Part 2: Introduction

¶2.1 In August 2012, over three years ago, I was appointed to conduct what were then the inquest proceedings concerning the death of Alexander Litvinenko.

¶2.2 I have described the procedural history of both the inquest and this Inquiry in some

detail at Appendix 1, but I propose shortly to summarise the position by way of introduction.

¶2.3 The inquest proceedings into Mr Litvinenko's death had been resumed by Dr Andrew

Reid, the then Coroner for Inner North London, in late 2011. A considerable amount of work was undertaken in preparation for the inquest, both prior to and following my appointment. However, the inquest proceedings ran into difficulties. In the end, and at my request, the inquest was replaced by the Public Inquiry that I have now conducted. The preparatory work was not wasted – almost all of it was simply carried over to the Inquiry.

¶2.4 The difficulties with the inquest centred on the existence of sensitive government

documents that were relevant to the investigation that I was conducting. More particularly, the documents raised an arguable case that the Russian State bore responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.

¶2.5 The law does not allow evidence to be taken in what are known as 'secret' or 'closed'

sessions at an inquest. But the government material was so sensitive that it could not be adduced in any form of public or 'open' session. The material was therefore excluded from the inquest proceedings under the legal principle known as public interest immunity.

¶2.6 It has always been my view that the question of possible Russian State responsibility

for Mr Litvinenko's death is one of the most important issues arising from his death. It was an issue that I had intended to investigate at the inquest, but it did not seem right to me to investigate this issue in the knowledge that government material that was of great relevance had been excluded – albeit that it had been excluded for a good reason.

¶2.7 I therefore asked the Home Secretary to establish a Public Inquiry to replace the

inquest. The advantage of a Public Inquiry over the inquest was that the rules governing an inquiry allow for sensitive evidence to be heard in closed session.

¶2.8 The Home Secretary initially refused to establish a Public Inquiry. She subsequently

agreed to do so after her refusal had been successfully challenged in the High Court by Mr Litvinenko's widow, Marina Litvinenko. I agreed to serve as the Chairman of the Inquiry.

¶2.9 The Inquiry was formally set up on 31 July 2014. I was at that time a serving High

¶Court Judge; I retired from that post in September 2014.

¶2.10 The Inquiry's Terms of Reference are to be found at Appendix 2 to this Report. In

broad terms, the issues that have been investigated by the Inquiry pursuant to the Terms of Reference replicate the matters that I would have investigated at the inquest. The issue of Russian State responsibility, in particular, has been fully examined. The sensitive government material that was excluded from the inquest on the ground of public interest immunity has been considered.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry

¶2.11 The Inquiry sat to conduct open hearings at the Royal Courts of Justice on 34 days in

¶January, February, March and July 2015.

¶2.12 Closed hearings were also conducted.

¶2.13 As I trust the detail of this Report will demonstrate, I took evidence from a very wide

range of sources. The witnesses who gave evidence to the Inquiry included not only Mr Litvinenko's family, friends and business associates, but also medical professionals, nuclear scientists, police officers and experts in fields as diverse as Russian history and polygraphy.

¶2.14 Transcripts of the open hearings, together with the very considerable volume of documentary evidence that I adduced, are available on the Inquiry website.

¶2.15 There were, however, several important witnesses from whom I did not hear.

¶2.16 Boris Berezovsky, who was a close friend of Mr Litvinenko and whom some have

blamed for his death, died himself in 2013. I did, however, have access to a large quantity of documentary material – principally police witness statements and interview transcripts which contain detailed accounts given by Mr Berezovsky regarding the matters under investigation. I adduced all this material into evidence.

¶2.17 Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun, both of whom are wanted by the British authorities

for the murder of Mr Litvinenko, declined my invitation to give evidence to the Inquiry. That is a matter of regret to me. Both men took some part in these proceedings. Mr Lugovoy was represented for a time during the preparations for the inquest, but declined to take any further part when the inquest was converted into an Inquiry. Mr Kovtun made contact with the Inquiry towards the end of the scheduled hearings and indicated that he wished to give evidence. He provided a witness statement and arrangements were made for him to give oral evidence by videolink from Moscow. In the end, however, he decided not to do so.

¶2.18 The decision was, of course, a matter for them. Since both men were out of the

jurisdiction I could not compel them to attend the Inquiry and give evidence. Their decision not to give oral evidence means that I do not have the answers to the questions that they would have been asked, and I have noted in the course of the Report several points in the evidence that demand an explanation from them.

¶2.19 Finally on this point, I should emphasise that, in the end, the fact that Mr Lugovoy

and Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence does not undermine the findings that I have made about their involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death. The findings are clear. I am entirely confident in making them.

¶2.20 As I have explained at paragraphs 122-123 of Appendix 1, in making findings of fact

I have adopted the 'flexible and variable' approach to the standard of proof that was formulated by Sir William Gage in the Baha Mousa Inquiry. I add that where in this Report I state that 'I am sure' I will have found a fact to the criminal standard. When I use such expressions as 'I find' or 'I am satisfied' the standard of proof will have been the ordinary civil standard of proof, namely the balance of probabilities. Where it is obvious that I have found a fact but I have not used one of these terms, the standard will have been the civil standard. All other expressions, such as a reference to a state of affairs being 'possible' will not be a finding of fact, but will indicate my state of mind in respect of the issue being considered.

¶Part 2 | Introduction

¶2.21 References in the footnotes such as 'INQ123456' or 'HMG345678' are to documents

that I have adduced in evidence and that can be found on the Inquiry website. A reference such as 'Mascall 30/83-92' is to the hearing transcript, which is also available on the website; that particular reference is to the evidence of Detective Inspector Mascall on Day 30 of the hearings, at pages 83 to 92 of that day's transcript.

¶2.22 The structure of this Report reflects the fact that I have received both open and closed evidence relating to the issues that I must determine.

¶2.23 Part 3, Part 4, Part 5 and Part 6 contain an analysis of the open evidence that I have

heard regarding Mr Litvinenko's life in the United Kingdom and Russia; theories and evidence as to who may have had a motive to kill him; the events of the final weeks of his life, including the so called 'polonium trail'; and the circumstances of his illness and death.

¶2.24 Part 7 concerns the closed evidence that I have received. Because of the sensitivity

of this evidence, I do not anticipate that any of this Part (other than the introductory section) will be published. This Part also contains the single recommendation that I have made. Because the recommendation relates to the closed material, I do not expect it to be published.

¶2.25 Part 8 and Part 9 contain my findings on the two linked questions of who killed

Mr Litvinenko and who directed his killing. Part 10 contains my final conclusions. The analysis and conclusions in these Parts are founded on the totality of the evidence that I have heard – that is, both the 'open' and the 'closed' evidence.

¶2.26 I have had the provisions of section 2 of the Inquiries Act 2005 very much in mind

in formulating my conclusions in this matter. The core factual findings that I have made, which are summarised in Part 10, are those which I consider it necessary to make in order to discharge my responsibility under paragraph 1(ii) of the Terms of Reference to identify where responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death lies. I have no power to determine any person's civil or criminal liability and I have not done so.

¶The Litvinenko Inquiry