Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

¶811. The following key findings are from Section 6.1:

The size and composition of a UK military contribution to the US‑led invasion of Iraq was largely discretionary. The US wanted some UK capabilities (including Special Forces), to use UK bases, and the involvement of the UK military to avoid the perception of unilateral US military action. The primary impetus to maximise the size of the UK contribution and the recommendations on its composition came from the Armed Forces, with the agreement of Mr Hoon.

From late February 2002, the UK judged that Saddam Hussein's regime could only be removed by a US‑led invasion.

In April 2002, the MOD advised that, if the US mounted a major military operation, the UK should contribute a division comprising three brigades. That was perceived to be commensurate with the UK's capabilities and the demands of the campaign. Anything smaller risked being compared adversely to the UK's contribution to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

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The MOD saw a significant military contribution as a means of influencing US decisions.

Mr Blair and Mr Hoon wanted to keep open the option of contributing significant forces for ground operations as long as possible, but between May and mid‑October consistently pushed back against US assumptions that the UK would provide a division.

Air and maritime forces were offered to the US for planning purposes in September.

The MOD advised in October that the UK was at risk of being excluded from US plans unless it offered ground forces, "Package 3", on the same basis as air and maritime forces. That could also significantly reduce the UK's vulnerability to US requests to provide a substantial and costly contribution to post‑conflict operations.

From August until December 2002, other commitments meant that UK planning for Package 3 was based on providing a divisional headquarters and an armoured brigade for operations in northern Iraq. That was seen as the maximum practicable contribution the UK could generate within the predicted timescales for US action.

The deployment was dependent on Turkey's agreement to the transit of UK forces.

Mr Blair agreed to offer Package 3 on 31 October 2002.

That decision and its potential consequences were not formally considered by a Cabinet Committee or reported to Cabinet.

In December 2002, the deployment of 3 Commando Brigade was identified as a way for the UK to make a valuable contribution in the initial stages of a land campaign if transit through Turkey was refused. The operational risks were not explicitly addressed.

Following a visit to Turkey on 7 to 8 January 2003, Mr Hoon concluded that there would be no agreement to the deployment of UK ground forces through Turkey.

By that time, in any case, the US had asked the UK to deploy for operations in southern Iraq.

Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

¶812. The following key findings are from Section 6.2:

The decisions taken between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January 2003 to increase the combat force deployed to three brigades and bring forward the date on which UK forces might participate in combat operations compressed the timescales available for preparation.

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The decision to deploy a large scale force for potential combat operations was taken without collective Ministerial consideration of the decision and its implications.

The large scale force deployed was a one‑shot capability. It would have been difficult to sustain the force if combat operations had been delayed until autumn 2003 or longer, and it constrained the capabilities which were available for a UK military contribution to post‑conflict operations.

Military equipment (pre‑conflict)

¶813. The following key findings are from Section 6.3:

The decisions taken between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January 2003 to increase combat forces and bring forward the date on which UK forces might participate in combat operations compressed the timescales available for preparation.

The achievements made in preparing the forces in the time available were very considerable, but the deployment of forces more quickly than anticipated in the Defence Planning Assumptions meant that there were some serious equipment shortfalls when conflict began.

Those shortfalls were exacerbated by the lack of an effective asset tracking system, a lesson from previous operations and exercises that the MOD had identified but not adequately addressed.

Ministers were not fully aware of the risks inherent in the decisions and the MOD and PJHQ were not fully aware of the situation on the ground during the conflict.

Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq

¶814. The following key findings are from Section 6.4, and relate to evidence in Sections 6.4 and 6.5:

Before the invasion of Iraq, Ministers, senior officials and the UK military recognised that post‑conflict civilian and military operations were likely to be the strategically decisive phase of the Coalition's engagement in Iraq.

UK planning and preparation for the post‑conflict phase of operations, which rested on the assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military presence in Iraq and deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly inadequate.

The information available to the Government before the invasion provided a clear indication of the potential scale of the post‑conflict task and the significant risks associated with the UK's proposed approach.

Foreseeable risks included post‑conflict political disintegration and extremist violence in Iraq, the inadequacy of US plans, the UK's inability to exert significant influence on US planning and, in the absence of UN authorisation

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for the administration and reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq, the reluctance of potential international partners to contribute to the post‑conflict effort. • The Government, which lacked both clear Ministerial oversight of post‑conflict strategy, planning and preparation, and effective co‑ordination between government departments, failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately. • Mr Blair, who recognised the significance of the post‑conflict phase, did not press President Bush for definite assurances about US plans, did not consider or seek advice on whether the absence of a satisfactory plan called for reassessment of the terms of the UK's engagement and did not make agreement on such a plan a condition of UK participation in military action.

The invasion

¶815. The following key findings are from Section 8:

It took less than a month to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad.

The decision to advance into Basra was made by military commanders on the ground.

The UK was unprepared for the media response to the initial difficulties. It had also underestimated the need for sustained communication of key strategic messages to inform public opinion about the objectives and progress of the military campaign, including in Iraq.

For any future military operations, arrangements to agree and disseminate key strategic messages need to be put in place, in both London and on the ground, before operations begin.

The UK acceded to the post‑invasion US request that it assume leadership of a military Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, a position it then held for six years, without a formal Ministerial decision and without carrying out a robust analysis of the strategic implications for the UK or the military's capacity to support the UK's potential obligations in the region.

The post‑conflict period

¶816. The following key findings are from Section 9.8, and relate to evidence in Sections 9.1 to 9.7:

Between 2003 and 2009, the UK's most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.

The UK struggled from the start to have a decisive effect on the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA's) policies, even though it was fully implicated in its decisions as joint Occupying Power.

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US and UK strategies for Iraq began to diverge almost immediately after the conflict. Although the differences were managed, by early 2007 the UK was finding it difficult to play down the divergence, which was, by that point, striking.

The UK missed clear opportunities to reconsider its military approach in Multi‑National Division (South‑East).

Throughout 2004 and 2005, it appears that senior members of the Armed Forces reached the view that little more would be achieved in MND(SE) and that it would make more sense to concentrate military effort on Afghanistan where it might have greater effect.

From July 2005 onwards, decisions in relation to resources for Iraq were made under the influence of the demands of the UK effort in Afghanistan. Although Iraq remained the stated UK main effort, the Government no longer had the option of a substantial reinforcement of its forces there.

The UK's plans to reduce troop levels depended on the transition of lead responsibility for security to the Iraqi Security Forces, even as the latter's ability to take on that responsibility was in question.

The UK spent time and energy on rewriting strategies, which tended to describe a desired end state without setting out how it would be reached.

UK forces withdrew from Iraq in 2009 in circumstances which did not meet objectives defined in January 2003.

Reconstruction

¶817. The following key findings are from Section 10.4, and relate to evidence in Sections 10.1 to 10.3:

The UK failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required in Iraq.

Reconstruction was the third pillar in a succession of UK strategies for Iraq. The Government never resolved how reconstruction would support broader UK objectives.

Following the resignation of Ms Clare Short, the International Development Secretary, and the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1483 in May 2003, DFID assumed leadership of the UK's reconstruction effort in Iraq. DFID would subsequently define, within the framework established by the Government, the scope and nature of that effort.

At key points, DFID should have considered strategic questions about the scale, focus and purpose of the UK's reconstruction effort in Iraq.

The US‑led Coalition Provisional Authority excluded the UK from discussions on oil policy and on disbursements from the Development Fund for Iraq.

Many of the failures which affected pre‑invasion planning and preparation persisted throughout the post‑conflict period. They included poor

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inter‑departmental co‑ordination, inadequate civilian military co‑operation and a failure to use resources coherently. • An unstable and insecure environment made it increasingly difficult to make progress on reconstruction. Although staff and contractors developed innovative ways to deliver projects and manage risks, the constraints were never overcome. Witnesses to the Inquiry identified some successes, in particular in building the capacity of central Iraqi Government institutions and the provincial government in Basra. • Lessons learned through successive reviews of the UK approach to post‑conflict reconstruction and stabilisation, in Iraq and elsewhere, were not applied in Iraq.

De‑Ba'athification

¶818. The following key findings are from Section 11.2, and relate to evidence in Section 11.1:

Early decisions on the form of de‑Ba'athification and its implementation had a significant and lasting negative impact on Iraq.

Limiting de‑Ba'athification to the top three tiers of the party, rather than extending it to the fourth, would have had the potential to be far less damaging to Iraq's post‑invasion recovery and political stability.

The UK's ability to influence the CPA decision on the scope of the policy was limited and informal.

The UK chose not to act on its well‑founded misgivings about handing over the implementation of de‑Ba'athification policy to the Governing Council.

Security Sector Reform

¶819. The following key findings are from Section 12.2, and relate to evidence in Section 12.1:

Between 2003 and 2009, there was no coherent US/UK strategy for Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The UK began work on SSR in Iraq without a proper understanding of what it entailed and hugely underestimated the magnitude of the task.

The UK was unable to influence the US or engage it in a way that produced an Iraq‑wide approach.

There was no qualitative way for the UK to measure progress. The focus on the quantity of officers trained for the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than the quality of officers, was simplistic and gave a misleading sense of comfort.

After 2006, the UK's determination to withdraw from Iraq meant that aspirations for the Iraqi Security Forces were lowered to what would be "good enough" for Iraq. It was never clear what that meant in practice.

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The development of the Iraqi Army was considerably more successful than that of the Iraqi Police Service. But the UK was still aware before it withdrew from Iraq that the Iraqi Army had not been sufficiently tested. The UK was not confident that the Iraqi Army could maintain security without support.

Resources

¶820. The following key findings are from Section 13.2, and relate to evidence in Section 13.1:

The direct cost of the conflict in Iraq was at least £9.2bn (the equivalent of £11.83bn in 2016). In total, 89 percent of that was spent on military operations.

The Government's decision to take part in military action against Iraq was not affected by consideration of the potential financial cost to the UK of the invasion or the post‑conflict period.

Ministers were not provided with estimates of military conflict and post‑conflict costs, or with advice on their affordability, when decisions were taken on the scale of the UK's military contribution to a US‑led invasion of Iraq, and on the UK's role in the post‑conflict period. They should have been.

There was no articulated need for additional financial resources for military operations in Iraq that was not met.

The arrangements for funding military Urgent Operational Requirements and other military costs worked as intended, and did not constrain the UK military's ability to conduct operations in Iraq.

The controls imposed by the Treasury on the MOD's budget in September 2003 did not constrain the UK military's ability to conduct operations in Iraq.

The Government was slow to recognise that Iraq was an enduring operation, and to adapt its funding arrangements to support both military operations and civilian activities.

The arrangements for securing funding for civilian activities could be slow and unpredictable. Some high‑priority civilian activities were funded late or only in part.

Military equipment (post‑conflict)

¶821. The following key findings are from Section 14.2, and relate to evidence in Section 14.1:

Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas, including protected mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and helicopter support.

It was not sufficiently clear which person or department within the MOD had responsibility for identifying and articulating capability gaps.

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Delays in providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces in MND(SE) for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been tolerated.

The MOD was slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The range of protected mobility options available to commanders in MND(SE) was limited. Although work had begun before 2002 to source an additional PPV, it was only ordered in July 2006 following Ministerial intervention.

Funding was not a direct barrier to the identification and deployment of additional solutions to the medium weight PPV gap. But it appears that the longer‑term focus of the Executive Committee of the Army Board on the Future Rapid Effect System programme inhibited it from addressing the more immediate issue related to medium weight PPV capability.

The decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan had a material impact on the availability of key capabilities for deployment to Iraq, particularly helicopters and ISTAR.

Civilian personnel

¶822. The following key findings are from Section 15.2, and relate to evidence in Section 15.1:

Before the invasion of Iraq, the Government had made only minimal preparations for the deployment of civilian personnel.

There was an enduring gap between the Government's civilian capacity and the level of its ambition in Iraq.

There was no overarching consideration by the Government of the extent to which civilians could be effective in a highly insecure environment, or of the security assets needed for civilians to do their jobs effectively.

The evidence seen by the Inquiry indicates that the Government recognised its duty of care to UK‑based and locally engaged civilians in Iraq. A significant effort was made to keep civilians safe in a dangerous environment.

Service Personnel

¶823. The following key findings are from Section 16.4, and relate to evidence in Sections 16.1 to 16.3:

In 2002, the UK military was already operating at, and in some cases beyond, the limits of the guidelines agreed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As a result, the Harmony Guidelines were being breached for some units and specialist trades.

The Government's decision to contribute a military force to a US‑led invasion of Iraq inevitably increased the risk that more Service Personnel would be put

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in breach of the Harmony Guidelines. The issue of the potential pressure on Service Personnel was not a consideration in the decision. • The MOD planned and prepared effectively to provide medical care in support of Operation TELIC. • There were major improvements in the provision of medical care, mental healthcare and rehabilitative care available to Service Personnel over the course of Op TELIC. • Most of the contacts between the MOD and bereaved families were conducted with sensitivity. In a few cases, they were not. The MOD progressively improved how it engaged with and supported bereaved families, in part driven by consistent public and Ministerial pressure. • The Government's decision in 2006 to deploy a second medium scale force to Helmand province in Afghanistan further increased the pressure on Service Personnel, on elements of the MOD's welfare, medical and investigative systems, and the coronial system. • Much of the MOD's and the Government's effort from 2006 was focused on addressing those pressures. • The MOD should have planned and prepared to address those pressures, rather than react to them. • The Government should have acted sooner to address the backlog of inquests into the deaths of Service Personnel. The support it did provide, in June 2006, cleared the backlog. • The MOD made a number of improvements to the Board of Inquiry process, but some proposals for more substantive reform (including the introduction of an independent member) were not fully explored. The MOD significantly improved the way it communicated with and supported bereaved families in relation to military investigations and inquests. • The MOD was less effective at providing support to Service Personnel who were mobilised individually (a category which included almost all Reservists) and their families, than to formed units.

Civilian casualties

¶824. The following key findings are from Section 17:

The Inquiry considers that a Government has a responsibility to make every reasonable effort to understand the likely and actual effects of its military actions on civilians.

In the months before the invasion, Mr Blair emphasised the need to minimise the number of civilian casualties arising from an invasion of Iraq. The MOD's responses offered reassurance based on the tight targeting procedures governing the air campaign.

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The MOD made only a broad estimate of direct civilian casualties arising from an attack on Iraq, based on previous operations.

With hindsight, greater efforts should have been made in the post‑conflict period to determine the number of civilian casualties and the broader effects of military operations on civilians. More time was devoted to the question of which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than it was to efforts to determine the actual number.

The Government's consideration of the issue of Iraqi civilian casualties was driven by its concern to rebut accusations that Coalition Forces were responsible for the deaths of large numbers of civilians, and to sustain domestic support for operations in Iraq.

Lessons

¶825. In a number of Sections of this Report, the Inquiry has set out explicit lessons. They relate in particular to those elements of the UK's engagement in Iraq which might be replicated in future operations.

¶826. The decision to join the US‑led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the product of a particular set of circumstances which are unlikely to be repeated. Unlike other instances in which military force has been used, the invasion was not prompted by the aggression of another country or an unfolding humanitarian disaster. The lessons drawn by the Inquiry on the pre‑conflict element of this Report are therefore largely context‑specific and embedded in its conclusions. Lessons on collective Ministerial decision‑making, where the principles identified are enduring ones, are an exception. They, and other lessons which have general application, are set out below.