Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002

¶496. The ingrained belief that Saddam Hussein's regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and was pursuing an active policy of deception and concealment, had underpinned UK policy towards Iraq since the Gulf Conflict ended in 1991.

¶497. While the detail of individual JIC Assessments on Iraq varied, this core construct remained in place.

¶498. Security Council resolutions adopted since 1991 demanded Iraq's disarmament and the re-admission of inspectors, and imposed sanctions in the absence of Iraqi compliance with those – and other – obligations. Agreement to those resolutions indicated that doubts about whether Iraq had disarmed were widely shared.

¶499. In parallel, by 2000, the wider risk of proliferation was regarded as a major threat. There was heightened concern about:

the danger of proliferation, particularly that countries of concern might obtain nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and

the potential risk that terrorist groups which were willing to use them might gain access to chemical and biological agents and, possibly, nuclear material, and the means to deliver them.

¶500. These concerns were reinforced after 9/11.

¶501. The view conveyed in JIC Assessments between December 2000 and March 2002 was that, despite the considerable achievements of UNSCOM and the IAEA between 1991 and December 1998, including dismantling Iraq's nuclear programme, the inspectors had been unable to account for some of the ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons and material produced by Iraq; and that it had:

not totally destroyed all its stockpile of chemical and biological weapons;

retained up to 360 tonnes of chemical agents and precursor chemicals and growth media which would allow it to produce more chemical and biological agents;

hidden a small number of long‑range Al Hussein ballistic missiles; and

retained the knowledge, documentation and personnel which would allow it to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

¶502. The JIC also judged that, since the departure of the weapons inspectors, Iraq:

was actively pursuing programmes to extend the range of its existing short‑range ballistic missiles beyond the permitted range of 150km;

had begun development of a ballistic missile with a range greater than 1,000km;

was capable of resuming undetected production of "significant quantities" of chemical and biological agents, and in the case of VX (a nerve agent) might have already done so; and

was pursuing activities that could be linked to a nuclear programme.

¶503. Iraq's chemical, biological and ballistic missile programmes were seen as a threat to international peace and security in the Middle East region, but Iraq was viewed as a less serious proliferation threat than other key countries of concern – Iran, Libya and North Korea – which had current nuclear programmes. Iraq's nuclear facilities had been dismantled by the weapons inspectors. The JIC judged that Iraq would be unable to obtain a nuclear weapon while sanctions remained effective.

¶504. The JIC continued to judge that co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was "unlikely", and that there was no "credible evidence of Iraqi transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups".

¶505. In mid‑February 2002, in preparation for Mr Blair's planned meeting with President Bush in early April 2002, No.10 commissioned the preparation of a paper to inform the public about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and WMD more generally in four key countries of concern, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Iraq.

¶506. When the preparation of this document became public knowledge, it was perceived to be intended to underpin a decision on military action against Iraq. The content and timing became a sensitive issue.

¶507. Reflecting the UK position that action was needed to disarm Iraq, Mr Blair and Mr Straw began, from late February 2002, publicly to argue that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm or be disarmed in accordance with the obligations imposed by the UN; and that it was important to agree to the return of UN inspectors to Iraq.

¶508. The focus on Iraq was not the result of a step change in Iraq's capabilities or intentions.

¶509. When he saw the draft paper on WMD countries of concern on 8 March, Mr Straw commented:

"Good, but should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to show why there is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this yet."200

¶510. On 18 March, Mr Straw decided that a paper on Iraq should be issued before one addressing other countries of concern.

¶511. On 22 March, Mr Straw was advised that the evidence would not convince public opinion that there was an imminent threat from Iraq. Publication was postponed.

¶512. No.10 decided that the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat should co‑ordinate the production of a "public dossier" on Iraq, and that Mr Campbell should "retain the lead role on the timing/form of its release".

¶513. The statements prepared for, and used by, the UK Government in public, from late 2001 onwards, about Iraq's proscribed activities and the potential threat they posed were understandably written in more direct and less nuanced language than the JIC Assessments on which they drew.

¶514. The question is whether, in doing so, they conveyed more certainty and knowledge than was justified, or created tests it would be impossible for Iraq to meet. That is of particular concern in relation to the evidence in Section 4.1 on two key issues.

¶515. First, the estimates of the weapons and material related to Iraq's chemical and biological warfare programmes for which UNSCOM had been unable to account were based on extrapolations from UNSCOM records. Officials explicitly advised that it was "inherently difficult to arrive at precise figures". In addition, it was acknowledged that neither UNSCOM nor the UK could be certain about either exactly what had existed or what Iraq had already destroyed.

¶516. The revised estimates announced by Mr Straw on 2 May were increasingly presented in Government statements as the benchmark against which Iraq should be judged.

¶517. Second, the expert MOD examination of issues in late March 2002 exposed the difficulties Iraq would have to overcome before it could acquire a nuclear weapon. That included the difficulty of acquiring suitable fissile material from the "black market".

¶518. In addition, the tendency to refer in public statements only to Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" without addressing their nature (the type of warhead and whether they were battlefield or strategic weapons systems) or how they might be used (as a last resort against invading military forces or as a weapon of terror to threaten civilian populations in other countries) was likely to have created the impression that Iraq posed a greater threat than the detailed JIC Assessments would have supported.