A POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR

¶752. By March 2006, senior members of the UK military were considering the possibility of civil war in Iraq, prompted by rising levels of sectarian violence and concerns that the Iraqi Government was "not ... perceived as even‑handed in security issues".263 The risk of civil war had been acknowledged by Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari in the wake of the bombing of the al‑Askari mosque in February. Although there was general agreement that the situation in Iraq did not constitute civil war, the risk that one might develop was considered to be real.

¶753. At this time, the presence in Iraq of the MNF was authorised by resolution 1637 (2005). The exchange of letters between Prime Minister Ja'afari and the President of the Security Council which accompanied the resolution clearly identified providing security for the Iraqi people as the reason why a continued MNF presence was necessary.

¶754. In late April, FCO officials were concerned that security in Basra was declining and that a determined and sustained effort, including a more assertive military posture, would be required to deliver the UK's objective of transferring Basra to Iraqi control by late 2006 or early 2007.

¶755. Accounts from mid‑2006 suggested that security in MND(SE) was a significant concern, characterised by "steady, if generally unspectacular, decline"264 and increased militia activity. The UK military's approach had generated US concern and the security situation was limiting UK civilian activity.

¶756. Gen Jackson's assessment in May of the short‑term security prospects in Iraq was bleak. He judged that "what we will leave behind will not look much like strategic success. Ten years hence our strategy may fully bear fruit."265

¶757. After visiting Iraq in early May, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff, advised Dr Reid that there should be no change to the operational approach and that there were "compelling reasons" why the UK should "press on" with handing over security to Iraq, including to permit the UK's continuing build‑up in Afghanistan.266 ACM Stirrup identified the risk that UK withdrawal from Basra would be seen as a "strategic failure" and suggested that "astute conditioning of the UK public may be necessary" to avoid that.

¶758. ACM Stirrup's view that the UK should press ahead with drawdown despite the security challenges in Basra was not consistent with Government policy that withdrawal should be conditions‑based.

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¶759. ACM Stirrup's acceptance that the "law of diminishing returns" was "now firmly in play" and that there was "an increasing risk" that UK forces would "become part of the problem, rather than the solution" had some validity: it was clear from accounts of the situation in Basra that UK forces were not preventing a steady decline in security. ACM Stirrup was also right to advise Dr Reid that the MNF in Iraq faced a "multifaceted", sophisticated and dangerous enemy; that serious issues remained in Basra (militia activity, poor governance, insecurity); and that it was possible the UK would be accused of strategic failure.

¶760. The established policy was that UK forces would withdraw as the capabilities of the ISF increased until responsibility could be handed over to the Iraqi Government. ACM Stirrup's proposed remedy of continued drawdown and managing public opinion did not mitigate the risk of strategic failure he described.

¶761. In the summer of 2006, in recognition of the need to stabilise Basra and prepare it for transition to Iraqi control, the UK developed the Basra Security Plan, "a plan to improve Basra through operations, high impact reconstruction and SSR [Security Sector Reform] ... lasting for up to six months".267 The military element of the plan became known as Operation SALAMANCA and included operations against militia groups.

¶762. In August 2006, ACM Stirrup was asked to give direction on both seeking US help for Op SALAMANCA and the possibility of deploying UK forces to support US operations outside MND(SE).

¶763. While ACM Stirrup stressed the importance of senior Iraqi political support if Op SALAMANCA was to be a success, Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton, the Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, indicated a concern that even with US support the capabilities available in MND(SE) might not be sufficient successfully to deliver Op SALAMANCA.

¶764. ACM Stirrup directed that it was acceptable for the UK to make use of US enablers, such as aviation, in MND(SE), but that, in general, commitments in MND(SE) were to be met by existing MND(SE) personnel (including contractors) and any shortfalls were to be identified and considered appropriately.

¶765. ACM Stirrup also directed that the deployment of UK troops to Multi‑National Division (Centre South):

"... crossed a clear policy 'red line' and seemed counter‑intuitive, given that consideration was also being given to obtaining US forces for MND(SE). The UK needed to draw down its force levels as soon as practicable, both in MND(SE) and elsewhere."268

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¶766. The decision not to allow the use of US support in Basra was an important one. The Inquiry considers that the question of what was needed to make Op SALAMANCA a success should have been addressed directly by ACM Stirrup, whose response instead precluded proper consideration of whether additional UK resources would be required.

¶767. There was continuing resistance to any suggestion that UK forces should operate outside MND(SE) and there may have been concern that US participation in Op SALAMANCA would have led to an obligation on the UK to engage more outside MND(SE). This might not, as ACM Stirrup observed, be consistent with a commitment to drawdown, but might have reduced the risk of strategic failure.

¶768. The nature of Op SALAMANCA was constrained by the Iraqi Government in September 2006, so that the eventual operation (renamed Operation SINBAD) left "Basra in the hands of the militant militia and death squads, with the ISF unable to impose, let alone maintain, the rule of law".269 This contributed to the conditions which led the UK into negotiations with JAM in early 2007.

¶769. Attempts were subsequently made to present Op SINBAD as equivalent to the 2007 US surge. Although there was some resemblance between the "Clear, Hold, Build" tactics to be used by US surge forces and the UK's tactics for Op SINBAD, the UK operation did not deploy sufficient additional resources to conduct "Hold" and "Build" phases with anything like the same strategic effect. The additional 360 troops deployed by the UK could not have had the same effect as the more than 20,000 troops surged into Baghdad and its environs by the US.

¶770. At the end of 2006, tensions between the military and civilian teams in MND(SE) became explicit. In a report to Mr Blair, Major General Richard Shirreff, General Officer Commanding MND(SE), diagnosed that the existing arrangement, in which the Provincial Reconstruction Team was located in Kuwait, "lacks unity of command and unity of purpose"270 and proposed the establishment of a "Joint Inter‑Agency Task Force" in Basra led by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE).

¶771. ACM Stirrup's advice to Mr Blair was that it was "too late" to implement Maj Gen Shirreff's proposal. That may have been the right conclusion, but the effect was to deter consideration of a real problem and of ways in which military and civilian operations in MND(SE) could be better aligned.

¶772. The adequacy of UK force levels in Iraq and the effectiveness of the UK's efforts in MND(SE) were explicitly questioned in Maj Gen Shirreff's end of tour report.

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