Chapter 11: Review and alteration of statements

Chapter 11: Review and alteration of statements

¶2.11.1 As discussed in Part 1, statements made by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) officers in the form of handwritten recollections of their experiences on the day of the disaster underwent an unprecedented process of review and alteration before their submission to the official inquiry.

¶2.11.2 On the authority of the Chief Constable this process was conducted by a small team of officers managed by Chief Superintendent Donald Denton in consultation with Peter Metcalf, a senior partner in the SYP solicitors, Hammond Suddards. Although widely known to those directly involved in the inquiries and investigations, the process only became public knowledge following submissions to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny and their subsequent analysis.1

¶2.11.3 Focusing on the material disclosed to the Panel, and in response to requests by bereaved families, this chapter revisits the initiation, operation and results of the review and alteration of SYP officers' statements. It also considers the adoption of a similar process by the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS). The wider consequences of the review and alteration process are discussed in Chapter 6.

¶Development of the review and alteration process within South Yorkshire Police 2.11.4 The disclosed papers reveal that the process of review and alteration undertaken by SYP developed incrementally in response to requests for evidence from West Midlands Police (WMP). In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, on Sunday 16 April 1989, SYP began to shape the investigation that followed.

¶2.11.5 At this initial meeting senior SYP officers anticipated that police officers would be interviewed as witnesses (in fact this did not happen). A record of the meeting disclosed to the Panel stated: 'Every officer is going to have to be interviewed and a statement obtained and they are going to have to be interviewed by Detectives. Duty statements [written by officers] are out.'2

1. Stuart-Smith, LJ Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster Cm 3878 London:

¶The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001); and Scraton, P Hillsborough: The Truth Edinburgh: Mainstream

¶Publications, 1999 (1st Edn). 2. SYP briefing given at noon on Sunday 16 April 1989, SYP000010040001, pp9-14.

¶
• Chapter 11 Review and alteration of statements — 315

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¶2.11.6 In contrast to their professional training, officers were instructed not to record their experiences in pocket books and 'anyone who was involved yesterday take time to sit down and make some notes'. The briefing officer asked if officers had 'made a pocket book brief'. None had. The briefing officer continued: 'Do not start making pocket book entries. Yesterday was the most traumatic experience of my life and large chunks of it I cannot remember. I am sure it must be the same for many of you'.

¶2.11.7 The rationale for abandoning pocket book entries was not fully explained. However, in a meeting with Counsel some days later, Mr Metcalf stated that 'briefs, accounts etc will remain privilege'. Thus they would remain confidential to SYP and its legal advisers. In contrast, 'pocket notebook entries can be called for [by the Inquiry] and must be produced'.3

¶2.11.8 On Monday 17 April, a meeting was attended by Chief Constable Peter Wright, Chief Superintendents Brian Mole and David Duckenfield, and other senior officers.4 The chronology of the disaster was discussed, along with the process of evidence gathering.

¶2.11.9 At this meeting the process of note-taking, suggested the previous day, was developed. Detective Superintendent Graham McKay suggested that '[s]o far as the enquiry team is concerned – set down your recollections over the next few days. We should be doing that with officers at the game'. The Chief Constable replied: 'Very good point – all officers at the game to make records of their recollections'.

¶2.11.10 This was the first reference in the disclosed papers to gathering 'recollections', rather than 'notes'. While the planned use of the recollections was not set out in detail, the notes of the meeting recorded that the intention was to gather evidence to inform the forthcoming investigation by WMP. CC Wright stated: '[I]f we [SYP] leave it to the West Midlands to provide the evidence we might not get the broad scope of evidence flowing in'.5 SYP should be 'the authors of most of the information fed in'.

¶2.11.11 By 20 April the planned use of 'recollections' became more formalised and was explained in a letter from solicitors Hammond Suddards to SYP Deputy Chief Constable Peter Hayes.6 SYP would be expected to submit a 'formal proof of evidence' (a written submission) to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.12 This would include details of SYP's approach to policing Hillsborough and an account of events on the day of the disaster. To produce this 'proof of evidence', Hammond Suddards advised, 'it will be necessary to have statements from as many as possible of the Officers who were deployed at the ground on that day'.

¶2.11.13 Because the statements to be provided by SYP officers were 'not required for the purpose of any criminal investigation', there was 'no reason ... for them to be prepared on CJA [Criminal Justice Act] forms and indeed many can, in our view, be self-taken, in the sense of simply forming a record of the recollections of the Officer concerned'. The quality of the Chief Constable's submission to the Taylor Inquiry would, they advised, 'depend very much on the accuracy and quality of information provided by the Officers who were on duty'.

3. Meeting with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000097210001, p2. 4. Notes of SYP meeting,17 April 1989, SYP000129200001, p37. 5. Notes of SYP meeting, 17 April 1989, SYP000096360001, p50. 6. Letter from Hammond Suddards to Deputy Chief Constable SYP, 20 April 1989, SYP000096850001, pp8-10.

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¶2.11.14 On 25 April, DCC Hayes informed WMP's Assistant Chief Constable Mervyn Jones of SYP's 'intention to obtain self-serving [i.e. self-taken] statements down to the rank of inspector and from all officers involved at the Leppings Lane end of the ground'.7 DCC Hayes reported that ACC Jones 'saw no problem with that whatsoever, understands that we need to be getting on with this quickly, has no worries over this but thanked us for informing him of our intended action'.

¶2.11.15 The process of gathering 'recollections', also noted in the documents as 'self-prepared' or 'self-taken' statements, began on 26 April. Chief Superintendent Terry Wain, in charge of putting together SYP's 'proof of evidence', briefed officers at 9am.8 Recollections would follow a template suggested by Hammond Suddards to produce a full account of the events on the day.

¶2.11.16 Regarding their collection from officers, 'that's where you fellows [those present at the meeting] come in'. Accounts would be obtained from 'as many as possible of the officers who were deployed in the vicinity of the Leppings Lane end of the ground that day' including 'not just those in the ground but those in the terraces at the turnstiles and outside the ground at Leppings Lane'.

¶2.11.17 The initial template was narrow, requesting details of officers' actions. It was soon revised to request information on 'the mood of fans', 'actions of stewards', 'any breakdown in radio transmissions' and whether officers had dealt with any of the deceased, as well as information as to their 'fears, feelings and observations'.9

¶2.11.18 C/Supt Wain stated that SYP's task was 'not to examine the policing arrangements on that day or to investigate actions or to establish blame in any way'. The 'job' was 'merely to collate what evidence South Yorkshire Police officer [sic] can provide to their Chief Constable in order that we can present a suitable case, on behalf of the force, to the subsequent inquiries'.10 Consistent with legal advice given to SYP, officers' accounts were to 'be self-written on plain paper and will not be taken under CJA [Criminal Justice Act] rules'.

¶2.11.19 Later on 26 April a meeting of senior police officers, including DCC Hayes and C/Supt Mole, and their legal Counsel, Bill Woodward QC, was held at which the process was confirmed.11 DCC Hayes informed Mr Woodward that the 'main players in this are doing their own accounts'. He asked, 'is that O.K. or would you rather someone take their statement'. Mr Woodward replied, 'It couldn't be better. They can put all the things in that they want and we will sort them out'.

¶2.11.20 At this point, 'self-taken' statements were intended to inform a submission to the Taylor Inquiry, the contents of which would be controlled by SYP.12 The statements were not intended to be shared but this changed within days as a consequence of requests from WMP.

7. Note of conversation between DCC Hayes and ACC Jones, 25 April 1989, SYP000097140001, p3. 8. 'Briefing for officers co-ordinating the collation of self-prepared statements from Police Officers on duty at the FA Cup semi-final at Hillsborough – 15 April 1989', 26 April 1989, SYP000097200001, p7. 9. Police Officer's recollection with copy proforma, 28 April 1989, SYP000111860001, p16. 10. 'Briefing for officers co-ordinating the collation of self-prepared statements from Police Officers on duty at the FA Cup semi-final at Hillsborough – 15 April 1989', 26 April 1989, SYP000097200001, p7. 11. Minutes of Meeting with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000097210001, p90. 12. The report ultimately produced as a result of this process is 'SYP submission to Taylor', SYP000096740001.

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¶2.11.21 On 29 April, ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright, inviting a number of senior officers to 'submit evidence' to be 'pass[ed] on to Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry'.13 From the documents disclosed this was the first formal indication that WMP did not intend to interview SYP officers, but would be content to rely on written evidence.

¶2.11.22 According to a note written on the same day by Mr Metcalf of Hammond Suddards, the WMP request gave 'rise to some concern'.14 Given the various roles assigned to WMP, Mr Metcalf initially had felt 'it might not be fair on the Officers' if self-taken statements were to be used at the inquests or in disciplinary proceedings, rather than being restricted to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.23 CC Wright, however, 'was satisfied that the West Midlands inquiry had a duty to report only to the Judge [i.e. LJ Taylor]'. He considered that 'there was no practical difficulty because there was not going to be anything in the self-taken statements which would not have been in CJA [Criminal Justice Act] statements if taken'.

¶2.11.24 Even so, it was agreed 'that it would be sensible for [Peter Metcalf] to see these statements before they went out to the West Midlands inquiry and to have some time to go through them with the men involved'. In doing so, Mr Metcalf 'made various suggestions for alterations'. This included the statement of Assistant Chief Constable Walter Jackson, who 'had not included any of the details of the planning of the match'.

¶2.11.25 On 7 May, ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright submitting a request from LJ Taylor for written recollections from more SYP officers.15 Officers had been selected because of the SYP 'operation order which identifies those police officers who were likely to be at Leppings Lane end, both inside and outside the ground'. Counsel to the Inquiry was keen to obtain 'as many written submissions as possible' prior to the opening of the hearings on 15 May 1989.

¶2.11.26 ACC Jones wrote that the 'invitation to submit written recollections follows the same criteria as for the senior officers before, in that there will be no interviews just requests to which the officer will be free to decide what he or she wishes to do'.

¶2.11.27 On 9 May, C/Supt Denton consulted Mr Metcalf.16 Mr Metcalf's note of the conversation recorded that WMP's request for statements concerned 120 officers of whom 100 had already provided an account to SYP. Outstanding accounts would be provided specifically for WMP, while 'for the others, there would need to be some scrutiny of the existing documents'. Many 'might be suitable to be handed on without further ado' but 'those which included comment or matters of speculation would probably have to be redone'.

¶2.11.28 A letter from C/Supt Denton to Mr Metcalf recorded that the solicitor had 'agreed to vet' the requested recollections.17 A note from C/Supt Wain to the SYP Incident Room confirmed the process: 'Nothing currently in our possession will be released to W/Mids until it has been vetted by our legal representatives'.18

13. ACC Jones, WMP, to CC Wright, SYP, 29 April 1989, SYP000096900001, p11. 14. Notes written by Peter Metcalf on conversations with SYP officers, 29 April 1989 to 2 May 1989, attached to letter to

¶Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, HOM000037560001, pp4-7. 15. Letter from ACC Jones to CC Wright, 7 May 1989, SYP000096900001, p39. 16. Attendance notes written by Peter Metcalf on discussions with SYP held on 9 May 1989, attached to letter to Lord

¶Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, HOM000037560001, p9. 17. Letter from C/Supt Denton to Peter Metcalf, 9 May 1989, HOM000030840001, p29. 18. Note from C/Supt Wain to the Incident Room, 10 May 1989, HOM000030840001, p30.

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¶2.11.29 Hundreds of officers' recollections were vetted, continuing into June. For SYP, the process was led by C/Supt Denton. Mr Metcalf undertook the key role on behalf of Hammond Suddards. The correspondence between SYP and Hammond Suddards concerning individual officers' recollections was substantial and conducted primarily by fax.19

¶The consolidation of the review and alteration process 2.11.30 The process of allowing self-taken statements was expanded to include officers from other forces on duty at Hillsborough, including those from Merseyside Police. A letter from ACC Jones of the WMP investigation team to the Chief Constable of Merseyside, Sir Kenneth Oxford, stated that the invitation to 'submit written recollections is based on criteria that I have already adopted with South Yorkshire Police officers'.20

¶2.11.31 There would be 'no interviews just simple requests to which the officer will be free to decide what he or she wishes to say'. ACC Jones noted that CC Wright had requested copies of the recollections, and Counsel for the Taylor Inquiry had 'no objections'.

¶2.11.32 On 23 May, SYP Assistant Chief Constable Stuart Anderson circulated two updates on the progress of inquiries into Hillsborough.21 The first focused on the Taylor Inquiry. The second was in response to SYP officers' concerns 'about alterations being made to their original statements prior to submission to West Midlands Police'.

¶2.11.33 ACC Anderson described the process: Hammond Suddards 'initially requested that all officers directly concerned should, as soon as possible, prepare a note of their recollections, in the form of a statement, including matters of comment and impression, whether or not this amounted to evidence'.

¶2.11.34 He stated that SYP had been advised subsequently by WMP that 'it would be appreciated if South Yorkshire Police officers, who were at Hillsborough, could effectively prepare their own factual statements for submission to the Inquiry'. This was agreed.

¶2.11.35 The 'obvious way of proceeding' was to 'look at the statements which had been initially prepared at our request, on the basis that if matters of hearsay and comment could be removed, these would be suitable as the factual statements requested by the West Midlands Police'.

¶2.11.36 ACC Anderson wrote that 'statements for submission to our own Counsel were intended to have an entirely different purpose to those submitted to West Midlands Police'. Initial recollections had 'contained a mixture of fact, conjecture and opinion'. Thus 'editing them for use as a factual statement by the Inquiry' necessitated the removal by the solicitors of 'conjecture and opinion', leaving 'only matters of fact'.

¶2.11.37 As all statements 'submitted to the Inquiry may be taken into account in reaching conclusions, whether or not the officer making the statement is called as a witness', it 'follows that the statements must contain only direct factual observations, as opposed to matters of impression'. ACC Anderson's note concluded: 'No amended statement will be submitted to the West Midlands Police until it has been seen, approved and signed by the officer making it'.

19. For example, at HOM000030840001 from p34. 20. Letter from ACC Jones to CC Oxford, 11 May 1989, SYP000017680001, p4. 21. 'The Hillsborough Inquiry – Update I', by ACC Anderson, 23 May 1989, SYP000097520001, pp11-14 and 'The

¶Hillsborough Inquiry – Update II' by ACC Anderson, 23 May 1989, SYP000097540001, p8.

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¶2.11.38 An early version of ACC Anderson's note, drafted by Mr Metcalf of solicitors Hammond Suddards, sheds additional light on the likely focus of the vetting process. Statements could be taken into account by LJ Taylor in reaching his conclusions, 'whether or not the Officer making that statement is called as a witness'.22

¶2.11.39 This could mean that criticisms made of 'other Officers, senior or junior' might be accepted by the Inquiry without being challenged in cross-examination. To prevent this from occurring, Mr Metcalf proposed that any statements containing such criticism 'should not be allowed to stand'.

¶2.11.40 Documents relating to a breakdown in the vetting process demonstrate that WMP and the Treasury Solicitor's Department were aware that alterations were being made to police recollections prior to their submission as formal statements.23

¶2.11.41 A letter from WMP's ACC Jones reminded David Brummell, an official at the Treasury Solicitor's Department, that 'because of the slowness of the supply of written recollections from South Yorkshire Police Officers, it was agreed that we would take from them their initial submissions which would be later superseded by their signed final versions, after they had been checked by their appropriate legal advice'.24

¶2.11.42 ACC Jones stated that he had 'personally made an undertaking with the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police that only the final versions would be the ones used in the Public Inquiry and this was after discussion with you'. At the Inquiry, however, an officer had been 'referred to his initial submission which contained opinion that had subsequently been removed from his final account'. Given the undertaking made by ACC Jones to SYP that only amended statements would be submitted, he 'would hope that this would not happen in the future'.

¶2.11.43 In reply, Mr Brummell wrote that the main difference between the 'initial and final versions' of SYP officers' statements was that 'expressions of opinion were (as I understand it, on the advice of [SYP Counsel] Mr Woodward) removed from the final version'.25

¶2.11.44 Yet it was the view of Andrew Collins QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, that 'there is absolutely no reason for excluding such expressions of opinion' where they touched on 'matters relevant to the Public Inquiry'. The Inquiry had in fact 'no objection in principle to written statements containing such opinion being submitted'.

¶2.11.45 Despite this view, and following the undertaking given by ACC Jones to the SYP Chief Constable, it was agreed that it would be inappropriate to use an 'original statement for the purpose of the Inquiry when this has been superseded by a subsequent statement'. Regarding the specific case, the final version of the statement had not been received in time and the original had been used. Mr Brummell wrote that 'I trust that this problem will not recur in the future'.

¶2.11.46 This exchange of letters demonstrates that the team supporting LJ Taylor was aware that SYP statements were reviewed and altered to remove 'expressions of opinion'. Mr Brummell's letter, however, indicated that the Inquiry considered there was 'absolutely no reason' for amendments. Yet the process was clearly not considered improper and no objections were raised.

22. Draft 'Hillsborough Update', SYP000160270001, p5. 23. The section below related to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny, however, suggests that WMP may not have been aware of the extent of the changes made. 24. Letter from ACC Jones to David Brummell, Treasury Solicitor, 7 June 1989, SYP000096900001, p44. 25. Letter from David Brummell to ACC Jones, 7 June 1989, SYP000096900001, p46.

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¶The form of amendments 2.11.47 The full extent of the review and alteration process can be appreciated only through consideration of all statements disclosed to the Panel and placed in the Hillsborough Archive. While there are numerous examples of statements that underwent review and alteration, what follows considers the reasons adopted by SYP and their solicitors for the process and its significance.

¶2.11.48 It uses illustrative examples drawn from the statements presented under collective headings: grammatical clarification, redundant language and jargon; informal or coarse language; criticisms of the police response or inadequate leadership; poor communications or inadequate radio contact; deletion of references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' or 'confusion'; and abusive criticism of supporters.

¶Grammatical clarification, redundant language and jargon 2.11.49 These amendments included incorrect grammar, syntax, redundant words, removal of parts of the text using Police Force 'jargon' or informal or coarse language to describe particular processes, punctuation, omission of obvious words, and rectification of mistakes (e.g. correction of an officer's mistaken reference to the game between 'Sheffield Wednesday and Liverpool').26

¶2.11.50 There appear to be a total of 194 statements identified for amendment. In 30 cases, changes related solely to this category. In these cases, the amendments did not alter the material content nor change the meaning of the statement.

¶2.11.51 For example the statement: 'I was approached by reporters from Radio Sheffield & Hallam that the then Lord Mayor Mrs Smith had requested that they attend the directors suit [sic] in order to speak to her and that she was to give an interview to them on what had taken place' was amended to read: 'I was informed by two reporters from Radio Sheffield & Hallam that the then Lord Mayor Mrs Smith had requested that they attend the directors suite in order to speak to her and that she was to give an interview to them on what had taken place'.27

¶2.11.52 The following amendment is a typical example of the elimination of 'redundant' words: 'Further to the [my] account given by me regarding my involvement' (deletions in text).28 Force jargon was clarified for the lay-reader, for example a reference to 'C & C' was amended to 'Command and Control'.29 Similarly 'via XS' was amended to 'via force control'.30

¶Informal or coarse language 2.11.53 A total of 164 statements were marked for amendments more substantial than simple corrections. Of these, 22 were amended to remove coarse or informal language.31

26. Statement of Sergeant David Batty (unamended), 17 May 1989, SYP000101600001, p1. 27. Statement of PC June Kirk (unamended), undated, SYP000104450001, p2. Amended version: SYP000108290001, p3. 28. Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 29 April 1989, SYP000117780001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000100430001. 29. Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 29 April 1989, SYP000117780001, p1. Amended version:

¶SYP000100430001. 30. Additional Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 7 July 1989, SYP000117780001, p4. Amended version: SYP000100430001. 31. Note that in many cases statements were amended for a number of reasons.

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¶2.11.54 An officer's statement referred to a fan who had been drinking: 'He had a can of beer in his hand. It was open and he was shaking it causing the contents to spray about. I took it off him and binned it. He then started to insult and abuse me and relate circumstances to the miners [sic] strike. I bollocked him and he was dragged away [deletion in text]'.

¶2.11.55 The final sentence was replaced by: 'I remonstrated with him, and he was taken away by his fellow supporters'.32 Similarly, expletives were removed: 'The gym was to put it bluntly fucking awful and I'll never forget the sight of the bodies dumped all over'.33

¶Police response or inadequate leadership 2.11.56 Beyond the issues of language, more significant alterations were made changing the meaning or balance of statements. Some 116 of the 164 substantially amended statements removed or altered comments unfavourable to SYP. These included 41 statements in which alterations downplayed or removed criticisms made by officers of their leadership and of the police response to the disaster. These commonly included any indication or impression that senior officers had lost control of events, or that they were ill-equipped to respond to the unfolding tragedy. The amendments also frequently included deletions of references relevant to the failure to effectively monitor the pens and close the tunnel once Gate C was opened, as discussed in Chapter 3 from paragraph 2.3.121.

¶2.11.57 The following account had the first sentence deleted:

¶I at no time heard any directions being given in terms of leadership. The only messages I heard were those requesting assistance of one sort or another, and where appropriate, their acknowledgements.34

¶2.11.58 Similarly, an observation about the role of senior management was deleted:

¶I have to state that even at this stage and this location and with a number of higher ranks in the area nobody seemed to be organising the injured.35

¶2.11.59 Police Constable John Hood was critical of sergeants and inspectors and the following was deleted from his original statement:

¶Sergeants and Inspectors appeared to be aimlessly milling about and direct radio control appeared to be lost. There did not appear to be any leadership.36

¶2.11.60 Police Constable Maxwell Groome's observation that 'The Control Room seemed to have been hit by some sort of paralysis' was deleted.37 Concerned by what he identified as poor management overall, he considered the decision to replace C/Supt Mole as match commander shortly before the match should be scrutinised. The following material was deleted:

32. Statement of PC Kevin Smallman (unamended), 30 April 1989, SYP000118000001, p3. Amended version:

¶SYP000100530001. 33. Statement of PC Gary Cammock (unamended), 8 May 1989, SYP000119990001, p10. Amended version:

¶SYP000101040001, p9. 34. Statement of PC Stephen Mercer (unamended), 27 April 1989, SYP000116760001, p7. Amended version:

¶SYP000100140001, p5. 35. Statement of PC Kenneth Frost (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117100001, p5. Amended version:

¶SYP000100220001, p5. 36. Statement of PC John Hood (unamended), 17 May 1989, SYP000120660001, p2. Amended version:

¶SYP00008153000, p5. 37. Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended), 4 May 1989, SYP000113620001, p4. Amended version:

¶SYP000078330001, p6.

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¶(7) The decision to replace Chief Superintendent Mole before the semi-final needs to come under some scrutiny. This man had many years experience of policing big matches at Hillsborough.

¶(8) Compared to other semi-finals held at Hillsborough, the organisation of this event was poor, as has been the case for most of the season. Too little notice had been taken of current trends and football intelligence and too much reliance has been placed upon previous information held.

¶(9) Too many non-operational supervisory officers were in charge of important and critical parts of the football ground.

¶(10) The deployment of officers around the crucial time needs to come under scrutiny, too many were sat around in the gymnasium whilst others were rushed off their feet.38

¶2.11.61 His statement was one of those most extensively altered. In his initial version he stated:

¶It was noticeable that the only supervisory officers above the rank of Inspector on the pitch were Chief Inspectors Beal and Sumner and Superintendent Greenwood.

¶Certain supervisory officers were conspicuous by their absence. It was utter chaos.

¶2.11.62 Altered, this read 'On the pitch were Chief Inspectors Beal and Sumner and Superintendent Greenwood'.39 A three-paragraph deletion included PC Groome's comments regarding the overcrowding in the central pens, the failure to delay the kick-off, the reduction in police numbers compared with the 1988 Semi-Final and the pressures on Control Room staff.

¶2.11.63 While these latter concerns reflected his broader opinion of events on the day and policing Hillsborough, his commentary on senior officers' presence or absence was his observation of appropriate police leadership and response.

¶2.11.64 Alterations to Police Constable Alan Wadsworth's original recollection also removed criticism of senior officers. The following passage was deleted:

¶There was no leadership at the Leppings Lane end following the disaster either in person or on the radio. The only officer I heard on the radio with any form of organisation and method was Ch Supt Nesbit who did not arrive until later.40

¶2.11.65 References made by five officers to disorganisation in the police response were altered or removed from their recollections. The following deletion is indicative:

¶Through out [sic] the time I was on the pitch or at the rear of the stand I saw no officer above the rank of sergeant other than Ch Insp Beal who was attempting to organise action on the playing area.41

38. Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended), 4 May 1989, SYP000113620001, pp6-7. Amended version:

¶SYP000078330001, p8. 39. Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended), 4 May 1989, SYP000113620001, pp4-5. Amended version:

¶SYP000078330001, p7. 40. Statement of PC Alan Wadsworth (unamended), undated, SYP000101960001, p7. Amended version:

¶SYP000108020001, p7. 41. Statement of PC Morledge (unamended), undated, SYP000102770001, p3. Amended version: SYP000108180001, p5.

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¶2.11.66 Several officers explicitly criticised the lack of coordination in the police response to the emergent crisis. References to senior officers' failure to coordinate the response were removed from these statements, including those of Inspector Derek Burgess who stated that, although urgent assistance had been requested, there was no officer 'of senior rank … co-ordinating such assistance'.42

¶2.11.67 Police Constable Philip Foster noted: 'No one was co-ordinating what we should do or saying where to go'.43 His original recollection was altered to read: 'I could not see anyone co-ordinating what we should do or saying where to go'.44 This change in emphasis was, in fact, a change in meaning.

¶2.11.68 Police Constable David Frost's emotional and graphic account was heavily edited, including the following deletion:

¶Notice for the first time the gaffers are now about. Where have they been. Why was the organisation so late. Thought. Anyway, good to see them in with the lads.45

¶Poor communications or inadequate radio contact 2.11.69 In managing the safety and regulation of large crowds, effective and efficient communication between police officers, including contact with others involved in stewarding, is imperative. This is particularly significant in the event of an emergency and the mobilisation of a previously agreed and rehearsed incident plan. In the aftermath of the disaster, poor communication between officers, the inadequate number of police radios available to those on duty, and the ineffectiveness of the radios that were working were frequently cited in officers' recollections. Such comments were regularly altered, amended or deleted.

¶2.11.70 These alterations minimised the difficulties officers experienced in communicating with one another and with match commanders as the emergency unfolded. In 48 instances, officers' statements were amended to remove or alter comments about the unavailability or inadequacy of police radios, and/or poor communication between senior SYP officers and the lower ranks deployed inside and outside the stadium.

¶2.11.71 In his initial account, Police Constable Keith Bradley referred to problems with radio communication and lack of direction from senior management. It was altered substantially. His original recollection read:

¶As it became obvious what had happened those of us attempting to keep some sort of order outside the ground, and keep the way clear for emergency vehicles, were subjected to a non stop torrent of vehement verbal abuse and threats from a good proportion of the crowd by now leaving the ground, this was a frightening situation as we were by now vastly outnumbered by a potentially hostile mass of distressed people. No officer senior or otherwise, came to inform us of what had happened, we were deflecting the insults, threats and abuse, basically still being unaware of what exactly had happened. Radio traffic was non existent all through this time, as was a lack of direction from supervisory officers.46

42. Statement of Insp Derek Burgess (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000119100001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000075060001, p8. 43. Statement of PC Philip Foster (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000118880001, p6. 44. Statement of PC Philip Foster (amended version), 3 May 1989, SYP000100700001, p6. 45. Statement of PC David Frost (unamended), 9 May 1989, SYP000120140001, p5. 46. Statement of PC Keith Bradley (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000111360001, p3.

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¶2.11.72 The altered version read:

¶As it became obvious what had happened those of us attempting to keep some sort of order outside the ground, and keep the way clear for emergency vehicles, were subjected to a non stop torrent of vehement verbal abuse and threats from a good proportion of the crowd by now leaving the ground, this was a frightening situation as we were by now vastly outnumbered by a potentially hostile mass of distressed people. We were deflecting the insults, threats and abuse, still being unaware of what exactly had happened. Radio messages being passed were more difficult to understand all through this time.47

¶2.11.73 The original recollection was unequivocal, asserting that radio traffic was 'non existent'. Yet this was deleted and the amended version altered the meaning by stating that radio messages were sent but difficult to understand. The amended version also removed reference to the 'lack of direction from supervisory officers'.

¶2.11.74 Reproducing these paragraphs in full demonstrates a further significant issue in the process – the removal of conjecture or opinion was highly selective and officers' comments on the hostility of the crowd remained as a statement of fact.

¶2.11.75 Police Constable Philip Dexter's recollections affirmed a breakdown in the command structure inside the stadium. Instructions and directions were not passed from management to officers:

¶I have only one observation to make on the events on the game, and that was the lack of communication whilst inside the ground. I did not know what was going on.48

¶2.11.76 This observation was deleted. Police Constable James Grant considered the rescue operation could have been carried out more effectively if 'more radios had been issued to officers – communication was very poor and consequently supervision of officers near impossible'.49 This was deleted.

¶2.11.77 Police Constable Kevin Bennett made several references to the lack of instruction from management and the poor state of radio communications, each of which was removed from his initial recollections. He referred to the build-up of the crowd at approximately 2.45pm, 15 minutes before the kick-off scheduled for 3pm. He described the scene as follows (deletions in text):

¶At around 2.45 p.m. the crowding became intense and shoulder to shoulder pushing and heaving was taking place. Still no one appeared to know what they were heading for and little, if any, instructions were coming from senior officers.50

¶2.11.78 He stated that, during this time, his personal radio was operational, but few instructions from senior management were forthcoming. His comment was amended significantly: 'I had with me my personal radio but very little instruction was coming from the control room within the ground'. The amended version of his recollection stated only that 'it was difficult to hear transmissions'. Yet this reference was not in the original.51

47. Statement of PC Keith Bradley (amended version), SYP000085350001, p5. 48. Statement of PC Philip Dexter (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117400001, p5. Amended version:

¶SYP000082190001, p6. 49. Statement of PC James Grant (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117490001, p8. Amended version:

¶SYP000100360001, p7. 50. Statement of PC Kevin Bennett (unamended), 9 May 1989, SYP000120000001, p7. 51. Statement of PC Kevin Bennett (amended version), SYP000082950001, p7.

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¶2.11.79 Inspector John Townend's initial recollection was highly critical of communications and the following passage was deleted from his statement:

¶Feeling of frustration of not being aware of what was happening. Radio useless.

¶P. A. announcements not utilised at all. Information and full extent learned from coach parties who were listening to local radio and then informing us. (Serial 34/35).52

¶2.11.80 It was replaced by the following, deleting his direct criticisms:

¶It was difficult to ascertain exactly what was happening within the ground. There was a lot of noise and confusion in the ground and Police Radio messages were indecipherable. I did not hear any announcements over the Public Address System at the ground.53

¶2.11.81 Police Constable Peter Finnerty's statement included comments regarding inadequate communications and leadership and was marked up for amendment. But a handwritten note by Police Constable Ken Greenway referred to difficulties in persuading PC Finnerty to change his statement.

¶2.11.82 The SYP process, as it had developed by August 1989 when more statements were subjected to review, was clear from the following lengthy account written by PC Greenway:

¶He appeared reluctant to change any part of the statement stating that if we had not wanted opinion and comment in we should have made that point early on ...

¶I explained to Finnerty that we had the only copies of his report and these did not go to W/Mids or anywhere else until they had been checked and signed by the officer making the statement and a supervisory [sic] checking the contents. He asked for his federation representative to be present. [Name redacted – Police Federation representative] ... accepts ... we should not be handing ammunition to our opponents.

¶I have given Finnerty a few days to mull this over in his mind.54

¶Deletion of references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' or 'confusion' 2.11.83 Twenty-three officers had references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' and 'confusion' altered or deleted from their original recollections. Five officers had references to 'chaos' deleted. Nine officers' statements were amended to remove the word 'panic' and there were 11 deletions of the word 'confusion'.55

¶2.11.84 A brief, undated, note to officers with guidance on how to complete statements illustrates the policy underpinning these alterations. The note states that 'no CRITICISMS' should be 'levelled at anyone in the text of your summary'. Further, there 'should be no mention of the word CHAOTIC or any of its derivatives which would give rise to the assumption that complete control had been lost at the ground ... All these items come from the express wish of DI King'.56

52. Statement of Inspector John Townend (unamended), 17 April 1989 in text, 29 April 1989 as completed statement,

¶SYP000117950001, pp6-7. 53. Statement of Inspector John Townend (amended version), SYP000100500001, p5. 54. Undated handwritten note by PC Ken Greenway, SYP000096870001, pp33-35. 55. Note that statements are frequently amended multiple times. This explains why the sum of these numbers is greater than the 23 quoted above. 56. Undated note on statement gathering, SYP000096870001, p448.

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¶2.11.85 Police Constable Glyn Dunn had a significant section of his initial account deleted as follows:

¶It appeared to me this year that one single senior officer appeared to be attempting to take control of the situation, that could at times be only called chaotic. I am also surprised that from the position of the ground control room, that no one in there could see what was happening inside the Leppings Lane stand and that officers on the perimeter of the pitch were unable to assess the situation correctly and out swiftly from it.57

¶2.11.86 The following sentence was deleted from Police Constable Martin McLoughlin's original recollection: 'As time went on this became thousands of people leaving the ground, streaming onto Penistone Road, which was full of ambulances etc. Basically it was chaos'.58

¶2.11.87 The following passage was deleted from an officer's statement, including sentences that had already been edited:

¶The messages being passed became more and more frantic and Repeated requests were made to have the gates in that area opened to avoid what the officer making this request called 'a disaster'. It was shortly after this [sic] after the requests were becoming more and more urgent. and a note of real fear and panic was in the voice of the officer requesting this that We started to travel from where we were ...59

¶2.11.88 References to 'panic' were also removed or altered, many of which pertained specifically to panic among the senior officers on duty. The following paragraph was deleted:

¶The thing that strikes in my mind about those first few minutes is the state of panic that appeared to set in and apparently overcame senior officers. The command structure of the force totally broke down for several minutes and no one appeared to grasp the severity of the situation and take command. Everyone was busy doing his own thing and that didn't help or anything.60

¶2.11.89 A reference to Superintendent Roger Marshall's request to the Control Box to open exit gates was removed from an officer's statement: 'Once outside, rear of South Stand, heard Supt. Marshall on radio requesting permission to open gates. Voice full of panic'.61

¶2.11.90 Similarly, another officer's account was altered: 'It became apparent to me that something serious was happening at the Leppings Lane end of the ground because what transmissions I could hear on the radio now had a real feeling of urgency and sometimes panic in them'.62 The emphasis shifted from 'panic' to 'urgency'.

57. Statement of PC Glyn Dunn (unamended), 9 May 1989, SYP000101060001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000101060001, p14. 58. Statement of PC Martin McLoughlin (unamended), undated, SYP000101420001, p2. Amended version:

¶SYP000107890001, p3. 59. Statement of PC Mark Hone (unamended), undated, SYP000103240001, p1. Amended version: SYP000083940001, p4. 60. Statement of PC SR Smith (unamended), 17 May 1989, SYP000120650001, pp6-7. Amended version:

¶SYP000101220001, p5. 61. Statement of Inspector Trevor Harvey (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000118840001, p3. Amended version:

¶SYP000100680001, p3. 62. Statement of PC Joy Dearden (unamended), undated, SYP000102570001, p3. Amended version: SYP000108140001, p2.

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¶2.11.91 References to confusion were also deleted. The following deletion, from PC Stephen Sapsford's account, is indicative:

¶My overwhelming reaction to the incident is one of utter confusion I personally did not hear any radio communication regarding any orders. I can also recall that I did not see any of the Sheffield Wednesday stewards during the incident.63

¶Removal or amendment of material critical of fans 2.11.92 As noted previously, 116 of 164 substantially amended statements had comments unfavourable to SYP removed or altered. In 33 cases officers' statements which criticised Liverpool fans were amended.

¶2.11.93 For example, Police Constable Hemsworth's account made derogatory references to Liverpool fans, which were deleted. He stated: 'One could not communicate with these animals as they continued to push'.64 The word 'animals' was replaced by 'people'.65 Liverpool fans, he claimed, were uncooperative: '... it was hopeless; the louts would not cooperate' [deletions in text]66 Altered, the sentence read: '... it was hopeless; the hooligan element amongst the supporters would not cooperate'.67

¶2.11.94 Occasionally, references to fans who had been drinking were removed. Sergeant Michael Long, for example, had the following comment removed and altered from his original recollection:

¶I asked what was the matter, and the St John's man said he [a supporter] was upset by what he had seen. I remember feeling very angry, because it was drunken rabble like him that was responsible for causing trouble at matches and would no doubt have been a primary cause of this tragedy. I remember picking him up and ejecting him from the ground.68

¶2.11.95 Altered, this read:

¶I asked what was the matter, and the St John's man said he [a supporter] was upset by what he had seen. I found this hard to believe.69

¶Comment and opinion 2.11.96 The stated rationale for the review and alteration of police statements was the removal of comment and opinion in order to provide 'factual' accounts of police officers' experiences. While many amendments related to 'comment and opinion', the deletion of such material was inconsistent and selective.

¶2.11.97 As part of the vetting process, Mr Metcalf named several officers who had made 'comments about the severity of the crushing outside the turnstiles in 1988'.70 He stated that the comments were 'not particularly helpful to our case, but if they represent factual recollections then they will probably have to stay in'.

63. Statement of PC Stephen Sapsford (unamended), undated, SYP000102970001, pp2-3. 64. Statement of PC Hemsworth (unamended), 16 May 1989, SYP000120600001, p5. 65. Statement of PC Hemsworth (amended version), SYP000101210001, p3. 66. Statement of PC Hemsworth (unamended), 16 May 1989, SYP000120600001, p5. 67. Statement of PC Hemsworth (amended version), SYP000101210001, p3. 68. Statement of Sergeant Michael Long (unamended), undated, SYP000102750001, p5. 69. Statement of Sergeant Michael Long (amended version), SYP000108170001, p3. 70. Hammond Suddards (referenced PCM [Mr Metcalf]) to D Denton, 12 June 1989, SYP000096870001, p71.

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¶2.11.98 But they could be 'qualified in one or more of the following ways'. First could be a 'clear comment to the effect that the ingress of mounted officers eased the problem'. Second, an 'indication that the problem was relatively short-lived, e.g. by 2.45 p.m. the crush had eased, if this is the case'; and finally, 'an indication that the Officers have watched the 1988 and 1989 videos and that the 1988 situation was clearly not as bad as that in 1989'.

¶2.11.99 In another example, Inspector John Harvey's statement was reviewed and the following deletion requested:

¶Many many officers, some of whom I have mentioned, carried out acts worthy of the highest praise. If I may be allowed to select one individual officer whose actions were outstanding for his command of the situation, organisation and physical effort, then

¶I select Chief Supt Nesbit, Operations and Traffic Division.71

¶2.11.100 In another officer's statement, however, the following personal observation and opinion remained untouched:

¶From what I witnessed inside the terraced end of the West Stand, I can only visualise as mass hysteria. I am positive that many of these fans were not aware of being trampled, crushed or killed OR if aware, did not care. Perhaps on reflection they became animals, fighting for survival in the heavy atmosphere being created by body heat.72

¶2.11.101 In PC Grant's recollection, the following was retained:

¶I am aware that it is inevitable that there will be criticism of various aspects of the incident at Hillsborough. I feel, however, that given the circumstances, the decisions taken, particularly in relation to opening gates were correct. I fully support them and feel it was the only course of action to take.

¶There is little point in 'iffing' and 'butting' about Police action. The circumstances were something that could never have been prepared for and I am sure if it happened tomorrow, most officers would behave in the same manner. Very little, if anything, could have been done to prevent the tragedy.73

¶2.11.102 Yet the following sentence was deleted:

¶However I feel that the rescue operation may have flowed more smoothly if more radios had been issued to officers – communication was very poor and consequently supervision of officers near impossible.

¶2.11.103 In the recollection provided by PC Robert Burkinshaw, the following paragraph was marked for deletion:

¶Again I have heard other officers' comments about the policing outside the ground which include statements that there was no other option open to Mr Marshall but to open the gate and relieve the pressure on the wall. Others have commented that there were not enough officers outside the ground at that point to cope with the numbers arriving. These were no doubt depleted by the taking of prisoners. The general feeling is that the …74 71. Recollection of Inspector John Harvey, 3 May 1989, SYP000118840001, p10. 72. Statement of PS Robert Burns, 23 May 1989, SYP000068510001, p14. 73. Recollection of PC Grant, 28 April 1989, SYP000117490001, pp7-8. 74. Recollection of PC Robert Burkinshaw, 4 May 1989, SYP000119290001, p10.

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¶2.11.104 Yet part of the final sentence was retained and reconstructed as a discrete sentence:

¶The fans arrived too late, and a lot of them under the influence of drink, to get into the ground in time for the kick off.

¶2.11.105 Thus his 'general feeling' was transformed into a factual statement. Finally, Police Constable Anthony Lang's recollection was amended as follows:

¶From what I could see throughout the incident the problem seemed to stem from the large number of people attending outside the ground at the same time. But when the gate was opened I felt at the time that we had transferred the problem into the ground and we would need a lot more PC's to control it.75

¶The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny 2.11.106 As discussed in Part 1 of this Report, the terms of reference of the Scrutiny of Evidence committed Lord Justice Stuart-Smith to 'ascertain whether any evidence exists relating to the disaster' that was not made available to the Taylor Inquiry, the Director of Public Prosections (DPP) or the Attorney General, or to the SYP Chief Constable (concerning 'disciplinary matters'). He was asked to advise whether any such evidence might provide grounds for a further public inquiry, for prosecution or disciplinary action or 'any other action which should be taken in the public interest'.76

¶2.11.107 In the course of his Scrutiny, LJ Stuart-Smith considered the 'facts surrounding the obtaining of statements from South Yorkshire police officers', establishing that over a period of five weeks from May to June 1989 'in excess of 400 statements written by South Yorkshire officers were submitted to the solicitors'.77 LJ Stuart-Smith commented that the process adopted initially was 'confidential'; an 'evidence gathering operation for the information of the legal advisers' who 'would choose what they wanted to leave in or out'.

¶2.11.108 Aware of the process, therefore, LJ Stuart-Smith wrote to Peter Metcalf of Hammond Suddards on 18 October 1997, concerning his role:

¶It appears that individual police officers were asked to write out in their own words on plain paper their recollections of events of the day, including comment and impressions. When statements were required by the West Midlands Police for the purpose of Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry, these original statements were forwarded to your firm and certain amendments were made, excluding in the main comment and impressions. These amended statements were intended to form the basis of Criminal

¶Justice Act statements for submission to Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry.78

¶2.11.109 He questioned 'why this approach was adopted':

¶Who considered it desirable to have police officers' comments and impressions, and why? It has been suggested to me that this was a departure from the usual procedure whereby police officers would make up their note books, then draft a CJA [Criminal

¶Justice Act] statement. Could you also let me know if any police officers refused to sign amended statements or the CJA statements based on them.

75. Recollection of PC Anthony Lang, 5 May 1989, SYP000119720001, p5. 76. The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp6-7. 77. The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp85-86. 78. Letter from Lord Justice Stuart-Smith to Peter Metcalf, 28 October 1997, SYP000096290001, p6.

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¶2.11.110 Mr Metcalf replied on 11 November 1997, informing LJ Stuart-Smith that he believed the process originated from a meeting held by SYP officers on 17 April 1989, the minutes of which have been disclosed to the Panel. Mr Metcalf stressed that he was 'not present' at the meeting and could not 'say whether officers were specifically asked to include comment and impression'.79 He wrote:

¶It is correct that when the West Midlands Police asked for statements from particular officers the self taken statements for those officers were forwarded to me. I read through the statements and made comments by fax to Chief Superintendent Denton.

¶I did not amend any statements. Where my comments suggested changes, these were principally removal of comment and impression. They also included suggestions to re-address apparent contradictions or ambiguities, to consider removal of evidence about events after the officers had gone off duty and, on occasions, to reconsider intemperate language.

¶2.11.111 Mr Metcalf stated that he was unaware of the procedure adopted by SYP on receipt of such advice, nor was he aware of officers who had refused to sign amended statements. He assumed that officers had signed amended statements, or they 'went to West Midlands in their original form'.80

¶2.11.112 The Scrutiny also sought the views of the WMP investigation, and wrote to Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster, who had a senior role within the criminal investigation. Det C/Supt Foster confirmed that he, the Treasury Solicitor and Lord Justice Taylor's team within the Home Office had been aware that SYP statements were being considered by their legal advisers and that it 'was accepted that Counsel representing SYP would advise the Force on the removal of expression of opinions to keep statements factual'.81

¶2.11.113 He stated that 'West Midlands Police were not party to the 'vetting' of the SYP statements but would have expected all factual evidence to be retained in the final version'. To his knowledge, however, WMP had not undertaken any 'dip check or sample to ensure this was the case'.

¶2.11.114 The Scrutiny provided Det C/Supt Foster with six sample amended statements, and in his letter he provided comments on the alterations. In five of the six cases, Det C/Supt Foster considered that alterations were inappropriate.82 For example, the following paragraph was removed from Police Constable Powell's statement:

¶The first thing I said was 'Where are all the bobbies, there's hardly anybody there.'

¶I saw numerous people climbing over the tops of the turnstiles and the few Police

¶Officers that I saw appeared to be doing nothing about it. My main observation at this point was the lack of Police presence. I couldn't understand how such a large crowd could have possibly gathered. I recall in previous games there was usually a large

¶Police presence concentrated on this part of the ground usually forming some sort of cordon.83

79. Letter from Peter Metcalf to Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, SYP000096290001, p9. 80. Letter from Peter Metcalf to Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, SYP000096290001, p11. 81. Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone, 17 December 1997, HOM000030920001, pp1-2. 82. In the sixth he offered no comment, since West Midlands Police had originally received both the amended and unamended versions of the statement. 83. PC Powell's recollection, 30 April 1989, SYP000112300001, pp3-4.

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¶2.11.115 Det C/Supt Foster commented on this deletion as follows:

¶I would have expected this to be left in especially where it refers to previous games and the forming of the cordon.84

¶2.11.116 Police Constable John Woodcock's statement was subject to an extensive deletion, including the following text:

¶I saw Inspector Harry White at the de-brief. He told me that his serial usually got the job of putting the crowd in the different pens at the rear of the goal mouth, working from the outside to the centre, but for some reason he'd been told to let the fans find their own level, on this occasion, resulting in too many going into the area immediately behind the goal. I could tell he was distressed by what had happened.85

¶2.11.117 Det C/Supt Foster commented as follows:

¶I can understand this being seen as opinion and hearsay, but of course it may have been valuable to the Investigation team in respect of Inspector White and his observation if that were not already known. I question the objectivity here of the person vetting. In fairness, a legal representative would not look at this as I would.86

¶2.11.118 In the conclusion to his letter to LJ Stuart-Smith, Det C/Supt Foster wrote that:

¶On reflection, it seems to me the original 'vetting' was focused on producing factual statements although from the examples sent, the omissions generally centre on police officers and their actions or lack of action. I imagine this was based upon Counsel for

¶SYP representing the best interests of the Force and individuals.

¶a. As far as the [West Midlands] Investigating Team were concerned, the objective of the Investigation was to seek the truth about how the disaster happened. Few officers have experienced such investigations but ALL relevant information can be of value, whether it is factual or opinion …

¶2.11.119 LJ Stuart-Smith's report did not reflect these comments. Yet it echoed another view presented by Det C/Supt Foster: 'I am confident not only from examining these sample statements, but from the thoroughness of the investigation, that [t]his has not had any bearing on the evidence gathered and presented to the Coroner, the DPP or the Police Complaints Authority'.

¶2.11.120 This view – that the amendment of the statements had not affected the outcome of the investigation and all relevant issues had been considered fully – closely reflected LJ Stuart-Smith's eventual conclusions.

¶Discussions with South Yorkshire Police 2.11.121 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny team also contacted individual SYP officers to obtain further information about the review and alteration process. On 7 January 1998, Chris Bone, the Scrutiny Secretary, wrote to a SYP Police Constable enquiring about the circumstances in which SYP statements were reviewed and altered. The Scrutiny was interested particularly

84. Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone, 17 December 1997, HOM000030920001, p2. 85. Statement of PC John Woodcock, 5 May 1989, SYP000119850001. 86. Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone, 17 December 1997, HOM000030920001, p3.

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¶in 'the extent to which officers … were reluctant/and or put under pressure' to change their statements.87

¶2.11.122 Mr Bone stated that his was an 'unusual request' which could put the officer in 'some difficulty especially given that we have unavoidably had to contact you via South Yorkshire Police'. The officer replied, referring to his original statement. He had 'wished' his 'final statement to be the exact copy of the original recollection (except for the item where I mistakenly stated seeing Chief Supt. Duckenfield running onto the pitch. This was of course Supt. Greenwood)'.88 2.11.123 Due to ill-health in the aftermath of the disaster, however, the officer had agreed to the alterations. With hindsight he considered that statements should not have been altered. He wrote:

¶However, since I (like most others) was suffering from post traumatic stress and depression, I agreed to the deletions to my final statement under the conditions I was placed under. My personal view is that a police officer should be able to freely make an honest and truthful statement of facts and opinion and it was an injustice for statements to have been 'doctored' to suit the management of the South

¶Yorkshire Police. 2.11.124 Mr Bone also contacted Police Constable Brian Huckstepp, who recalled being told:

¶... alterations were made to exclude personal opinion, to leave the document as a factual piece, similar to a statement. This seemed a satisfactory explanation to me.

¶At the time I accepted the removal of my personal opinions, especially as they were based on the hundreds of times I'd been to Hillsborough as a football supporter and not from police experience of working at the stadium.89 2.11.125 While PC Huckstepp did not remember being 'pressured to sign the typed amended version', he could not 'recall being given the opportunity to compare the original and amended versions'. Having been sent the original by Mr Bone, he 'didn't appreciate at the time how much had been removed'. 2.11.126 Concerning deletions and alterations to his recollections, he affirmed that it remained his 'firmly held belief that the key to the whole incident was the lack of direction of the fans once they were allowed into the stadium following the crush outside' and 'adequate planning or preparation for the influx was not carried out'. 2.11.127 LJ Stuart-Smith also met personally with SYP Chief Constable Richard Wells and former Chief Superintendent Donald Denton. In his meeting with CC Wells, LJ Stuart- Smith said that he regarded the majority of the vetting to be 'quite proper', but noted the imbalance in removing 'opinion and intemperate language' directed towards senior police officers while retaining 'similar material about misbehaviour of Liverpool fans'. He commented that this was a 'pattern'.90 2.11.128 LJ Stuart-Smith's meeting with former C/Supt Denton91 included the following exchange:

87. Letter from Mr Bone to Police Constable, 7 January 1998, HOM000031080001, pp1-2. 88. Letter from Police Constable to Mr Bone, 13 January 1998, HOM000031110001, p1. 89. Letter from PC Brian Huckstepp to Mr Bone, undated, HOM000031110001, p2. 90. Note of meeting between LJ Stuart-Smith and CC Richard Wells, 25 November 1997, HOM000039450001, p1. 91. Transcript of proceedings on 1 December 1997 before LJ Stuart-Smith, HOM000049140001, pp10-11.

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¶LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH: One of the things that strikes me about the alterations that I have looked at – and I have not looked at all of them – is that there tends to be a removal of criticisms of senior officers but no corresponding removal of criticism of the fans.

¶A [Donald Denton]: I think one has to look at the light in which this was being done, sir.

¶Q [LJ Stuart-Smith]: In what light is that?

¶A [Donald Denton]: This, as you say, was in fact being done in a way which anticipated an Inquiry and anticipated actions against the Club, against the Police, and I think it would be fair to say that throughout the whole of this exercise – whilst there was nothing distinctly deliberate about it – the South Yorkshire Police at that time had their backs to the wall a little bit with public opinion against them. I think it was absolutely natural for them to concern themselves with defending themselves.

¶Lord Justice Stuart-Smith's findings 2.11.129 LJ Stuart-Smith examined 'approximately 100 amended statements'. He found that in '74 instances the amendment is of no consequence', and in 'some cases' the 'solicitor's recommendation was not adopted and the suggested amendments were not made'.92

¶2.11.130 In 26 recollections 'comment and opinion' were deleted. He made further comments on ten cases. In five, 'factual matters were excluded when arguably they should not have been'. In four, matters of fact were included in the deleted comment. He wrote that it 'might have been better to elucidate these rather than simply exclude the comment'.

¶2.11.131 Noting that 'solicitors were under severe time constraints in giving their advice since the statements were urgently required for Lord Taylor's Inquiry', LJ Stuart-Smith accepted the legitimacy of the process. He concluded:

¶In no case does what is excluded render the rest of the statement misleading. In those cases where factual matter has been excluded I accept that the solicitors had to exercise judgement as to whether material unhelpful to the police case should have been excluded ... at least in some cases it would have been better if it had not been. But I would categorise this at worst as an error of judgement. I certainly do not think the solicitors were guilty of anything that could be regarded as unprofessional conduct.

¶2.11.132 LJ Stuart-Smith had 'no doubt that in the days following Hillsborough the South Yorkshire police perceived themselves to be on the defensive' with 'an understandable desire not to give anything away'. Yet while 'it would have been preferable if the deletion' in some cases 'had not been made', the amendments were 'unexceptionable' and the process was 'well known to Lord Taylor's Inquiry team'.

¶2.11.133 Quoting LJ Taylor's criticism of SYP for failing to 'concede that they were in any respect at fault in what occurred', LJ Stuart-Smith concluded that LJ Taylor's Inquiry had 'in no way been inhibited or impeded by the exclusion of material from the original statements'. Nor did he consider that the 'material excluded' would 'have influenced the jury

92. The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp88-93.

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¶at the Inquests to bring a different verdict'. Consequently he rejected the 'allegation ... of irregularity and malpractice'.

¶2.11.134 As discussed in Chapter 6, however, the process of review and alteration of statements did impact upon both the criminal and disciplinary investigations into SYP officers. See paragraphs from 2.6.198 and 2.6.293.

¶The South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service 2.11.135 Review and alteration of statements was not confined to SYP. A similar process was also adopted by the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) and South Yorkshire Fire Service prior to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.136 According to files from the WMP investigation, statements from SYMAS and Fire Service staff 'were not taken by West Midlands Police Officers' but 'were made to solicitors for the respective services who in turn provided them to the West Midlands Police for use at the Judicial Inquiry by Lord Justice Taylor'.93 Subsequently some ambulance staff were interviewed by WMP to supplement their statements.

¶2.11.137 No documents were provided to the Panel regarding the internal processes adopted within the Fire Service, but Yorkshire Ambulance Service (as it now is) provided relevant documents. Statements were reviewed and stylistic changes – corrections to grammatical or spelling errors – were made. Amended statements were signed by their authors. As with SYP, however, some amendments were substantial. These included the insertion or deletion of sentences or paragraphs.

¶2.11.138 Statements taken by SYMAS solicitors from 101 ambulance personnel were submitted to WMP. Of these, 54 staff members' formal statements were predated by earlier handwritten versions. There is no record of an earlier version of the remaining 47 statements. The early statements were taken within days of the disaster and the final, formal versions were produced two weeks later.

¶2.11.139 There are no records describing the SYMAS statement-taking process, but the quote above from the WMP investigation suggests that statements were produced after discussion with legal advisers and senior SYMAS staff.

¶2.11.140 Separately, a letter from an anonymous complainant noted that 'ambulance personnel are being interviewed individually by a panel of senior officers'.94 The complaint alleged that ambulance staff were being 'intimidated' and were 'withholding information in case of reprisals'. The documents contain no other evidence of staff intimidation.

¶2.11.141 Analysis of the statements indicates that internal discussions between ambulance personnel, senior SYMAS staff and solicitors occurred after initial handwritten statements had been produced, and it is possible that the initial statements were also the product of interviews.

¶2.11.142 Details added to initial statements, and the regularity with which particular issues were highlighted, are recurrent features within final statements. It is possible that final statements were written and agreed in response to questioning or prompting.

93. WMP Report to the Director of Public Prosecutions: Part VI, SYP000038830001, p4. 94. Anonymous letter, YAS000002400001, p19.

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¶2.11.143 The principal differences between initial handwritten statements and subsequent final versions were the addition of significant commentary and points of clarification, as well as grammatical corrections and the addition of timings. Further details were added in all 54 statements where handwritten original versions had been provided.

¶2.11.144 In addition to expanding their original statements, ambulance personnel appear to have responded to questions or prompts relating to their role and training history, as well as their knowledge of the SYMAS major incident plan and Hillsborough emergency plan.

¶2.11.145 In 17 cases, the statements contain amendments to material which might have been perceived as negative towards SYMAS. For example:

¶We did not see any Ambulance Officers at the Royal Hallamshire and Ambulances were stopping at the normal casualty entrance, preventing further Ambulances getting through to the Major Incident Entrance.95

¶2.11.146 As with the SYP amendments, in these 17 cases direct or implied criticisms of the SYMAS organisational response or decisions were downplayed or deleted. For example, the following comment relating to organisation of ambulances at the stadium was made in the officer's handwritten statement, yet it was absent from the final version:

¶From my position at the rear of all the parked vehicles [waiting to enter Hillsborough] it appeared that there was some problem at the front of the line as no vehicles were moving off.96

¶2.11.147 In the same statement, a comment that 'a [leading ambulance man] told me there were more casualties and it was chaotic' was removed and the description of an ambulance as 'abandoned' was amended to read 'parked'.

¶2.11.148 In another example, the following comment made in the handwritten version was deleted:

¶On arrival at the Northern General Hospital Casualty Department there was a lot of confusion and it took several minutes to locate trollies [sic] for the patients. We quickly arrived back at the Leppings Lane end of the Ground which seemed to be blocked by Fire Tenders and a large crowd.97

¶2.11.149 Another officer's comments about poor radio communications – '[w]e could only contact control with extreme difficulty ... equipment was inadequate' – was excluded from his final statement.98

¶2.11.150 In eight cases critical material was added to the initial versions. One statement, for example, contained the following additional comment: 'there was no [ambulance] officer in charge'.99

¶2.11.151 Another included an observation on communications: 'I had been given no information whatsoever and [name redacted] had not told me which part of the ground to go

95. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000700001. Final version of statement, YAS000001350001. 96. Typed version of original statement, YAS000001000001. Final version of statement, YAS000001810001. 97. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000790001. Final version of statement, YAS000001480001. 98. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000890001. Final version of statement, YAS000001620001. 99. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000670001. Final version of statement, YAS000001290001.

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¶to. I set the radio automatically onto ERC [emergency response] channel because I regarded it as a major incident, even though this had not actually been specified'.100

¶2.11.152 A comment was added to an ambulance officer's statement about 'initial difficulties' with radio communications, 'presumably because of the number of crews transmitting at the same time'.101 Another officer added that the scene was 'chaos', with 'casualties lying all over the place'.102

¶2.11.153 Some common alterations concerned the strength of presumption of death amongst those who appeared to be beyond help during the initial process of evacuation from the pens. A comment from one officer was amended from 'I presume he was dead' to 'I believe he was already dead'.103 There had been suggestions that not all may have been dead at this early stage. 2.11.154 Other insertions were critical of the intervention, or non-intervention, of SYP's response: 'I was staggered at the number of fatalities. Most of the bodies that I saw had clearly been dead for some time and I could not understand why their condition had not been noticed earlier'.104 2.11.155 A statement made by an ambulance officer concerning his ignorance of the Hillsborough emergency plan had the following comment deleted: 'At this stage I did not realise that the casualty clearing point was in the gym. I was not aware of any Hillsborough plan prior to this emergency'.105 2.11.156 Comments were inserted into some statements regarding checking victims for potential signs of life. An officer's statement had the following sentence inserted: 'Although some of the bodies had coats pulled over their heads we checked every single body for signs of life'.106

¶Further changes to SYMAS statements 2.11.157 Although the precise process of review and alteration remains unclear from the documents, it appears that further alterations were made to some statements that had already been amended. The Panel was unable to determine from the disclosed documents who had suggested these changes. 2.11.158 While records are incomplete, unamended 'final' statements were collected by the WMP investigation team, dated early May 1989.107 Amended versions, dated early June, were located within the Taylor Inquiry papers at the Home Office.108 2.11.159 Of the SYMAS statements disclosed to the Panel, 49 had alterations to 'final' statements, 33 of which related solely to correction or clarification. The remaining 16 had more substantial deletions or details added, five of which were more significant.109 The following section was removed from one statement: 100. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000950001. Final version of statement, YAS000001730001. 101. Typed version of original statement, YAS000001010001. Final version of statement, YAS000001820001. 102. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000980001. Final version of statement, YAS000001790001. 103. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 7 May 1989, YAS000001480001, p3. 104. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 7 May 1989, YAS000001480001, p5. 105. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 5 May 1989,YAS000001540001, p4. 106. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 5 May 1989, YAS000001570001, p4. 107. For example, SYP000065630001. Statements included within West Midlands Police's report to the Director of Public

¶Prosecutions, produced in March 1990, are also the unamended versions. 108. For example, HOM000000860001. 109. Two are quoted below. The others are at references YAS000001810001, YAS000001940001 and YAS000001900001.

¶These include deletions of descriptions of 'chaos' and radio problems.

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¶The access for the ambulances onto the pitch was pitifully inadequate. The access was narrow and the angle of approach difficult with obstructions on either side which, compounded by the number of fans in the area, made access to the pitch extremely difficult and hazardous. The ambulances needed to use their sirens and two tone horns simply to get from the arrival area onto the pitch and it was not a safe area for fans or the ambulances … [On arrival back at the ground in the evening] … most of the equipment of the Ambulance service had been exhausted.110

¶2.11.160 In another statement, deletion of six separate references to an ambulance crew member being unaware of the location of the 'casualty clearing point' for Hillsborough was advised. These included:

¶At this stage I did not realise that the casualty clearing point was in the gym. I was not aware of any Hillsborough plan prior to the emergency …

¶I asked [Control] where the casualty clearing point was. There was a pause and then

¶I was told to go to the Leppings Lane end. Ray Clarke was at control. I think he was telling me where to go and I do not think he knew where the casualty clearing point was ...

¶… and asked [name redacted] where the casualty clearing point was as I thought

¶Control had told us it was in Leppings Lane. He said that he did not know but that the vehicles in front were being loaded and would be moving shortly.111

¶2.11.161 The rationale underpinning the process adopted for making the initial alterations, the further amendments to the 'final' statements, and whether LJ Taylor and others were aware of the process, was not evident from the disclosed documents.

¶Conclusion: what is added to public understanding • From the documents disclosed to the Panel it is apparent that the decision to gather self-taken recollections from SYP officers, rather than following the standard procedure of contemporaneous pocket-book entries as the foundation for formal Criminal Justice Act statements, originated in the immediate aftermath of the disaster on 16 and 17 April.

¶The initial justification was to provide SYP and the Force solicitors with candid,

¶'warts-and-all' accounts from officers that would be used to inform SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry. • What followed, however, was an extensive process of review and alteration of the recollections and their transition to multi-purpose statements. The disclosed documents reveal confusion about the purpose of recollections, initially taken for SYP 'internal' purposes, and their subsequent use by the WMP investigation. It was brought into stark relief in the confusion surrounding the status of statements presented to the Taylor Inquiry and the Inquiry's acceptance of the 'final versions' of the reviewed and altered statements. • It was the Taylor Inquiry's understanding that the 'final versions' of SYP statements differed from the initial 'recollections' only with regard to the removal of officers' opinions.

¶The Inquiry team considered there to be 'absolutely no reason' why opinion should be removed, but did not consider the process improper and did not raise any objection.

110. Ambulance Service version with amendments proposed, YAS000001910001. Taylor Inquiry version with amendments made, HOM000001740001. West Midlands Police version with amendments not made, SYP000014020001. 111. Ambulance Service version with amendments proposed, YAS000001540001. Taylor Inquiry version with amendments made, HOM000000860001. West Midlands Police version with amendments not made, SYP000065630001.

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¶
• The process of transition from self-taken recollections to formal Criminal Justice Act statements was presented as removing 'conjecture' and 'opinion' from the former, leaving only matters of 'fact' within the latter. Disclosed correspondence between SYP and the Force solicitors reveals that comments within officers' statements 'unhelpful to the Force's case' were altered, deleted or qualified (rewritten by the SYP team).
• A significant number of SYP officers were uncomfortable with the methodology adopted in reviewing and altering their initial accounts and with the role of the SYP solicitors in this process. Senior SYP officers, including the Chief Constable, were aware of these concerns and the disclosed 'Hillsborough updates' demonstrate their attempts to assuage these concerns. An SYP inquiry liaison team was available to provide junior officers with 'necessary information and assistance' prior to giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.
• Examination of officers' statements shows that officers were discouraged from making criticisms of senior officers' responses, their management and deficiencies in the SYP operational response: 'key' words and descriptions such as 'chaotic' were counselled against and, if included, were deleted.
• Some 116 of the 164 statements identified for substantive amendment were amended to remove or alter comments unfavourable to SYP.
• Lord Justice Stuart-Smith raised concerns about the derivation and operation of the process of review and alteration with SYP's Chief Superintendent Donald Denton and Peter Metcalf (Hammond Suddards, SYP solicitors).
• Lord Justice Stuart-Smith also wrote directly to a number of officers to investigate the extent to which they were 'pressurised' into making alterations to original statements.
• One officer stated he had accepted the changes only because he was suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress. He considered it an 'injustice for statements to have been "doctored" to suit the management of South Yorkshire Police'. Another officer had accepted the process, but had not realised how much of his statement had been removed.
• Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster of the WMP investigation team informed the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny that in five out of a sample of six amended statements material should not have been removed. In one case he 'question[ed] the objectivity … of the person vetting'. He considered that the investigation had not been affected by the deletions made.
• The disclosed documents demonstrate that the role played by the Force solicitors was more significant and directive than was understood by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith.
• Lord Justice Stuart-Smith accepted that SYP edited those statements that were 'unhelpful to the police case' but 'at worst this was an error of judgement' as there were only a few examples 'where matters of fact were excluded'. The process reflected an 'understandable desire' to protect the interests of a Force on the 'defensive'. Yet Lord Justice Stuart-Smith found no 'irregularity or malpractice'. There had been no negative consequences for the Taylor Inquiry, the criminal investigations, the disciplinary proceedings or the coronial inquiry.
• The documents disclosed to the Panel show that the review and alteration of statements extended to the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) and its solicitors. While there is variation in the amendments, in a number of cases they deflected criticisms and emphasised the efficiency of the SYMAS response.