The Report of the Iraq Inquiry — Executive Summary · 2016
The search for WMD
The search for WMD
¶571. Section 4.4 considers the impact of the failure to find stockpiles of WMD in Iraq in the months immediately after the invasion, and of the emerging conclusions of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), on:
- the Government's response to demands for an independent judge‑led inquiry into pre‑conflict intelligence on Iraq; and
- the Government's public presentation of the nature of the threat from Saddam Hussein's regime and the decision to go to war.
¶572. The Inquiry has not sought to comment in detail on the specific conclusions of the ISC, FAC, Hutton and Butler Reports, all of which were published before the withdrawal by SIS in September 2004 of a significant proportion of the intelligence underpinning the JIC Assessments and September 2002 dossier on which UK policy had rested.
¶573. In addition to the conclusions of those reports, the Inquiry notes the forthright statement in March 2005 of the US Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reporting to President Bush, the Commission stated that "the [US] Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre‑war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure."
¶574. The evidence in Section 4.4 shows that, after the invasion, the UK Government, including the intelligence community, was reluctant to admit, and to recognise publicly, the mounting evidence that there had been failings in the UK's pre‑conflict collection, validation, analysis and presentation of intelligence on Iraq's WMD.
¶575. Despite the failure to identify any evidence of WMD programmes during pre‑conflict inspections, the UK Government remained confident that evidence would be found after the Iraqi regime had been removed.
¶576. Almost immediately after the start of the invasion, UK Ministers and officials sought to lower public expectations of immediate or significant finds of WMD in Iraq.
¶577. The lack of evidence to support pre‑conflict claims about Iraq's WMD challenged the credibility of the Government and the intelligence community, and the legitimacy of the war.
¶578. The Government and the intelligence community were both concerned about the consequences of the presentational aspects of their pre‑war assessments being discredited.
¶579. By June, the Government had acknowledged the need for a review of the UK's pre‑conflict intelligence on Iraq. It responded to demands for an independent, judge‑led inquiry by expressing support for the reviews initiated by the ISC and the FAC.
78¶580. The announcement of the Hutton Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly on 18 July, reinforced the Government's position that additional reviews were not needed.
¶581. The Government maintained that position until January 2004, backed by three votes in the House of Commons (on 4 June, 15 July and 22 October 2003) rejecting a succession of Opposition motions calling for an independent inquiry into the use of pre‑war intelligence.
¶582. Mr Blair's initial response to growing criticism of the failure to find WMD was to counsel patience.
¶583. After the publication of the ISG Interim Report, the Government's focus shifted from finding stockpiles of weapons to emphasising evidence of the Iraqi regime's strategic intent.
¶584. Once President Bush made clear his decision to set up an independent inquiry, Mr Blair's resistance to a public inquiry became untenable.
¶585. After the announcement of the Butler Review, the UK Government's focus shifted to the content of the next ISG report, the Status Report.
¶586. The Government, still concerned about the nature of the public debate on WMD in the UK, sought to ensure that the Status Report included existing ISG material highlighting the strategic intentions of Saddam Hussein's regime and breaches of Security Council resolutions.
¶587. Mr Blair remained concerned about continuing public and Parliamentary criticism of the pre‑conflict intelligence, the failure to find WMD and the decision to invade Iraq. After the reports from the Hutton Inquiry, the ISG and the US Commission, he sought to demonstrate that, although "the exact basis for action was not as we thought", the invasion had still been justified.
¶588. The ISG's findings were significant, but did not support past statements by the UK and US Governments, which had focused on Iraq's current capabilities and an urgent and growing threat.
¶589. The explanation for military action put forward by Mr Blair in October 2004 was not the one given before the conflict.