Reports that Matter

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry — Executive Summary · 2016

Front matter

Section 1 of 39

Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors

HC 264

Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons

dated 6 July 2016 for

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Executive Summary

Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016

HC 264

1

  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Contents Introduction — 4

  • Pre‑conflict strategy and planning — 5

  • The UK decision to support US military action — 6

  • UK policy before 9/11 — 6

  • The impact of 9/11 — 10

  • Decision to take the UN route — 16

  • Negotiation of resolution 1441 — 19

  • The prospect of military action — 21

  • The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens — 24

  • The end of the UN route — 30

  • Why Iraq? Why now? — 40

  • Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat? — 40

  • The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq .47 JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002, 'An Initial Assessment of Iraq's WMD Declaration'. The UK's relationship with the US — 51

  • Decision‑making — 54

  • Collective responsibility — 55

  • Advice on the legal basis for military action — 62

  • The timing of Lord Goldsmith's advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441 — 63

  • Lord Goldsmith's advice of 7 March 2003 — 65

  • Lord Goldsmith's arrival at a "better view" — 66

  • The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003 — 66

  • Lord Goldsmith's Written Answer of 17 March 2003 — 67

  • Cabinet, 17 March 2003 — 68

  • Weapons of mass destruction — 69

  • Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 — 69

  • Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 — 72

  • Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 — 75

  • The search for WMD — 77

2

  • Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq — 78

  • The failure to plan or prepare for known risks — 78

  • The planning process and decision‑making — 81

  • The post‑conflict period — 86

  • Occupation — 86

  • Looting in Basra — 86

  • Looting in Baghdad — 88

  • UK influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution 1483 — 89

  • UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority — 90

  • A decline in security — 93

  • The turning point — 96

  • Transition — 97

  • UK influence on US strategy post‑CPA — 97

  • Planning for withdrawal — 97

  • The impact of Afghanistan — 99

  • Iraqiisation — 101

  • Preparation for withdrawal — 103

  • A major divergence in strategy — 103

  • A possible civil war — 104

  • Force Level Review — 107

  • The beginning of the end — 108

  • Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? — 109

  • Key findings — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – "axis of evil" to Crawford — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 — 112

  • Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 — 112

  • Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 — 113

  • Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 — 113

  • Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 — 114

  • Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 — 115

  • Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 — 116

  • Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 — 117

  • The search for WMD — 117

3 4

Introduction 1. In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full‑scale occupation of a sovereign State – Iraq. Cabinet decided on 17 March to join the US‑led invasion of Iraq, assuming there was no last‑minute capitulation by Saddam Hussein. That decision was ratified by Parliament the next day and implemented the night after that.

2. Until 28 June 2004, the UK was a joint Occupying Power in Iraq. For the next five years, UK forces remained in Iraq with responsibility for security in the South‑East; and the UK sought to assist with stabilisation and reconstruction.

3. The consequences of the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the wider Middle East, as well as in the UK. It left families bereaved and many individuals wounded, mentally as well as physically. After harsh deprivation under Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi people suffered further years of violence.

4. The decision to use force – a very serious decision for any government to take – provoked profound controversy in relation to Iraq and became even more controversial when it was subsequently found that Iraq's programmes to develop and produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons had been dismantled. It continues to shape debates on national security policy and the circumstances in which to intervene.

5. Although the Coalition had achieved the removal of a brutal regime which had defied the United Nations and which was seen as a threat to peace and security, it failed to achieve the goals it had set for a new Iraq. Faced with serious disorder in Iraq, aggravated by sectarian differences, the US and UK struggled to contain the situation. The lack of security impeded political, social and economic reconstruction.

6. The Inquiry's report sets out in detail decision‑making in the UK Government covering the period from when the possibility of military action first arose in 2001 to the departure of UK troops in 2009. It covers many different aspects of policy and its delivery.

7. In this Executive Summary the Inquiry sets out its conclusions on a number of issues that have been central to the controversies surrounding Iraq. In addition to the factors that shaped the decision to take military action in March 2003 without support for an authorising resolution in the UN Security Council, they are: the assessments of Iraqi WMD capabilities by the intelligence community prior to the invasion (including their presentation in the September 2002 dossier); advice on whether military action would be legal; the lack of adequate preparation for the post‑conflict period and the consequent struggle to cope with the deteriorating security situation in Iraq after the invasion. This Summary also contains the Inquiry's key findings and a compilation of lessons, from the conclusions of individual Sections of the report.

8. Other Sections of the report contain detailed accounts of the relevant decisions and events, and the Inquiry's full conclusions and lessons.

5

9. The following are extracts from the main body of the Report covering some of the most important issues considered by the Inquiry.