Decision to take the UN route

¶100. Sir David Manning, Mr Blair's Foreign Policy Adviser, told President Bush that it would be impossible for the UK to take part in any action against Iraq unless it went through the UN.

¶101. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 31 July the "central issue of a casus belli" and the need for further work on the optimal route to achieve that was discussed.³²³² Rycroft to McDonald, 31 July 2002, 'Iraq: Prime Minister's Phone Call with President Bush, 31 July'. Mr Blair said that he wanted to explore whether the UN was the right route to set an ultimatum or whether it would be an obstacle.

¶102. In late August, the FCO proposed a strategy of coercion, using a UN resolution to issue an ultimatum to Iraq to admit the weapons inspectors and disarm. The UK was seeking a commitment from the Security Council to take action in the event that Saddam Hussein refused or subsequently obstructed the inspectors.

¶103. Reflecting the level of public debate and concern, Mr Blair decided in early September that an explanation of why action was needed to deal with Iraq should be published.

¶104. In his press conference at Sedgefield on 3 September, Mr Blair indicated that time and patience were running out and that there were difficulties with the existing policy of containment.³³³³ The National Archives, 3 September 2002, PM press conference [at Sedgefield]. He also announced the publication of the Iraq dossier, stating that:

"... people will see that there is no doubt at all the United Nations resolutions that Saddam is in breach of are there for a purpose. He [Saddam Hussein] is without any question, still trying to develop that chemical, biological, potentially nuclear capability and to allow him to do so without any let or hindrance, just to say, we [sic] can carry on and do it, I think would be irresponsible."

¶105. President Bush decided in the meeting of the National Security Council on 7 September to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN.

¶106. The UK was a key ally whose support was highly desirable for the US. The US Administration had been left in no doubt that the UK Government needed the issue of Iraq to be taken back to the Security Council before it would be able to participate in military action in Iraq.

¶107. The objective of the subsequent discussions between President Bush and Mr Blair at Camp David was, as Mr Blair stated in the press conference before the discussions, to work out the strategy.³⁴³⁴ The White House, 7 September 2002, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the Peace.

¶108. Mr Blair told President Bush that he was in no doubt about the need to deal with Saddam Hussein.³⁵³⁵ Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, 'Your Visit to Camp David on 7 September: Conversation with President Bush'.

¶109. Although at that stage no decision had been taken on which military package might be offered to the US for planning purposes, Mr Blair also told President Bush that, if it came to war, the UK would take a significant military role.

¶110. In his speech to the General Assembly on 12 September, President Bush set out his view of the "grave and gathering danger" posed by Saddam Hussein and challenged the UN to act to address Iraq's failure to meet the obligations imposed by the Security Council since 1990.³⁶³⁶ The White House, 12 September 2002, President's Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly. He made clear that, if Iraq defied the UN, the world must hold Iraq to account and the US would "work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions". But the US would not stand by and do nothing in the face of the threat.

¶111. Statements made by China, France and Russia in the General Assembly debate after President Bush's speech highlighted the different positions of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, in particular about the role of the Council in deciding whether military action was justified.

¶112. The Government dossier on Iraq was published on 24 September.³⁷³⁷ Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002. It was designed to "make the case" and secure Parliamentary (and public) support for the Government's policy that action was urgently required to secure Iraq's disarmament.

¶113. In his statement to Parliament on 24 September and in his answers to subsequent questions, Mr Blair presented Iraq's past, current and potential future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. He said that at some point in the future that threat would become a reality.³⁸³⁸ House of Commons, Official Report, 24 September 2002, columns 1‑23.

¶114. Mr Blair wrote his statement to the House of Commons himself and chose the arguments to make clear his perception of the threat and why he believed that there was an "overwhelming" case for action to disarm Iraq.

¶115. Addressing the question of why Saddam Hussein had decided in mid‑September, but not before, to admit the weapons inspectors, Mr Blair stated that the answer was in the dossier, and it was because:

"... his chemical, biological and nuclear programme is not an historic left‑over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now."

¶116. Mr Blair posed, and addressed, three questions: "Why Saddam?"; "Why now?"; and "Why should Britain care?"

¶117. On the question "Why Saddam?", Mr Blair said that two things about Saddam Hussein stood out: "He had used these weapons in Iraq" and thousands had died, and he had used them during the war with Iran "in which one million people died"; and the regime had "no moderate elements to appeal to".

¶118. On the question "Why now?", Mr Blair stated:

"I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will always draw: that the international community will talk but not act, will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will."