UK policy before 9/11

¶26. Before the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11), the UK was pursuing a strategy of containment based on a new sanctions regime to improve international support and incentivise Iraq's co‑operation, narrowing and deepening the sanctions regime to focus only on prohibited items and at the same time improving financial controls to reduce the flow of illicit funds to Saddam Hussein.

¶27. When UK policy towards Iraq was formally reviewed and agreed by the Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) in May 1999, the objectives towards Iraq were defined as:

"... in the short term, to reduce the threat Saddam poses to the region including by eliminating his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes; and, in

the longer term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law‑abiding member of the international community."1

¶28. The policy of containment was seen as the "only viable way" to pursue those objectives. A "policy of trying to topple Saddam would command no useful international support". Iraq was unlikely to accept the package immediately but "might be persuaded to acquiesce eventually".

¶29. After prolonged discussion about the way ahead, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1284 in December 1999, although China, France and Russia abstained.2

¶30. The resolution established:

a new inspectorate, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (which Dr Hans Blix was subsequently appointed to lead);

a timetable to identify and agree a work programme; and

the principle that, if the inspectors reported co‑operation in key areas, that would lead to the suspension of economic sanctions.3

¶31. Resolution 1284 described Iraq's obligations to comply with the disarmament standards of resolution 687 and other related resolutions as the "governing standard of Iraqi compliance"; and provided that the Security Council would decide what was required of Iraq for the implementation of each task and that it should be "clearly defined and precise".

¶32. The resolution was also a deliberate compromise which changed the criterion for the suspension, and eventual lifting, of sanctions from complete disarmament to tests which would be based on judgements by UNMOVIC on the progress made in completing identified tasks.

¶33. Iraq refused to accept the provisions of resolution 1284, including the re‑admission of weapons inspectors. Concerns about Iraq's activities in the absence of inspectors increased.

¶34. The US Presidential election in November 2000 prompted a further UK review of the operation of the containment policy (see Section 1.2). There were concerns about how long the policy could be sustained and what it could achieve.

¶35. There were also concerns over both the continued legal basis for operations in the No‑Fly Zones (NFZs) and the conduct of individual operations.4

¶36. In an Assessment on 1 November, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) judged that Saddam Hussein felt "little pressure to negotiate over ... resolution 1284 because the proceeds of oil smuggling and illicit trade have increased significantly this year, and more countries are increasing diplomatic contacts and trade with Iraq".5

¶37. The JIC also judged:

"Saddam would only contemplate co‑operation with [resolution] 1284, and the return of inspectors ... if it could be portrayed as a victory. He will not agree to co‑operate unless:

there is a UN‑agreed timetable for the lifting of sanctions. Saddam suspects that the US would not agree to sanctions lift while he remained in power;

he is able to negotiate with the UN in advance to weaken the inspection provisions. His ambitions to rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes makes him hostile to intrusive inspections or any other constraints likely to be effective.

"Before accepting 1284, Saddam will try to obtain the abolition of the No‑Fly Zones. He is also likely to demand that the US should abandon its stated aim to topple the Iraqi regime."

¶38. In November 2000, Mr Blair's "preferred option" was described as the implementation of 1284, enabling inspectors to return and sanctions to be suspended.6

¶39. In December 2000, the British Embassy Washington reported growing pressure to change course from containment to military action to oust Saddam Hussein, but no decision to change policy or to begin military planning had been taken by President Clinton.7

¶40. The Key Judgements of a JIC Assessment in February 2001 included:

There was "broad international consensus to maintain the arms embargo at least as long as Saddam remains in power. Saddam faces no economic pressure to accept ... [resolution] 1284 because he is successfully undermining the economic sanctions regime."

"Through abuse of the UN Oil‑for‑Food [OFF] programme and smuggling of oil and other goods" it was estimated that Saddam Hussein would "be able to appropriate in the region of $1.5bn to $1.8bn in cash and goods in 2001", and there was "scope for earning even more".

"Iranian interdiction efforts" had "significantly reduced smuggling down the Gulf", but Saddam Hussein had "compensated by exploiting land routes to Turkey and Syria".

"Most countries" believed that economic sanctions were "ineffective, counterproductive and should now be lifted. Without active enforcement, the economic sanctions regime" would "continue to erode".8

¶41. The Assessment also stated:

Saddam Hussein needed funds "to maintain his military and security apparatus and secure its loyalty".

Despite the availability of funds, Iraq had been slow to comply with UN recommendations on food allocation. Saddam needed "the Iraqi people to suffer to underpin his campaign against sanctions".

Encouraged by the success of Iraq's border trade agreement with Turkey, "front‑line states" were "not enforcing sanctions".

There had been a "significant increase in the erosion of sanctions over the past six months".

¶42. When Mr Blair had his first meeting with President Bush at Camp David in late February 2001, the US and UK agreed on the need for a policy which was more widely supported in the Middle East region.9 Mr Blair had concluded that public presentation needed to be improved. He suggested that the approach should be presented as a "deal" comprising four elements:

do the right thing by the Iraqi people, with whom we have no quarrel;

tighten weapons controls on Saddam Hussein;

retain financial control on Saddam Hussein; and

retain our ability to strike.

¶43. The stated position of the UK Government in February 2001 was that containment had been broadly successful.10

¶44. During the summer of 2001, the UK had been exploring the way forward with the US, Russia and France on a draft Security Council resolution to put in place a "smart sanctions" regime.11 But there was no agreement on the way ahead between the UK, the US, China, France and Russia, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

¶45. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a policy of containment, but sanctions were eroding.12 The policy was "partially successful", but it did not mean that Saddam Hussein was "not still developing his [prohibited] programmes".