Reports that Matter

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry — Executive Summary · 2016

Front matter

Section 1 of 46

Original document ↗ · About this edition →

Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors

HC 264

Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons

dated 6 July 2016 for

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Executive Summary

Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016

HC 264

1

  • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Contents Introduction — 4

  • Pre‑conflict strategy and planning — 5

  • The UK decision to support US military action — 6

  • UK policy before 9/11 — 6

  • The impact of 9/11 — 10

  • Decision to take the UN route — 16

  • Negotiation of resolution 1441 — 19

  • The prospect of military action — 21

  • The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens — 24

  • The end of the UN route — 30

  • Why Iraq? Why now? — 40

  • Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat? — 40

  • The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq — 47

  • The UK's relationship with the US — 51

  • Decision‑making — 54

  • Collective responsibility — 55

  • Advice on the legal basis for military action — 62

  • The timing of Lord Goldsmith's advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441 — 63

  • Lord Goldsmith's advice of 7 March 2003 — 65

  • Lord Goldsmith's arrival at a "better view" — 66

  • The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003 — 66

  • Lord Goldsmith's Written Answer of 17 March 2003 — 67

  • Cabinet, 17 March 2003 — 68

  • Weapons of mass destruction — 69

  • Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 — 69

  • Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 — 72

  • Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 — 75

  • The search for WMD — 77

2

  • Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq — 78

  • The failure to plan or prepare for known risks — 78

  • The planning process and decision‑making — 81

  • The post‑conflict period — 86

  • Occupation — 86

  • Looting in Basra — 86

  • Looting in Baghdad — 88

  • UK influence on post‑invasion strategy: resolution 1483 — 89

  • UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority — 90

  • A decline in security — 93

  • The turning point — 96

  • Transition — 97

  • UK influence on US strategy post‑CPA — 97

  • Planning for withdrawal — 97

  • The impact of Afghanistan — 99

  • Iraqiisation — 101

  • Preparation for withdrawal — 103

  • A major divergence in strategy — 103

  • A possible civil war — 104

  • Force Level Review — 107

  • The beginning of the end — 108

  • Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? — 109

  • Key findings — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002 — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – "axis of evil" to Crawford — 111

  • Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 — 112

  • Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002 — 112

  • Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 – the negotiation of resolution 1441 — 113

  • Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003 — 113

  • Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003 — 114

  • Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002 — 115

  • Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 — 116

  • Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003 — 117

  • The search for WMD — 117

3 4