On 11 February 2014, the Divisional Court allowed Marina Litvinenko's application for judicial review and quashed the Home Secretary's decision. Accordingly, the Home

¶Secretary was required to make a further decision on whether to establish an inquiry.

On 22 July 2014, the Home Secretary announced the government's decision to establish an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 to investigate Mr Litvinenko's death.
On 31 July 2014, the Inquiry was formally set up. On that date, I held a short hearing at which the inquest was suspended, in accordance with the provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and formally opened the Inquiry. The Terms of Reference can be found in Appendix 2.
On 5 September 2014, I published the List of Issues which the Inquiry would consider. This list can be found at Appendix 3.

¶The opening of the Inquiry and procedural hearings 54. At a short hearing on 31 July 2014, the formal setting up date of the Inquiry, I made a statement setting out the history of the events which had led up to the establishment of the Inquiry. I also set out procedural matters which would be dealt with in forthcoming directions hearings.

Open directions hearings were held on 5 September 2014,¹⁶¹⁶ INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 9) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Goldfarb 26/56-57 Mascall 8/78 INQ017728; INQ020308 Dombey 23/20-32 October 2014,¹⁴¹⁴ Berezovsky 25/6-7 Felshtinsky 23/128-131 Service 28/48 lines 3-9 Hohne 32/51 INQ015781 part 1, INQ015781 part 2; INQ015777 part 1, INQ015777 part 2; INQ015778; INQ015779; INQ015780 [videos] Dombey 23/13-39 November 2014,¹⁷¹⁷ Berezovsky 25/7 Goldfarb 26/122 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Mascall 8/75 INQ019031; INQ019054 Dombey 23/24-30; INQ020031 (page 2 paragraphs S9-S10) December 2014 and 20 January 2015.
In addition, preparation for the closed substantive hearings required a number of closed directions hearings to be held.

¶Core participants 57. On 31 July 2014, I invited applications for core participant status under rule 5 of the Inquiry Rules 2006.

On 5 September 2014, I announced that applications had been received from Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko, the MPS, the Home Secretary (on her own behalf and as a representative of the government), The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE plc) and Mr Scaramella.
Mr Scaramella's application was refused, for which reasons were given in a written ruling dated 9 October 2014.
I granted the other applications.
The solicitors for the ICRF, which had been an interested person in the inquest, wrote to me to indicate that it would be making no application for core participant status in the Inquiry.
During March 2015, after the substantive hearings had already been under way for a substantial period of time, Mr Kovtun expressed a wish to take part in the Inquiry by giving oral evidence and by becoming a core participant. I summarise these events below.

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¶Appendix 1 | The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted

¶Funding applications 63. On 31 July 2014, I also invited applications for funding under the Inquiries Act 2005. Under section 40 of the Inquiries Act 2005, such funding may be made available to allow certain persons having a connection to the Inquiry to receive legal representation at public expense.

On 5 September 2014, I announced that applications for funding had been received from Marina Litvinenko and Anatoly Litvinenko, and from Mr Scaramella.
I granted the application by Marina Litvinenko and Anatoly Litvinenko in principle, with the precise terms of the award to be finalised following further submissions.
I refused Mr Scaramella's application as it did not meet the criteria set out in section 40(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005.
Later, during the course of the substantive hearings, a further application for funding was received from Mr Scaramella, who travelled from Italy to London on two occasions to give evidence to the Inquiry. I allowed this later application.
I also received and allowed applications from a number of other witnesses for expenses and legal costs.

¶Closed evidence – restriction notices 69. On 31 July 2014, I explained that the most important feature of the Inquiry, and the reason why I asked that it be established, was that it would permit me to consider closed evidence and hold closed hearings, from which the public, most of the core participants and the press would be excluded. It would not have been possible to hold such hearings at all during an inquest. I considered the reason why it was of great importance to be able to hold at least some closed hearings was that the government held some documents that were relevant to Mr Litvinenko's death, but which were of such sensitivity that they could not be used in open court. Had the proceedings remained as an inquest, those documents would have had to be excluded from my enquiries, in accordance with my PII rulings and the decision of the Divisional Court.

Because of the sensitivity of the government evidence, it was inevitable that at least some of my final report would also have to remain secret. But I have always made it clear that I intend to make public my final conclusion on the issue of Russian State responsibility, together with as much as possible of my reasoning in that regard.
I announced that, on 7 July 2014, the Home Secretary had made a restriction notice under section 19 of the Inquiries Act 2005, the effect of which was to require that specified sensitive material was considered only in closed session, and that the Home Secretary may make further restriction notices.
A second restriction notice was made by the Home Secretary on 4 November 2014. The first and second restriction notices were amended on 21 January 2015. Further restriction notices were made by the government on 9 March 2015 and 29 June 2015.

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¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶Anonymity – restriction orders

In the course of the inquest proceedings, applications had been made for anonymity orders in respect of a number of proposed witnesses whose evidence was to be adduced although not necessarily orally.
On 29 January 2013, I gave directions about the making of any anonymity applications.
On 27 February 2013, the MPS applied for anonymity in respect of three witnesses known as D1, D2 and C1.
On 14 March 2013, I conducted a hearing at which these applications were considered. For reasons which included the need by the representatives of media organisations to receive more information before they could usefully make submissions on the applications, the applications were adjourned.
On 11 June 2013, I conducted a further hearing to consider these anonymity applications, and a further anonymity application made by AWE plc in respect of a witness known as A3.
On 11 July 2013, I granted the application in relation to A3, but refused the applications in relation to D1, D2 and C1. Because the applications were based in part on material which could not be made public, the written ruling had a closed addendum dealing with that material.
On 4 October 2013, I conducted a further hearing to consider anonymity applications in relation to witnesses known as C2, C3, D3, D6 and D7, together with a residual issue in relation to D1, D2 and C1 as to whether there should be disclosure of the contents of the closed addendum in relation to them.
On 26 November 2013, I granted the application in relation to D3. Because the witnesses C2, C3, D6 and D7 formed part of a group that also included D3, and identification of any member of that group other than D3 would be likely to lead to the identification of D3, I also granted the application in relation to them although the individual merits of the applications in relation to them would not have warranted the grant of an anonymity order.
On the same day, I also ruled that none of the contents of the closed addendum in relation to D1, D2 and C1 should be made public at that time.
On 5 September 2014, at the first directions hearing following the establishment of the Inquiry, all core participants and the media agreed that for the purposes of the Inquiry I should adopt the anonymity orders I had already made during the inquest proceedings. Accordingly, on 9 October 2014 a restriction order was made repeating the anonymity orders which had been made during the inquest.
On 14 November 2014, a further restriction order was made granting anonymity in relation to a witness known as A1.
On 27 November 2014, a further restriction order was made granting anonymity in relation to a witness known as D9.
Further applications were made in respect of these witnesses that, if they gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, they should be screened from the public and the press. In relation to all of the witnesses who were granted anonymity, I made a further order

257

¶Appendix 1 | The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted providing that if they were required to attend and give evidence at the public hearing of the Inquiry, their physical appearance would be concealed from the public, the media and core participants, but not from me, counsel to the Inquiry, counsel for the core participants or security cleared Inquiry staff. Further orders were made directing that their physical appearance need not be concealed from any other person whom I directed.

On 9 October 2015, I made a further restriction order granting anonymity in relation to a witness known as witness G. By the time of this order, I did not envisage a need to take any further oral evidence.

¶Broadcasting 87. Under existing legislation, broadcasting was not permitted by law of any of the inquest proceedings. Following the establishment of the Inquiry, broadcasting would be permitted of such parts of the Inquiry proceedings and to the extent which I considered appropriate.

On 31 July 2014, I permitted broadcast of the formal opening of the Inquiry. Arrangements were made with one broadcast company for a video feed to be made available to other broadcasters.
On 5 September 2014, I heard submissions about whether I should permit the broadcast of the Inquiry's proceedings, particularly the evidence which the Inquiry was to receive. In addition, I heard submissions about whether the Inquiry's proceedings should be streamed live over the Internet.
On 7 November 2014, I gave a written provisional ruling inviting further submissions on certain aspects of the issue of live streaming of the Inquiry's proceedings over the Internet.
On 14 November 2014, I heard further submissions on that issue. Those submissions included evidence from the MPS about the responses given by some prospective witnesses to the idea that their evidence might be broadcast, and the effect that might have on some witnesses' willingness to give evidence to the Inquiry.
On 26 November 2014, I gave a written ruling giving reasons for my decision not to permit live streaming of the proceedings of the Inquiry when it took evidence. Different considerations applied to the opening and closing statements by counsel to the Inquiry and by core participants' legal representatives, which I would permit to be broadcast.

¶Text based communications from the hearing rooms 93. On 12 September 2014, I published a protocol concerning the use of live text based communications in the hearing rooms.

This provided that, in general, any member of a legal team, or member of the press, or member of the public was free to use a mobile electronic device in the hearing rooms to send and receive text based communications whilst the Inquiry was sitting, provided that the device in question was used in silent mode and there was no disruption to

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¶The Litvinenko Inquiry proceedings. This was in practice superseded by the arrangements set out in the protocol described in paragraph 98 below.

I made clear that mobile devices were not to be used in the hearing rooms at any time to make or receive telephone calls, to take photographs or to undertake audio or video recording.

¶Public access to hearings 96. For the substantive hearings, the Inquiry used Court 73 in the Royal Courts of Justice as the main hearing room, together with Court 66 as an additional media annex/ overflow room. Proceedings in Court 73 were relayed to Court 66 by a closed circuit videolink, and screens in Court 66 reproduced documents and the live transcript shown on the display screens in Court 73.

Normally, members of the media and the public were freely admitted to both hearing rooms. However, because there was a risk that some of the sensitive information protected by restriction notices or restriction orders might be disclosed, inadvertently or otherwise, during the course of the open hearings, all open hearings were conducted under one of the sets of measures set out in a protocol issued on 9 December 2014.
Under the default measures:

¶a. The public and press would be afforded unrestricted access to the main hearing room, subject to physical capacity constraints b. Proceedings in the main hearing room would be relayed to the media annex by means of a video feed that was delayed by 5 minutes c. The use of mobile electronic devices in the main hearing room would be prohibited to all persons other than me, legal representatives and security cleared Inquiry staff d. The use of such devices would be permitted (on the terms set out in the protocol on the use of live text based communications in the hearing rooms) in the media annex e. A transcript of proceedings would be posted on the Inquiry website at the end of each day

Under enhanced measures:

¶a. The public and press would be excluded from the main hearing room, although access would still be permitted for both the public and the press to the media annex b. Proceedings in the main hearing room would be relayed to the media annex by means of a video feed that was delayed by 5 minutes c. The use of mobile electronic devices in the Inquiry room would be prohibited to all persons other than me, legal representatives and security cleared Inquiry staff

259

¶Appendix 1 | The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted d. The use of such devices would be permitted (on the terms set out in the protocol on the use of live text-based communications in the hearing rooms) in the media annex e. A transcript of proceedings would be posted on the Inquiry website at the end of each day

The hearing was conducted under enhanced measures when evidence was taken from a small number of witnesses; Alex Goldfarb, Dean Attew and Akhmed Zakayev. Otherwise, the evidence was taken under default measures.
In addition, the enhanced measures were adopted in modified form in relation to each witness giving oral evidence who had the benefit of an anonymity order (this applied to A1, C2 and D6). Those who were not permitted to see the witness' physical appearance were excluded from the main hearing room, and the relay of the proceedings from the main hearing room to the media annex was limited to audio only.

¶Special advocate 102. On 27 February 2013, in the course of the PII application in the inquest proceedings, I had ruled that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to appoint special counsel or PII advocates to represent the interests of interested persons in the disclosure proceedings.

On 5 September 2014, an application was made on behalf of Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko for the appointment of a special advocate.
On 9 October 2014, I refused the application for reasons given in a written ruling on that date.

¶Warning letters 105. Rule 13 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 provides:

¶"(1) The chairman may send a warning letter to any person – a. he considers may be, or who has been, subject to criticism in the inquiry proceedings; or b. about whom criticism may be inferred from evidence that has been given during the inquiry proceedings; or c. who may be subject to criticism in the report, or any interim report.

¶(2) The recipient of a warning letter may disclose it to his recognised legal representative.

¶(3) The inquiry panel must not include any explicit or significant criticism of a person in the report, or in any interim report, unless –

¶(a) the chairman has sent that person a warning letter; and

¶(b) the person has been given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the warning letter."

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¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

By rule 14, the contents of a warning letter are to be treated as subject to the obligations of confidence set out in rule 14(1). The inquiry Chairman's obligation of confidence under this rule ends when the inquiry report is signed, and all other obligations of confidence under this rule end when the inquiry report is published.
The fact that a possible criticism has been included in a warning letter, whether written under rule 13(1) or 13(3), does not necessarily mean that the criticism will be adopted in the inquiry proceedings or in any report. The procedural provision is intended to afford the individual a fair opportunity to prepare for giving evidence or to draw attention to reasons why the criticism should not be made. Accordingly, I do not propose to publish the content of warning letters. 108. However, in accordance with rule 13, warning letters were sent as appropriate to people who were covered by the provisions of rule 13.

¶The substantive hearings 109. On 27 January 2015, the Inquiry's substantive hearings commenced. Opening statements were made by counsel to the Inquiry, counsel for Marina and Anatoly Litvinenko, counsel for the Home Secretary and counsel for AWE plc. 110. The Inquiry hearing lasted for a total of 34 days. Evidence was taken on 30 of those days. A total of 62 witnesses gave oral evidence. A number of witnesses giving oral evidence attended the Inquiry on more than one occasion to do so. Five of the witnesses gave evidence from overseas by videolink. In addition, witness statements of a further 20 witnesses were read, together with a further witness statement from a witness who had already given oral evidence (Marina Litvinenko). 111. In addition, a large quantity of documents was adduced in evidence. Some of these documents were referred to and discussed by witnesses, but I simply put other documents into evidence because it was not necessary for them to be discussed with a witness. 112. It was originally envisaged that the Inquiry's open hearings would conclude before Easter. However, the overall length of the Inquiry hearings was prolonged by the actions of Mr Kovtun, who is the subject of one of the two arrest warrants issued in respect of Mr Litvinenko's death. 113. During the course of March 2015, the solicitor to the Inquiry received a number of communications from a man who said he was Mr Kovtun. He said that he was willing to take part in the Inquiry and in particular to give evidence by videolink. He also indicated that he wished to apply for core participant status. These developments were notified to core participants, the public and the press at the substantive hearing on 19 March 2015. 114. On 30 March 2015, I indicated that I was minded to grant Mr Kovtun core participant status, subject to his fulfilling a number of conditions. Mr Kovtun had to give a confidentiality undertaking in the same manner as all other core participants. He had to provide a detailed witness statement, including a response to nine questions put to him in Russia by Major General of Justice Krasnov, and a tenth question which was added in a letter dated 5 March 2015 from the Inquiry secretariat to Mr Kovtun. Further, he had to disclose any documents and other written material which he had said in media interviews was relevant to the issues being considered by the Inquiry. I

261

¶Appendix 1 | The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted fixed the date on which Mr Kovtun's evidence would be taken, namely 27 July 2015; Mr Kovtun would have to make himself available for two or three days. 115. In the days leading up to 27 July 2015, Mr Kovtun and the Russian authorities began to raise a number of legal issues about whether Mr Kovtun could, under Russian and international law, lawfully give evidence to the Inquiry. On that date, Mr Kovtun did not make himself available to give evidence. I considered the matters which had been said by Mr Kovtun and by the Russian authorities, and decided to give Mr Kovtun a final opportunity to live up to his assertion that he wanted to assist me in the Inquiry by adjourning the hearing until 28 July 2015. 116. On 28 July 2015, the Inquiry's agent in Moscow reported that he had spoken to Mr Kovtun that morning, and that Mr Kovtun had said that he would not be attending to give evidence by videolink. Accordingly, the final items of witness evidence were taken that day.

On 30 and 31 July 2015, closing submissions were made by counsel for the MPS and counsel for Marina Litvinenko and Anatoly Litvinenko. Closing statements were made by counsel to the Inquiry and by me, bringing the Inquiry's substantive hearings to an end.

¶Closed hearings 118. On 27 January 2015, when the substantive hearings commenced, it was envisaged that they would be completed by Easter. On that date, I indicated that at some point in the future, there would be closed hearings at which I would consider the material subject to the restriction notices. Counsel to the Inquiry indicated in their opening statement that these would take place after the open hearings had concluded.

On 31 July 2015, in their closing statement counsel to the Inquiry announced that the closed hearings had taken place. The conclusion of the open hearings that day accordingly completed all of the Inquiry's hearings.

¶Miscellaneous procedural matters 120. On 30 March 2015, I heard submissions on a number of legal matters which were relevant to the approach which I should take in reaching my conclusions.

I considered the question of whether and what standard of proof I should apply. There was a consensus that I should adopt the approach taken by Sir William Gage in the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, which had been set out in a ruling of 7 May 2010. That had itself adopted; "the flexible and variable standard of proof as applied [by Dame Janet Smith] in the Shipman Inquiry". At paragraph 28 of his ruling, Sir William concluded:

¶"For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain I have concluded that it is right for me to approach my task by initially adopting the civil standard of proof in relation to findings of facts, but indicating where appropriate where I am sure of a finding. As I have said, I shall record the level of satisfaction which I find established in relation to any finding of fact. Thus, I shall state where necessary that I find a fact proved on the balance of probabilities or to a higher standard where appropriate. I do not think it will be necessary expressly to refer to expressions such as 'inherent improbabilities' or the 'bare' balance of probabilities."

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I agreed and adopted that approach.
On the same date, I also heard submissions on the question of whether I should or should not draw adverse inferences from the silence of any individual concerned in the events which the Inquiry was investigating, or their refusal to participate, and in particular the silence or refusal of Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun or authorities of the Russian State. There was a consensus that there was no need or basis for adopting the approach taken in the criminal courts to such silence. I took the view that a failure to participate or to give evidence has the obvious consequence that I would make findings of fact without the benefit or otherwise of such a contribution.
Further, counsel to the Inquiry made submissions to me about the approach that should be taken to credibility generally if, on analysis of the evidence (including any relevant closed evidence), it were to become apparent that some witnesses had not given an accurate account of events in oral evidence. Counsel to the Inquiry submitted that I should be guided by the principles which underlie the direction commonly given to juries in criminal cases who have to consider what they make of the evidence given by a witness whom they consider has lied. Such a direction is commonly known as a Lucas direction, after R v Lucas [1981] QB 720. I did not consider it necessary to rule on that submission.
On the same date I also considered the interplay between sections 2(1) and (2) of the Inquiries Act 2005. These provide that an inquiry panel is not to rule on and has no power to determine any person's civil or criminal liability; but an inquiry panel is not to be inhibited in the discharge of its functions by any likelihood of liability being inferred from facts that it determines or recommendations that it makes. I considered that it was difficult to deal in the abstract with the interplay between those two sections and made no formal ruling on the issue.
Finally, I clarified the approach I would take to the interface between the open and closed evidence and findings. I said that I would perform a global analysis of the evidence adduced both in the open and the closed hearings. It followed that any facts as found and recorded in the open section of the report will have been informed both by the evidence that I heard in the open hearings and by the relevant closed hearings. I stated that I would provide a single report to the Home Secretary, but the consequence of the restriction notices and orders that had been made meant that parts would not be published if to do so would be to damage national security or international relations.
On 24 July 2015, I considered submissions on an issue which had arisen under the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003. Evidence had been obtained from Russia pursuant to a request made under that Act for the purposes of the criminal investigation and any criminal proceedings. This evidence included the records of the interviews conducted in Russia with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
In addition, the Russian authorities had given permission for that evidence to be used in the inquest proceedings. After the ICRF was granted interested person status in the inquest, it was formally represented at hearings in the inquest proceedings; at open Inquiry hearings, its English solicitors were routinely present. The Russian authorities were aware of the fact that the Inquiry was established to take over from the inquest in the investigation of Mr Litvinenko's death, and of the inclusion in the Inquiry's Terms of Reference that it should take into account the investigations that had already taken place within the inquest proceedings. In addition, in September 2014 I had directed

263

¶Appendix 1 | The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted that the inquest evidence would be adduced in the Inquiry in accordance with the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

Notwithstanding their awareness of the status of the inquest and Inquiry proceedings, the Russian authorities did not expressly extend permission for that evidence to be used in the Inquiry. The part of the Home Office that deals with matters under this Act wrote to its Russian counterparts both before and after the commencement of the Inquiry's substantive hearings, but no response was forthcoming then, or at any time before the originally scheduled end of the Inquiry's substantive open hearings.
On 17 July 2015, the Inquiry was notified by the Home Office of a response which it had received on 15 July 2015 from the Russian authorities, declining permission for the evidence to be used in the Inquiry proceedings.
On 24 July 2015, I heard submissions on the consequences of this response. I concluded that section 9 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 precluded the use of such material for any other purpose than that specified in the request, namely the original criminal investigation and any subsequent prosecution, without the consent of the Russian authorities. Accordingly, those records of interview could not be used by the Inquiry.
I invited further submissions on whether, on the proper construction of the relevant statutory provisions, I could admit evidence as to the content of the interviews from the MPS officers who were present at the interviews, other evidence obtained by the MPS during their trip to Moscow, evidence as to the level of cooperation of the Russian authorities in arranging the interviews, and evidence as to attempts made by a Russian official to pressure an interpreter to give an inaccurate translation of what was said in the course of the interviews.
On 25 September 2015, following consideration of further submissions, I gave a written ruling further concluding that it would not be permissible for me either to admit in evidence notes about the content of the interviews, or to hear evidence from the officers as to their content. But the statutory provisions did not preclude the admission of evidence as to the circumstances in which the interviews were carried out, provided that such evidence did not reveal the content of the interviews, either directly or by implication; nor did they preclude evidence as to the level of cooperation of the Russian authorities and as to their attempts to produce transcripts that did not reflect the true content of the interviews, or any notes made by the MPS officers as to such matters.

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265

¶Appendix 2: Terms of Reference 1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3 below, the Chairman is to conduct an investigation into the death of Alexander Litvinenko in order to:

¶(i) ascertain, in accordance with section 5 (1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, who the deceased was; how, when and where he came by his death; and the particulars (if any) required by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 to be registered concerning the death;

¶(ii) identify, so far as is consistent with section 2 of the Inquiries Act 2005, where responsibility for the death lies; and

¶(iii) make such recommendations as may seem appropriate.

That investigation is to take into account the investigations which have already been conducted by the Assistant Coroner for the Inner North London [Sir Robert Owen].
In the light of the Assistant Coroner's views, expressed in his ruling of 17 May 2013, (see paragraph 13 of the Judicial Review judgment dated 11 February 2014) that there is no material within the relevant documents to suggest that, at any material time, Alexander Litvinenko was or ought to have been assessed as being at a real and immediate threat to his life, the inquiry will not address the question of whether the UK authorities could or should have taken steps which would have prevented the death.

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¶Appendix 3: List of Issues A. Background

Alexander Litvinenko's life in Russia

¶a. Personal life b. Career in KGB/FSK/FSB c. Relationship with Boris Berezovsky d. Circumstances of departure from Russia and travel to UK, September –

¶November 2000 2. Alexander Litvinenko's personal life in UK

Alexander Litvinenko's work from November

¶a. Work for Boris Berezovsky b. Publications c. Work with/for Mitrokhin Commission in Italy d. Work for UK security firms e. Alleged work for UK/Spanish intelligence agencies f. Any other UK/overseas work 4. Alexander Litvinenko's involvement in political campaigning, media appearances, relationship with dissident/émigré community, 2000 – 2006 5. Actual/threatened/perceived threats to and attacks against Alexander Litvinenko/ Boris Berezovsky/Akhmed Zakayev, 2000 – 2007

Circumstances of Alexander Litvinenko's death

Narrative of Alexander Litvinenko's life/lifestyle during October 2006 7. Alexander Litvinenko's movements/meetings on 1 November and subsequent deteriorating health 8. Medical treatment/hospitalisation/attempts to diagnose 9. Police interviews 10. Immediate circumstances of death C. Post mortem/toxicology evidence 11. Evidence from pathologists/toxicologists

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¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶D. Responsibility for death 12. Source of the Po-210 apparently ingested by Alexander Litvinenko a. Properties/uses of Po-210 b. Scientific analysis of Po-210 samples c. Legitimate trade in/international carriage of Po-210 d. Apparent documentary evidence of consignment of Po-210 at Yaroslavl,

¶August 2006