Reconstruction

¶866. The starting point for all discussions of reconstruction in circumstances comparable to those in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 must be that this is an area where progress will be extremely difficult.

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¶867. Better planning and preparation for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. It would not have been possible for the UK to prepare for every eventuality. Better plans and preparation could have mitigated some of the risks to which the UK and Iraq were exposed between 2003 and 2009 and increased the likelihood of achieving the outcomes desired by the UK and the Iraqi people.

¶868. From late 2003, successive reviews of the UK's approach to post‑conflict reconstruction, later expanded to include the broader concept of stabilisation, resulted in a series of changes to the UK's approach to post‑conflict operations. Despite those changes, many of the shortcomings that characterised the UK Government's approach to pre‑conflict planning and preparation in 2002 and early 2003 persisted after the invasion.

¶869. The UK Government's new strategic framework for stabilisation, the new machinery for inter‑departmental co‑ordination and the enhanced resources now available for stabilisation operations continue to evolve. If future changes are to increase the effectiveness of UK operations, they must address the lessons for planning, preparation and implementation derived from the Iraq experience.

¶870. The lessons identified by the Inquiry apply to both the planning and preparation for post‑conflict operations, of which reconstruction is a major but not the sole component, and to post‑conflict operations themselves.

¶871. Analysis of the available material must draw on multiple perspectives, reflect dissenting views, identify risk – including that associated with any gaps in knowledge – and consider a range of options.

¶872. Information must be shared as widely across departments as is necessary to support that approach.

¶873. Gathering information and analysis of the nature and scale of the potential task should be systematic and as thorough as possible, and should capture the views and aspirations of local communities.

¶874. Plans derived from that analysis should:

incorporate a range of options appropriate to different contingencies;

reflect a realistic assessment of UK (and partners') resources and capabilities;

integrate civilian and military objectives and capabilities in support of a single UK strategy;

be exposed to scrutiny and challenge at Ministerial, senior official and expert level;

be reviewed regularly and, if the strategic context, risk profile or projected cost changes significantly, be revised.

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¶875. A government must prepare for a range of scenarios, not just the best case, and should not assume that it will be able to improvise.

¶876. Where the UK is the junior partner and is unable during planning or implementation to secure the outcome it requires, it should take stock of whether to attach conditions to continued participation and whether further involvement would be consistent with the UK's strategic interest.

¶877. Public statements on the extent of the UK's ambition should reflect a realistic assessment of what is achievable. To do otherwise is to risk even greater disillusionment and a loss of UK credibility.

¶878. Departmental priorities and interests will inevitably continue to diverge even where an inter‑departmental body with a cross‑government role, currently the Stabilisation Unit (SU), is in place. Therefore, co‑operation between departments needs continual reinforcement at official and Ministerial levels.

¶879. The Head of the SU must be sufficiently senior and the SU enjoy recognition inside and outside government as a centre of excellence in its field if the Unit is to have credibility and influence in No.10, the National Security Council, the Treasury, the FCO, DFID and the MOD, and with the military.