Chapter 3: Custom, practice, roles, responsibilities

¶2.3.1 As established in Part 1 and in the previous chapters, and central to the submissions to the Panel from bereaved families, key issues of concern focus on crowd management, crowd safety and the condition of the stadium.

¶2.3.2 While the behaviour of the crowd and its predictability was the overarching priority for those responsible for managing, controlling and policing, the important question, noted in Lord Justice Taylor's Interim Report, was whether an institutional mindset that focused on hooliganism compromised thorough planning to prioritise the safety of the crowd.

¶2.3.3 The bottleneck at the turnstiles, the restricted flow through the turnstiles and the expectation of processing a capacity crowd within a confined outer concourse area were problems identified previously by the South Yorkshire Police (SYP).

¶2.3.4 Packing the pens (especially the central pens), the steep tunnel leading down to the central pens, the policing and stewarding of fans within the inner concourse area, the recognition of overcrowding in the pens, and the monitoring and closure of the tunnel access were raised regularly following the 1981 incident.

¶2.3.5 Given these complex yet recurrent issues the debriefings after previous semi-finals, especially the near tragedy in 1981, were crucial to informing Operational Orders and the responsibilities of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) stewards and police officers. This was particularly significant as there was no reliable count of the number of fans entering individual pens and police officers had raised concerns about crushing inside and outside the stadium.

¶2.3.6 Regarding responsibility for the safe passage of fans and their well-being once inside the stadium, the disclosed documents demonstrate that serious deficiencies were accommodated, even rationalised, by established custom and practice. Warning signs that were clearly evident in the management of the crowd at previous semi-finals were, at best, not taken seriously. At worst they amounted to serious negligence in the face of foreseeable and imminent danger.

¶2.3.7 This chapter relies on documents disclosed to the Panel and released into the public domain that add significantly to knowledge regarding previous events and their centrality, once ignored, as factors that contributed to the disaster.

Chapter 3 Custom, practice, roles, responsibilities — 103

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¶2.3.8 It reflects on the released documents to explore the following key issues:

allocation of areas of the stadium to rival fans and the assumptions underpinning crowd segregation
organisation of the approaches to the stadium, filtering the crowd in the vicinity of the stadium and congestion at the Leppings Lane turnstiles
'packing' the Leppings Lane terrace and filling the recently constructed pens
apparently contrasting views held by SWFC and SYP regarding responsibility for crowd management and distribution within the stadium
significance of the tunnel beneath the West Stand in feeding the central pens within the Leppings Lane terrace
what was known about the tunnel, and its use as a means of restricting access to the central pens, by SYP officers of different ranks and by SWFC.

¶Choice of venue and allocation inside the stadium 2.3.9 By the late 1980s segregation was a key factor in policing soccer matches. Considerable time and effort were committed to keeping rival fans separate, not only inside stadia but also in the immediate vicinity and in the approaches. At Hillsborough for regular league matches 'away' fans were allocated the Leppings Lane end of the stadium, or a smaller portion of terrace, depending on numbers.

¶2.3.10 FA Cup semi-finals were different as neither set of fans were from the Sheffield area and all were travelling some distance. Seated areas (stands) and terraces were allocated to each club on an approximately equal basis. Because Leppings Lane turnstiles provided access to the North and West Stands and to the Leppings Lane terrace they were allocated exclusively to one team (in 1988 and in 1989 to Liverpool fans). Other stands and terraces, and their access points, were allocated to the other team (in both years, Nottingham Forest fans).

¶2.3.11 According to SYP the decision about the allocation of 'ends' was based on motorway approaches, coach and car parking, and street layout. Liverpool Football Club, however, contested the decision, proposing that because their team had the bigger fan base and following they should be allocated the biggest end – the Spion Kop.

¶2.3.12 The former match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, noted Liverpool's 'approaches ... to reverse the ends and I found that not possible to do'.1 Referring to the Popplewell Report into the tragic fire at Bradford in 1985, he confirmed that 'the recommendations we have received ... have indicated spatial separation'. He stated that segregation benefited not only the crowd but also the local population.

¶2.3.13 Allocation of segregated areas within the stadium, therefore, 'was based on the geographical location of the Stadium and was in an effort to ensure complete segregation of supporters to prevent confrontation and public disorder … this policy was followed and the operations were successful'.2

¶2.3.14 C/Supt Mole was approached by Graham Mackrell, the Secretary of SWFC, in March 1989 to confirm that SYP would be content to police the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final should Hillsborough be hired by the Football Association (FA).

Transcript of C/Supt Mole's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, day 6, 23 May 1989, SWF000001320001, p27. 2. Statement of C/Supt Mole, 19 May 1989, SWF000001320001, p3.

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¶2.3.15 C/Supt Mole agreed on condition that the stadium would be segregated with Liverpool fans allocated the North Stand, West Stand and Leppings Lane terrace and Nottingham Forest fans the Spion Kop and South Stand. This was the arrangement in 1988.

¶Choice of venue 2.3.16 The draw for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Finals was made at 7.45am on Monday 20 March. Once the matches were known, 'Members of the Challenge Cup Committee, together with the Chairman of the Match & Grounds Committee' met to consider 'the choice of venue for each tie'.3

¶2.3.17 A short time before that meeting took place, Steve Clark, the FA's Competitions Secretary, received a call from Peter Robinson, Liverpool Football Club's Secretary, with a request that should Hillsborough be chosen as the venue for their tie, Liverpool should be allocated the Spion Kop end of the ground.

¶2.3.18 Responding, Mr Clark spoke to Mr Mackrell at Sheffield Wednesday.4 He, in turn, contacted SYP's C/Supt Mole. Mr Mackrell informed C/Supt Mole that in the event of Hillsborough being chosen, the FA had requested the 1988 allocation of the Leppings Lane and Spion Kop ends of the stadium be reversed to provide a greater proportion of accommodation for Liverpool fans.5

¶2.3.19 C/Supt Mole's reply reiterated his rationale for the 1988 allocation and, after consultation with Assistant Chief Constable Walter Jackson, he confirmed there was no possibility of change. Mr Mackrell contacted the FA and the SYP position was accepted.

¶2.3.20 Mr Clark 'spoke to Mr Kelly [FA Chief Executive] about the arrangements for the Challenge Cup Committee and mentioned to him the call I had had from Mr Robinson'.6 When, however, Graham Kelly spoke with Jack Wiseman, the Chairman of the Match & Grounds Committee which would take the decision on ground venue, he apparently 'did not mention the Peter Robinson (Liverpool) phone call'.7 This did not seem to matter, however, as Wiseman 'had already in his mind Hillsborough and Villa Park as the likely venue [sic]'.

¶Need for segregation takes precedence 2.3.21 Subsequent written submissions to LJ Taylor by West Midlands Police (WMP) note that the FA considered there was no option but to accept SYP's decision on the allocation of ends. Mr Kelly stated that 'allocation to competing clubs is now dictated by the need for segregation and the capacity of the sections of the ground to each club's supporters'.8 He continued, 'on matters like this (ticket allocation) the staging club and the F.A. are really bound to accept the view of the Police'.

¶2.3.22 At a meeting prior to the 1988 Semi-Final, attended by Mr Adrian Titcombe, Mr Mackrell and an 'unidentified' SYP officer, an application from Liverpool Football Club for the allocation to be changed to give Liverpool supporters the majority ticket share was considered. The police officer 'objected to any change of ticket allocation and none was made'.

Note from Steve Clark, FA Competitions Secretary, FFA000001920001, p1. 4. Note of meeting between Freshfields solicitors and FA, 27 April 1989, FFA000004820001, p1. 5. Statement of C/Supt Mole, SYP000038700001, pp176-190. 6. Statement of Steve Clark, FA Competitions Secretary, HOM000000510001, p3. 7. Note of meeting between Freshfields solicitors and Football Association, 2 May 1989, FFA000004550001, p1. 8. WMP paper on ticket allocation, 17 June 1989, SYP000027590001, pp23-24.

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¶2.3.23 The conclusion drawn by WMP was that the 'overriding necessity to segregate supporters of the two clubs has resulted in the situation whereby both the Football Association and Sheffield Wednesday FC allowed the South Yorkshire Police to effectively dictate allocation of tickets in both 1988 and 1989'. Consequently, the Nottingham Forest ticket allocation was 4,000 higher than that received by Liverpool.

¶2.3.24 In its submission to the Taylor Inquiry, the FA maintained 'the choice of venue and the allocation of ends was not in itself a contributing factor' to the disaster.9 Yet the FA considered that the uneven distribution of tickets would have caused more Liverpool fans to 'arrive without tickets and more [Liverpool] fans with "Kop" tickets would appear at the Leppings Lane end seeking entry'.

¶2.3.25 According to the FA, the only concern about the suitability of Hillsborough for a capacity match attended by two sets of fans unfamiliar with the stadium layout centred on the configuration of the turnstiles at Leppings Lane: 'The rate at which the turnstiles were expected to operate at various sections of the ground does not appear to have been the subject of sufficient consideration by the organisers'.

¶2.3.26 As stated in the previous chapter, the processing of almost half the match attendance through 23 turnstiles entering via a confined concourse at one narrow end of the stadium constituted a clear and foreseeable risk.

¶Filtering, managing approach and congestion at the turnstiles 2.3.27 In the late 1980s segregation of rival fans was planned by the police from the moment they arrived in the city. Arriving on trains and in coaches fans were met at stations or drop-off points and escorted by the police to the stadium, a strategy known as 'corralling'.

¶2.3.28 Many other fans, travelling in cars, made their own way to the stadium. The match ticket carried a request for fans to be inside the stadium 15 minutes before kick-off. For FA Cup semi-final matches fans were in unfamiliar surroundings and relied on the police for direction to the appropriate turnstiles.

¶2.3.29 The immediate approach to the west end of the stadium was on a bend in Leppings Lane. On arrival at the stadium Liverpool fans entering the West Stand, the Leppings Lane terrace and the North Stand passed through gates in an outer fence before entering a divided concourse leading to the turnstiles.

¶2.3.30 The outer concourse was a tightly confined area between a wall and a fence above the River Don. As stated in Part 1, managing the crowd approaching, and within, the outer concourse was crucial in avoiding crushing at the turnstiles.

¶2.3.31 In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry a journalist, David Walker, described the 1987 policing arrangements.10 They included 'snake queues' from the Leppings Lane turnstiles, 'two or three abreast … so there was no surge on particular turnstile entrances'. The queues were 'probably 30 or 40 yards' long. Further back, on the street approach were 'Police checkpoint barriers to check that you had a ticket before you actually got around the perimeter of the ground'. 9. FA submission to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000033690001, pp74-75. 10. Transcript of David John Walker's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000026140001, p62. See also statement of

¶David Walker, SYP000038760001, p292.

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¶SHEFFIELD WEDNESDAY F.C. HILLSBOROUGH Figure 4: Layout of the turnstiles at Leppings Lane, April 1989 Original available at SCC000002050001, p56.

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¶2.3.32 Police Constable Alan Ramsden, on duty in 1987, noted a 'sort of semi-sterile area' where crowds were kept 'outside the metal railings and gates to allow myself and other officers to carry out searches'.11 Inspector Clive Calvert described how the police restricted ticketless fans' access to the turnstile area and statements made available to the Panel provide a range of accounts regarding ticket checking and crowd filtering in 1987.12

¶2.3.33 Analysis of CCTV evidence by SYP from the 1988 Semi-Final to 'ascertain if stewards were involved in any control of the crowd in Leppings Lane' concluded that they 'appear to have some physical control of the outer perimeter gates leading to the service road'.13 This was a reference to the narrow service road running between the outer concourse area and the river across the face of exit Gate C. 2.3.34 The stewarded section of the outer perimeter fences was restricted to 'selected persons or vehicles'. It was 'isolated from the A–G concourse area, by use of portable barriers'. The A–G concourse area housed the turnstiles for the Leppings Lane terrace. However, there was 'no evidence of a filtering of fans outside the outer perimeter gates' (on Leppings Lane).

¶2.3.35 In his Interim Report LJ Taylor referred to 'a very large and consistent body of evidence that, on the day [1988], the police in Leppings Lane conducted an efficient filtering exercise designed to keep away those without tickets and control the flow of fans towards the ground'.14 Mr Mackrell affirmed that he had been informed by C/Supt Mole that in 1988 on approaching the stadium fans' tickets were checked by SYP officers.15

¶2.3.36 C/Supt Mole, however, denied there was an SYP policy of filtering fans using barriers although this was contested by other officers.16 He stated they were used only at junctions along Leppings Lane to protect residents' access to their homes.

¶2.3.37 C/Supt Mole claimed that police officers 'were briefed to be aware of the possibility of non ticket holders attending the game and that checks should be made to identify them and turn them away' but 'there were no specific plans to place cordons on Leppings Lane in the form of barriers and I did not give any instructions to that effect'. He denied 'knowledge of any such cordons being introduced' and 'it was not my policy to filter supporters by utilising barriers across the footpath'.

¶2.3.38 In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, SYP suggested that the turnstiles could not cope because 'Liverpool supporters were getting to the turnstiles and instead of offering tickets were offering money. At this stage the crush was such that they could not turn away from these turnstiles'.17 Further, it was suggested that ticketless fans were not prevented from approaching the turnstiles.

¶2.3.39 According to the Treasury Counsel's submission to the Taylor Inquiry, the 'police told the inquiry that there was little they could do, since no offence was committed in being near a ground without a ticket, provided there was no obstruction or breach of the peace'.

Officer's Report and witness statement of PC Alan Ramsden, SYP000039140001, pp6-7. 12. Statement of Inspector Calvert, SYP000074110001. 13. South Yorkshire Police 'Summary of 1988 Semi-Final', SYP000098380001, pp2-4. 14. Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Interim Report, Cm 765, August 1989,

¶London: HMSO. 15. WMP interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, p149. 16. Statement of C/Supt Mole, 20 June 1989, SYP000123550001, p113. 17. SYP briefing notes, 17 April 1989, SYP000010190001, p8.

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¶2.3.40 This was contested: 'We do not think the police are so powerless. Ticketless fans do cause a problem and, in sufficient numbers, are almost bound to cause an obstruction. It is in our opinion perfectly reasonable for a police officer to ask a fan if he has a ticket and, if he has not, it is lawful to refuse him access to the immediate vicinity of the ground'.18 2.3.41 The significance of managing the crowd in the vicinity of Leppings Lane was also considered. In 1989 there was an attempt by stewards to control the crowd outside the turnstiles using portable barriers. Photographs suggested 'that portable barriers were positioned between turnstiles 10 and 11, extending back towards the perimeter gates' to channel fans to particular turnstiles.19

¶Inside the stadium: filling pens and 'find their own level' 2.3.42 On the terrace the issue of 'packing' pre-dated the 1981 incident. During the debriefing for the 1981 game Superintendent David Chapman described how 'the usual packing problems occurred' as the terrace filled.20 2.3.43 Packing became more significant once lateral fences were introduced and pens were created and sideways movement along the terrace was restricted. Inevitably the even distribution of the crowd between pens was difficult to achieve, especially as there was no way of knowing when a pen had reached its designated maximum safe capacity. 2.3.44 Chapter 6 details the controversy about differing estimates regarding the maximum safe capacity for each pen and the overestimation of the figures provided by the out-of-date safety certificate for the stadium. 2.3.45 In 1988 at least 62 people experienced crushing in the central pens ,21 some sustaining injuries such as bruised ribs.22 One fan described hearing a public announcement to alleviate the crush before the match, raising doubts that senior officers were unaware of the problem of crushing.23 2.3.46 In his 1989 statement Police Constable Stuart Beardshall claimed that in 1988 there had been severe crushing on the outer concourse. On this point the SYP solicitors, Hammond Suddards, sought clarification.24 In a clear illustration of how the SYP solicitors gathered information they note that PC Beardshall 'and one or two others [police officers] mentioned below make comments about the severity of the crushing outside the turnstiles in 1988'. Their statements were 'not particularly helpful to our case, but if they represent factual recollections, then they will probably have to stay in'. The letter continued:

¶I wonder if they could not be qualified in one or more of the following ways:

¶A) A clear comment to the effect that the ingress of mounted Officers eased the problem.

¶B) An indication that the problem was relatively short-lived, e.g. by 2.45p.m. the crush had eased, if that is the case.

¶C) Perhaps an indication that the Officers have watched the 1988 and 1989 videos and that the 1988 situation was clearly not as bad as that in 1989. 18. Final Submission to the Taylor Inquiry on behalf of Treasury Counsel, SYP000098180001, p23. 19. Note from C/Supt Wain to Mr Metcalf, 23 May 1989, SYP000097530001, p4. 20. Minutes of the 1981 debriefing, HOM000026500001, p7. 21. See, for example, Chapter 1, paragraph 2.1.106. 22. HOLMES category record print, SYP000121610001, pp13-14 and SYP000123530001, pp297-341. 23. HOLMES category record print, SYP000123530001, p299. 24. Fax from Hammond Suddards to C/Supt Denton, 12 June 1989, SYP000096870001, pp71-72.

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¶2.3.47 In his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, C/Supt Mole stated that knowing when a pen had reached capacity was 'purely a visible perception based upon experience'.25 A statement by another officer, Police Constable Maxwell Groome, confirmed C/Supt Mole's approach, saying, 'In previous years Chief Superintendent Mole would walk around the perimeter track asking officers how things were going, and obviously noting the ground capacity'.26

¶2.3.48 Remarkably, given the crushing and injuries recorded in the central pens in 1988, C/Supt Mole considered it was not his experience that if fans were left to their own devices overcrowding in the pens would result. He stated there had been 'occasions when it possibly is in excess because, as I say, I have no way of knowing exactly; it is an estimate from experience as to how many are in there'.27

¶2.3.49 C/Supt Mole continued, 'my experience has been that they [the crowd] have found their own level. The level was found in 1987; it was found in 1988 and at other large League matches that level has been found'. The level of crowd distribution between pens was 'monitored and if a difficulty is seen then I would take what action is necessary through the Chief Steward or through my Officers to relieve that problem'.

¶2.3.50 According to Superintendent John Freeman, the 'policy' of 'find their own level' was used for capacity matches. At semi-final matches, 'knowing it was going to be a capacity crowd' the procedure 'was to allow the pens at the Leppings Lane end – on that occasion [1987] for Leeds fans – to fill up all at the same time, with no restrictions on entry'.28 As pens filled, police officers were expected to ensure that fans 'moved to the front and centres within each area'. Invariably, 'at any large capacity game ... the centre pen filled first'.

¶2.3.51 The situation at regular league games was different as, once through the turnstiles, away fans were directed to specific pens. A small crowd, for example, 'would be accommodated in either the centre pen, or the one directly under the Police Control Box, depending on the expected size of the visitors [sic] contingent'.

¶2.3.52 When away fans 'exceeded expectations then a further pen, adjacent to whichever pens were then open, would be opened to accommodate them, but the unused pens were kept closed'. At a capacity match, however, 'all pens would be opened as a matter of course'.

¶2.3.53 Inspector Harry White, who had considerable experience of policing the Leppings Lane terrace, confirmed Supt Freeman's recollection:

¶With regards to distributing the supporters, my normal way, depending on the anticipated numbers, would be to fill the centre two enclosures first and if necessary the enclosures nearer to the South Stand next.

¶I would do this by placing barriers across the building line of the West Stand at its ends giving access to Pens 1 and 2 and at the other end leading to Pens 6 and 7.

¶These barriers would be manned by a Police Officer who would direct supporters to whichever direction they were supposed to go. At the same time, I would have Police

¶Officers on the gates at the rear of the enclosures on the radial fences, they would have these gates closed and bolted but not locked and they were there for evacuation purposes.

Transcript of C/Supt Mole's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, day 7, 24 May 1989, SWF000001320001, p72. 26. Officer's Report of PC Maxwell Groome, South Yorkshire Police, SYP000119280001, p5. 27. Transcript of C/Supt Mole's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, day 7, 24 May 1989, SWF000001320001, p72. 28. Statement of Superintendent John Freeman, SYP000096840001, pp511-512.

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¶When the central enclosures were full, I would close the blue gates leading from the concourse onto the tunnel, to show the incoming fans that the central enclosures were full. These gates would be manned by a Police Officer, who would then re-direct the incoming fans. These gates could not be kept closed for more than a few minutes, and in any case whilst they were closed they were always manned by a Police

¶Officer.29 2.3.54 Supt Chapman also described police direction of the spectators in the pens:

¶Leppings Lane end of the ground was, during my era, separated into terraced enclosures by the installation of radial fences. At this time the Leppings Lane end of the ground was used by both home and visiting supporters, and the separate enclosures were used for the purpose of segregation and thus the prevention of public disorder amongst the fans.

¶The policy adopted by the police at league matches was to marshal the opposing fans to their respective enclosures. The allocation of enclosures at the Leppings

¶Lane end of the ground was predetermined according to the nature and number of visiting supporters. For example, if there were a number of supporters that could be accommodated in a single enclosure then they would be allotted and directed towards one of the outer pens, the centre pens would be left empty as a sterile area and the other outer pen would be designated for home supporters (this was the era before the centre pen was split further into two separate enclosures).

¶In carrying out this policy, police officers would be deployed to the turnstile area and to the concourse between the turnstiles and the stand at Leppings Lane, to separate and keep apart the opposing factions of supporters. The fans would be directed by police and stewards into their respective enclosures. A further contingent of police officers would be deployed to the sterile area between the two sets of supporters to maintain order. This contingent would be issued with a key to the gates in the radial fence so they could gain access to either of the populated enclosures to deal with disorder. There would be neither police officers nor stewards on the terraces with the supporters as a matter of course.30 2.3.55 According to Chief Inspector Robert Creaser, at the 1987 Semi-Final the pens were filled 'progressively'.31 The central pens filled first. Once it was estimated that they were full, police officers were positioned at the rear of the pens alongside the narrow radial fence gates which were closed. 2.3.56 The remaining pens were filled and once they were approximately three-quarters full the officers withdrew having reopened the lateral fence gates to allow fans to 'find their own level'. During this time the doors at the head of the tunnel into the central pens were closed and reopened when most of the crowd had been admitted and the lateral pens were approaching capacity. 2.3.57 CI Creaser stated that in his debrief he did not reflect on his management of the crowd as he was following custom and practice at that time which was to fill the pens individually and progressively. He told the Taylor Inquiry that he considered it to be an unsuccessful procedure as fans often wanted 'to leave those pens once they got in … when they want to use the facilities'.

Statement of retired police Inspector Harry White, SYP000095080001, pp597-599. 30. Statement of Supt David Chapman, HOM000018350001, pp4-8. 31. CI Creaser's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025950001, pp49-52.

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¶2.3.58 In 1987 Supt Freeman was in the Police Control Box. He was replaced by Superintendent Bernard Murray in 1988 and 1989. CI Creaser's evidence noted a policy change when Supt Murray was appointed. Sergeant Michael Goddard, however, disagreed with CI Creaser's recollection stating that the policy in 1987 and 1988 was consistent: find their own level.32 The precise meaning of the term 'find their own level' was ambiguous. It was used in the context of filling the pens progressively and also filling all the pens at the same time.

¶2.3.59 According to Insp White, prior to the 1989 Semi-Final, 'Superintendent Murray had observed me filling the pens as I have described [pen by pen], and he told me that I was not to do it in this way and that the gates of the rear of the terraces in the radial fences were to remain open bolted against the wall and that the fans would find their own level on the terraces'.33

¶2.3.60 On the day of the 1989 match, CI Creaser visited Supt Murray in the Control Box to enquire how the pens should be filled. He was informed that the fans should find their own level.34 In evidence to the inquests CI Creaser stated that this was 'a tried and trusted method which was found acceptable the previous year and there was an agreement that that was the action which would be taken'.35

¶2.3.61 Fans 'would walk on to the terraces and obviously if it was noted there was a problem with compaction at a particular area, then some action would be taken, but there would be no restrictions on the fans'. Despite the injuries sustained by many fans in 1988, there was no reappraisal of the strategy for filling the pens prior to the 1989 match.

¶Flaws in 'find their own level' 2.3.62 As an assumed policy, 'find your own level' was flawed. According to John Stalker's Report for SWFC, it was 'hard to fully understand what many police officers meant when expecting the Leppings Lane terrace crowd to "find its own level". Crowds just don't do that without help or direction from officials'.36

¶2.3.63 In pursuing disciplinary action against Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) drafted charges which argued that 'even a cursory glance would have made it clear that such a policy ['find your own level'] was unworkable'.37 John Stalker argued that, as a policy, it failed to consider that 'those who arrive early and obtain better positions will not move in order to accommodate the comfort of late comers'.38 It assumed that if fans considered a pen was full and uncomfortable they could move to the side pens.

PS Goddard's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000026040001, p340. 33. Statement of retired police Inspector Harry White, SYP000095080001, pp597-599. 34. Sergeant Michael Goddard, who was responsible for the control of radio messages in the Police Control Box, confirmed in his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry that he heard this conversation between Supt Murray and CI

¶Creaser. See HOM000026040001, pp14-15. It is also confirmed in PS Goddard's statement dated 31 May 1989,

¶SYP000038790001, p170. Others in the Control Box included PC Trevor Bichard. His statement dated 5 May 1989 is available at SYP000038790001, pp179-189. PC Michael Ryan worked in the Control Box with responsibility for the Tannoy or public address system and three telephones. His statement dated 5 May 1989 is available at

¶SYP000038790001, pp190-197. 35. CI Creaser's evidence to the Coroner, SYP000110390001, p423. 36. Statement of John Stalker, former Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, 20 August 1990,

¶SYP000116060001, p275. 37. PCA, draft disciplinary charges, 30 September 1991, SYP000094930001, p24. 38. Statement of John Stalker, former Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, 20 August 1990,

¶SYP000116060001, p275.

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¶2.3.64 Yet 'it was impossible to move sideways beyond the limits of the radial fences and outside help was essential in redistribution of supporters from one pen to another'. Police Constable Peter Smith described how in his experience fans 'find their own level' by climbing over the lateral fences between pens.39 The system also failed to consider the rate of evacuation in an emergency.

¶2.3.65 At the contribution hearings SYP argued that the system of 'find your own level' had been 'devised and approved here by Dr. Eastwood and in that capacity representing the Club'.40 It was stated by SYP Counsel that 'the Police wrongly tried to make a system work which was a bad system'.

¶2.3.66 They 'should never have used or attempted to use any judgement as to whether a pen was full or not merely by visual impression' and the disaster had made 'it quite plain that the system is hopelessly ineffective'.

¶2.3.67 The SYP position was that they had not 'deliberately overlook[ed] the crowding in the pens' nor did they 'shut their eyes to it'. They had seen how many people were in the pens and 'did not think that it was unsafe'. They reacted when 'they realised that people were being hurt' and 'responded when the situation became dangerous, simply because what they were doing was operating a system which had been devised for them by others'.

¶Responsibility for 'packing' the pens 2.3.68 The documents disclosed to the Panel demonstrate that in 1981, months after the severe crushing at the Semi-Final, ambiguity remained about the division of responsibility between SYP officers and Club stewards in managing the crowd on the terraces. SYP considered that 'Club Stewards at Hillsborough often do less than they should and are at times not aware of our function and operation and our respective roles'.41

¶2.3.69 An internal SYP memorandum entitled 'SWFC Ground Education of Club Stewards' attempted to clarify roles and responsibilities. It stated that the responsibility for the terraces lay with Club stewards and their training was organised by the police: 'We should stress to the stewards that the admission of spectators and the packing of those spectators at the bigger games on to the terracing is primarily their function and not a police one'. SWFC supported the SYP position.

¶2.3.70 Although this appears to be a clear delineation of tasks, the experience and recollections of those policing and attending the match show that they were not clear to the police, the stewards or the spectators.

¶2.3.71 Supt Chapman, in a statement within the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry, described the SYP interpretation of the roles of police and stewards:

¶The whole basis of my deployment of police officers at the West End and Leppings

¶Lane Terraces, was intended to deal with the segregation of opposing fans and prevent disorder. This in no way absolved the stewards from undertaking their duties in respect of the safety of spectators and there was never any agreement, formal or informal that the police would accept these stewarding responsibilities.42

WMP report to the Director of Public Prosecutions summarising the evidence of PC Smith given to the Taylor Inquiry,

¶SYP000038850001, p92. 40. Transcript of proceedings in the contribution hearings, SYP000098630001, pp14-19. 41. Internal SYP memo from C/Supt Herold to A/Supt Smith and Insp Calvert, 18 August 1981, SYP000047780001, p36. 42. Statement of Supt Chapman, HOM000018350001, pp4-8.

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¶2.3.72 According to Supt Chapman this was the procedure in place when Douglas Lock replaced him in the role in June 1982. He maintained that contrary to Mr Lock's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry he had not participated with him in planning crowd management for any match at Hillsborough:

¶I refute, absolutely, his understanding of the role of the police in 'stewarding' the Leppings Lane end of the ground. In particular, he claims that he was simply continuing practices that pertained which I was responsible for policing Hillsborough.

¶This is certainly not true, the role of officers, whilst under my command, was one of ensuring segregation and preventing disorder. There was never any agreement that the stewards had no role to play at the Leppings Lane End.

¶2.3.73 C/Supt Mole's version of events was that fans entered the pens and found their own level. He maintained that the police were not responsible for packing the pens. Yet a 1986 letter from Mr Richard Chester, then Club Secretary, to C/Supt Mole indicated that at league matches C/Supt Mole occasionally did manage the crowd including packing the terraces for safety.

¶2.3.74 Referring to a West Ham United league fixture on 12 March 1986, Mr Chester stated he would 'be obliged if you could arrange that there will be no future repeat of the situation, concerning your officers, relating to the closure of the elevated standing area [on] Leppings Lane and the apparent uncooperative attitude of the camera man using the T.V. gantry'.43

¶2.3.75 C/Supt Mole's reply to Mr Chester referred to confusion regarding the use of the elevated standing area on Leppings Lane (north-west end of the terrace) for regular league matches. The 'ground commander' had seen 'fit not to open it initially, but subsequently, on my instructions, did so'.44

¶2.3.76 He continued: 'I can only add that it is not my intention to regularly close the elevated standing area and that as agreed in the past, either I or John Freeman would discuss the position prior to a match and if there was such an intention then you would be informed accordingly'.

¶2.3.77 There was also reference to television cameramen objecting to the presence of police officers in their area. C/Supt Mole responded: 'I am sure you will agree that public safety is of greater importance than the media coverage and if we are jointly to achieve our objectives of ensuring the safety of the public at such splendid sporting events then the need for preventative measures such as the attendance of my Scenes of Crime Officers is essential'. In a private meeting between SYP officers and Counsel on 26 April 1989, C/Supt Mole confirmed that it was the responsibility of the police to note when enclosures were full.45

¶2.3.78 C/Supt Mole made an additional statement in preparation for the contribution hearings in which he attempted to clarify what he considered was 'a great deal of misunderstanding' about the reasons for monitoring the pens: 'the purpose of having separate pens is to ensure crowd segregation and improve police access for public order'.46

Letter from RH Chester, SWFC Secretary, to C/Supt Mole, 24 March 1986, SYP000028310001, p25. 44. Letter from C/Supt Mole to RH Chester, SWFC Secretary, 26 March 1986, SYP000028310001, p26. 45. Discussion with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000096360001, p84. 46. Additional statement of C/Supt Mole for contribution hearings, 5 May 1989, SYP000116400001, pp2-3.

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¶2.3.79 To achieve segregation he considered it necessary 'that the gates at the rear of the radial fences should be locked shut because otherwise spectators would have direct access from one pen to another'. Yet he stated that it was 'recognised that if those gates were locked shut then there had to be an assessment of the numbers being allowed into the pen because the fans were not in a position to "find their own level"'. 2.3.80 According to C/Supt Mole, locking the gates at the rear of the lateral fences was limited to league matches but for semi-finals, when the entire terrace was allocated to one club, 'all the gates between the pens would be locked open and no visual assessment of numbers would take place'. 2.3.81 C/Supt Mole concluded, 'I therefore think it misguided of people to criticise the police for having prevention of hooliganism and prevention of public disorder as by far in a way their main priority in attending a football match. Of course police officers have to be concerned with safety but that is not the reason for their attendance'. This was a clear statement of priority from the SYP officer with the most extensive experience of policing Hillsborough.

¶Crowd distribution: the Club's responsibility 2.3.82 C/Supt Duckenfield was in no doubt that crowd distribution within and between the pens was the Club's responsibility. He informed the Taylor Inquiry that 'the club and ourselves [SYP] accept our individual responsibilities and as far as I am concerned it is clearly defined. My understanding is ... crowd management, filling of pens and monitoring of pens is a Club responsibility and not that of the Police Service'.47 2.3.83 Yet he stated that should the pens reach 'overfilling and it becomes apparent to me that they are overfilling and difficulties are likely to occur, then I shall take some action'. It was the responsibility of the 20 officers on the perimeter track to react 'if the filling of the pens gets to the point of overcrowding'. A further six officers monitored the West Stand above the Leppings Lane terrace. 2.3.84 In his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry CI Creaser stated that the police watched the pens to ensure fans' safety. Regarding what C/Supt Mole described as 'visual assessment' CI Creaser commented that from his 'experience at policing that end of the ground [Leppings Lane], the Officers at that location get a feel for it. There might be, for example, a fan who leaves the terrace from the tunnel and said [sic] "Look it is packed out in there, you want to stop any more going in". That sort of thing'.48 As previously discussed, the pens within the Leppings Lane terrace were directly beneath, and in full view of, the main Police Control Box. 2.3.85 Inspector Steven Sewell considered it was 'the Club's responsibility for the actual packing of people' yet 'there are no stewards allocated to that terrace'.49 The SYP-approved document 'Instructions for match day staff', however, made no reference to Club stewards' responsibility for packing the terraces. This clearly contradicted the 1981 SYP memorandum mentioned above regarding Club stewards' responsibilities. 2.3.86 Insp Sewell explained that officers gained experience of appropriate responses because of their established routine at matches. Yet an analysis of allocated duties showed that none of the officers in Serials 14 and 15, allocated to the Leppings Lane terrace in 1989, although experienced at league matches, was positioned there in 1988.50

C/Supt Duckenfield's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000123550001, pp231-233. 48. CI Creaser's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025950001, p4. 49. Inspector Sewell's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000123550001, p6. 50. Inspector Sewell's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000123550001, pp16-17.

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¶2.3.87 At league matches the Operational Order stated that '[o]ccupancy of pens by away fans will be given at briefing'51 yet there was no equivalent statement within the semi-final Operational Order. It was evident that the system that had evolved for packing the pens was geared to crowd control and not to safety or preventing overcrowding.

¶SWFC view of crowd management responsibility 2.3.88 While SYP considered that responsibility lay with SWFC, the Club disagreed. In a WMP interview for the criminal investigation, Club Secretary Mr Mackrell considered that police officers had a crowd management role. They 'had got the close circuit television, the Police Control Box is right above the area where it took place. You know, I would regard that as being the prime Police responsibility ... to monitor that situation'.52 No written agreement existed allocating duties and responsibilities to stewards and police. 2.3.89 According to the SWFC Security Officer and former SYP officer Douglas Lock, there was a formal agreement that the police would assume the duties of the stewards. Chief Superintendent R Herold, however, refuted this claim, noting that it was 'certainly not the case that there has ever been any agreement, oral or in writing, (formal or informal), which in any way alters the duties of the steward and those of the police officers in acting as agents of the club'.53 2.3.90 C/Supt Herold insisted that SYP did not assume the responsibility of stewards while admitting that police officers acted as a 'longstop' to alleviate the 'inadequacies, the age and often the incompetence of the stewards in the interest of public safety'. Police officers were available to assume the duties of stewards should trouble arise but did not seek to assume the role of stewards. 2.3.91 The SWFC document 'Instructions for Match Day Staff' provided some details about the role and behaviour of stewards.54 Advising gatemen and turnstile operators it stated that 'All exit gates must be manned at all times. If any gate is left unmanned at all, the entire staff covering the gate will be instantly dismissed.' It noted that a coded message would be announced over the public address system regarding emergency evacuation. 2.3.92 Club staff were warned against 'becom[ing] involved with crowd misbehaviour' as this was 'a matter for the police – AND THE POLICE ONLY' (emphasis in original). At the head of an SWFC document entitled 'Instruction to stewards', an unattributed handwritten note read 'not a word about terraces or packing supporters'.55 2.3.93 The SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry criticised the Club's understanding of the role and responsibility of the stewards. Quoting the Popplewell Report, SYP noted 'it has somehow been assumed by the Clubs that the responsibility for control of what goes on inside the ground has passed from them to the Police'.56 2.3.94 The SYP submission stated that Mr Lock's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry indicated 'the existence of some agreement to some such effect', but this was 'refuted by the police'. It concluded that the police 'were not intending to fulfil nor had any arrangement been made that they should perform any stewarding role'.

Inspector Sewell's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000123550001, p30. 52. WMP interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, p166. 53. Statement of C/Supt Herold, 10 July 1989, SYP000096840001, pp372-373. 54. 'Instructions for Match Day Staff', with internal SWFC communication dated 8 June 1988, SYP000047780001, pp497502. 55. 'Instructions to stewards', with internal SWFC communication dated 8 June 1988, SYP000047780001, p501. 56. SYP final submission to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000018350001, pp26-32.

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¶FA view of crowd management responsibility 2.3.95 The FA submission to the Taylor Inquiry claimed that crowd management was a police responsibility. In its resumé of the FA submission, SYP criticised the FA for being confused:

¶The [FA] submission comes down firmly on poor crowd distribution as being the main causal factor and is dismissive of the non-ticket holder factor as being contributory ...

¶It wrongly asserts that 'the evidence is overwhelming that the responsibility for preventing overcrowding of the central pens had been undertaken by the Police, and that the cause of the disaster was accordingly a failure in policing.' This confuses the Police practice at league games of ensuring specified pens are used to ensure segregation and proper crowd control. The club cannot be absolved from its statutory duty.57 (emphasis in original)

¶2.3.96 It stated further that the FA submission:

¶... confuses the issue of pen filling and wrongly states that operational orders for league matches provide for checking the levels in pens 3 and 4, directing the crowd away from them, closing the tunnel if necessary and for communication between officers charged with these duties ... This is a total misinterpretation of the Leppings

¶Lane terraces Serial Instruction for a league game which has a requirement to

¶'ensure pens are filled in accordance with instructions from Control' at Phase I of the operation.

¶2.3.97 SYP concluded that the key concern was 'occupancy of pens in terms of segregation and not packing', underlining the policing priority established by C/Supt Mole.

¶The Operational Order and the tunnel 2.3.98 The West Midlands Police (WMP) report submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) concluded that in the 1989 SYP Operational Order responsibility for managing crowd access to the pens via the tunnel was overlooked. Regarding the 'Tunnel/Terraces – West Stand' the submission stated:

¶It is relevant that whilst a number of officers in this sector were posted to the turnstiles or terracing area in the time prior to kick off, no officers were specifically posted to supervise the tunnel. It appears that officers had a dual responsibility for searching supporters at the turnstiles and ensuring order on the terraces and responsibility for the tunnel fell between. However, because of their commitments at the turnstiles they were unable to comply with their instructions in relation to the terraces. During the match two serials were posted to the tunnel to maintain order as required.

¶This is mentioned because the police failure to close off the tunnel prior to authorising the opening of gate 'C' to prevent supporters going into pens 3 and 4 had a direct bearing on the disaster.58

¶2.3.99 Significant in this statement is the WMP conclusion that the police failure to anticipate that mass entry through Gate C would result in most fans descending the tunnel opposite into the already packed central pens.

Hillsborough Disaster Inquiry – Phase 1, Written Submission of the Football Association, with SYP resumé,

¶SYP000098190001, pp2-3. 58. WMP's submission to the DPP, Part V, SYP000038790001, p26.

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¶2.3.100 While it recognises a profound failure at the 'moment' of opening Gate C, it demonstrates a foreseeable failure in preparing for such an eventuality given prior knowledge of the problems of crushing at the turnstiles, overcrowding in the central pens and the need to redirect the incoming crowd to the side access points.

¶The closure of the tunnel 2.3.101 According to a turnstile operator, in 1981 Club stewards were instructed by police on duty in the inner concourse area behind the West Stand and Leppings Lane terrace to close the gates at the head of the tunnel. Fans were redirected to access points at either end of the terrace.59 Although he could not recall details, CI Creaser stated that in 1987 the tunnel was closed '[w]hen it was considered that the pens were full'.60

¶2.3.102 In 1988, there is evidence that the tunnel was also closed for an unspecified period. A typed summary of the 1988 Semi-Final video tapes recorded that at '15.02.44' two police officers were standing at the back of the terrace by the central tunnel. Police officers, therefore, were at the mouth of the tunnel when it was said to have been closed.61 The 'ground control room book' had no entry or details relating to any action taken in 1988 regarding tunnel closure or restricted access.62

¶2.3.103 Fans described how in 1988 they were prevented by police and stewards from entering the tunnel. According to Frederick Eccleston, stewards and police officers blocked the tunnel. Questioned at the Taylor Inquiry, he considered there might have been more stewards than police but he was not certain.63 As he and his daughter left the turnstiles they met 'a line of police officers and stewards that stopped us going through the tunnel. They quite gently but forcefully said, "Look, this is full, you've got to go to the left or the right"'.64

¶2.3.104 Another fan, Mr P Mahew, also gave evidence at the Taylor Inquiry and stated that he had been directed by stewards: '[w]hen you got through the turnstiles you were met by a steward or I think he was a steward, anyway, and you were told to go down to the other section'.65

¶2.3.105 A HOLMES66 category record print cross-reference for 1988 disclosed to the Panel records that at least 58 people recalled that the tunnel was closed in 1988. Police or stewards or a combination of both directed fans to the side pens. Documents released to the Panel reveal a significant number of witnesses who gave evidence about the closure of the tunnel and redirection of fans to the side pens.67

¶What police officers knew about the tunnel 2.3.106 A number of police officers confirmed in their statements that the tunnel was closed in 1988 when the central pens became full. Sergeant William Crawford was responsible for a serial of officers located on the inner concourse at the rear of the West Stand and Leppings

Statement of turnstile operator, SYP000038700001, pp78-82. 60. CI Creaser's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025950001, p50. 61. Summary of video evidence from the 1988 Semi-Final, SYP000119170001, p6. 62. Action 725, 11 June 1990, SYP000110270001, p5. 63. Evidence of Mr Eccleston, a fan, to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025850001, p28. 64. Evidence of Mr Eccleston, a fan, to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025850001, p11. 65. Evidence of Mr Mahew, a fan, to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025830001, p155. 66. The HOLMES computer database records statements and other police material and allows systematic searching and cross-referencing. 67. HOLMES category record print, SYP000123530001, pp297-341.

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¶Lane terrace. He stated that 'at 14.50 hours we had an instruction believed verbal, that no more fans were to be allowed in the central pens, therefore, the wooden gate at the rear of the tunnel was closed denying access. This was done by PC 1278 Lang'.68

¶2.3.107 PC Lang closed 'one half of the gate for a period from about 2.45pm, I do not know how long this was for, to assist in the prevention of further persons going down the tunnel into pens 3 and 4, I presume because of congestion in those pens'.69 PS Crawford stated that he believed that PC Lang's action was 'a result of his being ordered to do this by a supervisory officer at least Inspector rank [sic]'.

¶2.3.108 He was 'unable to say which officer gave the order or whether it was done orally or via the radio' but recollected 'as I told the Inquest, of going to see Constable Lang to ensure he had carried out the order so that tends to indicate that I heard the order being given so it probably was given via the radio'.

¶2.3.109 Reflecting on what happened in 1989, PS Crawford noted that the police were 'very light on manpower at this end'. Further, in relation to the tunnel, he noted that '[n]ormally we have had a serial at the centre tunnel to direct fans to the North or South pens when the Centre pens had been filled'.70

¶2.3.110 Re-interviewed during SYP investigations for the contribution hearings, PS Crawford adhered to his original statement that an instruction was received to close the tunnel. He reiterated that he had not acted on his own initiative but could not recall whether the instruction had come from a police officer or a Club steward.71

¶2.3.111 Confirming PS Crawford's account, PC Lang recalled receiving an order to close the tunnel:

¶Sometime between 2.45 (14.45) and 2.50pm (14.50) I received an order to close the gates at the top of the tunnel leading to the central pen and remain at these gates to prevent entry by any further fans into the centre. I closed the right hand gate and remained at this post directing fans to the wing entrances … A short time after the kick off further officers attended at my location and the gates were again opened after they took up duty in the tunnel. I do not know who gave the order to close these gates or why the order was given.72

¶2.3.112 Other officers confirmed that an instruction was given to seal the tunnel in 1988. Officers within Serial 14 were initially responsible for ensuring that fans entering the Leppings Lane terrace turnstiles (A–G) were not carrying items prohibited by the ground rules. This was Phase One (pre-match). During the match (Phase Two) the officers moved to the central tunnel. Sergeant Trevor Higgins described receiving an instruction to seal the tunnel:

¶During the game and because of the amount of fans within pens 3 and 4, I received instruction to close the gates to the entrance and thereafter direct fans to the two outer pens of the stand. I cannot recall where the instruction came from. Under normal circumstances instruction came from a Serial Inspector or via radio from control. I cannot say from which the instruction came.73 68. Statement R170A of PS Crawford, 31 May 1989, SYP000110730001, p39. 69. Ghost statement of PS Crawford from the disciplinary investigation file, SYP000110370001, pp20-21. 70. Statement R170 of PS Crawford, 28 April 1989, SYP000110730001, p6. In the process of review and alteration of statements described in Chapter 11, PS Crawford's comments were deleted. The amended version of his statement is available at SYP000038810001, p56. 71. Re-interview of PS Crawford, 26 May 1990, SYP000098390001, p7. 72. Statement R333A of PC Lang, 2 June 1989, SYP000114060001, p13. 73. Statement R516 of retired PS Trevor Higgins, 2 June 1989, SYP000038700001, pp462-463.

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¶2.3.113 Subsequently, he stated that 'it was a police instruction but I could not remember whether it was via control or directly from a serial inspector. There were definitely no SWFC stewards in the immediate area'.74

¶A 'commonsense' response 2.3.114 Officers in Serial 17 also recalled that the tunnel was closed in 1988. They considered the action was a commonsense response by officers on duty rather than a consequence of an instruction from senior officers. These officers were also located in the central tunnel during the match.

¶2.3.115 Police Constable Hughes stood at the back of pens 3 and 4 for a few minutes and realised the pens were packed.75 He recalled 'no specific instruction that I was aware of to form a cordon across that tunnel but commonsense told me as obviously the other officers had realized that there was limited space in the pens'.76

¶2.3.116 Consequently, 'together with those other officers' PC Hughes 'turned people away from the rear of the tunnel when they came to try and enter pens 3 and 4 from that time on. The match had already started by this time'. He saw no Club stewards at the location at that time.

¶2.3.117 Sergeant Howard Cable was also in the tunnel and realised that the central pens were very crowded:

¶Common sense told me and my officers that we should endeavour to prevent any more people entering the pens via the tunnel but I would clarify that my serial, together with officers from another serial, were simply standing in the tunnel to monitor the crowd in the pens. We were not physically blocking access via the tunnel, simply persuading people trying to enter through the tunnel that there was no more room in the central pens and that they should try to get in to the terracing elsewhere.

¶As far as I can recall there were no club stewards present.

¶There would have been possibly up to 20 Police Officers either in or near the outer tunnel entrance and that number may have appeared to be [a] cordon although I stress it was not a physical planned obstruction of the tunnel.77

¶2.3.118 He stated, 'there was no specific operational plan to block the tunnel by a Police cordon'. In another statement he recalled 'the pressure in the centre pen being relieved slightly by allowing supporters to leave the pen via the gates in the fencing dividing the pens. This was one way traffic only police officers allowing supporters to leave the centre pen only'.78

¶2.3.119 Another officer in Serial 17, Police Constable Barnes, was located in the tunnel at the entrance to pen 4 at the start of the match. Consistent with other officers in his serial he did not recall receiving an order to seal the tunnel but diverted supporters following PC Hughes' observations that the central pens were congested. He stated:

Statement R516B of retired PS Trevor Higgins, 1 July 1990, SYP000087460001, p4. 75. Statement R524 of PC Hughes, 5 June 1989, SYP000115970001, p3. 76. Statement R524B of PC Hughes, 5 June 1989, SYP000110270001, p328. 77. Statement R424B of PS Cable, SYP000110270001, pp326-327. 78. Statement R424A of PS Cable, 20 June 1989, SYP000120630001, p2.

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¶I cannot recall any direct order for either myself or the serial I was assigned to, to start to seal off the tunnel which gave access to the 'pen' area onto the terrace behind the goal.

¶As the 'pen' began to fill with supporters I was joined by other officers who had been earlier directed to police inside the actual pen. I was informed by those officers that the pen was getting very crowded and we then observed the crowd in that pen from the rear of the terrace.

¶Myself and about six other officers were stood across the mouth of the tunnel observing the crowd. As we observed the crowd, more spectators came down the tunnel with a view to getting into that 'pen'. As they tried to get in myself and other officers began to turn them away and simply explained to them it was full already. The spectators almost immediately turned away and quickly ran back up the tunnel to find alternative standing areas.

¶Through my duties at this location I cannot recall seeing any Sheffield Wednesday club stewards, who are normally visible by their orange coloured vests.79

¶2.3.120 There is no explanation in the disclosed documents as to why these closures were not recorded in SYP debriefings and the procedure not anticipated in successive SYP Operational Orders. Clearly, such an omission regarding a fundamental crowd safety issue is a serious cause for concern.

¶The significance of closing the tunnel Review and alteration of statements 2.3.121 As noted in Part 1, police officers' statements underwent a process of review and alteration of content. This process was known to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny and is covered in detail in Chapter 11. In 1989 the failure to effectively monitor the pens and close the tunnel once Gate C was opened was a particular focus in the review and alteration process.

¶2.3.122 In Police Constable Brian Huckstepp's statement, for example, the following sentence was deleted: 'knowing the Hillsborough Ground as I do and how the Leppings Lane end fills up it might possibly have been better to direct the fans coming in through open gates into the flank areas, which I saw were by no means full'.80

¶2.3.123 Police Constable Jim Walpole recalled that at '2.55pm the central pen for standing at the Leppings Lane end appeared to be absolutely packed solid whilst the pen towards the Police Control was about half full and the pen towards the North Stand was perhaps only one sixth full. For normal big games the standing fans at the Leppings Lane terrace have filled each pen slowly well before kick off'.81 The following sentence was deleted: 'I did not hear any radio message for the entrance to the central pen to be closed off, despite this being packed solid'.

¶2.3.124 Insp White managed the serials on the inner concourse in 1989. He retired soon after the disaster on medical grounds and did not give evidence to the Taylor Inquiry or at the inquests. He had four years' experience as an Inspector in this area of the stadium and was dealing with an arrest when the order came to open Gate C. 79. Statement R527B of PC Barnes, SYP000110270001, p324. 80. Recollection of PC Huckstepp, SYP000009590001, p7 (unamended) and p13 (amended). 81. Recollection of PC Walpole, SYP000113600001, p3 (unamended) and SYP000100790001, p3 (amended).

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¶2.3.125 Deleted from his statement was the comment that at the briefing 'no mention was made about the tunnel gates being used to control the ingress of the crowd'.82 The following commentary was also removed:

¶Although on rare occasions in the past I have used the gates nearest the concourses to control flow away from the tunnel around to the south pen. I did this only for a few moments merely as a psychological support to turn the fans round to the south pen.

¶I would not use them for any length of time as when they are in the closed position they would be an obstruction in an emergency evacuation situation as they would have to be opened against the crowd and also because this is the only ingress/egress of fans in the central pens to get to the snack bar and toilets.

¶2.3.126 Police Constable Andrew Brookes' statement was also altered and the comment 'why were the sliding doors at the back of the tunnel not closed at 2.45 (1445) when those sections of the ground were full as at the Manchester United match this season?' was deleted.83

¶2.3.127 Police Constable Powell's statement had the following passage deleted:

¶The first thing I said was, 'Where are all the bobbies, there's hardly anybody there'.

¶I saw numerous people climbing over the tops of the turnstiles and the few Police

¶Officers that I saw appeared to be doing nothing about it. My main observation at this point was the lack of Police presence. I couldn't understand how such a large crowd could have possibly gathered. I recall in previous games there was usually a large

¶Police presence concentrated on this part of the ground usually forming some sort of cordon.84

¶2.3.128 Under the direction of Insp White, PS Crawford led Serial 14 inside Gate C. The comment that '[N]ormally we have had a serial at the centre tunnel to direct fans to the North or South pens when Centre pens have been filled', was deleted from his statement.85

¶What senior officers knew about the tunnel 2.3.129 Despite the close proximity of the Police Control Box to the central pens and the bank of CCTV monitors at his disposal, C/Supt Mole stated that as Match Commander in 1987 and 1988 he was unaware of overcrowding or crushing or that the tunnel had been closed. Further, he stated that 'the de-briefs did not disclose any suggestion that supporters had been injured due to overcrowding or crushing' and none of the other agencies had mentioned these issues.86

¶2.3.130 C/Supt Mole also noted that had the tunnel been closed in 1988 it was 'the sort of incident I would have expected to have been on a de-brief sheet'. Because he was 'not made aware of the problem in 1988' his 'planning for 1989 was not influenced'. As far as he was concerned, as with the 1987 Semi-Final, '1988 was a success and formed a sound base for the 1989 match'.

Recollection of Inspector White, SYP000112860001, pp6-7. 83. Recollection of PC Brookes, SYP000118520001, p4. 84. Recollection of PC Powell, SYP000112300001, pp3-4 (unamended), and SYP000100520001, p3 (amended). 85. Recollection of PS Crawford, SYP000112410001, p3 (unamended), and SYP000069280001 (amended). 86. Ghost statement of C/Supt Mole as part of the disciplinary investigation, SYP000110370001, pp89-90.

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¶2.3.131 The suggestion, therefore, was that if the tunnel had been closed it was the responsibility of the police officers concerned to report back their decision through a 'debrief sheet' completed before officers went off duty and passed by them to the 'logistics team' and then to the supervisory officer debriefing meeting held soon after the match.

¶2.3.132 C/Supt Mole's professed knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the 1988 tunnel closure formed a key element in establishing SYP responsibility for anticipating the tragic events of 1989, particularly the relationship between controlling inflow into the stadium, monitoring the central pens and regulating access to the tunnel.

¶2.3.133 While C/Supt Mole stated that he was aware of the crushing in 1981, by 1987 the control of inflow, monitoring the pens and managing tunnel access did not feature in operational planning. C/Supt Mole said he believed that he had passed a successful operational legacy to the new Match Commander, C/Supt Duckenfield.

¶2.3.134 Supt Murray, who assisted C/Supt Mole in the Police Control Box, stated he had attended the 1988 debriefing and nothing was reported to suggest there had been a problem. Questioned in a WMP interview about 'the suggestion' the tunnel had been closed in 1988, he reiterated his earlier statement that he had 'never know [sic] the tunnel to be closed under any circumstances'.87 He was also asked whether police officers who had claimed that the tunnel had been closed had been mistaken. He responded: 'I don't know, it's never come to my attention … that the tunnel's been closed at any of the matches I went to, particularly the 1988 … semi-final'.

¶2.3.135 Supt Murray recounted an incident at a league match in February 1989, just weeks before the disaster, when access to the terraces from the back had become difficult and fans were admitted by the police through the gates in the perimeter fence. He stated that the decision was not a result of overcrowding but because fans refused to move down into the pens and were blocking access. The Club had criticised the police for admitting fans via gates in the perimeter track fence.

¶2.3.136 Superintendent Roger Marshall also stated that he had no knowledge of the tunnel closure in 1988 and would have expected such a decision to have been recorded in a written debrief. Further, he questioned the truthfulness of the claim, as the large gates opened inwards and would cause a problem in the event of an emergency evacuation via the tunnel.88

¶2.3.137 Also interviewed by WMP, ACC Jackson stated he was unaware of the 1988 tunnel closure. It had not been referenced in the debrief sheet. He stated that issues such as overcrowding should have been reported and he offered no explanation as to why officers had failed to report the closure.89 He confirmed there was no consideration in the 1988 or 1989 Operational Orders given to preventing access to pens once they were filled to capacity.90

¶2.3.138 CI Creaser, however, recalled that the tunnel had been closed in 1988. He was on the inner concourse and saw that the gates to the central tunnel were closed and police and stewards were redirecting fans to the side pens. He was aware that a police officer, and not Club stewards, had closed the tunnel.91

Criminal interview with Superintendent Murray, 25 June 1990, SYP000038900001, pp20-26. 88. Criminal interview with Superintendent Roger Marshall, 19 June 1990, SYP000038880001, pp22-26. 89. Criminal interview with ACC Jackson, 28 June 1990, SYP000038910001, pp112-116. 90. Criminal interview with ACC Jackson, 28 June 1990, SYP000038910001, pp121-123. 91. CI Creaser's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000025950001, pp46-53.

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¶2.3.139 PS Goddard, located in the Police Control Box, stated that he had no knowledge of tunnel closures in 1987 or 1988 but had this occurred it would have been on 'an Officer's own volition ... rather than [an instruction] from Control'.92

¶2.3.140 According to evidence given to the Taylor Inquiry by the SWFC Security Officer, Mr Lock, the Club had been aware of the tunnel closure. He stated that 'the Centre pen was closed off by the police because the fact that it was so full and they had to deviate [sic] them around ... that is what I would have expected with our system'.93

¶2.3.141 His information had come from Stuart Thorpe, chief steward at the West Stand, and the issue had been discussed with Insp Sewell and C/Supt Mole. He speculated that in his experience as a former SYP officer, Police Control might have issued an instruction to close the tunnel. The SWFC Club Secretary, Mr Mackrell, also stated that a cordon had been organised across the tunnel entrance in 1988.94

¶The acceptance of senior officers' statements 2.3.142 In his Interim Report LJ Taylor concluded that in 1988 the tunnel leading to the central pens had been closed when the pens were full. It was a straightforward manoeuvre, 'for a few officers to act as a cordon at the entrance to the tunnel and divert fans elsewhere'. He considered it unfortunate that 'the 1988 closure seems to have been unknown to the senior officers on duty at the time'.95

¶2.3.143 The subsequent WMP criminal investigation concurred with LJ Taylor that senior officers neither knew nor authorised the 1988 tunnel closure. While fans had stated that police officers had formed 'a blockade' across the tunnel entrance it had not been 'documented and was not a decision made by the Senior Officers present at the 1988 game'.96

¶2.3.144 According to the WMP report the 'probability' was that officers had acted 'on their own initiative turning supporters away having recognised that part of the terrace was full'. In 1989, the report concluded, 'the fact that access to the tunnel was not controlled aggravated the overcrowding in pens 3 and 4 and [was] a significant factor in the deaths of the 95 people'.

¶2.3.145 After investigating the matter internally, Chief Inspector Norman Bettison stated that the 'fullest information on the closure of the tunnel at the 1988 Semi-Final' showed it was 'an informal initiative at junior level not reported to command level. It was performed exclusively by the police'.97 This conclusion was also drawn by the Coroner who directed the inquest jury that the senior officers had not been aware of diversions from the tunnel by police officers in 1988.98

PS Goddard's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, HOM000026040001, p41. 93. Mr Lock's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, SYP000118450001, pp19-20. 94. Report outlining actions following witness statements taken from various people in relation to criticism of events at the

¶1989 FA Cup Semi-Final, SYP000122450001. 95. Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Interim Report, Cm 765, August 1989,

¶London: HMSO, para 230. 96. West Midlands Police Interim Report (2), Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, Sheffield Wednesday Football Ground,

¶Saturday 15 April 1989, HOM000026960001, pp22-23. 97. Report of Norman George Bettison, 'PREPARATION OF CASE FOR HILLSBOROUGH CONTRIBUTION HEARINGS',

¶12 July 1990, SYP000113470001, p16. 98. Inquest transcripts, day 75, 21 March 1991, SYC000109210001, p102.

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¶Conflicting evidence about the senior officers' knowledge of tunnel closure 2.3.146 Minutes of debriefing meetings held in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and disclosed to the Panel indicate that senior officers were aware of contingency plans involving tunnel access. At a meeting on 17 April 1989 C/Supt Duckenfield explained to the Chief Constable, Peter Wright, that it was the responsibility of 'Inspector White with serials 14 and 15' to divert people from the tunnel. There were 'specific instructions on the order at phase 2 [once the match was under way]'.99

¶2.3.147 He added that 'once the central tunnel becomes full ... it is shut off and people directed to the wings'. The Chief Constable observed, 'there were contingencies to deal with the filled stand, i.e. the shutting of the tunnel'. In the minutes of discussions with SYP Counsel on 26 April it was clear that C/Supt Mole had been aware of contingency plans to seal the tunnel.100

¶2.3.148 The SYP Deputy Chief Constable, Peter Hayes, stated: 'Superintendent Freeman is alleged to have had a contingency to block off the tunnel in the event of a build up of fans in the enclosures'. C/Supt Mole replied: 'So did I. We blocked them off. The fans always go for the area behind the goal. We put a cordon and send them round'.

¶2.3.149 Statements from C/Supt Duckenfield and C/Supt Mole demonstrate that, whatever their knowledge of 1988, both officers were aware that the tunnel could be used as a means of preventing overcrowding in the central pens. This is consistent with C/Supt Mole's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry when he stated that, faced with full central pens, he would close the tunnel.101

¶Police investigation into the role of stewards in tunnel closure 2.3.150 Following the disaster and for the contribution hearings, the internal SYP team had responsibility for gathering evidence relating to the 1988 tunnel closure. Its investigation focused on the possibility that there were more stewards than police involved in the closure and on identifying the source of the instruction for closure, thus providing evidence for apportioning liability.102

¶2.3.151 A fax from Peter Metcalf, SYP solicitor, to DCC Hayes stated that if stewards were involved or if the instruction came from them 'then the Club's responsibility is correspondingly increased'.103 Obviously, this deflected responsibility from SYP to the Club.

¶2.3.152 In the course of the SYP investigation into the 1988 closure of the tunnel, Detective Inspector John Cleverley reported to C/Supt Wain. His report, a consequence of SYP inquiries requested by the SYP solicitors, included the following summary:

¶This question was covered at the time of the Taylor Enquiry, and I would refer first to the Note to Counsel (11) made at that time. Nothing has been found to alter the basic conclusion of that enquiry, namely that officers had acted on their own initiative to close off the tunnel at a critical time when the pens were becoming full. There were apparently two types of control.

Minutes of meeting, 17 April 1989, SYP000096360001, pp43-49. 100. Discussion with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000096360001, p81. 101. Transcript of C/Supt Mole's evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, day 7, 24 May 1989, SWF000002030001, pp65-66. 102. 'Hillsborough-contribution action', 30 May 1990, SYP000098230001, p3. 103. Faxed letter to DCC Hayes from Hammond Suddards, 31 May 1990, SYP000098250001, p3.

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¶We have interviewed again the officers who closed the gates. The instruction to do so came from police sources, not the club so far as they knew. No stewards were involved. The operation seems to have been simple and low key, with not much more than three officers involved, and not lasted longer than the full surge of incoming spectators before the start of the match.

¶When the match began other officers who had been on the turnstiles were no longer needed because the flow of spectators had diminished, they also went to the tunnel and stood inside near the pens. (They probably hoped to see a little of the match from there!). The gates were no longer closed off at that time. They could see that the pens were full. As late comers tried to get in down the tunnel to the pens, they were turned back by those policemen and directed to the side pens.

¶No evidence has been found of club involvement.104

¶Further internal SYP enquiries into tunnel closure for the contribution hearings 2.3.153 SYP enquiries were also carried out regarding the actions of PS Crawford, PC Lang, PS Higgins, Inspector Raymond Hooley and Inspector Raymond Walker. A Note to Counsel stated:

¶Sergeant CRAWFORD was in charge of Serial 13 which had responsibility for the West

¶Stand in 1988. Part of that duty would include officers in the Leppings Lane enclosure supervising the stairways to the West Stand seating area. He recalls receiving an instruction, from whom or how he does not recall, that there were to be no more fans allowed into the central pens, and therefore the wooden gates at the rear of the tunnel were to be closed, denying access. The actual task, according to him, was undertaken by PC LANG.

¶PC LANG was a member of Serial 13 and was responsible for the stairway giving access to the seating area in the West Stand, this stairway being at the South end of the Leppings Lane enclosures. PC LANG confirms that he received an order to close the gates at the top of the tunnel which gave access to the central pens, he closed the right hand gate and directed fans to the wings.

¶Ex [retired] Sergeant HIGGINS was in charge of Serial 14. He confirms that because of the large number of fans in pens 3 and 4 he received an instruction, again there was no indication as to how or from where, to close the gates, and thereafter direct fans to the two outer pens.

¶Inspector Raymond HOOLEY was in charge of Serial 13 with responsibility for the

¶West Stand. This officer has no recollection of any events relating to the tunnel gates.

¶So far as he is concerned, they were open.

¶Inspector Raymond WALKER was in charge of Serials 14 and 15, with responsibility for the Leppings Lane terracing. He has no recollection of any actions being taken to shepherd fans to any particular part of the ground nor any problems with fans in the tunnel. He recalls passing through the tunnel himself on several occasions.

¶You will recall that Chief Superintendent MOLE was not aware of any policy or instructions in relation to the filling of the central pens. 104. 'Interim Report 3: Result of enquiries requested by Hammond Suddards', 1 July 1990, SYP000119460001, p8.

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¶It seems therefore that officers have acted on their own initiative to exercise control and direction of the tunnel. They are, of course, expected to use initiative and take independent action as circumstances dictate, which were the very matters we were discussing in respect of command structure last week. It does seem, however, that the hierarchy were not made aware of this independent action.

¶It also seems likely in the light of events to date, 5 June, as revealed by Chief

¶Inspector CREASER, that we exercised some control over that tunnel in 1987. West

¶Midlands have already asked for the 1987 Operational Order, and I anticipate that we shall have requests for statement from serials working at the Leppings Lane enclosures. I do not, therefore, at this moment in time, propose to initiate our own enquiries unless you yourself indicate you would like some early indication of what is going to be said.105

¶2.3.154 Thus, knowledge of the 1988 tunnel closure apparently was related inversely to rank and seniority – and managerial responsibility. The lower ranked officers involved directly claimed they followed instructions. The more senior officers claimed they had no knowledge of the closure or of any difficulties regarding the crowd management or overcrowding in the pens.

¶2.3.155 In advance of the civil trial, and as a consequence of commissioning the Phillips Report, SYP did not concede 'that the failure to block the entrance to the tunnel on the opening of Gate C itself amounted to negligence'.106 Referring to the evidence given by officers Creaser, Calvert, Darling and Sewell, the SYP solicitor, Peter Metcalf, proposed that the use of the word 'monitoring' was ambiguous. He stated:

¶What I would like to understand is whether those officers, on reviewing the transcript, agree that it gives the true flavour of what they meant to say. In other words in relation to this semi-final: 1. Were they expecting any Police Officer to be checking the pens, not merely for individual signs of overcrowding, but by way of making regular and deliberate assessments as to whether they were full with a view to closing off such pens? 2. If not were they expecting any other body to be undertaking this duty? ...

¶I would be grateful if the Officers referred to could review their inquiry evidence and if, in the light of that review, they believe that statements explaining the purport of their evidence can be given, then perhaps these could be taken by the Hillsborough

¶Inquiry Team. I attach a draft format but, as long as the points are covered, it would be preferable if the statements were self taken to preserve individual style.

¶2.3.156 Mr Metcalf concluded: 'I am sure I don't need to emphasise that there is no point in any officer putting forward evidence which he cannot honestly sustain in cross examination'. He required a further statement '[o]nly if the officers consider that the transcript does not fairly state their true position'.

¶2.3.157 Following a request from the solicitors, officers Creaser, Darling, Calvert and Sewell were approached and asked to review the evidence in their statements in relation to filling the pens. All four declined to add to their original evidence.107

Note to Counsel, SYP000098390001, p7. 106. Letter from Peter Metcalf, Hammond Suddards, to DCC Hayes, 19 July 1990, SYP000118290001, pp4-6. 107. 'Interim Report 6: Further enquiries requested by Hammond Suddards', 8 August 1990, SYP000098530001, p2. See also SYP000118290001, p1 for details of police action raised in this regard.

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Based on the established policy of maintaining segregation of fans within the stadium and its approaches, particularly at FA Cup semi-finals, the documents disclosed to the Panel demonstrate that SYP determined the allocation of the stadium's stands and terraces to each club's fans. The tickets allocated to Nottingham Forest fans significantly exceeded those allocated to Liverpool fans, an issue raised by Liverpool Football Club and the Football Association.
The confined outer concourse area serving the Leppings Lane turnstiles accommodated the entire Liverpool crowd, heading towards three discrete areas within the stadium (North Stand; West Stand; Leppings Lane terrace). It was a well-documented bottleneck and at matches with capacity attendance presented a predictable and foreseeable risk of crushing and injury.
From statements provided to the Panel, at previous FA Cup semi-finals SYP managed congestion in the outer concourse area and its approaches by filtering the crowd and checking tickets on the roads leading to the ground. This did not happen in 1989. The former SYP match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, denied that filtering the crowd's approach to the turnstiles had been previously adopted as police practice.
SYP proposed that preventing ticketless fans from approaching the turnstiles was not possible because no offence had been committed. This was contested and criticised by Counsel to the Taylor Inquiry.
In their 1989 statements some SYP officers referred to crushing in the outer concourse area at the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final. They were asked by the SYP solicitors, Hammond Suddards, to reconsider and qualify their statements.
Concerning the distribution of the crowd on the standing terraces inside the stadium, Chief Superintendent Mole stated that officers on the perimeter track and in the Control Box estimated when full capacity of each pen was reached 'based on experience'.
SYP officers with extensive experience of policing Hillsborough, including Chief Superintendent Mole, stated that the fans' distribution between the Leppings Lane terrace pens was based on an informal practice that allowed fans to 'find their own level'. In the aftermath of the 1989 disaster, SYP claimed that 'find their own level' was a flawed practice 'devised' by the safety engineers and SWFC.
From the SYP statements disclosed to the Panel it is evident that SWFC stewards and SYP officers with experience of managing the crowd on the Leppings Lane terrace had adopted the practice of redirecting fans to side pens when the central pens were estimated to be full. At semi-final matches in 1987 and in 1988 the gates at the entrance to the tunnel opposite the turnstiles and leading into the central pens were closed temporarily by police officers who redirected fans to the side pens. In 1988 many fans in the central pens experienced crushing and minor injuries. Neither the gate closures nor the crushing were recorded in debriefing notes.
Although an established practice, the use of the tunnel entrance gates as a means of regulating access to the central pens was not included in the Operational Order for capacity crowd matches.
The disclosed documents reveal persistent ambiguity throughout the 1980s about SYP's and SWFC's responsibilities for crowd management. The SYP position, exemplified by Chief Superintendent Mole's statements, was that while safety was a concern for SYP the

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¶'prevention of hooliganism' and 'public disorder' was the main priority. The custom and practice that had evolved within SYP for packing the pens was concerned primarily with controlling the crowd. • In the view of Chief Superintendent Mole's successor, Chief Superintendent David

¶Duckenfield, crowd distribution between the Leppings Lane terrace pens was the responsibility of SWFC stewards but police officers, particularly those on the perimeter track, were expected to react to overcrowding in the pens. • In its post-disaster assessment the West Midlands Police investigators concluded that the failure to anticipate that unregulated entry of fans through exit Gate C and down the tunnel would lead to a sustained crush in already full central pens had a 'direct bearing on the disaster'. • SYP officers with experience of the inner concourse and terrace access stated that previously they had controlled access to the tunnel once the central pens appeared to be full, particularly in 1988. The disclosed documents reveal that this information was deleted from some officers' statements. Several officers declined a further invitation by SYP solicitors to reconsider their statements regarding SYP responsibility for monitoring the pens. • Senior SYP officers denied knowledge of tunnel closures at previous semi-finals, particularly 1988. They placed responsibility for that information not being given at debriefings on the officers responsible for the closures. Yet SYP officers responsible for closing the tunnel access in 1988 claimed that they had acted under instructions from senior officers. • Whatever their personal knowledge of the 1988 tunnel closure, both Chief Superintendent

¶Mole and Chief Superintendent Duckenfield admitted their awareness of the practice of occasionally restricting access to the tunnel to prevent overcrowding in the central pens.