB who certainly did take that view.

¶Dismissal, arrest, prosecution, imprisonment 3.65 The period between the press conference in November 1998 and Mr Litvinenko's decision to leave Russia for good in September 2000 saw his position gradually deteriorate. 3.66 In December 1998 Mr Litvinenko and all the officers involved in the press conference were dismissed from the FSB. Mr Berezovsky gave them jobs as consultants. 3.67 An official investigation was opened into Mr Litvinenko's record. Marina Litvinenko recalled that he told her that the situation would develop in one of two ways, "they will kill him, or he will be arrested".54 3.68 Mr Litvinenko was arrested on 25 March 1999. He was charged and detained in the FSB Lefortovo prison in Moscow. The charges against Mr Litvinenko were of exceeding his authority by assaulting a suspect. However, Mrs Litvinenko stated that the investigator, named Nikolay Barsukov, had told her that the charges had been brought in response to the press conference, and that; "if they were unsuccessful in making the charges stick this time… they would come up with something else".55 The events that followed certainly lend credence to this threat. 3.69 Mr Litvinenko spent eight months in detention at Lefortovo prison. Marina Litvinenko stated that Mr Berezovsky made representations to Mr Putin on Mr Litvinenko's behalf, but without success. She also stated that Mr Litvinenko's former colleagues were pressured to give false evidence against him, but refused to do so. When the trial eventually took place before the Moscow Regional Military Court on 26 November 1999, Mr Litvinenko was acquitted of all charges.56 3.70 That, however, was far from the end of Mr Litvinenko's difficulties. As Mrs Litvinenko described, at the very moment that Mr Litvinenko was formally acquitted of the first

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko set of charges: "immediately people came to this courtroom and they said they are from the FSB and they have another order against my husband, and they need to arrest him."⁵⁷⁵⁷ Marina Litvinenko 3/87 lines 16-18 Marina Litvinenko 3/135-136 Shvets 24/82-84 Krgo 9/57 INQ019146 (page 23 paragraph 73) 3.71 Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that the new charges against Mr Litvinenko concerned allegations of mishandling suspects and stealing goods during an operation at a Moscow market in which he had been involved several years previously. The investigator was again Mr Barsukov. Mr Litvinenko was again detained, but in a different prison. He was released on bail in mid December 1999.58

¶3.72 The evidence before me was that these new proceedings collapsed before trial when Mr Litvinenko produced evidence that he had not been at the market on the day in question. A third set of proceedings was then brought against Mr Litvinenko, again at the instigation of Mr Barsukov. The charge on this occasion was that Mr Litvinenko had planted evidence on a suspect. Mr Litvinenko was not arrested but his passport was confiscated and he was told not to leave Moscow without permission.59

¶3.73 There is evidence that on this occasion as previously an associate of Mr Litvinenko was put under pressure to give false evidence against him.60 I have also seen evidence that Mr Litvinenko's father, Walter, was complaining of being harassed by the Russian authorities at this time.61

¶3.74 This third set of proceedings was still in train when Mr Litvinenko left Russia in October 2000. Mr Litvinenko was ultimately convicted on those charges in 2002.62

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Chapter 2: Leaving Russia

¶3.75 The evidence I have received suggests that Mr Litvinenko became increasingly concerned for his safety and that of his family in Russia during 2000. 3.76 Mr Felshtinsky gave evidence about a meeting that he had with General Khokholkov, the former head of URPO, in Moscow in May 2000. According to Mr Felshtinsky, his purpose in speaking with General Khokholkov was to try to establish whether the authorities would let Mr Litvinenko leave Russia, in particular now that he had served nine months or so in prison. General Khokholkov's response, as reported by Mr Felshtinsky, was uncompromising:

¶"He told me that nine months, or whatever, is nothing, that Litvinenko committed treason, that he is going to… prison anyway, and if he [i.e. Khokholkov] actually sees him by chance, you know, somewhere in a dark corner, he would kill him with his own hands." Mr Felshtinsky explained that General Kohkholkov had gestured with his hands as he had said this – he said that, "Khokholkov hated Litvinenko very much, and… considered him… a person who committed treason, this is for sure."⁶³⁶³ Felshtinsky 23/141 Bukovsky 26/94 Goldfarb 5/127; 27/112 Reilly 10/95 Zakayev 26/162-163 3.77 Mr Felshtinsky immediately reported this conversation to Mr Litvinenko, and told him that he should consider leaving Russia.64 3.78 Nor was this the only threat that Mr Litvinenko received. Marina Litvinenko said that her husband had been approached by an FSB colonel who had said words to the following effect: "We will not continue discussions with you, we will kill you, to be clear we will kill your six year old son… you are being prosecuted not for any crimes that you may have committed. Everybody knows that you did not commit them. You are being prosecuted for betraying the system and openly acting against the system."⁶⁵⁶⁵ INQ017734 (page 22 paragraph 76); Marina Litvinenko 4/101 (2003) NIQB 56 Marina Litvinenko 3/146 Reilly 10/108 Zakeyev 26/163-167 3.79 Marina Litvinenko also gave evidence that when the third set of charges was brought against Mr Litvinenko in early 2000, they were told that the case would be heard not in Moscow, as with the first two sets of proceedings, but in Yaroslavl, some 300km from Moscow. They were also told that the trial would be closed to the press and the public. Their concern was that, away from the public attention that the earlier proceedings had received in Moscow, the authorities would be able to implement what Mr Litvinenko believed to have been the direct order to "put him in prison and never let him… out".66 3.80 It would appear that it was a combination of all these fears that led Mr Litvinenko to decide to leave Russia for good. Mr Felshtinsky's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko had decided to leave Russia by the time of a meeting between the two men in Moscow on 24 September 2000, at which they discussed Mr Litvinenko's proposed escape.67 3.81 This was not, however, a decision that Mr Litvinenko initially shared with his wife or his son. Mrs Litvinenko's evidence was that in September 2000 (presumably in late September, after his meeting with Mr Felshtinsky), Mr Litvinenko suddenly left Moscow for Nalchik, saying that he was flying to Nalchik to visit relatives.68

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶3.82 Having arrived in Nalchik, Mr Litvinenko crossed into neighbouring Georgia. Once he had made his way to Tbilisi, Mr Litvinenko passed a message to Mr Berezovsky, who in turn contacted Mr Felshtinsky. Mr Felshtinsky then travelled from Boston to Tbilisi to meet Mr Litvinenko.69

¶3.83 Next Mr Litvinenko got a message to Marina Litvinenko instructing her to buy a new mobile phone. He then called her on the new phone and told her that she and Anatoly must go on holiday anywhere she liked as soon as possible – they decided on Malaga in Spain. Mrs Litvinenko explained that the suggestion of a holiday was unexpected and inconvenient; but she made the arrangements and they flew to Malaga on about 17 October 2000.70

¶3.84 Mr Felshtinsky recalled speaking to Marina Litvinenko from Tbilisi about her travel arrangements. He then flew from Tbilisi to Malaga and met Marina Litvinenko on her arrival there. He stayed with her for two days, and then flew back to join Mr Litvinenko in Tbilisi.71

¶3.85 I should mention at this point that the evidence I heard was that this entire exercise was funded by Mr Berezovsky. He paid for air flights and hotel accommodation. He also made his private jet available, for example for Mr Felshtinsky's flights between Tbilisi and Malaga.72

¶3.86 Marina Litvinenko's evidence to me was that she spoke to Mr Litvinenko at length whilst she was in Malaga. He explained that he was not in Nalchik but in Georgia, and that they now had to decide whether they would ever return to Russia. He said that if she wished to go back, he would go back with her, but he feared that if he did return he would be arrested, jailed and killed in prison. He was worried, she said, not only for his own safety in Russia but also for her and Anatoly, whom he would be unable to protect from the FSB. In the end, Marina Litvinenko explained, they decided not to return.73

¶3.87 Back in Tbilisi, Mr Felshtinsky and Mr Litvinenko were concerned for their safety. Mr Felshtinsky's evidence was that they had asked officials at the United States (US) embassy in Tbilisi to grant Mr Litvinenko political asylum, but without success (he also said that they had not, contrary to Mr Goldfarb's evidence, approached the British embassy in Tbilisi). They were worried that the FSB might have realised that Mr Litvinenko had left Moscow, and that they might have traced him to Georgia. By this stage, Mr Litvinenko had acquired a false Georgian passport. The two men travelled to Antalya in Turkey.74

¶3.88 Mr Felshtinsky then took Mr Berezovsky's plane back to Malaga, where he collected Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko and brought them back to Antalya.

¶3.89 At this stage Mr Felshtinsky returned to the US, but he was replaced by Mr Goldfarb, who flew from his home in New York to join the Litvinenko family at Mr Berezovsky's request. Mr Felshtinsky recalled that the two men had spoken by telephone whilst they were both in London on their respective journeys, although they did not have time to meet.75

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.90 Mr Goldfarb described how, after his arrival in Turkey, he had travelled with the Litvinenko family to Ankara. He had arranged an approach to the US embassy there, and Mr and Mrs Litvinenko were interviewed separately by US officials.76

¶3.91 The American officials responded on the following day saying that they could not assist. By this time, the Litvinenko family and Mr Goldfarb were in Istanbul, having driven there overnight, again because they were concerned that they might be in danger from the FSB.

¶3.92 The group were now desperate to reach a place of safety. Mr Goldfarb's evidence was that Badri Patarkatsishvili, Mr Berezovsky's friend and business partner, suggested sending a boat to pick them up in Istanbul, but that was considered too dangerous. Mr Goldfarb researched which destinations could be reached by air without the need for a visa. The solution that they eventually hit upon was to fly to the UK by purchasing tickets from Istanbul to Tbilisi via London, a trip that did not require any transit visas. As had been the case throughout this period, Mr Berezovsky met the costs – Mr Goldfarb's evidence was that the costs that he had incurred amounted to US$130,000.77

¶3.93 On 1 November 2000, Alexander, Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko flew to London with Mr Goldfarb on the first leg of their supposed journey to Tbilisi. Marina Litvinenko described in her evidence how, having landed at Heathrow Airport, Mr Litvinenko approached the first police officer that he saw in the transit area and said, "I am KGB officer and I'm asking for political asylum".78

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶Chapter 3: In the United Kingdom 3.94 The Litvinenko family lived in the UK for six years before Mr Litvinenko's death on 23 November 2006. I heard a great deal of evidence about Mr Litvinenko's work and campaigning activities during this period, together with other aspects of his life that may have been connected to his death. I will address these matters in detail in due course. In this chapter I propose to give a brief outline of the evidence that I have heard about the family's life during those six years.

¶Immigration status 3.95 As I have indicated, Mr Litvinenko claimed asylum on behalf of himself and his family when they first arrived in the UK. Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko was interviewed for a lengthy period by immigration officers at Heathrow on the day of their arrival. Thereafter he worked with George Menzies, the solicitor whom Mr Goldfarb had contacted whilst they were on their way to the UK, to prepare his claim. The Home Office granted the family's asylum claim in May 2001.79

¶3.96 Marina Litvinenko gave evidence that when they were granted asylum, the family took up the option of changing their names. She took the name of Marie Anne Carter, Mr Litvinenko the name of Edwin Redwald Carter and Anatoly that of Anthony Carter.80

¶3.97 In 2002 the family were issued with travel documents (in their new names), which enabled them to travel away from the UK. Marina Litvinenko said that the first holiday they took, in the summer of 2002, was back to the hotel in Spain where she and Anatoly had stayed in 2000, and where they had taken the decision to leave Russia permanently.81

¶3.98 In 2006 the family became eligible for naturalisation as British citizens. They made an application and were granted citizenship at a ceremony at Haringey civic centre on 13 October 2006. One thing that is clear on the evidence that I have heard is that Mr Litvinenko was delighted to have become a British citizen. Marina Litvinenko said that he flew an English flag from their balcony during the World Cup in the summer of 2006 – he was, she said, "very proud to be British, … and he was very proud for his son to be British and having his future in England".82 There was, of course, a darker side to this moment. As we shall see, one of the reasons that Mr Litvinenko was so pleased to be granted British citizenship was that it made him feel safer. Ironically, the ceremony took place only a few weeks before he was fatally poisoned.

¶Accommodation 3.99 I have already referred to the evidence that Mr Berezovsky funded the Litvinenko family's escape from Russia. Marina Litvinenko stated that, while she had been in Spain and trying to decide whether or not the family should leave everything behind them in Russia, she had spoken to Mr Berezovsky, who had promised that he would support them.83 On the evidence that I have heard, this was a promise that, at least in broad terms, Mr Berezovsky fulfilled.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.100 Mr Berezovsky provided accommodation for the family. After a few days in a hotel and then an aparthotel, the family moved into a rented flat in Kensington that was paid for by Mr Berezovsky. They stayed there for two years. In about 2002 they moved to the house in Muswell Hill,¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ Nathwani 18/101 Glushkov 17/46-48 Mascall 12/4-5; 12/9 Osier Crescent, where they were living at the time of Mr Litvinenko's death. Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that this house was owned by one of Mr Berezovsky's companies. They did not pay any rent for the house, but they did pay all the bills.84

¶3.101 I also heard evidence that Mr Berezovsky employed Mr Litvinenko to work for him. Both Marina Litvinenko and Mr Goldfarb said that payments were made to Mr Litvinenko by way of regular grants from the International Foundation for Civil Liberties, which I have heard was funded by Mr Berezovsky and operated by Mr Goldfarb.85 There was also some evidence that in due course Mr Berezovsky reduced the payments that he was making to Mr Litvinenko. It has been suggested that this led to a falling out between the two men. I will return to that issue below.

¶Medical history 3.102 Mr Litvinenko was, according to the evidence that I have heard, an extremely healthy man. In contrast to many of his colleagues in the FSB, he did not drink or smoke. He took regular exercise. Marina Litvinenko said that she had registered the family with a local medical practice following their move to Muswell Hill in 2002, but she did not think that Mr Litvinenko had ever been to see the general practitioner (GP) in the subsequent years, although she did remember one occasion when a private doctor had come to see him about a lower back problem.86

¶3.103 A statement was read to the Inquiry from Dr Rebecca Hatjiosif, who is a GP at that practice. She produced Mr Litvinenko's medical notes, which I received in evidence.87 Dr Hatjiosif stated that Mr Litvinenko had been registered with her practice in May 2003 and gave evidence which confirmed Marina Litvinenko's recollection that he had not thereafter had any contact with the surgery.88

¶Work and school 3.104 Marina Litvinenko stated that both she and her husband attended language school in Kensington for the first two years that they were in London. By 2004, her English was good enough to enable her to secure a job as a dance teacher at a David Lloyd club in Finchley. She said that she also taught at a language school for Russian children.

¶3.105 All the evidence I have heard is that Mr Litvinenko's spoken English was markedly worse than his wife's, and that she was being over modest when she told me that her English was "maybe… a little bit better" than his.89 When Dean Attew first met Mr Litvinenko in 2004, he found his English to be "extremely limited". Mr Attew did think that Mr Litvinenko's English had improved considerably by 2006, but he observed that:

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶"there was always, if I may say, a distinct difference between Marina who had clearly taken on board the English language and had progressed very quickly and

¶Sasha, I think, took a little bit longer."⁹⁰⁹⁰ Attew 13/15-16 Scaramella 27/78-93; INQ018922 INQ022370

¶It appears from the evidence of other witnesses, for example Tim Reilly and Alexander Tabunov, that even in 2006 Mr Litvinenko was still in the habit of seeking out Russian speakers in order to talk in his mother tongue. And when Mr Litvinenko was interviewed by the Metropolitan Police Service when he was in hospital after the poisoning, it was necessary for him to be assisted by an interpreter.

¶3.106 Anatoly Litvinenko started school in London in 2001. Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that his school fees were met by Mr Berezovsky, although she added that there was a reduction in these payments after 2003.91

¶Close friends 3.107 Mr Litvinenko had a number of friends and associates in London, including some, such as Mr Berezovsky and Mr Goldfarb, who have already featured in this narrative. I will refer to others in due course.

¶3.108 At this stage, I propose simply to introduce two men with whom Mr Litvinenko developed particularly strong friendships during this period.

¶3.109 The first of these men was Vladimir Bukovsky. Mr Bukovsky, who came to give evidence to the Inquiry, was a Russian dissident who had spent many years in detention in Soviet Russia before being released to the West in 1976 in exchange for the general secretary of the Chilean Communist Party. It seems that either Mr Goldfarb or Mr Berezovsky put Mr Litvinenko in touch with Mr Bukovsky shortly after the family's arrival in the UK. The evidence from both Marina Litvinenko and Mr Bukovsky himself was that, thereafter, the two developed a very strong friendship. Mrs Litvinenko described Mr Bukovsky as Mr Litvinenko's "guru", and the "greatest contact" that he had.92 Mr Bukovsky said that he talked to Mr Litvinenko about the history of KGB repression during the twentieth century, of which Mr Litvinenko had previously been unaware. He said that Mr Litvinenko would sometimes telephone him "20,³⁰³⁰ BLK000253 (page 3) Goldfarb 5/122 Shvets 24/56-58 INQ006201 (page 15) INQ022423; INQ022433 times a day, including the night time" and that Mr Litvinenko also travelled to see him at his home.93 It is clear to me that Mr Litvinenko's discussions with Mr Bukovsky were highly influential in the development of his political views.

¶3.110 The second of Mr Litvinenko's very close friends was Akhmed Zakayev. Mr Zakayev arrived in London in 2002 and claimed asylum. Like Mr Litvinenko, he was supported by Mr Berezovsky. Mr Zakayev was introduced to Mr Litvinenko by Mr Berezovsky, and Mr Zakayev subsequently chose to live with his family in a house very close to the Litvinenko's house in Muswell Hill. As Mr Zakayev put it in evidence, "Chechen people first choose the neighbour and then they buy the house. That's exactly what I did." He said that the two families became "very, very big friends, very close friends", who would see each other almost every day.94 Again, it is clear to me that his friendship with Mr Zakayev was an important influence on Mr Litvinenko's life in the years between 2002 and 2006. It was during this period, and no doubt a result of this friendship, that

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Mr Litvinenko became increasingly committed to the Chechen cause, a cause for which he campaigned publicly. On a more personal level, Mr Litvinenko decided at the end of his life to convert to Islam, a process that Mr Zakayev arranged for him on his deathbed.

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶Chapter 4: Illness and death 3.111 Mr Litvinenko was taken ill during the night of 1 November 2006. After a few days he was admitted to Barnet Hospital. He spent two weeks there before being transferred to University College Hospital (UCH) on 17 November. His condition gradually deteriorated and he died on 23 November.

¶3.112 The purpose of this chapter is to record the evidence that I heard, much of it uncontentious, regarding the events, and the course of Mr Litvinenko's symptoms, between 1 November and his death some three weeks later.

¶Onset of symptoms 3.113 Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko fell ill suddenly and unexpectedly during the night of 1 November. I have referred above to the evidence that Mr Litvinenko was generally in very good health. Although he had been sick a fortnight or so earlier on the evening of 16 October (a subject to which I shall have to return in some detail below), it seems that he had recovered from that episode within a couple of days.95 Mrs Litvinenko recalled that Mr Litvinenko had been "absolutely normal" on 31 October,96 and was again "absolutely fine" on the evening of 1 November when he returned from meetings in central London.97 Because it was the anniversary of their arrival in the UK, and their first such anniversary since acquiring British citizenship, Mrs Litvinenko cooked a special meal, which she and Mr Litvinenko ate together. Mr Litvinenko ate with a healthy appetite and suggested that they did not have a late night because he had promised to take one of Mr Zakayev's grandsons to school the next day, as well as having more meetings in London.98

¶3.114 Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko started vomiting in the early hours of 2 November. He spent the rest of the night in the spare room, but carried on vomiting. Mrs Litvinenko recalled that when she went to check him the next morning he looked "very exhausted" and was vomiting "again and again".99

¶3.115 Mr Litvinenko's condition worsened during the day on 2 November. He could not keep any food or drink down. Mrs Litvinenko recalled telephoning a doctor in the local Russian community, a man called Yuri Prikazchikov, who recommended that Mr Litvinenko take salt and mineral solutions. She went to the chemist to buy the suggested treatments, but Mr Litvinenko simply vomited them back up again.100

¶3.116 By the middle of the next night, i.e. the early hours of 3 November, Mrs Litvinenko decided to call an ambulance. She recalled that the ambulance came and that the paramedics examined Mr Litvinenko, but that they said that he was probably suffering from a bug or flu, and advised him to stay at home.101 Statements from the two members of the ambulance crew, which broadly confirmed this account, were read to the Inquiry.102

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.117 Mr Litvinenko was worse again on the following day,³³ Marina Litvinenko 3/23-24 HMG000358 (page 3) INQ022399 (pages 23-24) November. He started to complain of pain, and to experience bloody diarrhoea.103 Mrs Litvinenko's evidence was that it was on this day that she prevailed upon the Russian doctor to whom she had previously spoken on the phone to come and visit.104 Mr Prikazchikov, who gave evidence to the Inquiry, thought that he had visited on the previous day, but in light of the chronology he is probably wrong about that. Mrs Litvinenko and Mr Prikazchikov were, though, agreed on what he said when he visited. He said that Mr Litvinenko was probably suffering from either food poisoning (no other form of poisoning was mentioned) or an infection, but that either way he ought to be taken straight to hospital.105 3.118 Accordingly, Mrs Litvinenko again rang for an ambulance. The ambulance arrived just after 4.00pm on 3 November and, on this occasion, took Mr Litvinenko to Barnet Hospital, where he was immediately admitted.106

¶Treatment in Barnet Hospital 3.119 Dr Andres Virchis, a consultant haematologist at Barnet Hospital, gave evidence about Mr Litvinenko's care and treatment for the fortnight that he was a patient at that hospital.107 I also admitted into evidence Mr Litvinenko's medical notes from Barnet Hospital.108 3.120 The evidence that I received from such sources as to Mr Litvinenko's symptoms whilst in Barnet Hospital, about the care and treatment that he received, and in particular about the attempts made by the medical staff to diagnose the condition from which he was suffering, may be summarised as follows: a. Mr Litvinenko had been suffering from abdominal pain, profuse diarrhoea and vomiting for two days when he was taken to hospital.109 An initial diagnosis of gastro-enteritis with mild dehydration was made;110 and Mr Litvinenko underwent a wide range of tests over the following days to try to identify the cause of his symptoms. The results of the initial blood tests showed that although the platelet count was normal, both haemoglobin and the white blood cell count were high.111

¶The blood test results also revealed that Mr Litvinenko had abnormally high levels of creatine and urea, indicating that he was dehydrated from the vomiting and diarrhoea112 b. On 4 November Mr Litvinenko was started on a course of Ciprofloxacin, a relatively strong broad spectrum antibiotic.113 However, further samples of

¶Mr Litvinenko's blood were analysed over the next few days; and doctors observed that the platelet count fell to an abnormal level and the red and white blood cell counts fell further. The continuing decline in blood cell count caused increasing levels of concern114

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko c. On or around 9 November, Marina Litvinenko asked Mr Litvinenko's consultant,

¶Dr Dean Creer whether Mr Litvinenko's infection could have been the result of poisoning. She explained that her husband was usually extremely fit and healthy, but, "he knew of dangerous people and a friend of theirs had been poisoned and killed by these people", hence her anxiety. Dr Creer told her that the symptoms were common and that intentional infection/poisoning was not likely115 d. Dr Virchis took over Mr Litvinenko's care on 13 November. He was aware of

¶Mrs Litvinenko's previously expressed concerns about possible poisoning,116 and he observed that Mr Litvinenko's condition did not fit with the previous evolving diagnosis of gastro-enteritis or of Ciprofloxacin toxicity.117 Further attempts were made by medical staff to identify a cause for Mr Litvinenko's declining condition and various investigations were carried out involving toxicology colleagues at

¶Guy's Hospital poisons unit118 e. When considering the signs and symptoms with which Mr Litvinenko was presenting, it struck Dr Virchis that his presentation was similar to that of a patient suffering from acute leukaemia who had been treated with intensive chemotherapy and total body irradiation prior to a bone marrow transplant.119

¶The clinical notes reveal that radiology was to be asked to, "check radioactive sources of poisoning." Testing with a Geiger counter on 15 November did not detect radioactive emissions120 f. On 16 November Dr Virchis spoke to Mr Ivan House at the poisons unit. Mr House

stated that preliminary results showed that Mr Litvinenko's condition should be treated as "suspicious thallium poisoning"; and treatment with Prussian blue was started that evening121

¶g. Dr Virchis was concerned that tests showed that Mr Litvinenko's bone marrow had degenerated and contained no discernible normal blood forming elements. He considered a bone marrow transplant to be the only means of restoring meaningful bone marrow function,122 and discussed the possibility of such a transplant with staff at University College Hospital (UCH). Mr Litvinenko was transferred to UCH on 17 November123

¶The hair sample 3.121 An incident of some importance to this Inquiry that took place whilst Mr Litvinenko was in Barnet Hospital was the collection of some hair from his head. He had begun to lose his hair a few days after his admission to hospital. Marina Litvinenko explained in evidence that he found it very uncomfortable when his hair started to fall out, and she asked a Russian friend, Valentina Michenina, to come to the hospital and shave his head.124 Mrs Michenina gave oral evidence and had a clear memory of this incident.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Her recollection was that when she went to the hospital for this purpose, a doctor asked her to pull out some of Mr Litvinenko's hair for testing, and gave them a clear plastic bag to fill for this purpose. She remembered pulling out Mr Litvinenko's hair where she could and filling the bag, then shaving the rest of his head. She said she gave the bag to Mrs Litvinenko.125 Mrs Litvinenko did not recall being directed by staff to fill the bag, but she did remember filling the bag with hair and putting it on Mr Litvinenko's bedside table with his other possessions.

¶3.122 To complete this part of the story, I also heard evidence from a nurse at UCH named Gemma Trout.126 Ms Trout stated that she found a plastic bag of hair in the room on her ward that Mr Litvinenko had occupied before being moved to intensive care. She assumed that it was his. Her description of the bag broadly matched that given by Marina Litvinenko and Mrs Michenina. Ms Trout's evidence tallies with that of Marina Litvinenko, who remembered the bag of hair being transferred to UCH, and seeing it on Mr Litvinenko's bedside table there.127 Ms Trout gave the bag to the police. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests performed much later demonstrated to an extremely high degree of likelihood that the hair in the bag was Mr Litvinenko's.128

¶3.123 As we shall see, these hair samples were of some importance to the scientific investigations that were subsequently carried out.

¶Visitors 3.124 Marina Litvinenko stated in evidence that she had visited Mr Litvinenko every day that he was in hospital, often taking Anatoly with her.129 Mr Zakayev, too, said that he had visited every day.130

¶3.125 Both Mr Goldfarb and Mr Berezovsky were out of the country when Mr Litvinenko was taken ill. Mr Goldfarb stated that he had been in Paris since 9 November. He said that he returned to London on 13 November and first visited Mr Litvinenko on 15 November. He appears thereafter to have visited Mr Litvinenko on a more or less daily basis.131

¶3.126 Mr Berezovsky was in South Africa, having flown there (as we shall see) on the evening of 1 November. The evidence that he gave in his police witness statement was that he returned to the UK on 16 or 17 November and first visited Mr Litvinenko at Barnet Hospital on the day after he arrived back.132 This account tallies with Marina Litvinenko's evidence. She remembered him visiting for the first time on 17 November.133 Mr Berezovsky told the police that he then visited Mr Litvinenko daily.134

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶Transfer to UCH and treatment there 3.127 As noted above, Mr Litvinenko was transferred to UCH late at night on 17 November. He was an inpatient there for a little less than a week before his death on 23 November.

¶3.128 I heard oral evidence about Mr Litvinenko's medical treatment at UCH from Dr Amit Nathwani, a consultant haematologist at that hospital.135 As with Dr Virchis, I also admitted into evidence the relevant medical notes.136

¶3.129 In summary:

¶a. Following Mr Litvinenko's arrival at UCH, he seemed to be responding well to the

treatment with Prussian blue and reported feeling much better since the treatment had started

¶b. Professor John Henry, an internationally renowned toxicologist with an interest in

rare poisons, became involved in advising on Mr Litvinenko's treatment. He died in 2007, but statements that he had given to the police were read into the record

¶c. Professor Henry stated that he had received a telephone call from Mr Goldfarb

on 17 November. They discussed Mr Litvinenko's case and Mr Goldfarb told Professor Henry that Mr Litvinenko had been poisoned by thallium.137 Professor Henry visited Mr Litvinenko at UCH on 18 November and examined him with the agreement of the haematology team. Professor Henry stated that he agreed with the diagnosis of thallium poisoning138 and Mr Litvinenko continued to be treated with Prussian blue

¶d. Despite the early improvement in Mr Litvinenko's symptoms, he began to

vomit blood; and Dr Nathwani thought that this might be an adverse reaction to one of the antibiotics with which he had been treated.139 Medical staff were also concerned that Mr Litvinenko appeared to have an irregular heartbeat, his temperature was raised, he continued to vomit and he had abdominal pain.140 An electrocardiogram (ECG) confirmed an irregular heartbeat.141 Dr Nathwani felt that he and his colleagues were in "uncharted territory" with the suspected thallium poisoning. Dr Nathwani therefore wanted to monitor Mr Litvinenko closely and considered the possibility of transferring him to a high dependency or intensive care unit (ICU) where his heart rate could be monitored continuously142

¶e. On 19 November, a bed became available for Mr Litvinenko on the ICU. The

police expressed concerns as to security with regard to a transfer to the ICU. But Dr Nathwani decided that Mr Litvinenko should be moved for his own well being; he was transferred to the ICU later that evening143

¶f. Dr Nathwani assessed Mr Litvinenko's condition again on 20 November. He was concerned about Mr Litvinenko's bone marrow failure and raised temperature

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

and noted that his falling platelet count created a risk of bleeding. In order to maintain the platelet count, Mr Litvinenko was given a blood transfusion. Dr Nathwani noted that, although the level of thallium in Mr Litvinenko's blood had been abnormal before his transfer to UCH, it was not elevated to the level that would indicate that he had been poisoned. The clinical picture at that time was one of bone marrow failure together with mucosal gut damage and hair loss; and Dr Nathwani was surprised to note that, given such serious symptoms, Mr Litvinenko did not have any significant damage to his nerve endings and had relatively low thallium levels.144 Fundamentally, Dr Nathwani remained puzzled by Mr Litvinenko's clinical presentation, and was concerned that it did not fit squarely with a diagnosis of thallium poisoning145

¶g. Mr Litvinenko's renal function then began to deteriorate and his blood was artificially filtered to remove toxins. This further complication added to the puzzle but Dr Nathwani observed in evidence that it is not unusual for patients with a persistent infection and a high temperature that is unresponsive to antibiotics to present with a gradual deterioration of other organs; he added that this is quite common in patients with bone marrow failure. But he was more surprised to note that Mr Litvinenko's liver function was also decreasing146 h. Dr Nathwani described fishing for diagnoses and further samples were taken in order to look for chromosomal changes.147 His registrar, Dr Kim Ryland discussed

¶Mr Litvinenko's condition with Dr Dargan at Guy's Hospital poisons unit. She noted her colleagues' concerns that, clinically, Mr Litvinenko was not behaving like a patient with thallium poisoning because of the absence of neurotoxicity and the profound pancytopaenia (the absence of all types of blood cells). A further urine sample was sent to Guy's and the registrar at Guy's advised continuing with 'Berlin blue' (which Dr Nathwani explained is the same as Prussian blue)

¶for seven to ten days and until urinary levels returned to normal, and that other causes of Mr Litvinenko's clinical presentation should be considered as thallium poisoning did not appear to be the primary cause148 of his condition i. Dr Nathwani discussed Mr Litvinenko's condition again with Dr Dargan at

Guy's poison unit on 21 November. Dr Dargan confirmed that they did not think Mr Litvinenko had thallium poisoning. Dr Dargan advised that Dr Nathwani investigate whether radioisotopes could be a potential cause, and gave Dr Nathwani the contact details for the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The poison unit's note of this conversation records the unit's view that there are only a few agents that would cause isolated mucositis and bone marrow failure149

¶j. Mr Litvinenko's condition continued to deteriorate on 21 November and during

that night, he suffered two cardiac arrests from which he was resuscitated.150 On 22 November, doctors stopped treating Mr Litvinenko with Prussian blue as they were by then certain that he was not suffering from thallium poisoning

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko k. Dr Nathwani recalled that it was on 21 November that the idea that chemotherapeutic agents or radioisotopes could have been used to poison

¶Mr Litvinenko was first suggested by the pharmacist at UCH and colleagues at the poisons unit151 l. On the same day, Professor Henry was interviewed by journalists outside UCH, after visiting Mr Litvinenko for a second time. During the televised interview,

¶Professor Henry expressed the opinion that Mr Litvinenko had been poisoned with radioactive thallium.152 Mr Clive Timmons (a Detective Superintendent in 2006)

¶recalled speaking to DS Mike Jolly, who had seen Professor Henry's televised interview, later on 21 November. DS Jolly suggested to Mr Timmons that it would be useful to try to establish if radioactivity was affecting Mr Litvinenko. Consequently, samples of Mr Litvinenko's blood and urine were sent to AWE for testing153 m. The blood and urine samples arrived at AWE in the early evening of 21 November.

¶Tests were conducted overnight154 n. A meeting between police officers, the forensic science service, AWE and

¶Dr Nicholas Gent from Porton Down had been arranged for the following day,²²²² Sixsmith The Litvinenko File (pages 78-79); Cowell The Terminal Spy (pages 103-104) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Marina Litvinenko 4/110-111 Marina Wall 32/75 Mascall 22/127 A1 2/131-140 November. During the meeting, the results of the urine tests at AWE, which revealed that polonium was present in Mr Litvinenko's urine, were discussed.

¶However, it was thought that this reading was an anomaly caused by the plastic bottle in which the sample had been stored155 o. Mr Timmons had requested that a 'living post mortem' be carried out on Mr Litvinenko in order to try to establish the cause of his condition. In the course of the meeting

¶Dr Gent presented five causes that had been identified as possibly contributing to his condition.156 One possibility, an internal radiation source, appeared to fit with the spike of polonium that had been identified in the tests at AWE. But those present at the meeting were of the view that this was an unlikely cause. It was decided that further investigation was needed. At AWE's request, a further sample of one litre of Mr Litvinenko's urine was sent to AWE for further testing157 p. The further urine sample arrived at AWE in the early afternoon of 23 November.

¶Further testing was conducted. The results, which confirmed polonium contamination, were communicated to the police between about 3.00pm and 5.00pm158 q. At 8.51pm on Thursday 23 November, Mr Litvinenko suffered a third cardiac arrest. Mr James Down, ICU consultant, was on duty at the time and attempted to resuscitate Mr Litvinenko. But it became clear to him that Mr Litvinenko was not going to regain spontaneous cardiac output. The attempts to resuscitate were terminated; at 9.21pm Mr Down pronounced life extinct. He confirmed that

¶Mr Litvinenko died from multiple organ failure including progressive heart failure159

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Police interviews 3.130 The Metropolitan Police Service conducted lengthy interviews with Mr Litvinenko for the first three days that he was at UCH. The interviews took place in four sessions. The first session was very early in the morning on 18 November – from midnight until 2.45am; this would have been only a few hours after Mr Litvinenko arrived at UCH. The second session took place at the end of the same day, from 7.24pm to 11.49pm. The third and fourth sessions took place in the late afternoon and evening of 19 and 20 November respectively. 3.131 The senior of the two interviewing officers, Detective Inspector (DI) Hyatt, gave oral evidence to the Inquiry.160 3.132 The interviews were transcribed and I adduced the entirety of the transcripts into evidence. It is, to put it mildly, unusual when inquiring into a death to have available lengthy transcripts of interviews with the deceased conducted shortly before his death. I regard these transcripts as being of great value to this Inquiry.

¶Mr Litvinenko's own explanation for his illness 3.133 It would appear that Mr Litvinenko was alive to the possibility that he had been deliberately poisoned from the first days of his illness. Mr Prikazchikov recalled that Marina Litvinenko asked him whether Mr Litvinenko might have been poisoned when he visited the house, probably on 3 November.161 Mr Zakayev recalled discussing with Mr Litvinenko the possibility that he had been poisoned on either 4 or 5 November.162 3.134 Who did Mr Litvinenko think might have poisoned him? At the first of his police interviews, in the early hours of 18 November, Mr Litvinenko told DI Hyatt that one of three people must have been the poisoner.163 The three men that he named were Mario Scaramella, with whom he had eaten at itsu during the early afternoon of 1 November, and Andrey Lugovy and Dmitri Kovtun, whom he had met later that day in the Pine Bar at the Millennium Hotel. Mr Litvinenko told DI Hyatt something else. He said that, although he had spoken publicly about his meeting with Mr Scaramella on 1 November, he had deliberately not said anything in public about his meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.164 His explanation to DI Hyatt, put shortly, was that he hoped that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun might be sufficiently confident that they were not suspects to return to London, where they could be arrested. In his oral evidence to me Mr Zakayev stated that this was a strategy that he and Mr Litvinenko had devised together.165 3.135 Shortly before Mr Litvinenko left Barnet Hospital, probably on 17 November, he gave an interview to the journalist David Leppard. Mr Leppard wrote an article on the basis of the interview which appeared in the Sunday Times on Sunday 19 November. I admitted both a transcript of the interview and a copy of the article into evidence.166 It is apparent from those documents that Mr Litvinenko implied to Mr Leppard that he thought he had been poisoned by Mr Scaramella; he did not mention Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun at all. The strategy that Mr Litvinenko described to DI Hyatt in his subsequent interview would appear to explain what would otherwise be a puzzling omission.

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶3.136 There is, however, a further related point. It was a recurring feature of the evidence that I heard from a number of Mr Litvinenko's friends and associates that during the time that he was in hospital he told them that he believed that Mr Scaramella had poisoned him on 1 November, and that he either delayed in telling them, or did not tell them at all, about his meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on the same day. Evidence to this effect was given by Yuri Shvets,167 Vladimir Bukovsky168 and Akhmed Zakayev;169 and Boris Berezovsky's witness statement is to a similar effect.170

¶3.137 The reluctance on the part of Mr Litvinenko to tell his friends about his meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on the day that he became ill cannot be explained by his strategy to try to lure the two men back into the jurisdiction, since these were private conversations with trusted friends. The answer seems to lie in what Mr Shvets described as Mr Litvinenko's "wounded professional pride". He said:

¶"He was agonised by the understanding that as a professional he failed. … He was always saying that I can identify my enemy a mile away,… that I am a professional.

¶But this particular case when it comes to his own life he badly failed."¹⁷¹¹⁷¹ Shvets 24/92-93 Mascall 12/95-103

¶Mr Zakayev, in a similar vein, explained that Mr Litvinenko, as a former FSB officer, had advised him on his personal security and had warned him that; "they might send a person from my past to me, someone who I'd had good relations with… it [was] that person that the threat would come from". He said that Mr Litvinenko was "embarrassed" that, "exactly this scenario… was turned against him."¹⁷²¹⁷² Zakayev 26/156-157 Mascall 12/103-104

¶3.138 These insights are, in my view, convincing. They are also valuable, because they suggest that Mr Litvinenko's accounts of his meetings with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun – in particular, perhaps, his description of their meeting on 1 November – must be approached with some caution. It may be that these accounts contain some infelicities, added by Mr Litvinenko in an attempt to salve his wounded pride.

¶3.139 If the contemporaneous documents give rise to some uncertainty as to whom Mr Litvinenko believed had poisoned him, there is no ambiguity as to whom he thought bore ultimate responsibility. Mr Berezovsky recalled that when he visited him in hospital Mr Litvinenko "insisted that it was a direct order of Putin", although at that stage Mr Berezovsky disagreed with him.173 Several days later, towards the end of his interviews with DI Hyatt, Mr Litvinenko stated:

¶"I have no doubt whatsoever that this was done by the Russian Secret Services.

¶Having knowledge of the system I know that the order about such a killing of a citizen of another country on its territory, especially if it [is] something to do with

¶Great Britain could have been given by only one person."

¶When DI Hyatt asked who that person was, Mr Litvinenko replied, "That person is the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin".174 A few days later, as we shall see, Mr Litvinenko was to make a similar accusation in his final statement, which was published and widely circulated after his death.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶The photo and the deathbed statement 3.140 On Tuesday 21 November 2006, a photographer visited UCH and took the photograph of Mr Litvinenko lying in his bed that became the iconic image of this case.175 I heard some evidence about the circumstances in which the photograph was taken.

¶3.141 Mr Goldfarb said that the idea for the photograph was his. He said that there had been a "crowd" of press outside UCH following the publication of Mr Leppard's article on Sunday 19 November, and he thought that a photograph would be a way of creating extra interest in the story. He said that Mr Litvinenko was "adamant" about, "letting the world know that he has been poisoned by the Kremlin", and that he approved the idea of the photograph.176 Marina Litvinenko stated that she was against the idea because at that time she still hoped that Mr Litvinenko would survive, but she confirmed that Mr Litvinenko agreed both to the photograph being taken and to it being published.177 Lord Bell, whose agency arranged for the photograph to be taken, gave evidence before me. He recalled that Mr Litvinenko had been "particularly keen that people should see what had happened to him", and that, to that end, he had pulled his hospital gown to one side when the photograph was taken so that all the medical equipment was visible.178

¶3.142 It was on the same day,²¹²¹ Marina Litvinenko 3/41-43 Knuckey 7/38-44; see also Mr Knuckey's report and timeline relating to this incident: INQ019304; INQ019301 Marina Litvinenko 3/125-129 Marina Wall 32/63 Marina Wall 32/66-67 INQ016403 (pages 29-32) November, that Mr Litvinenko signed what has become known as his deathbed statement. On the day after Mr Litvinenko's death, the statement was read to the media by Mr Goldfarb at a press conference held outside UCH, and was thereafter published widely.

¶3.143 The statement was short, and was in the following terms:179

¶"I would like to thank many people. My doctors, nurses and hospital staff who are doing all they can for me; the British Police who are pursuing my case with rigour and professionalism and are watching over me and my family. I would like to thank the British Government for taking me under their care. I am honoured to be a

¶British citizen.

¶I would like to thank the British public for their messages of support and for the interest they have shown in my plight.

¶I thank my wife, Marina, who has stood by me. My love for her and our son knows no bounds.

¶But as I lie here I can distinctly hear the beating of wings of the angel of death. I may be able to give him the slip but I have to say my legs do not run as fast as I would like. I think, therefore, that this may be the time to say one or two things to the person responsible for my present condition.

¶You may succeed in silencing me but that silence comes at a price. You have shown yourself to be as barbaric and ruthless as your most hostile critics have claimed.

¶You have shown yourself to have no respect for life, liberty or any civilised value.

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

You have shown yourself to be unworthy of your office, to be unworthy of the trust of civilised men and women.

You may succeed in silencing one man but the howl of protest from around the world will reverberate, Mr Putin, in your ears for the rest of your life. May God forgive you for what you have done, not only to me but to beloved Russia and its people."

¶The statement was signed in manuscript by Mr Litvinenko, and dated 21 November 2006.

¶3.144 Doubts have been expressed as to the authenticity of this statement, or at least as to the extent to which it represented Mr Litvinenko's views. I therefore took detailed evidence on this subject. The key witnesses, who all gave oral evidence, were George Menzies, who was Mr Litvinenko's solicitor,180 Mr Goldfarb,181 Marina Litvinenko182 and Lord Bell.183

¶3.145 My conclusions regarding the so called deathbed statement are as follows:

¶a. The witnesses were agreed that the idea of the statement did not originate from

¶Mr Litvinenko. Mr Menzies recalled the idea being suggested to him by a press consultant (not Lord Bell); Mr Goldfarb thought that the idea had emerged,

¶"between me and George Menzies and Sasha"

¶b. Mr Goldfarb emphasised that the idea had emerged "naturally" because

¶Mr Litvinenko "was so adamant in trying to get across the message that the

¶Kremlin and Putin poisoned him". This is certainly consistent with other evidence that I have heard about Mr Litvinenko's thinking at this time c. Marina Litvinenko was opposed to the idea of the statement because, as with the photograph, she still believed that Mr Litvinenko would survive – she said that preparing the statement was like giving up d. Mr Menzies drafted the statement. The draft was prepared in English; there was never a Russian version. Mr Menzies dictated the statement and had it typed by his secretary. He had not discussed the statement in terms with Mr Litvinenko at that point, but he had visited him in hospital and discussed the possible causes of his illness, and the content of the draft statement reflected Mr Menzies'

¶understanding of Mr Litvinenko's state of mind e. Mr Menzies and Mr Goldfarb initially took the statement to Lord Bell. He was against the idea of the statement because he felt it read like a deathbed statement, and he still hoped that Mr Litvinenko would recover f. Mr Goldfarb and Mr Menzies took the statement to UCH on 21 November. They

showed it to Marina Litvinenko, who approved it and agreed that it should be shown to Mr Litvinenko

¶g. All three then went into Mr Litvinenko's room. Mr Goldfarb read the statement to him in Russian. Mr Litvinenko then asked for a pen and signed the statement

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

Mr Menzies, Mr Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko all told me that they were satisfied that Mr Litvinenko agreed with the content of the statement. I would add in this regard that the statement is consistent with views expressed by Mr Litvinenko to others at around this time, notably in his police interviews

¶Alexander Litvinenko's death 3.146 Tuesday 21 November and Wednesday 22 November were the last days that Mr Litvinenko was conscious. He had lost consciousness by Thursday 23 November and died that evening.

¶3.147 At some point during this period Mr Zakayev brought an imam to Mr Litvinenko's bedside. The evidence of both Marina Litvinenko184 and Mr Zakayev185 was that Mr Litvinenko, who had been baptised into the Russian Orthodox church, had expressed a desire to convert to Islam after talking with Mr Zakayev about his faith whilst he was still in Barnet Hospital. Mr Zakayev spoke the shahada with Mr Litvinenko, and later arranged the visit of the imam to UCH, with Marina Litvinenko's consent. Mr Zakayev's evidence to me was that he believed Mr Litvinenko died as a Muslim.

¶3.148 Mr Litvinenko's father, Walter, travelled from Russia and arrived at the hospital on 21 November.

¶3.149 As Marina Litvinenko was leaving Mr Litvinenko's bedside on the evening of 22 November, he told her that he loved her.186 Those proved to be the last words that he spoke to her. He remained unconscious throughout the next day.

¶3.150 Mr Litvinenko suffered a fatal cardiac arrest at 8.51pm on 23 November. The evidence of Mr Down, an intensive care consultant on duty at UCH that evening, was that cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was commenced but was terminated when it became clear that Mr Litvinenko would not regain spontaneous cardiac output. Mr Down pronounced life extinct at 9.21pm that evening. He confirmed that Mr Litvinenko died from multiple organ failure including progressive heart failure.187

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶Chapter 5: Scientific examination of

¶Alexander Litvinenko's body 3.151 Many scientific investigations and tests have been conducted on Mr Litvinenko's body, and on samples taken from it. This process started before Mr Litvinenko's death with the array of tests that were commissioned by the treating clinicians. At the same time, frequent observations were taken and recorded in Mr Litvinenko's medical notes. I have referred to some of the tests and observations above. I have also referred to the tests conducted on samples of Mr Litvinenko's blood and urine at AWE, which revealed for the first time excess levels of polonium in his body. 3.152 The process of testing and investigation continued after Mr Litvinenko's death, first with a post mortem examination and thereafter with a series of tests on samples taken from his body. This process has generated a considerable quantity of data, which has been set out and analysed in a series of statements and reports written by a variety of experts. All this material has been in evidence before me. 3.153 This scientific material has not been put into the public domain prior to these proceedings (although some of it was used as the basis for a paper published in a scientific journal in 2007).188 3.154 I am aware that some commentators have suggested that there may be something sinister about the fact that this material has not so far been presented publicly – for example, that it may be part of a cover up orchestrated by the British government. I would simply observe that it is normal in this jurisdiction for medical and scientific reports and records of this type not to be made public until they have been used in court proceedings relating to the death. In Mr Litvinenko's case, this Inquiry is the first substantive set of proceedings that has taken place with regard to his death. I would not therefore have expected this material to have been published prior to my Inquiry. I should add that my team and I have studied thousands of government documents that relate to Mr Litvinenko's death. They do not contain anything to suggest that there has been deliberate concealment of relevant material. The fact that this material has not hitherto been put into the public domain is simply a consequence of normal procedures being followed, albeit that in this case – given its exceptional features – it has taken longer than normal for those procedures to run their course. 3.155 Further and in any event, all this material has now been published by the Inquiry. Anyone who wishes to refer to the detail of the scientific investigation that has taken place may now access the underlying documents by means of the Inquiry website. The key documents are tabulated at Appendix 8. 3.156 What I propose to do in the remainder of this section of the Report is to identify the more important conclusions that the scientists have reached as a result of their analysis, and to consider the evidence that I received in respect of those conclusions.

¶The raised levels of polonium 210 in Mr Litvinenko's body 3.157 As I have already noted, the first tests that identified raised levels of polonium 210 in Mr Litvinenko's body were the tests conducted at the AWE in Aldermaston on 21 and 22 November 2006 – i.e. very shortly before Mr Litvinenko's death.189

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶3.158 Following Mr Litvinenko's death, measurements of polonium 210 were taken using tissue samples from Mr Litvinenko's lung, spleen, kidneys and liver, using gamma ray spectrometry. These tests showed raised levels in each of the organs, with the highest result (49,000Bq per g of tissue) in the kidney sample and the lowest (3,500Bq per g of tissue) in the lung sample. These findings are recorded in Dr Harrison's statement dated 26 April 2007.190 3.159 In a further statement dated 27 October 2010,191 Dr Harrison reported the results of similar gamma spectrometry tests on other samples taken from Mr Litvinenko's body after his death, namely samples of mesentery, testicle, muscle, brain, bile, heart, skin and blood. The results of these tests appear to have been consistent with those of the earlier tests.

¶The total intake of polonium 210 3.160 Dr Harrison used the results of the gamma ray spectrometry tests on tissue samples to estimate Mr Litvinenko's likely total intake of polonium 210. He described his calculations, and the assumptions that he made in performing this exercise, in his statement of 26 April 2007.192 He stated that the best estimate of intake was 4.4Gbq of polonium 210. 3.161 The further testing reported in 2010 broadly supported the earlier estimate, although the test on the blood sample indicated that the intake might have been slightly lower at 4.1Gbq. 3.162 This analysis is also discussed at paragraphs 5 to 9 of the experts' joint report dated February 2014.193

¶The route of intake: ingestion or inhalation? 3.163 I have already referred to the fact that Dr Harrison's gamma ray spectrometry testing in 2007 indicated a relatively low concentration of polonium 210 in lung tissue. Dr Harrison calculated that, given these values, only about 5 per cent of the total amount of polonium 210 in Mr Litvinenko's body could have been inhaled. 3.164 On this basis, Dr Harrison explained that he, "dismissed inhalation as a route of intake and concentrated on ingestion as a route of intake."¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ Harrison 19/26 Mascall 30/83-92 The fact that polonium 210 was discovered in the lung tissue, albeit in relatively low quantities, did not require a conclusion that any polonium had been inhaled: the finding was equally consistent with polonium being distributed through blood following ingestion.195 3.165 The formal conclusion expressed by Dr Harrison on this point in his report dated 26 April 2007 was that, "The low concentration of polonium-210 in lung tissue is consistent with inhalation being a minor route of intake." He then proceeded to calculate the likely total intake on the basis of intake solely by ingestion. In his oral evidence, Dr Harrison stated that the low value for retention in lung tissue, "indicates that inhalation wasn't an important route of intake".196

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko

¶3.166 As I understand Dr Harrison's evidence on this point, his view is that in this case there was certainly a major intake of polonium 210 by ingestion. There may have been an additional, but minor, intake by inhalation, or there may in fact have been no intake by inhalation at all.

¶3.167 I also note in this regard an observation made in the course of oral evidence by Dr Swift, one of the two pathologists who conducted the post mortem. He stated that, whilst it was not possible to state with certainty the route by which the polonium 210 had entered Mr Litvinenko's body; "given the clinically recognised severe pharyngeal, so the back of the throat, and oesophageal, the food pipe or gullet, inflammation, it has most likely entered the body through oral means."¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ Swift 2/90-91 INQ021208 (page 11)

¶3.168 The conclusion that most if not all of the polonium 210 found in Mr Litvinenko's body had been ingested rather than inhaled is relevant, amongst other things, to the question of whether Mr Litvinenko's death could have been an accident. Put shortly, it seems less likely that he could have accidentally eaten something than that he accidentally inhaled something. I shall return to this point in due course.

¶The medical cause of Mr Litvinenko's death 3.169 The evidence on this issue comprised two lines of scientific investigation and analysis, which were, to an extent at least, interdependent.

¶The pathologists 3.170 First, there was the evidence of the two pathologists, Dr Cary and Dr Swift, who conducted Mr Litvinenko's post mortem.198 The post mortem took place at the Royal London Hospital on 1 December 2006. Special safety precautions were taken because of the radioactivity that was then still present in Mr Litvinenko's body. Even so, Dr Cary stated that the procedure had been: "one of the most dangerous post- mortem examinations ever undertaken in the Western world".199

¶3.171 Dr Cary summarised his findings in the form of six conclusions, with which Dr Swift agreed. I shall record those conclusions here.

¶3.172 First, Dr Cary stated that:

¶"the changes in the internal organs are typical of those seen at the end stage of multi-organ failure in an intensive care setting. There is no macroscopic evidence, and by that I mean to the naked eye, of any underlying natural disease process that would have preceded the presentation with an acute illness on

¶3 November 2006."²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ Cary 2/64 Mascall 30/150-151

¶3.173 Second, Dr Cary noted that due to the hazardous nature of the tissue samples that he had taken from Mr Litvinenko's body, he was unable to follow what would otherwise have been the routine procedure of examining these samples under the microscope to try to obtain further information about the cause of death. That said, Dr Cary observed that the medical records from Mr Litvinenko's time in hospital provided useful information in this regard – there was clear documentation, for example, of

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry bone marrow failure, multi-organ failure and the development of alopecia. Dr Cary stated; "when you look at all these together, they provide clinical corroboration for the fact that the deceased suffered acute radiation exposure due to ingestion of polonium 210".201

¶3.174 Third, Dr Cary noted the findings, made through analysis of samples taken both before and after Mr Litvinenko's death, that he had ingested a quantity of polonium 210.202

¶3.175 Fourth, Dr Cary noted the findings of Dr Harrison and his colleagues (to which I shall refer further below), to the effect that Mr Litvinenko had ingested a quantity of polonium 210 that was far in excess of known survivability limits.

¶3.176 Fifth, Dr Cary concluded:

¶"I am entirely satisfied that on the basis of both the calculated exposure of the internal organs to radiation and the deceased's downhill clinical course a cause of death of acute radiation syndrome may be recorded."²⁰³²⁰³ INQ003002 (page 7); Cary 2/67 Quirke 11/98-99

¶3.177 Sixth, Dr Cary listed a number of possibilities in relation to the final mode of death, namely:

¶"(i) Due to bone marrow failure there was a final episode of sepsis, including as a

possibility due to fungal infection with this sepsis resulting in cardiorespiratory arrest.

¶(ii) Due to metabolic consequences of organ failure (particularly the liver and kidney) cardiorespiratory arrest occurred.

¶(iii) Due to primary effects of radiation on the heart itself an ultimately fatal heart rhythm disturbance developed resulting in cardiorespiratory arrest.

¶(iv) A combination of some or all of the above."²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ INQ003002 (page 7); Cary 2/67-68 Mascall 13/168-173

¶Dr Harrison and his colleagues 3.178 In one of his written reports, Dr Harrison explained the mechanism by which the alpha particles emitted by polonium 210 cause damage within the human body. He said:

¶"Ionizing radiations, including gamma rays and alpha particles can kill cells by damaging biological molecules within them, including DNA. Alpha particles are particularly effective at killing cells because, although they only travel short distances (a few cell widths), they deposit a lot of energy along their paths. They can be thought of as atomic bullets, capable of killing at a cellular level. Enough alpha particles will kill enough cells to cause gross tissue damage, organ failure and death."²⁰⁵²⁰⁵ INQ007633 (page 5) Mascall 13/191

¶3.179 Having ascertained (see above) that Mr Litvinenko had ingested approximately 4.4Gbq of polonium 210, Dr Harrison was able to calculate the quantity of radiation that would have been generated within Mr Litvinenko's body, and to compare those figures with

¶Part 3 | Chapters 1 to 5 | Alexander Litvinenko scientific tables giving expected survival periods following exposure to radiation. Dr Harrison explained this analysis in detail in both his written and oral evidence.206

¶3.180 The conclusion that Dr Harrison drew from this analysis was clear. He stated:

"Death is the inevitable outcome of the radiation doses estimated to have been received by Mr Litvinenko's red bone marrow, kidneys and liver. Bone marrow failure is likely to be an important contributory cause of death occurring within a few weeks of intake, as a component of multiple organ failure."²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ INQ007633 (page 7) Mascall 13/185-187

¶3.181 The experts' joint statement comments, at paragraph 25:208

"It can be stated with certainty that Mr Litvinenko died as a consequence of an intake of polonium 210."

¶The number and timing of the doses of polonium 210 ingested by Mr Litvinenko 3.182 Scientific analysis of samples of Mr Litvinenko's hair was consistent with there having been more than one intake of polonium 210. The hair analysis suggested that there had been two intakes, the earlier being about a hundred times smaller than the later.209

¶3.183 The scientific evidence did not produce a definitive timing for the second and larger intake of polonium. That said, I heard that Mr Litvinenko's medical records, and in particular the rise in levels of circulating neutrophils (white blood cells) recorded on 3 November and 5 November, were consistent with the fatal intake having taken place on 1 November.210 As we shall see, there is independent evidence which strongly indicates that that is when the second intake occurred.

¶3.184 As to the timing of the earlier intake, the scientific evidence may be summarised as follows:

¶a. It was common ground that it was not possible to determine the precise date upon which the earlier intake had occurred. As the experts put it in their joint report:

"[the] evidence does not enable precise interpretation in terms of relative times of intake because of uncertainties over the rate of hair growth and the possible effect of radiation exposure on hair growth."

¶b. Accordingly, the scientists estimated a period during which the earlier intake had taken place, assuming that the later intake had occurred on 1 November c. Dr Harrrison, Dr Gent and A1 concluded that the earlier intake had probably taken place between 18 October and 23 October 211 d. Dr Black, who conducted his analysis on a different basis, estimated that the earlier intake had taken place between 14 and 18 October 212

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry e. The evidence that Mr Litvinenko vomited and was feeling unwell on the evening

of 16 October should not be taken as a strong indication that the first intake of polonium had occurred on that day. The scientists were cautious as to whether the similar 'prodromal' symptoms that Mr Litvinenko suffered on the evening of 1 November had been caused by the very much higher intake of polonium on that day.213 The symptoms that Mr Litvinenko suffered on 16 October must, therefore, be an even less reliable indicator of a postulated weaker intake of polonium on that day

¶Part 4: Why would anyone wish to kill

¶Alexander Litvinenko? Chapter 1: Introduction 4.1 On the evidence that I have heard, Alexander Litvinenko lived a most eventful life in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2000 and 2006. He involved himself in a wide range of activities, many, as before, focused on challenging corruption in the Federal Security Service (FSB) and on combating organised crime. He also had to try to find a way of making a living in the UK using the skills and contacts that he had acquired as an FSB officer in Russia. The evidence suggests that, in the course of such activities, and just as he had in Russia, Mr Litvinenko may have made some dangerous enemies.

¶4.2 The purpose of this Part of the Report is to review the evidence that I have heard, both as to what Mr Litvinenko was doing during this period, and as to whom his activities might have upset. The question that underpins this exercise, and that I will come to address later in this Report, is simple: could any of Mr Litvinenko's activities during this period have provided a motive for murder?

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Chapter 2: Enemy of the Russian State?

¶4.3 On 24 November 2006, the day after Mr Litvinenko's death, Sergey Abeltsev, a member of the Russian State Duma, made a speech on the floor of the Duma in which he said:

¶"Last night Alexander Litvinenko died in a London hospital. The deserved punishment reached the traitor. I am confident that this terrible death will be a serious warning to traitors of all colours wherever they are located. In Russia, they do not pardon treachery."¹¹ Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399

¶4.4 On the same day, President Putin made comments to the media about Mr Litvinenko's death with what Professor Service described as, "a verbal levity that border[ed] on the macabre". For example, President Putin observed that, "the people that have done this are not God, and Mr Litvinenko is, unfortunately, not Lazarus."²² Marina Litvinenko 3/20-23 INQ019146 (page 14-15 paragraph 45) A translated copy of the law provided to the Solicitor to the Inquiry by the Russian Embassy in London is at INQ018962

¶4.5 Mr Abeltsev is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party in Russia. The leader of that party, Vladimir Zhironovsky, described Mr Litvinenko following his death as a "scoundrel" and a "traitor" and suggested that he had been killed by MI6 on behalf of the FSB.3

¶4.6 During a radio interview in February 2007, Mr Gusak, Mr Litvinenko's former colleague in the FSB, expressed the view that Mr Litvinenko had deserved to be executed.4

¶4.7 The language that I have quoted in these paragraphs is couched in the strongest terms. But it appears that, although extreme, such language does not misrepresent the way in which a section, at least, of the Russian people and government regarded Mr Litvinenko. Professor Service, who approached his analysis of these matters with commendable caution, gave oral evidence to the effect that, by the time of his death, Mr Litvinenko had come to be regarded as an enemy of the Russian State.5

¶4.8 What was it that Mr Litvinenko had done to earn such posthumous opprobrium?

¶Perceived betrayal of the FSB 4.9 There is strong evidence that Mr Litvinenko was regarded by those within the FSB as someone who had betrayed that organisation.

¶4.10 The starting point is the sequence of events that culminated in the November 1998 press conference. As I have described above, (see paragraph 3.60 – 3.62) Mr Litvinenko's escalating protest against what he regarded as the unlawful orders that he and his colleagues in the Department for the Investigation and Prevention of Organised Crime (URPO) had been given, was challenged at every stage by his superiors. There is evidence that Mr Kovalyev, the Head of the FSB, regarded Mr Litvinenko's actions in telling Mr Berezovsky of the order that he claimed to have received to kill him as a, "betrayal of the interests of the security services" (see paragraph 3.52 above). I also heard evidence that Mr Putin, Mr Kovalyev's successor as head of the FSB, publicly criticised Mr Litvinenko and his colleagues for going public with their allegations at the

¶Part 4 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Why would anyone wish to kill Alexander Litvinenko?

¶November 1998 press conference,6 and that the prosecutor, Mr Barsukov, told Marina Litvinenko that the charges he was bringing against Mr Litvinenko were a response to the press conference (see paragraph 3.68 above).

¶4.11 Marina Litvinenko's evidence was that the decision that she and her husband made to leave Russia was based in part on a fear that the FSB retribution against Mr Litvinenko for what it regarded as his act of betrayal would end either in his indefinite detention or, worse, in his death. I have referred to Mr Felshtinsky's evidence that General Kokholkhov told him in May 2000 that if he came across Mr Litvinenko in a dark corner, "he would kill him with his own hands" (see paragraph 3.76 above).

¶4.12 The evidence suggests that Mr Litvinenko's flight from Russia did not soften in any way the FSB's view of him. During the course of his interviews with Detective Inspector (DI) Hyatt, Mr Litvinenko described a phone call that he had received on his mobile telephone from his former URPO colleague Mr Ponkin. He said that he had received the call in April or May 2001 (i.e. a few months after his arrival in the UK), whilst visiting Mr Bukovsky at his home. Mr Litvinenko recalled that Mr Ponkin had said that he had just been questioned at the Military Prosecutor's Office by Mr Barsukov. He told DI Hyatt:

¶"Ponkin said that Barsukov asked him to give me a message that I should as soon as possible return to my country by myself, and then nothing will happen to me.

¶And if you do not return yourself then you will either be brought back in a body bag, or you will be pushed under the train. And he also asked to tell me that… my wife

¶Marina shouldn't be afraid of anything and she could travel freely, no one will touch her. I replied to Ponkin that this is very nice offer but I refuse it… that conversation

¶I straight away re-told to Mr Bukovsky."⁷⁷ INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 8) INQ016642 (page 7) INQ017734 (page 23 paragraph 80) Mascall 8/2-4

¶4.13 When he gave oral evidence to me, Mr Bukovsky recalled what sounded very much like the same incident. He described Mr Litvinenko receiving a call from "some former colleague from Lubyanka" whilst visiting him at his home in around 2002 "very soon after… his escape." He said that Mr Litvinenko had become "rather gloomy" as the call went on, and he had inferred from hearing one side of the conversation that Mr Litvinenko was being threatened. He recalled that, when the telephone conversation had finished, Mr Litvinenko recounted to him the substance of the call in the following terms, "do you feel safe, secure in Britain; come on, remember Trotsky".⁸⁸ Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61

¶4.14 A continuing interest in Mr Litvinenko on the part of the Russian authorities may also perhaps be evidenced by the continuation (indeed, it appears the escalation) of the criminal proceedings against him in Russia following his departure. I admitted into evidence a letter dated 3 May 2002 sent by Mr Litvinenko's Russian lawyer, named Mr Marov, to Mr Menzies, the British lawyer assisting Mr Litvinenko with his asylum claim.9 Mr Marov's letter indicated that a further (i.e. a fourth) set of proceedings had been instituted against Mr Litvinenko, and that the prosecutor wished to proceed with a trial in Mr Litvinenko's absence. The letter also cited a number of what were said to be instances of lack of due process on the part of the prosecutor. I am aware that the ongoing proceedings against Mr Litvinenko in Russia gave rise to at least one attempt on the part of the Russian authorities to secure his extradition. Unsurprisingly given Mr Litvinenko's successful asylum claim, the request was not granted. Mrs Litvinenko

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry gave evidence that Mr Litvinenko was convicted on one of the extant sets of proceedings against him in Russia during 2002.10

¶4.15 Just as the evidence suggests that the FSB's anger at what some at least of its members appear to have regarded as Mr Litvinenko's betrayal of his old organisation did not diminish on his departure from Russia, so it is reasonable to speculate that such feelings of betrayal in fact increased over the following years. As I shall describe below, Mr Litvinenko wrote books that accused the FSB of corruption and also of responsibility for the mass murder of hundreds of Russian citizens in the so-called 'apartment bombings' of 1999. Further, there was certainly a belief amongst some FSB officers and others that Mr Litvinenko had started to work for MI6 following his arrival in the UK.

¶4.16 It is therefore at least possible that Mr Litvinenko's profile amongst members of the FSB (and also perhaps amongst the wider military establishment) as an insider who had betrayed his own organisation did not decline following the press conference and Mr Litvinenko's departure from Russia, but in fact increased between 2000 and 2006.

¶4.17 There is one striking piece of evidence that seems to corroborate this point. I saw video evidence of Russian soldiers using targets featuring Mr Litvinenko's face for target practice.11 Mrs Litvinenko gave oral evidence about this.12 She said that both she and Mr Litvinenko had heard that this was going on at some point in 2006, certainly before his death. Police enquiries suggested that the video footage was taken at the Vityaz special forces training centre in Balashikha.13 Mrs Litvinenko said that Mr Litvinenko had been a member of the Vityaz force in his early career before joining the FSB.

¶Membership of Boris Berezovsky's circle 4.18 I have referred several times to the close relationship between Mr Litvinenko and Boris Berezovsky. It began in the mid 1990s when Mr Litvinenko was assigned to investigate an attempted assassination of Mr Berezovsky. Mr Litvinenko subsequently earned Mr Berezovsky's gratitude when he protected him from arrest in connection with the murder of Mr Listyev. I have explained in Part 3 above the role that Mr Berezovsky played in the whistleblowing saga, and in particular his attempts to support Mr Litvinenko's demands for reform of the FSB.

¶4.19 At the time of those events, Mr Berezovsky enjoyed considerable political influence as a close associate of President Yeltsin. As I indicated above, at the time of the November 1998 press conference, Mr Berezovsky regarded himself as a friend of Mr Putin, who had replaced Mr Kovalyev as head of the FSB. Moreover, as Mr Felshtinsky explained in evidence, Mr Berezovsky appears to have had (or at least claimed to have had) a role in the events that led to Mr Putin being elected President in 2000.14

¶4.20 This friendship, however, did not last. As Professor Service has explained:

¶"Tension between Putin and Berezovski started almost as soon as Yeltsin resigned the Presidency in December 1999. Berezovski relished the reputation of kingmaker. He claimed responsibility for Putin's rise to the Presidency, and no doubt his

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¶bouncy condescension grated upon Putin. When Putin took decisions that clashed with Berezovski's interests, Berezovski instructed the national TV station under his control to criticise Putin. Berezovski quickly lost the contest. Putin told him directly that no businessman, however high and mighty, was going to determine public policy any longer."¹⁵¹⁵ Marina Litvinenko 3/35-36 INQ019146 (page 24 paragraph 75) Service 28/51 lines 2-6 Marina Wall 32/55 INQ017779 Dombey 23/22

¶4.21 Mr Berezovsky left Russia at the end of 2000 and became a political exile in London, where he claimed, and was ultimately granted, asylum. I heard evidence from Professor Service, Mr Goldfarb and others that, following his arrival in London, Mr Berezovsky used his great wealth to become a vocal critic of President Putin, and to fund others to do likewise. It was also clear that Mr Litvinenko played a leading role in this respect – as Professor Service put it, "Berezovski encouraged and financed emigres who shared his hostility to Putin, and Litvinenko was the most prominent and ebullient of them."¹⁶¹⁶ INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 9) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Goldfarb 26/56-57 Mascall 8/78 INQ017728; INQ020308 Dombey 23/20-32 Another of this group of emigres in Mr Berezovsky's circle was the Chechen leader Akhmed Zakayev. As I have mentioned above, Mr Litvinenko and Mr Zakayev became very close friends, and their two families lived so close to each other that they regarded themselves as neighbours.

¶4.22 I will turn shortly to consider the various activities upon which Mr Litvinenko became engaged during this period, and the causes that he espoused. Before doing so, however, it is worth noting a point that Mr Goldfarb made in evidence, namely that Mr Litvinenko was putting himself at risk simply by associating with two men who were, as he put it, "demonised by Russian propaganda as arch enemies." Extradition requests in respect of both Mr Berezovsky and Mr Zakayev were vigorously pursued by the Russian government. Mr Zakayev was, in Mr Goldfarb's words, "characterised by [the] Russian foreign minister as [the] Russian Osama Bin Laden and accused of gross terrorism," while Mr Berezovsky was, "depicted by the Russian propaganda as somebody who sponsors terrorism." Mr Goldfarb said that, "an association with Boris and with Zakayev … was [a] kind of kiss of death, if you want".¹⁷¹⁷ Berezovsky 25/7 Goldfarb 26/122 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Mascall 8/75 INQ019031; INQ019054 Dombey 23/24-30; INQ020031 (page 2 paragraphs S9-S10)

¶4.23 I note, of course, that this is no more than a contextual matter, and that Mr Goldfarb is not (and would not, I think, claim to be) a neutral commentator on these events. But the point that he makes has a resonance with a point made by Professor Service in the expert report that he prepared:

¶"Some kind of action by the FSB against Berezovski and his associates, especially

¶Litvinenko, was made likely by their sustained media campaign against the Putin administration. The form of such action could not be predicted."¹⁸¹⁸ Marina Litvinenko 3/40 lines 24-25 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 79) BLK000134 Mascall 8/76 Bruce Burgess 21/1-171 Mascall 29/77-78

¶4.24 I also note that, on the evidence I have heard, there appear to have been at least two occasions during this period on which Mr Litvinenko became involved in potentially dangerous incidents as a consequence of his connection with Mr Berezovsky.

¶4.25 First, in 2003, Mr Litvinenko was one of those in Mr Berezovsky's entourage who became involved with a man named Mr Terluk. Mr Litvinenko made a lengthy contemporaneous statement about these events for the purposes of Mr Berezovsky's asylum appeal, which I have admitted into evidence.19 According to that statement, Mr Terluk claimed in 2003 to have been instructed by an official from the Russian Embassy in London

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry to conduct what appeared to have been some form of reconnaissance exercise for a possible attempt to assassinate Mr Berezovsky, perhaps by poisoning him. I am aware that, in more recent years, Mr Terluk has given a very different version of these events, which was the subject of contested defamation proceedings in the High Court in London.20 I should make it clear that, whilst I have read and taken into account the findings of Mr Justice Eady in the defamation proceedings, I have not sought to investigate the true facts of this episode, which are highly contentious and of only peripheral importance to my Terms of Reference.

¶4.26 The second incident that I have in mind took place in October 2004, when the houses of both Mr Litvinenko and Mr Zakayev were firebombed, apparently by two Chechen men who were in dispute with Mr Berezovsky. The evidence that I have about this episode, which is limited, suggests that the dispute had arisen over a payment that one of the Chechen men claimed he was owed for a trip to Paris, which he said he had made at Mr Berezovsky's request, in connection with a deal relating to the plans for a 'nuclear suitcase bomb'. Prior to the firebombing of his house, Mr Litvinenko had been attempting to mediate on Mr Berezovsky's behalf.21

¶4.27 As with the Terluk episode, I am not in a position to make any findings as to the rights and wrongs of this episode, which took place more than ten years ago. I refer to the two incidents because they do perhaps give a flavour of the life that Mr Litvinenko was living, and the risks that he was running, as a member of Mr Berezovsky's entourage during this period.

¶Criticism of President Putin and his regime 4.28 It is clear on the evidence that the profile that Mr Litvinenko established during the time that he lived in London was considerably greater than simply as a member of Mr Berezovsky's circle. He had a reputation of his own as a campaigner and commentator, and an outspoken one at that. I have already referred to Professor Service's characterisation of Mr Litvinenko as the "most prominent and ebullient" of the critics of President Putin around Mr Berezovsky. Professor Service added that "Litvinenko's denunciations were fierce".²²²² Sixsmith The Litvinenko File (pages 78-79); Cowell The Terminal Spy (pages 103-104) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Marina Litvinenko 4/110-111 Marina Wall 32/75 Mascall 22/127 A1 2/131-140

¶4.29 I heard from a number of witnesses, including Marina Litvinenko, Mr Goldfarb and Mr Bukovsky, about the way in which Mr Litvinenko's political understanding and convictions developed following his arrival in London. It was, of course, such convictions that underpinned his campaigning activities. Mr Bukovsky, in particular, gave compelling evidence regarding the new understanding of Russian history in general and the history of the KGB/FSB in particular that Mr Litvinenko developed after he arrived in this country.23

¶4.30 Perhaps the most significant pieces of Mr Litvinenko's campaigning work were the two books that he co-authored during his early years in London. The first, published in Russian in 2001, was subsequently published in English as Blowing Up Russia. The second, which Mr Litvinenko wrote in 2001 and 2002, was never published in English, but its Russian title translates as The Gang from the Lubyanka.

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¶4.31 Mr Litvinenko researched and wrote Blowing Up Russia with Mr Felshtinsky, who had helped him and his family escape from Russia. The subject of the book was the apartment bombings that had taken place in Russia in September 1999. Enormous bombs had exploded, several days apart, in four apartment blocks. Nearly 300 people had been killed, and many more injured. The blame for the bombings had been officially attributed to Chechen separatists; this formed an important part of the context for the start of the Second Chechen War shortly thereafter. Mr Putin was Prime Minister at the time of the apartment bombings, having been promoted from his position as Head of the FSB in August 1999. The reaction to the bombings and public support for the war was one of the factors that assisted his political rise in the following months, culminating in his election as President in March 2000.

¶4.32 The theory that Mr Litvinenko and Mr Felshtinsky proposed in their book was that the apartment bombings had not been the work of Chechen terrorists at all. They asserted, rather, that the bombings had been the work of the FSB, designed to provide a justification for war in Chechnya and, ultimately, to boost Mr Putin's political prospects.

¶4.33 On the evidence I heard, the book was more than a political tract – it was the product of careful research. Professor Service's view was that the two men had "credibly investigated" the issue and, although their contentions about it had not been "proved 100 per cent," he considered they were more likely than not to be accurate. He said that: "the Felshtinsky and Litvinenko book piled up the evidence pointing a very damaging finger at the FSB and its involvement in those explosions".²⁴²⁴ Zakayev 26/142 lines 9-11 Service 28/30-31; 28/69-70; Felshtinsky 23/175-177 Goldfarb 5/102-107 Elenora Wall 32/77 INQ016403 (page 31)

¶4.34 Mr Felshtinsky described in oral evidence how he and Mr Litvinenko had first discussed the apartment bombings when they were together in Moscow in September 2000, at about the time that Mr Litvinenko was deciding to leave Russia forever. They subsequently worked on the book together after Mr Litvinenko's arrival in London (although the evidence was to the effect that Mr Felshtinsky took the leading role).25 The evidence was that the funding for the work that both men did in writing the book was provided by Mr Berezovsky.26

¶4.35 Mr Felshtinsky gave evidence that the book was first published in August 2001 as a special edition of the journal Novaya Gazeta, which Mr Felshtinsky described as "a major oppositionist newspaper in Russia."²⁷²⁷ Marina Litvinenko 3/44 lines 19-20 Felshtinsky 23/136-137 Reilly 10/27-28 INQ006201 INQ014620; INQ014621 One of the journalists who wrote for Novaya Gazeta was Anna Politkovskaya, to whom I shall return. Mr Felshtinsky said that the book's publication: "was a big deal because the newspaper printed … 100,000 copies and they selected the best chapters for publication, so, yes, this was a big deal."²⁸²⁸ Goldfarb 27/108 lines 8-15 Felshtinsky 23/175 lines 14-17 Attew 13/23 Moughton 8/94-116 INQ017548 (pages 8-9)

¶4.36 The publication of the book did not, however, mark the end of Mr Litvinenko's campaigning work on this issue.

¶4.37 As I understood Mr Goldfarb's evidence, the publication of the book was only one part of a larger strategy, supported and funded by Mr Berezovsky, to publicise the allegations regarding the FSB's responsibility for the apartment bombings. Apart from producing and promoting the book, Mr Berezovsky also funded the making of a film

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry that rehearsed the allegations – which he arranged to be shown (with some fanfare, it would seem) in March 2002 at the Royal United Services Institute in London.29 Mr Berezovsky commissioned Mr Felshtinsky and Mr Litvinenko to try to gather further evidence about what had happened in 1999. In Moscow, Mr Berezovsky encouraged and supported the establishment of a Commission to conduct a public investigation into the allegations. I heard that the Commission had about 15 members, including politicians, lawyers and journalists, as well as the daughter of one of the victims of the bombings. The Commission was founded jointly by a Member of Parliament (MP) and "old-time Russian dissident"³⁰³⁰ BLK000253 (page 3) Goldfarb 5/122 Shvets 24/56-58 INQ006201 (page 15) INQ022423; INQ022433 named Sergei Kovalyov and another MP named Sergei Yushenkov. Another of its members was Yuri Shchekochikhin, a journalist who had written for Novaya Gazeta about corruption in URPO at the time of Mr Litvinenko's press conference.31

¶4.38 The evidence shows that Mr Litvinenko was very much involved in this activity. I summarise. He helped to promote the film. He undertook further investigations with Mr Felshtinsky, including travelling with him to Georgia to try to interview a Chechen named Ahmed Gochiyaev, who was said by the Russian authorities to have been the mastermind behind the bombings.32 He publicly supported the Commission in Moscow by appearing at its hearings via videolink. He drew his friend Mr Trepashkin into working with Mr Yushenkov; Mr Trepashkin undertook his own investigations in Moscow and discovered, for example, evidence that Mr Gochiyaev had been framed.33 Mr Litvinenko also made initial enquiries into separate allegations that the FSB might have been involved in perpetrating the Moscow theatre siege in October 2002, another mass casualty event that had been blamed by the Russian authorities on Chechen terrorists. Mr Litvinenko's enquiries into this matter involved trying to trace a Chechen named Mr Terkibayev; I heard that these enquiries were subsequently pursued by Mr Yushenkov, and later by Ms Politkovskaya.34

¶4.39 It appears that not only was Mr Litvinenko deeply involved in these interrelated activities, but that he became something of a public figurehead for the whole enterprise. Mr Goldfarb referred, in this context, to: "an understanding in our circle that Sasha would be essentially the face of the campaign to inform the public opinion and the powers that be that the FSB might have been involved in the apartment bombings."³⁵³⁵ Marina Litvinenko 4/85 lines 10-14 Goldfarb 27/110 Svetlichnaya 25/82-98 INQ006218 (page 15) INQ020031 (page 5 paragraphs S27-S31)

¶4.40 I heard that Mr Litvinenko's second book was written between 2001 and 2002. It was written in Russian and, although subsequently translated into Polish and Bulgarian, an English translation has never been produced.36 Its title translates as The Gang from the Lubyanka. Like Blowing Up Russia, this book was also funded by Mr Berezovsky. I heard from Marina Litvinenko and from Mr Goldfarb that the book took the form of transcripts of interviews between Mr Litvinenko and a Russian journalist named Akram Murtazaev, which had been edited by Mr Goldfarb. The book contained a record of Mr Litvinenko's own experiences in Russia in the years before he had left, as well as allegations of corruption and other criminality on behalf of the FSB in general and Mr Putin in particular.37 The book was published in early 2002 by a company that

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¶Mr Goldfarb, financed by Mr Berezovsky, had set up for the purpose. It was printed in New York and also in Latvia, in the latter case with the intention of transporting the books into Russia.38 I will return below to what happened when this was attempted.

¶4.41 I should add that I heard that Mr Litvinenko, with assistance from Mr Goldfarb, subsequently wrote an extended essay that was described as, "a distilled version of what he had said on The Gang from the Lubyanka."³⁹³⁹ INQ017734 (page 7 paragraphs 20-21) Goldfarb 26/28-30 Attew 13/25-27 Mascall 9/9-10 INQ022423 That document, which was never published, was titled The Uzbek File, and I have admitted a translated copy into evidence.40

¶4.42 Unsurprisingly, these activities on the part of Mr Litvinenko and others do not appear to have gone unnoticed by the authorities in Moscow.

¶4.43 I have referred above (at paragraphs 4.12 – 4.13) to the threat from Mr Barsukov that Mr Litvinenko received whilst visiting Mr Bukovsky in about May 2001, by way of a phone call from his former subordinate, Mr Ponkin. In a witness statement dated 10 October 2003, Mr Litvinenko suggested that he had in fact received a number of calls from Mr Ponkin at around that time, and that Mr Ponkin had conveyed warnings about Mr Litvinenko's activities in the UK. In his statement Mr Litvinenko said that: "Ponkin passed on to me threats made by the FSB to kill me and warnings not to write books or to speak out against various matters."⁴¹⁴¹ INQ017734 (pages 7-8 paragraph 23) INQ014928 Shvets 24/65 Mascall 9/35-37 INQ022423 (page 7 paragraph 30) There were other similar incidents.

¶4.44 Mrs Litvinenko described an incident when an official from the Russian Embassy in London came to the door of her flat demanding to see Mr Litvinenko.42 This evidence appears to correspond with a letter, dated 22 March 2002, written by Mr Menzies, Mr Litvinenko's solicitor, to the Home Office. The letter refers to "repeated visits" being made by an official from the Embassy, whose manner was described as "persistent and harassing."⁴³⁴³ INQ017734 (page 8 paragraph 24) HMG000307 INQ006481 Mascall 9/27 Emmerson 1/156-157

¶4.45 Later in 2001, on 12 October, Mr Litvinenko received an email from his friend Mr Trepashkin in Moscow. The email gave news of a more explicit threat that Mr Trepashkin said he had heard from Victor Shebalin, another of Mr Litvinenko's former colleagues from URPO days. The first paragraph of the email made a direct reference to Mr Litvinenko's book The Gang from the Lubyanka. It went on (in translation):

¶"I had a meeting today with Victor Shebalin, who has wide contacts with the FSB employees as a former colonel of the FSB. During our conversation he stated, that you are 'sentenced' to extrajudicial elimination, meaning that you definitely will be killed after publication of your last book. He also asked to stress that he will not going to do anything with his murder [sic]. He repeated this several times.

¶Shebalin did not say who exactly is going to eliminate you, but he hinted that such persons do exist. (So, you can write your last will in advance.)"⁴⁴⁴⁴ Marina Litvinenko 3/71-74; INQ017734 (pages 8-9 paragraphs 27-29) INQ015366 Shvets 24/81-82 COM00046001; COM00198001 Mascall 29/77-78

¶Amongst the documentary evidence there is a further letter from Mr Menzies to the Home Office about this email. That letter recorded Mr Litvinenko's response to the email, namely that he, "does not consider that there is likely to be any substance

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry behind this threat."⁴⁵⁴⁵ BLK000253 (page 10) HMG000308 Attew 13/37 Mascall 9/27-28 INQ019146 (page 15 paragraph 46) Subsequent events may have proved him wrong. That is one of the matters that I have to decide.

¶4.46 I heard evidence from Marina Litvinenko that the FSB may have gone a step beyond issuing threats to Mr Litvinenko, and may have tried to implicate him in a crime in London. She recounted how, in early 2003, Mr Ponkin came to London and tried to involve Mr Litvinenko in a plot to kill President Putin. She said that Mr Litvinenko quickly came to the view that this was a provocation orchestrated by the FSB, and reported the matter to the British police. Mr Ponkin and another man with whom he was travelling were deported.46 If Mr Litvinenko was right about what Mr Ponkin was trying to achieve, it would seem to suggest that Mr Litvinenko was a sufficiently important target for the FSB that they were prepared to take action against him overseas.

¶4.47 I referred above to the arrangements that were made to print copies of The Gang from the Lubyanka in Latvia. Mr Goldfarb described in his oral evidence how the first batch of these books was successfully smuggled into Russia in mid 2002:47

¶"…we designed an elaborate scheme to have this truck with books go by land from Riga to Moscow, and somehow we managed to get it through customs as printed material without – nobody looked. And then it was met by Mr Trepashkin in Moscow who arranged for warehousing, and for several kiosks in the centre of

¶Moscow to sell it, and I think even in the State Duma. So it was a total surprise to the authorities when it suddenly appeared."

¶Mr Goldfarb went on, however, to describe how the second shipment in early 2003, which contained copies of both Mr Litvinenko's books, was stopped on the highway by the FSB, with all the books being confiscated.

¶4.48 In a similar vein, I heard that attempts to distribute and show Mr Berezovsky's film about the apartment bombings in Russia, which were led by Mr Yushenkov, were also disrupted. As Mr Goldfarb put it in his oral evidence, "people got beaten up and theatres were closed, and that created more scandals."⁴⁸⁴⁸ HMG000115 Goldfarb 5/120; 26/19 Shvets 24/73 INQ013787 (page 4) Goldfarb 5/115; 5/121-123

¶4.49 I also heard evidence that these interrelated campaigns, in which Mr Litvinenko played a key role, were disrupted by more than the seizing of books or the breaking up of film screenings. Both Mr Yushenkov and Mr Shchekochikhin lost their lives in 2003; Mr Yushenkov was shot dead in a Moscow street49 and Mr Shchekochikhin died in suspicious circumstances, suspected to have been poisoned50 (I shall return to this later). In December 2003, Mr Trepashkin, in Russia, was arrested for illegal possession of a weapon (Mr Goldfarb suggested that the weapon had been planted by the FSB) shortly before he was due to represent two Muslims accused of involvement in the apartment bombings.51 When Mr Litvinenko and Mr Felshtinsky visited Georgia in an attempt to meet Mr Gochiyaev, their driver was killed and they were told to leave the country immediately for their own safety. Mr Terkibayev was killed in a car accident shortly after Ms Politkovskaya had published an interview with him in Novaya Gazeta in which he had implicated the FSB in the Moscow theatre siege.52 Ms Politkovskaya,

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¶as we shall hear, was herself murdered outside her Moscow flat only a few weeks before Mr Litvinenko himself was killed.

¶4.50 I heard evidence about a number of other strands to Mr Litvinenko's campaigning activity during the time that he lived in London. There are two of these to which I shall briefly refer.

¶4.51 First, there was clear evidence that Mr Litvinenko had a role, although not a central one, in a project to transcribe and publicise what are sometimes referred to as the Kuchma tapes. Put shortly, I heard that these were tapes of conversations between Leonid Kuchma, who was then President of Ukraine and various other people. The tapes had been secretly recorded by a member of President Kuchma's security staff named Nikolai Melnychenko. Mr Berezovsky became involved as one of the funders of a project to transcribe the tapes. It appears that for a time in 2002 and again in 2005 work on the transcription was carried out in London. Although Mr Litvinenko was not involved in the actual transcription, he met and became friendly with Mr Melnychenko and also a man named Yuri Shvets, who had come to London from his home in the USA for this purpose. Mr Felshtinsky also said that he was himself involved.53 We will hear more of Mr Shvets in due course.

¶4.52 As Mr Goldfarb explained in his oral evidence, the particular reason for Mr Litvinenko's involvement in this project was the possibility that, "something could be found on those tapes which relate[d] to the Russian situation".⁵⁴⁵⁴ Marina Litvinenko 3/82-84; INQ017734 (pages 10-11 paragraphs 35-36) Goldfarb 26/37 Shvets 24/79-80 Krgo 9/49 INQ019146 (page 19 paragraph 61) The evidence was to the effect that some of the content of the tapes was indeed thought relevant to "the Russian situation". In particular, there were passages on the tapes that suggested links between President Putin and organised crime, in particular Semion Mogilevich and a company named the St Petersburg Real Estate Holding Company (SPAG), believed to be a front company for the Tambov Group.55

¶4.53 Of particular importance for present purposes, I heard evidence that Mr Litvinenko made no secret either of his involvement in this process, or of his view of what the transcripts showed. When Mr Goldfarb was asked whether Mr Litvinenko's involvement with the tapes was open knowledge, he replied, "I think so because he was giving interviews about that, particularly about SPAG and Mogilevich, I think."⁵⁶⁵⁶ INQ017734 (pages 10-11 paragraphs 36,39-40) Goldfarb 26/50 INQ015674 Mascall 9/96-97 Goldfarb 26/26

¶4.54 The other strand of Mr Litvinenko's activism that deserves mention at this stage is his involvement with the Chechen cause.

¶4.55 I have referred to Mr Litvinenko's growing sympathy for the Chechen cause, which appears to have started with his experiences in the First Chechen War, and developed as a result of his friendship with Mr Zakayev following his arrival in London. The evidence is that he took up issues related to Chechen independence and the conduct of the Russian authorities in resisting it, and indeed much of his campaigning work from London was done via the medium of the Chechenpress website.57

¶4.56 Beyond that, Mr Zakayev gave evidence that, at his request, both Mr Litvinenko and Ms Politkovskaya served on a War Crimes Commission that had been established under his chairmanship in 2004 by Chechnya's President Maskhadov. Mr Zakayev explained that both took an active part in the Committee's work of attempting to

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry gather evidence of Russian war crimes in Chechnya. Mr Zakayev's evidence was that the fact that Mr Litvinenko and Ms Politkovskaya were serving on the Committee was public knowledge, and that, in his view, the Russian military and FSB would have been "afraid" that they might have faced charges in an international war crimes tribunal as a result of the Committee's work.58

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¶Chapter 3: Work for UK intelligence agencies 4.57 Ever since Mr Litvinenko died, there has been speculation that he may have worked for the UK intelligence agencies. MI6 is the agency most commonly suggested. As we shall see, such speculation was in part the result of public comments made by Mr Lugovoy. I heard evidence on this topic from a number of witnesses.

¶4.58 Before turning to that evidence, I observe that the questions this issue raises with regard to the matters that I am investigating are more complex than the binary question of whether or not Mr Litvinenko was working for the agencies. In terms of the risks that Mr Litvinenko may have faced, the detail is critical. If Mr Litvinenko did work for the agencies, what type of work did he undertake? What information may he have passed? What (and whose) secrets may he have betrayed? What may have been the consequences? More fundamentally, the question of what Mr Litvinenko was or was not actually doing may be less important than that of what his enemies thought he was doing. For if there was a distinction between the two, Mr Litvinenko was unlikely to have received the benefit of it.

¶4.59 Marina Litvinenko answered questions about this issue in her oral evidence.59 Her evidence can be summarised as follows:

¶a. She knew that Mr Litvinenko undertook work for one of the agencies – she was

unsure whether it was MI5 or MI6. Mr Litvinenko had told her about this work. She was also aware of monthly payments being made into their joint bank account that she understood was payment for Mr Litvinenko's work with the agencies

¶b. This work had started after Mr Litvinenko's arrival in the UK. She did not believe

that Mr Litvinenko had had any involvement with UK agencies while he was still living in Russia

¶c. She stated that Mr Litvinenko had shared with her some of the information he

was supplying to British intelligence, "but not the details". She believed that the information Mr Litvinenko gave to the agencies related to Russian organised crime, including its presence in the UK. But, as I have said, she did not know the details of what Mr Litvinenko had been doing. She had no idea, for example, as to the accuracy or otherwise of an allegation that he had passed the names of Russian sleeper agents in the UK to UK intelligence agencies

¶d. Mr Litvinenko received a payment of £2,000 per month for this work. The payments

had started in about 2004 and were made into the joint bank account that Mr and Mrs Litvinenko shared

¶e. Her understanding was that Mr Litvinenko had worked for the agencies on a

consulting basis, as opposed to being one of their employees or agents (terms that she regarded as synonymous). To her, this was an important distinction. This was the explanation for a statement that she had given to the press in 2007 asserting that Mr Litvinenko, "was never an agent for MI6" – she did not believe that he had been an 'agent', as opposed to a consultant. As she put it, "I knew Sasha did work for MI6, or MI5, but he has never been an agent of MI6." She had earlier explained that she understood the term 'agent' to mean: "work[ing] with the Security Service and doing undercover job, doing something abroad under position of agent of MI6… But more important it's be employed, employed."

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶4.60 The evidence of others who were close to Mr Litvinenko was to a similar effect.

¶4.61 Mr Goldfarb stated that Mr Litvinenko had told him sometime in early 2003 that he was working for MI6; he added that, "he introduced me to one of them." He said that Mr Litvinenko had told him that he was consulting for MI6 on Russian organised crime in Europe and travelling to various countries in the EU to assist their law enforcement.60

¶4.62 Mr Berezovsky told the Metropolitan Police Service that Mr Litvinenko had worked for what he described as "the intelligence service" and "the security services" (terms that he appears to have used interchangeably), but added that he did not know any details of his relations with them. He stated that:

¶"After he stopped working for me I understand he just kept working for the security services. They paid him money to support himself and his family. … he later said that he was disappointed with his working arrangements with the intelligence service."⁶¹⁶¹ Marina Litvinenko 4/105-110; BER002750; HMG000120 Berezovsky 25/10; 25/12 Marina Litvinenko 3/145; Goldfarb 27/112 Reilly 10/80; 10/83-84 Dombey 23/46-48

¶4.63 There were others of Mr Litvinenko's associates who appear to have been unaware, prior to his death, that he had any possible connection with UK intelligence agencies. Mr Reilly62 and Mr Bukovsky63 fall into this category.

¶4.64 I note that none of the witnesses from whom I heard and who knew Mr Litvinenko during his life expressed the firm view that he did not have a relationship with UK intelligence agencies.

¶4.65 The Home Secretary was a core participant in the Inquiry, acting in a representative capacity for Her Majesty's Government generally, as well as in her own right. Since the factual issue was whether or not Mr Litvinenko worked for, or with, a government agency, it would have been open to the Home Secretary to provide evidence answering the point one way or another. No such evidence was provided in the open session, and it was made clear that the Home Secretary neither confirmed nor denied this allegation. Mr Garnham QC, who appeared on behalf of the Home Secretary, explained the position in his opening statement, in the following terms:

¶"The very nature of the work of the agencies requires secrecy if it is to be effective, and there is obvious and widely recognised need to preserve that effectiveness. It has been, therefore, the policy of successive governments to neither confirm nor deny (to NCND, in the jargon) assertions, allegations, or speculation in relation to the security and intelligence agencies.

¶That means that, as a general rule, the government will NCND whether the agencies are carrying out or have carried out an operation or investigation into a particular person or group, have a relationship with a particular person, hold particular information on a person or have shared information about that person with any other agencies, whether within the UK or elsewhere.

¶In order to be effective, the NCND principle must be applied consistently, including when no activity has taken place and a denial could be made perfectly properly.

¶If the government were prepared to deny a particular activity in one instance, the inference might well be drawn that the absence of a denial in another amounted to

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¶confirmation of the alleged activity. If the government were forced to depart from the NCND principle in one case, it would create a clear risk of serious harm to essential UK national security interests. It could, furthermore, potentially put lives at risk."⁶⁴⁶⁴ Felshtinsky 23/143 lines 14-17 Garnham 1/172-173 Goldfarb 5/128 Reilly 10/84; 10/107-110 Goldfarb 26/118-121

¶Later in the opening statement, Mr Garnham quoted a passage from the judgment of Lord Carswell in the Scappaticci case:65

¶"To state that a person is an agent would be likely to place him in immediate danger from terrorist organisations. To deny that he is an agent may in some cases endanger another person who may be under suspicion from terrorists. Most significant, once the government confirms in the case of one person that he is not an agent, a refusal to comment in the case of another person would then give rise to an immediate suspicion that the latter was in fact an agent, so possibly placing his life in grave danger.

¶… If the government were to deny in all cases that persons named were agents, the denials would become meaningless and would carry no weight. Moreover, if agents became uneasy about the risk to themselves being increased through the effect of government statements, their willingness to give information and the supply of intelligence vital to the war against terrorism could be gravely reduced.

¶There is in my judgment substantial force in these propositions and they form powerful reasons for maintaining the NCND policy."⁶⁶⁶⁶ INQ017734 (page 12 paragraph 43); Marina Litvinenko 3/90-91 Garnham 1/174-175 Marina Litvinenko 4/33 Reilly 10/85-86 Scaramella 15/172-173

¶Mr Garnham concluded the statement by emphasising the consequence of the NCND approach that the Home Secretary was taking:

¶"All that, sir, has an immediate consequence in the circumstances of these open hearings. The failure of the government either to confirm or deny an assertion or a suggestion about events under consideration in this Inquiry tells you precisely nothing about the truth or otherwise of that assertion or suggestion. It means, sir, you must look elsewhere to determine the truth or falsity of such allegations."⁶⁷⁶⁷ Felshtinsky 23/143-144 Garnham 1/178-179 Quirke 11/64-66 INQ018987 (page 2) Scaramella 15/172-178

¶4.66 So much for the question of what relationship Mr Litvinenko may actually have had with the agencies, and what his family and friends understood to be the position at the time. As I indicated above, for the purposes of this Inquiry it is at least as important, perhaps more important, to assess what Mr Litvinenko's enemies thought he was doing. Did, for example, the FSB believe that Mr Litvinenko was or may have been working with the UK intelligence agencies?

¶4.67 There is some evidence before me to suggest that that is precisely what the FSB believed. The source of that evidence is Mr Lugovoy.

¶4.68 In public statements and interviews that post-dated Mr Litvinenko's death, Mr Lugovoy stated firmly not only that Mr Litvinenko had told him that he was working with MI6, but that Mr Litvinenko had tried to recruit him as an MI6 agent. For example, at the press conference that Mr Lugovoy gave (with Mr Kovtun) in Moscow on 31 May 2007, he stated that, during meetings that he had held in London during 2006, Mr Litvinenko had been involved in an attempt, "to try and recruit me openly as an agent for British Intelligence." Mr Lugovoy went on to describe what it was that, as he understood it,

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry he was being recruited to do. On Mr Lugovoy's account, the intention was that he would take part in an operation to gather incriminating information about President

¶Putin and his family – he stated that one element of this plan was that a Russian state official would be lured to London and then blackmailed into disclosing incriminating information about Mr Putin. Mr Lugovoy said that he had rejected the approach.

¶Mr Litvinenko, he said, "was enraged that I declined the offer to work for British secret services."⁶⁸⁶⁸ Marina Litvinenko 3/94-95; Felshtinsky 23/145 lines 13-16 INQ001886 (pages 2-3) Attew 13/20 INQ018987 (page 2) INQ013784

¶4.69 Mr Lugovoy returned to this theme in an interview with the Spanish newspaper El Pais in 2008. On that occasion, he repeated his claim that Mr Litvinenko had been involved in an attempt to recruit him on behalf of British intelligence. He also claimed in this interview that Mr Litvinenko had encouraged him to join him in work that he was conducting with the Spanish secret services against the Russian mafia operating in Spain – a subject to which I shall return below. The particular significance of this interview for present purposes lies in what Mr Lugovoy said he did in response to Mr Litvinenko's attempt to recruit him for British intelligence. As to this, Mr Lugovoy stated that: "when the British agents started to approach me, one of the first things that I did was to inform the FSB so that they wouldn't accuse me of being a traitor or a spy."⁶⁹⁶⁹ Felshtinsky 23/145 INQ017684 Marina Litvinenko 4/38-42 INQ017922 (page 3) Scaramella 15/139-140

¶4.70 If these accounts are true (and I will address the subject of Mr Lugovoy's credibility below), the FSB received directly from Mr Lugovoy not only information that Mr Litvinenko was working with UK intelligence agencies, but also some idea of the type of work he was conducting.

¶4.71 It may not take much imagination to consider how the FSB would have reacted to a report that one of its own former officers was working with British intelligence, especially if, as Mr Lugovoy claimed, that former officer was involved in an operation targeting President Putin.

¶4.72 It may be that comments made by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Gusak after Mr Litvinenko's death provide an indication of the FSB's likely reaction to a report that Mr Litvinenko was working with UK intelligence agencies.

¶4.73 Lugovoy himself, as we shall see, was never an FSB officer. But he came from a military background and served in the KGB before it was broken up, and thereafter in the Federal Protection Service. He gave his view of Mr Litvinenko's conduct in acting for British intelligence in the El Pais interview that is referred to above, which is printed as a question and answer session:

"A. … [The British] believed that Lugovoy killed Litvinenko because Litvinenko criticised Putin and the FSB.

¶Q. But the FSB believes that Litvinenko was a traitor.

A. And I think so as well. But so what? That doesn't mean that a traitor has to be immediately killed?

Q. Do you think that someone could have killed Litvinenko in the interests of the Russian state?

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¶A. If you're talking about the interests of the Russian state in the purest sense of

the word, I myself would have given that order. I'm not talking about Litvinenko, but about any person who causes serious damage. For example, if I had been president, I would have ordered the assassination of Saakashvili.

¶Q. Saakashvili isn't a Russian citizen, he's president of the Republic of Georgia.

¶A. Well, there is another person, Oleg Gordievsky (colonel of the KGB), a friend

of Litvinenko's, who fled to the UK (in 1985) and was sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of the USSR. I think that this punishment should be enacted. If he is caught, he must be brought here and locked up for life. And if someone has caused the Russian state serious damage, they should be exterminated. This is my firm belief and the belief of any normal Russian."

¶4.74 In February 2007, before either Mr Lugovoy's press conference or his interview with El Pais, Mr Gusak, Mr Litvinenko's former friend and superior officer had given an interview to the Ekho Moskvy radio station.70 The interview appears to have been a follow up to an earlier interview that he had given to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The interviewer asked Mr Gusak: "Tell us, please, you have described Litvinenko as a traitor and said that he did indeed inflict serious damage on our country, he revealed his sources of information, and even betrayed several [undercover] agents. Is that so?" Mr Gusak responded: "The thing is, when Aleksandr Valterovich [Litvinenko] defected abroad, he naturally handed over the undercover agents who had been his contacts." Later in the same interview, Mr Gusak was asked, "But you believe that under Soviet laws Litvinenko deserved to be executed, right?" Mr Gusak replied "Well, he did, yes."

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Chapter 4: Work for the Mitrokhin Commission in Italy 4.75 Vasili Mitrokhin was a senior KGB archivist who defected to the UK in 1992. He brought with him a very large collection of handwritten notes of KGB records that he had made over many years. Much of the material contained in what became known as the Mitrokhin Archive has subsequently been published in books jointly written by Mr Mitrokhin and the British historian Professor Christopher Andrew.

¶4.76 The Mitrokhin Archive contained details of historic KGB operations throughout the world. It included details of such operations in Italy. In 2002 the Italian Parliament established a Commission to investigate matters arising from the Mitrokhin Archive. It was known as the Mitrokhin Commission. Mr Litvinenko took part in its enquiries. Could anything that Mr Litvinenko did in relation to the Mitrokhin Commission have had a connection with his death?

¶4.77 Before considering the evidence available to the Inquiry that bears on that question, it is important that I enter a number of caveats. It is apparent even from the limited evidence that I have heard about it that the Mitrokhin Commission was and remains highly controversial, both in Italy and beyond. It seems that there are many who have questioned both the legitimacy of its work and the value of its findings. I must make it clear at the outset that it is no part of my function to investigate, far less to make any findings, in relation to those controversies. The scope of this Inquiry's interest in the Mitrokhin Commission is sharply limited. Put simply, it is to investigate what it was that Alexander Litvinenko did for and in connection with the Commission, and whether there could have been any link between those matters and his death.

¶4.78 I heard oral evidence from two witnesses who had a direct connection with the Mitrokhin Commission, and with the work that Mr Litvinenko undertook for it.

¶4.79 First, I heard from Mario Scaramella. Mr Scaramella is an Italian lawyer who has held a number of posts during his career. He was a consultant to the Mitrokhin Commission and conducted certain investigations on its behalf. It was in this capacity that he was introduced to Mr Litvinenko; and Mr Litvinenko subsequently assisted Mr Scaramella by providing him with information. The two men became friends. Mr Scaramella also has a second part to play in the narrative because he met Mr Litvinenko in London on 1 November 2006, shortly before Mr Litvinenko's meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Pine Bar; I will return to his evidence about events on that day at a later stage of the Report (see paragraphs 6.293 – 6.300 below).

¶4.80 The second witness was Paolo Guzzanti. At the time of the events in question, Mr Guzzanti was a member of the Italian Senate, having previously spent many years as a journalist, including a lengthy period as editor in chief of the newspaper La Republica. Mr Guzzanti was the Chairman of the Mitrokhin Commission.

¶4.81 I am aware that both these two men have been caught up in the controversies surrounding the Mitrokhin Commission (to which I referred above), and that in that context questions have been raised in the public domain about their conduct and their credibility. Although the oral and written evidence that Mr Guzzanti and (in particular) Mr Scaramella have provided to the Inquiry has extended to cover a range of issues, the evidence that they have given that is of central relevance to this Inquiry – i.e. their evidence concerning their dealings with Mr Litvinenko and his dealings with the

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¶Mitrokhin Commission – is of a much narrower compass. Both men gave evidence to the Inquiry voluntarily – since they both live out of the jurisdiction, I could not have compelled them to give evidence. I accept that what they have said about the core issues to which I have referred was reliable. It is unnecessary for me to make any findings regarding their evidence as to wider matters.

¶4.82 There is also in evidence an Affidavit sworn by Mr Litvinenko in 2006 that provides an outline account of his dealings with the Mitrokhin Commission.71

¶Factual context 4.83 The evidence that I have heard enables me to make some outline findings regarding the Mitrokhin Commission and Mr Litvinenko's involvement with it. I will set out those findings below:

¶a. The Mitrokhin Commission was established by the Italian Parliament in 200272 b. The Commission had 40 members – 20 from the lower house of the Italian

¶Parliament and 20 from the Senate. Mr Guzzanti, a senator, was elected as

¶Chairman of the Commission73 c. The Commission was initially tasked with investigating how the Italian secret service had dealt with papers and information from the Mitrokhin Archive after it had received them from the authorities in the UK. The Commission's report on that matter was completed in April 2004. However, the Commission then decided to widen the scope of its enquiries to cover all possible KGB activities in Italy – it continued investigating these broader issues until it was wound up in 200674 d. Mr Scaramella was not a member of the Commission. He was hired by the

¶Commission in 2003 as a consultant to conduct investigations on its behalf. The scope of the investigations that Mr Scaramella conducted in this capacity appears to have been very broad; Mr Guzzanti told me that they covered matters such as the illegal financing of the Communist Party of Italy by the Soviet Union, the links between Russian secret services and organised crime and terrorism in Italy, and the KGB's power to manipulate Western media75 e. Mr Scaramella was introduced to Mr Litvinenko in late 2003 by a mutual acquaintance, Victor Rezun, also known as Victor Suvorov. Mr Scaramella asked for Mr Litvinenko's help in the enquiries that he was conducting for the Mitrokhin

¶Commission, and Mr Litvinenko agreed76 f. Mr Litvinenko assisted Mr Scaramella by providing him with information. Their

first meeting took place in Naples in January 2004 and lasted about five days.77 Mr Scaramella told me that they had a number of subsequent meetings at which Mr Litvinenko provided him with information. He thought that they met on three or four occasions in Italy and also on three or four occasions in London.78

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

Mr Litvinenko never met Mr Guzzanti, although they did once speak briefly on the phone79

¶g. Mr Scaramella arranged for Mr Litvinenko's expenses to be paid, but Mr Litvinenko did not receive any further remuneration for his assistance80 h. Mr Litvinenko introduced Mr Scaramella to Mr Limarev. Mr Litvinenko told

¶Mr Scaramella that Mr Limarev knew more than he did about Russian organised crime. This introduction appears to have taken place in January 2004. Thereafter

¶Mr Limarev became a further source of information for Mr Scaramella. The two corresponded regularly by email81 i. The Mitrokhin Commission was wound up in April 2006. Mr Scaramella and

¶Mr Litvinenko ended their regular contact at that time82

¶4.84 It is apparent from the evidence that I have heard and seen that Mr Litvinenko provided Mr Scaramella with a very large volume of information. There is a transcript of Mr Litvinenko's first meeting with Mr Scaramella, which runs to well over 100 pages and covers a wide range of topics.83

¶4.85 The information that Mr Litvinenko gave to Mr Scaramella included some on what might be thought to have been particularly sensitive topics. I will give two examples.

¶4.86 First, Mr Litvinenko made various claims to Mr Scaramella about a man called Semion Mogilevich. The written closing submissions served on behalf of Marina Litvinenko describe Mr Mogilevich as: "one of Russia's most notorious [Organised Crime Group] leaders. … It is said he is responsible for contract killings and smuggling weapons."⁸⁴⁸⁴ Marina Litvinenko 3/114-116 Marina Litvinenko written closing submissions, page 46 paragraph 142 Goldfarb 5/132; Attew 13/22; Tabunov 13/139-140 Mascall 9/109-111 INQ019146 (pages 26-27 paragraph 83) Mr Mogilevich was, at least at one stage, one of the FBI's most wanted men.85 I have seen the text of a speech given by the US Attorney General in 2008 in which Mr Mogilevich is said to have, "exert[ed] influence over large portions of the natural gas industry in parts of what used to be the Soviet Union."⁸⁶⁸⁶ Marina Litvinenko 3/122-123 BLK000241 (page 4) Marina Litvinenko 4/35-37 INQ019146 (page 6 paragraph 18)

¶4.87 Mr Litvinenko passed on to Mr Scaramella information about Mr Mogilevich that he said had emerged from the transcription of the Kuchma tapes. Mr Litvinenko told Mr Scaramella that Mr Mogilevich (whom he described as a "well known criminal- terrorist" ) was. "in a good relationship with Russian President Putin and most senior officials of the Russian Federation" ; that Mr Mogilevich and President Putin had, "a common cause, in my understanding a criminal cause" ; that Mr Mogilevich was an arms dealer who was selling weapons to Al-Qaeda; and that he knew: "beyond doubt that Mogilevich is FSB's long-standing agent and all his actions including the contacts with Al-Qaeda are controlled by FSB … For this very reason the FSB is hiding Mogilevich from FBI." These allegations were contained in a written statement that Mr Litvinenko sent by fax to the offices of the Mitrokhin Commission.87

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¶4.88 Second, in the course of his discussions with Mr Scaramella, Mr Litvinenko claimed to have evidence that Romano Prodi, the senior Italian politician, was a KGB agent. Mr Scaramella said that: "Litvinenko presented this information as the most important information in his hands."⁸⁸⁸⁸ Hatjiosif 2/99-101 Scaramella 27/97-99; LUG000092 INQ021208 (page 3)

¶4.89 Information of this character was clearly highly sensitive. It is possible to imagine that, if it became known that Mr Litvinenko was making this type of allegation to a formal body such as the Mitrokhin Commission, attempts may have been made to silence him. Mr Scaramella gave evidence that the files containing the information that Mr Litvinenko had given him were locked away, but that on at least one occasion there was a security breach and unauthorised copies were made of the files.89

¶4.90 Another person whom Mr Litvinenko discussed with Mr Scaramella was a man named Alexander Talik. Mr Talik was a Russian living in Naples in or about 2005. Mr Scaramella said that he knew him, indeed that he had employed him to do some work for his organisation, the Environmental Crime Prevention Programme (ECPP). Precisely what took place between Mr Talik, Mr Scaramella and Mr Litvinenko is not at all clear on the evidence. I would add that these matters have also been the subject of proceedings in the Italian courts.

¶4.91 Mr Scaramella told me that he understood that Mr Talik was a former FSB officer; he also appeared to believe that Mr Talik was connected to an incident when he (Mr Scaramella) had been shot at in Naples by hooded men. There is evidence that Mr Litvinenko also believed that Mr Talik had links with the FSB, and that he told Mr Scaramella this. I also heard evidence about a consignment of arms, which Mr Litvinenko thought may have been destined for Mr Talik, being intercepted in Italy.90

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Chapter 5: Work for the Spanish security services 4.92 I have made reference at paragraph 4.69 above to the assertion made by Mr Lugovoy to the effect that Mr Litvinenko told him that he was working with the Spanish secret services against the Russian mafia operating in Spain, and moreover that Mr Litvinenko suggested to Mr Lugovoy that he join him in this work.

¶4.93 This account was corroborated by evidence that I heard from Marina Litvinenko and others during the oral hearings.

¶4.94 Marina Litvinenko said that she believed Mr Litvinenko's work with the Spanish authorities had started in 2005 or at the end of 2004. She had been aware that he was making trips to Spain for that purpose, and also that at least one payment in respect of this work had been made into their joint account. She knew, too, that Mr Litvinenko was helping the Spanish authorities in combating Russian organised crime in Spain. She also knew that Mr Lugovoy had become involved in this exercise, because she knew that he had been due to accompany Mr Litvinenko on a trip to Spain on 10 November 2006. But Mrs Litvinenko was not aware of the detail of the work that Mr Litvinenko was doing in Spain – she said that, "Sasha didn't tell me a lot because he tried to save me."⁹¹⁹¹ Marina Litvinenko 3/119-120 Marina Litvinenko 3/155-157; 4/120 Mascall 17/79-80

¶4.95 It would appear from a witness statement that Mr Berezovsky gave to the Metropolitan Police Service in December 2006 that Mr Litvinenko had shared at least some of these details with Mr Berezovsky. The statement included the following passage:

¶"I know that he [i.e. Mr Litvinenko] also collected some money from cooperation with the Spanish intelligence service. He was helping them regarding the Russian mafia. I understand his wife also received some money.

¶Twice in September 2006, he told me that he had helped the Spanish intelligence agency to arrest a top Russian mafia boss operating in Spain called Shakuro.

¶He also told me that he was working on some intelligence relating to Roman

¶Abramovich. This was likely to see him arrested in Spain for money laundering and buying land illegally. This also involves Putin."⁹²⁹² Marina Litvinenko 3/142-143 Berezovsky 25/13 Mascall 17/80-81

¶4.96 Mr Goldfarb gave evidence that he had had two conversations with Mr Litvinenko about the work that the latter said that he was undertaking with the Spanish security services. First, Mr Goldfarb said that in 2005 Mr Litvinenko had suggested that Mr Trepashkin, who had briefly been released from prison, might leave Russia and go to live in Spain, where he would be able to arrange work for him with the Spanish authorities.93 The second conversation that Mr Goldfarb recalled took place in 2006. The notable feature of that conversation was that Mr Litvinenko told Mr Goldfarb that one day he would give evidence in court about Mr Putin's links to the mafia.94

¶4.97 The evidence that Mr Litvinenko may have been assisting the Spanish authorities with operations against Russian organised crime figures in Spain, and in particular Mr Goldfarb's recollection that he was anticipating giving evidence in court about

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¶these matters, is also consistent with a number of documents that I admitted into evidence. Mr Goldfarb referred to the contents of these documents when giving oral evidence.95

¶4.98 A US diplomatic cable dated 31 August 2009 published on the Wikileaks website96 described two operations, codenamed Avispa and Troika, that the Spanish authorities carried out against members of Russian organised crime groups in or about 2005 and 2006. The cable referred to allegations made in the Spanish press that Mr Litvinenko had; "tipped off Spanish security officials on the location, roles and activities of several 'Russian' mafia figures with ties to Spain." The cable went on to assert that Mr Litvinenko "allegedly provided information on Izguilov, Zakhar Kalashov and Tariel Oniani to GOS [Government of Spain] officials during a May 2006 meeting."

¶4.99 A further US cable published on Wikileaks appears to provide further support to the idea that Mr Litvinenko was assisting Spanish authorities in their investigations into Russian organised crime. This cable, dated 8 February 2010,97 refers to the Spanish prosecutor heading the investigation, named Jose Grinda Gonzales, quoting what he described as a "thesis" by Mr Litvinenko. The 'thesis' was that: "the Russian intelligence and security services … the FSB, the SVR and the GRU – control organised crime in Russia." The cable further records Mr Grinda as having stated that he himself, "believes this thesis is accurate".

¶4.100 If Mr Litvinenko did provide the type of assistance to the Spanish authorities that was described in the evidence that I have summarised above – and in particular if it is true that he was due to give evidence about these matters in court – the question that arises for the purposes of this Inquiry is whether there could have been any connection between those matters and his death. Is it possible, for example, that Mr Litvinenko was killed in order either to punish him for assisting the Spanish authorities, or to prevent him offering any further assistance, including perhaps giving evidence in court? I shall return to this issue below.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Chapter 6: Private security work 4.101 Mr Litvinenko was not, on the evidence that I have heard, readily employable following his arrival in the UK. His English was poor and the skills that he had developed over 20 years in the FSB and before that the KGB were highly specialised. In the early years, it would appear that Mr Berezovsky funded the family more or less entirely. He provided accommodation, paid for Anatoly's school fees and made regular payments to Mr Litvinenko, for example, for his work on the two books. Mr Berezovsky was, however, keen that Mr Litvinenko should become more self sufficient. As we shall hear, he encouraged Mr Litvinenko to try to obtain other work. He also cut the level of payments that he made to the Litvinenko family.

¶4.102 I shall return to this point in due course because it relates to the question of whether there was a falling out between the two men in mid 2006, and if so whether this could be relevant in any way to Mr Litvinenko's death.

¶4.103 The important point for present purposes is that in 2005 and 2006, in part no doubt due to Mr Berezovsky's encouragement and the reducing payments, Mr Litvinenko appears to have started undertaking more work in what might loosely be described as the private security field.

¶4.104 Some of the work that Mr Litvinenko undertook in this field involved the preparation of so called 'due diligence' reports. I heard that these reports were at the time (and, no doubt, continue to be) routinely commissioned by one company or businessman seeking to find out more information about another company or businessman. Such reports were often obtained at an early stage of a proposed transaction. I heard that such reports might be sought because of a genuine wish to find out more information about the target, but might also serve a more formal compliance purpose. Either way, a negative report might lead to a proposed transaction being cancelled.

¶4.105 The evidence I heard was that in the period 2005-6, there was a strong demand in London for 'due diligence' reports to be prepared on Russian targets. As we shall see, Mr Litvinenko sought to establish himself as someone who could provide such reports, using both his own knowledge and his contacts in their preparation.

¶4.106 Could it be that Mr Litvinenko's death was connected in some way to the work that he undertook in this sphere? Is it possible that a disgruntled subject of a negative report prepared by Mr Litvinenko might have wished to punish him? Or might Mr Litvinenko's need to establish a network of sources in order to assist with this work have drawn him into the company of people who wished him ill for other reasons?

¶4.107 I heard evidence that there were three private security companies with which Mr Litvinenko became involved in this period. They were RISC Management Limited, Titon International Limited and Erinys UK Limited. I propose to review the evidence relating to each in turn.