Part 2: Hillsborough: 'what is added to public understanding'

¶Within its terms of reference the Hillsborough Independent Panel was given responsibility for deciding on the detailed content of its Report. It was envisaged by the Government that the Report would provide an overview of the documents and other material made available by the contributing organisations.

¶In carrying out its work, the Panel was greatly assisted by consultations with families and has taken account of their views when researching and analysing the disclosed documents. In that context, the Report focuses primarily on 'how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath'.

¶Part 1 provides a review of 'what was known' or publicly available prior to the Panel's work. Through a detailed analysis of the material disclosed, Part 2 further expands on 'what was known' to explore in detail the key issues raised by families and to provide a full review of what disclosure adds to public understanding.

¶Chapters 1 to 3 cover the longer-term context through to the circumstances of the disaster, focusing on the relationships between the control, management and safety of the crowd and providing a review of institutional responsibilities before, during and after the disaster.

¶Chapters 4 and 5 consider the emergency response, medical evidence and pathology, the latter focusing on the recording and publicising of blood alcohol levels of all who died, as well as on findings concerning their cause of death.

¶The range of investigations and inquiries are covered in Chapters 6 and 7, considering the significance of and relationship between parallel investigations. Chapters 8 to 10 address concerns raised by bereaved families regarding the inquests.

¶Chapter 11 returns to the contentious issue of the process adopted by the South Yorkshire Police and, to a more limited extent, by the South Yorkshire Ambulance Service, for reviewing and altering officers' statements. Finally, Chapter 12 examines the disclosed material to establish how in the immediate aftermath unsubstantiated allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool fans received such prominence in the press.

Part 2 Hillsborough: 'what is added to public understanding' — 59

Chapter 1: 1981–1989: unheeded warnings, the seeds of disaster

¶Introduction 2.1.1 When disasters occur it is rare that causation can be attributed to one single overarching act or omission. Even when there is unequivocal evidence that such a single action by an individual or individuals occurred or there was negligence, the historical context and the immediate circumstances are vital ingredients to understanding and explaining how a failure or failures in systems, and the judgements of those responsible, came together. Because systems, their design and monitoring, and their operators evolve over time they are susceptible to custom and practice. For that reason, particularly in situations where people gather in large numbers as travellers, spectators or participants, public events are regulated and managed to create the safest possible environment. That responsibility falls on the owners and, if appropriate, the hirers of the facility, on those responsible for managing and policing people before, during and after the event and on those responsible for responding effectively and efficiently to any emergency should it occur.

¶2.1.2 While the Panel's work focuses on a disaster involving mass fatalities, injuries and trauma, it is important that the circumstances of the Hillsborough disaster are placed in the context of previous incidents at the stadium and the lessons that were learned, or not, from debriefings and from negotiations between the owners, the safety engineers, the local authority, the police and the other emergency services. The structural condition of the stadium, including alterations to the stands and terraces, was a significant factor in establishing whether it provided a safe environment for spectators, especially when full to capacity. Given the pre-eminent climate in which soccer was policed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the custom and practice adopted by Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) and South Yorkshire Police (SYP) in the management and regulation of the crowd were also important factors.

¶2.1.3 Following the 1989 disaster considerable evidence relating to the context, circumstances and consequences of the 1981 crushing on the Leppings Lane terrace was gathered by the key agencies concerned, primarily to establish whether the tragedy was foreseeable and preventable. What follows draws significantly on that evidence as disclosed to the Panel. Not all the evidence sought has been provided, in some cases because it no longer exists.

Chapter 1 1981–1989: unheeded warnings, the seeds of disaster — 61

¶The 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final 2.1.4 The 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, between Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers, took place at Hillsborough on Sunday 11 April. The kick-off was scheduled for 3pm but was delayed until 3.15pm. The fans of both clubs travelling to Sheffield approached the stadium from the city's south. Several traffic incidents on the M1, including an accident involving 13 cars, the breakdown of a public service vehicle and road works, caused considerable travel delays, culminating in the late arrival of many fans close to kick-off.

¶Crushing at the turnstiles and opening Gate C 2.1.5 Fans described considerable congestion at the Leppings Lane turnstiles.1 By 2.10pm congestion on the outer concourse was severe.2 Stuart Thorpe, the chief steward for the West Stand, organised three stewards to open exit Gate C as an additional point of monitored entry. Approximately 50 people were admitted and their tickets were checked.3 While the use of the exit gates for entry established a precedent for relieving the crush at the turnstiles, in 1981 the police and stewards combined to manage the situation effectively. Mr Thorpe described how fans were lined up outside the gate while stewards and police inside the stadium prepared to receive them.4

¶Crushing on the terraces and opening of the perimeter gate 2.1.6 In 1981 the Leppings Lane terrace, although accessed from various points including the central tunnel, was not divided into pens by lateral fences. It was an open terrace. As fans arrived onto the already packed steps there was crushing resulting in serious injuries including broken bones, cuts and bruises.5 Thirty-eight people received treatment from St John Ambulance volunteers and some were taken to hospital.6 The crushing was most severe when Tottenham Hotspur scored a goal three to four minutes into the game and fans entering pushed forward. One supporter described how 'people were passing out and having difficulty breathing, people were getting hysterical, shouting and screaming'.7

¶2.1.7 As the game continued a senior police officer, Assistant Chief Constable Robert Goslin, stated it was decided to remove fans from the Leppings Lane terrace 'to ease a dangerous situation where serious injuries or even fatalities were a real possibility'.8 He gave the order to open the gates in the perimeter fence, thereby releasing approximately 150 spectators onto the perimeter track and relieving the crush. The evidence suggests that the perimeter gates were opened after the crushing was recognised. Yet one eye witness suggests that fans had been allowed onto the perimeter track as early as 2.30pm.9 Certainly, the opening of the gates at the time of the crush averted further, possibly fatal, injuries. Inspector Roger Greenwood (Superintendent and Ground Commander in 1989) stated

Statement of football supporter Gary Vaux, 14 May 1989, SYP000038700001, p75. These recollections are reiterated in Vaux's evidence to Lord Justice Taylor: see HOM000026190001, pp3-4. 2. Letter from a Tottenham Hotspur supporter to the Secretary of Liverpool FC, 20 April 1989, SYP000028950001, pp2-3. 3. Evidence of chief steward for the West Stand, Stuart Thorpe, to Lord Justice Taylor, 14 June 1989,

¶HOM000026170001, p36. 4. Evidence of chief steward for the West Stand, Stuart Thorpe, to Lord Justice Taylor, 14 June 1989,

¶HOM000026180001, p18. 5. Statement of ACC Robert Goslin, 14 August 1990, SYP000096840001, p286. 6. Letter from SYP to FA, 3 June 1981, SCC000001730001, p239. 7. Statement of football supporter Gary Vaux, 14 May 1989, SYP000038700001, p76. These recollections are reiterated in Vaux's evidence to Lord Justice Taylor, HOM000026190001, p5. 8. Minutes of the 1981 SYP debriefing, undated, SYP000096520001, p1. 9. Letter from a Tottenham Hotspur supporter to the Secretary of Liverpool FC, 20 April 1989, SYP000028950001, p2.

¶that he was stationed at one of the perimeter gates and radioed the Police Control Box for authority to open the gates. He received no response and together with another officer he opened the gates.10 The fans sat on the track, their backs against the perimeter fence wall.

¶Managing the crowd in the stadium 2.1.8 In addition to opening the perimeter gates to ease the crush on the terrace, the police also managed fans entering the terrace. According to a turnstile operator, before the start of the match stewards had been instructed by police on duty in the inner concourse area behind the West Stand to close the gates to the tunnel and to divert fans to the access points at either end of the terrace.11 This alleviated the concentration of fans behind the goal.

¶2.1.9 At half time ACC Goslin attempted to move fans from the perimeter track to the Spion Kop end. Because this mixed rival fans, it was a decision unpopular with some, resulting in 'a minor break-out' or pitch invasion as they refused to be relocated.12 In fact approximately 50 to 100 fans were successfully transferred to the Spion Kop. ACC Goslin subsequently admitted that his decision might have been ill-conceived, especially as the fans on the perimeter track had caused no problems for policing. The half-time interval was restricted to five minutes rather than ten minutes, giving insufficient time to move people. The second half was delayed, to the annoyance of the match referee, Clive Thomas. Further, the Club criticised the police strategy for seemingly 'helping fans to climb over the railings'. SYP replied that they had helped fans who had tried to climb the perimeter fence to escape the crush. Their officers' intention was to prevent further injury.

¶2.1.10 A letter of complaint from a member of the public alleged the police had 'herded more and more people into the Leppings Lane enclosure when it was obvious that it was full'. SYP Superintendent David Chapman refuted this, explaining that the entrances to the Leppings Lane end were controlled to ensure an even distribution across the terrace but as the terrace filled, 'the usual packing problems occurred'. He insisted that there was space for even distribution within the terrace but that fans had refused to move. Police officers entered the terrace to ensure better distribution. According to the stadium's safety certificate, the capacity for the Leppings Lane terrace was 10,100. The turnstiles' tally recorded 10,435. Also, a significant number of Tottenham Hotspur supporters had obtained tickets allocated to Wolverhampton Wanderers. Police officers moved them from the Spion Kop to Leppings Lane for their own safety. Thus the authorised limit for the terrace was exceeded by just over 400.

¶2.1.11 There was also controversy regarding the quality of the communications systems. Supt Chapman noted that the extensive media coverage at the ground resulted in high levels of interference, yet Acting Superintendent PJ Ruddy insisted that the communications systems were successful. Further, the number of senior officers present in the control room had caused confusion.

¶Post-match meeting 2.1.12 Eric England was SWFC Secretary and after the match an acrimonious meeting took place in his office. It was attended by Chief Constable JH Brownlow, ACC Goslin and SWFC Chairman, Bert McGee. The 30-minute meeting focused on the crushing outside the stadium and on the terrace. The SWFC representatives were extremely critical of the police

Transcript of interview and written submission of Superintendent Roger Greenwood to West Midlands Police, 29 June

¶1990, SYP000038920001, pp18-20. 11. Statement of turnstile operator, 13 May 1989, SYP000038700001, pp78-82. 12. Minutes of the 1981 SYP debriefing, undated, SYP000096520001.

¶action, for allowing the situation to develop and for how it was resolved. ACC Goslin insisted that 'circumstances beyond our control had brought about the crushing situation and conventional methods of control had failed'.13

¶2.1.13 He stated that he had been on the perimeter track and had instructed that the perimeter fence gate be opened and spectators assisted in evacuating the terrace to prevent serious injury. Fans were then allowed to sit on the track against the perimeter fence wall. Mr McGee argued that the police action was 'completely unnecessary and made the ground look "untidy"'. He considered that it might prevent Hillsborough hosting future semi-finals. ACC Goslin insisted that due to crushing on the terraces there had been a 'real chance of fatalities' to which Mr McGee replied 'Bollocks – no one would have been killed!' Following this disagreement, the relationship between SYP and SWFC became strained.

¶1981 debrief 2.1.14 A debrief of the 1981 Semi-Final was attended by ACC Goslin, Chief Superintendent R Herold, Acting Chief Superintendent Thompson, Supt Chapman, A/Supt Ruddy, Chief Inspector Smith, Inspectors Greenwood, Clive Calvert and Gordon Sykes and Sergeant Purdy (date unrecorded: several of these officers were on duty at Hillsborough in 1989).

¶2.1.15 Reflecting on the crushing, the discussion focused on the construction of the Leppings Lane terrace and its safe capacity. The officers, with the exception of Supt Chapman, agreed the maximum capacity of 10,100 was set too high.

¶2.1.16 C/Supt Herold suggested the construction of a lateral segregation gap providing a 6 to 8ft wide channel down the centre of the terrace to divide and segregate opposing fans for regular league matches. ACC Goslin disagreed, arguing that a relatively narrow gap would encourage missile throwing, with the police caught in the middle. Insp Calvert was concerned that the entrance at the Leppings Lane end of the stadium was characterised by delays and blockages and would benefit from reconstruction.14 All who attended the meeting received the minutes and a copy was filed in the 'F' Division policy file relating to policing Hillsborough.

¶Disagreement over crowd capacity 2.1.17 On 28 April 1981 C/Supt Herold met with Mr England, SWFC Secretary.15 C/Supt Herold informed Mr England that the SYP 'consensus view is that the 10,100 crowd figures specified in the Safety Certificate is too high'. Mr England disagreed, noting 'the former capacity, prior to the implementation of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act at Hillsborough was 11,000 and that on a number of occasions in previous all-ticket matches the terracing has accommodated that number'.

¶2.1.18 At this meeting C/Supt Herold introduced the SYP proposal for radial fences: 'the Leppings Lane terracing should be sectioned "vertically" front to back to produce pens to enable more accurate crowd control and prevent sideways movement and he [England] is already actively considering this'. C/Supt Herold also conceded that it had been a poor decision to move fans from the perimeter track to the Spion Kop at half time.

Statement of ACC Goslin, 14 August 1990, SYP000096840001, pp285-287. 14. Minutes of the 1981 SYP debriefing, undated, SYP000096520001, pp2-3. 15. Internal SYP memorandum from C/Supt Herold to ACC Goslin, 30 April 1981, SYP000096960001, pp144-145.

¶Club–police tensions 2.1.19 SWFC remained critical of SYP, attributing to the police responsibility for the crushing incident. In a letter to CC Brownlow on 20 May 1981, Mr McGee described supporters' complaints about how 'crowd control at Leppings Lane end didn't do what it set out to do'.16 SWFC's investigations concluded that 'the major contributory factor was that police turned away many supporters at the Spion Kop end wearing Tottenham favours but producing tickets that they had obtained from the Wolverhampton ground – they were turned back to Leppings Lane to be with the Tottenham supporters'. This then caused 'the congestion that resulted into the spill-over at the fence'.

¶2.1.20 Mr McGee concluded that 'clearly as a Club and you as a police force, we mustn't have this kind of trouble again if it can possibly be avoided'. This continuing criticism of SYP soured relations after the 1981 match yet the SYP Chief Constable defended his officers and 'his only criticism of his senior officers was for not opening the gates earlier'.17

¶2.1.21 A decade later, in its submission to the Taylor Inquiry, SWFC's position appears to have mellowed: 'the two parties most directly concerned with it [the 1981 crushing] appear to have reacted to it sensibly: the Police reconsidered the whole question of an open terrace and devised the penning system and the club accepted the recommendation and acted upon it in accordance with the advice of Dr. Eastwood and the authority of the Council'.18

¶SYP position on the 1981 Semi-Final 2.1.22 On 3 June 1981 ACC Goslin, on behalf of the SYP Chief Constable, wrote to Ted Croker, the Football Association (FA) Secretary, outlining the SYP position on the 1981 match.19 He noted the late arrival of fans due to travel delays and condemned Wolverhampton Wanderers' sale of tickets to Tottenham Hotspur fans. He stated: 'Neither of the two participating Semi-Final clubs saw fit to inform the South Yorkshire Police, Sheffield Wednesday Football Club or the Football Association about this situation and in that event the mixing of supporters was not properly catered for'. Consequently, 'some 400 Tottenham fans had to be removed from the Spion Kop, in the interests of general safety and public order, and were accommodated in the Leppings Lane end of the ground, which had been designated for use by Spurs supporters'.

¶2.1.23 ACC Goslin also raised the SYP assumption that the 10,100 capacity figure for the Leppings Lane terrace 'obviously contains a safety factor'. He described how the police had opened the fence gates to the perimeter track to relieve pressure and how they had refused further access to the terrace, concluding that 'no other course of action could have been adopted in the interest of public safety'. He received a bland reply.20

¶2.1.24 The issues of capacity and reconstruction raised at the SYP debrief were included in a key letter from SYP to Mr McGee on 5 June 1981.21 The letter stated that 'the Leppings Lane end is not constructed to give maximum aid to the packing and control of the crowd and the accepted crowd capacity is such that there is no safety margin'. Further, it repeated concerns that had earlier been passed to Mr England, the Club Secretary, by C/Supt Herold at their previous meeting in April.

Letter from Bert McGee to CC Brownlow, 20 May 1981, SYP000098450001, p4. 17. Final submission of South Yorkshire Fire Service and Civil Defence Authority to Lord Justice Taylor,

¶SYP000098170001, pp16-17. 18. Final submission of SWFC to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000098200001, p12. 19. Letter from ACC Goslin, SYP, to Ted Croker, Secretary of the FA, 3 June 1981, SCC000001730001, pp238-239. 20. Letter from the FA to ACC Goslin, SYP, 12 June 1981, SYP000019280001, p17. 21. Letter from SYP to Chairman of SWFC, 5 June 1981, SYP000096530001.

¶Responding to the 1981 Semi-Final 2.1.25 On 7 August 1981 a meeting was convened at SYP headquarters to discuss the organisation of football matches within the South Yorkshire area for the 1981/82 season. It was attended by SYP officers and representatives of South Yorkshire County Council (SYCC), SWFC, Sheffield United FC, Rotheram FC and Barnsley FC. In the minutes of meeting there is no mention of the 1981 incident.22 A letter from the Secretary of the Sheffield branch of the Tottenham Hotspur Supporters' Club was sent to the FA and SYP seeking an explanation for the crushing on the terrace but no response was received.23 2.1.26 A number of parallels can be drawn between the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final and subsequent matches: late arrival of fans, delayed kick-off, opening exit gates to ease congestion at the turnstiles, problems with packing the terraces, the closure of the tunnel to divert fans away from the terrace immediately behind the goal and the opening of the perimeter gates. Reflecting back on 1981, SWFC argued that crushing occurred 'before the pens were devised or installed and it is accordingly plain that this type of tragedy could have occurred in circumstances similar to those with which this Inquiry [Taylor] is concerned even if there had been no pens'.24 Had 'a thousand people ... been allowed rapidly to enter the most popular area of the terrace at a time when the entrance leading directly to that area should have been "closed" to them it must have been foreseeable that those at the front could have been crushed even in the absence of radial fences'.

¶1981–86 ground modifications and safety issues Certification for Hillsborough 2.1.27 A working party including the Fire Service, SYP, Sheffield City Council (as building authority) and SYCC had been established in the mid-1970s to consider safety certification at venues across the region. In April 1977 there were injuries and arrests at a Hillsborough match. A member of the public made a complaint about an incident at Leppings Lane. This prompted the SYP Chief Constable to contact the Home Office regarding 'designation' of the ground under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975. 2.1.28 The Home Office stated that the matter would be reconsidered. A further representation by SYCC was also declined. In April 1978 SYCC submitted a lengthy paper arguing that crowd safety could only be ensured if the stadium was designated. In August 1978 the Home Office finally agreed and the safety certificate drafting exercise began.25 2.1.29 Dr Wilfred Eastwood of Eastwood & Partners was appointed consultant engineer to SWFC in 1978.26 As part of the application for a safety certificate, Eastwoods prepared

Minutes of a meeting to discuss the organisation of football matches within the SYP area, 7 August 1981,

¶SYP000013780001, pp331-334. 23. Letter from a Tottenham Hotspur supporter to the Secretary of Liverpool FC, 20 April 1989, SYP000028950001, pp2-3. 24. Final submission of SWFC to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000098200001, p12. 25. Statement submitted to Lord Justice Taylor by Acting Head of the Administration and Legal Department of

¶Sheffield City Council, SCC000001960001, pp33-34. See letter from Home Office to SWFC, 23 August 1978,

¶SYP000096970001, pp4-13. Includes Appendix A which is the procedure regarding applications for general safety certificates and Appendix B which is the procedure regarding applications for special safety certificates.

¶See also Home Office circular no. 136/78 – The Safety of Sports Grounds (Designation) Order 1978, 23 August

¶1978, sent to the Chief Executive of the County Council and the Director General of the Greater London Council,

¶SYP000096970001, pp14-15. 26. Letter from SWFC to Eastwood & Partners, 1 December 1978, SYP000096970001, p57. SYCC were informed of

¶Eastwood & Partners' appointment by letter, 1 December 1978, SYP000096970001, p55.

¶a report on ground capacity for SYCC.27 Its report was completed in January 1979. The report focused on strengthening and supplementing crush barriers on the terraces and calculating exit times. The 1976 Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (the Green Guide) was used as a basis for the calculations, although the report noted 'as with probably all existing grounds, it will not be possible to satisfy all the recommendations in the guide. Reasonable compromise will be needed on the part of the fire officer and the police'.

¶Eastwoods' report findings 2.1.30 Eastwoods' report disregarded the stadium's failure to meet the requirements of the Green Guide. Regarding the Spion Kop, for example, 21 of 101 barriers tested in 1973 failed to carry the required test load. The report, however, concluded 'it should be emphasised that the general situation was satisfactory compared with most grounds'. From the report it appears that SYP were consulted in the design of the terraces. For example, regarding the Spion Kop barriers, Eastwoods noted, 'we are prepared to accede to the police view and use peak viewing area standards for all barriers'.

¶2.1.31 The report concluded that the Spion Kop capacity was 15,973, noting 'it should be kept in mind that as many as 20,000 spectators have been admitted to the Kop in the past'. The projected time period to evacuate 16,000 people was 11¾ minutes, more than the eight minutes maximum recommended in the Green Guide. Eastwoods' response was: 'we do not consider this to be a serious matter. Rapid evacuation (in say eight minutes) is very desirable for stands where there may be a risk due to fire, or explosion, or structural failure. In the case of terracing it is only the impatience of spectators which might create danger'.

¶2.1.32 In relation to the Leppings Lane terrace (excluding its north-west corner) the report calculated a capacity of 7,200 spectators exiting in six minutes. However, some fans would be 25m from an exit, well beyond the recommended 12m. The report stated, 'but we feel this is of no consequence as movement horizontally along this terrace will be easy and quick'.

¶Leppings Lane terrace capacity 2.1.33 In February 1979 a meeting of the Officer Working Party commented on the capacity of the Leppings Lane terrace, concluding 'it would be unreasonable to insist that gangways or additional exits would be provided'.28

¶2.1.34 Eastwoods calculated the Leppings Lane terrace capacity, including the north-west corner, as 10,100, noting that 'exits serving this part of the terraces are very adequate in width and there will be no difficulty in emptying in eight minutes'.29 An attached, but unattributed, handwritten note reads: '4½ min'. The North Stand exits were assessed as being less than the recommended width of 1.1m but Eastwoods noted 'we do not consider this to be of great consequence'. Gangways were also well below the recommended width but this finding was also dismissed: 'it is clearly appropriate to take into account the general nature of the stand, the number as well as the width of the gangways, and above all the ease and speed with which spectators can evacuate the stand'.

Report to South Yorkshire County Council on ground capacity of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club in connection with application for certificate of ground safety, prepared by Eastwood & Partners, January 1979, SYP000038710001, pp48-57. 28. Minutes of the Officer Working Party meeting, 12 February 1979, SYP000038720001, p361. 29. Report to South Yorkshire County Council on ground capacity of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club in connection with application for certificate of ground safety, prepared by Eastwood & Partners, January 1979, SYP000038710001, pp54-57.

¶2.1.35 The evacuation time for the South Stand was 11 minutes, also above the recommended time of eight minutes, but the report noted that 'because the stand is open to the air and there is very ready access to the pitch we do not think this rather long emptying time is of any great consequence'. Overall there were several areas where the stadium fell well short of the requirements specified in the Green Guide but these shortfalls were rejected as being of little consequence.

¶2.1.36 The report concluded by establishing overall capacity for the stadium at 50,100, stating 'it should also be emphasised that the ground has an excellent safety record stretching over very many years'. This capacity was lower than the capacity of 55,000 previously agreed with SYP, following a 1970 report by Husband and Co., consulting engineers.30

¶2.1.37 A general safety certificate was issued to SWFC on 21 December 1979 subject to remedial works being carried out to South Stand steel columns and emergency lighting.31 A programme of inspections was scheduled.32 There was an inspection on 7 April 1981, prior to the FA Cup Semi-Final. Issues were raised relating to means of escape and there was some disagreement regarding works to be carried out.

¶Sheffield City Council assumes responsibility for ground safety 2.1.38 On 1 April 1986, in accordance with the Local Government Act 1985, SYCC ceased to exist and Sheffield City Council (SCC) assumed responsibility for the discharge of functions under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975. As part of this reorganisation the Officer Working Party was replaced by the Safety of Sports Grounds Advisory Group (SSGAG) which provided professional advice to the Council. SWFC and Eastwoods did not have a role in the SSGAG. David Bownes, Chief Licensing Officer for Sheffield City Council, commented that following the changeover he 'was entitled to assume (in the absence of any contrary evidence), that the sports grounds in Sheffield, including Hillsborough Stadium, were reasonably safe'.33

¶2.1.39 The SSGAG's inspections at Hillsborough in 1986, 1987 and 1988 appear less than adequate. There is no written record of the 1986 inspection claimed to have been carried out on 7 August 1986. The reason given was that efforts were concentrated on a lengthy and complex debate relating to the Spion Kop. Twice-yearly inspections ceased in 1987. One annual inspection was carried out thereafter.34

¶The Green Guide: a matter of interpretation? 2.1.40 No FA Cup semi-finals were played at Hillsborough from 1981 until 1987. According to SYP the reasons for this were first, that the clubs scheduled to play the semi-finals were not located in close proximity to Sheffield and second, that there had been complaints

Letter from Eastwood & Partners to Sheffield City Council, 4 January 1990 enclosing a 1970 report by Husband and

¶Co. Consulting Engineers, SYP000038710001, pp187-190. 31. SWFC completed application form for a safety certificate, SYP000096970001, pp16-19. A copy of the safety certificate is available at SYP000038710001, pp62-73. Background correspondence on this is available at

¶SYP000096970001, pp52-61. 32. Statement submitted to Lord Justice Taylor by the Acting Head of the Administration and Legal Department of

¶Sheffield City Council, SCC000001960001, pp34-39. 33. Statement of David Bownes, Chief Licensing Officer with the Administration and Legal Department of Sheffield City

¶Council, 20 June 1990, SYP000038720001, p413. 34. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 1 June 1987, SYP000096970001, pp481-482. See for example letter from

¶SCC to SWFC, 4 December 1987 re their annual inspection of the grounds which was carried out on 6 August 1987 enclosing a list of comments arising from that inspection, SYP000096970001, pp641-643.

¶received from local residents.35 Clearly, however, the 1981 incident and the disputes that followed had a bearing on this decision.

¶2.1.41 Dr Eastwood considered that SWFC officials were conscious of safety and willing to invest in stadium improvements. Retrospectively, he described how 'McGee has been Chairman of the Club throughout this time, and he has taken a keen interest in safety matters including attending some of the meetings with the Working Party ... He has always stressed the need for the ground to be safe and has been a driving force in getting work done'.36

¶2.1.42 Dr Eastwood was informed initially by the 1976 Green Guide and subsequently by the revised 1986 edition. The Green Guide was a voluntary code with no legal force. It was characterised by a 'flexible approach ... in order to take account of the particular circumstances at individual grounds'. Thus, the 'relevant criterion when assessing the adequacy of safety for spectators in new work or re-construction is that of a reasonable degree of safety'.

¶2.1.43 Writing to SWFC in 1986 in relation to the Home Office document Fire Safety and Safety at Sports Venues, Dr Eastwood commented, 'there is a welcome statement ... that due account should be taken of the need to keep the costs to clubs and local authorities to reasonable proportions'.37 Further, he stated: 'it is comforting to know that the new Green Guide will not become a statutory code and will continue to be subject to interpretation'.

¶2.1.44 A 2.7m vertical wire mesh perimeter fence at the front of the terrace was in place before Eastwoods were retained in 1978. Perimeter fences also acted as crush barriers at the front of the terrace. Accordingly, under the provisions of the 1976 Green Guide, they were strengthened in 1979.38 To prevent fans climbing out of the terrace, cranked extensions were fitted to the top of the perimeter fencing leaning towards the spectators at an angle of 45° with spikes projecting inwards. Eastwoods were not involved in this design.

¶2.1.45 On the terraces crush barriers were designed to break up the crowd standing on the shallow steps. Initially, SYCC requested Eastwoods to test one in five barriers every five years. They agreed, however, that Eastwoods would test a block of 37 barriers every five years.39 Eastwoods also conducted an annual inspection as required by the safety certificate.40

¶Introduction of radial fences on the Leppings Lane terrace 2.1.46 In September 1981, Eastwoods were instructed by SWFC to prepare the installation of two radial fences on the Leppings Lane terrace, as had been suggested by SYP (see paragraph 2.1.18). The recommendation was to divide the terrace into three discrete areas each with its own entrance. It was anticipated that this would improve the control and management of fans. At the head of each fence, adjacent to the back wall, narrow gates

South Yorkshire Police submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000096730001, p4. 36. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000096940001, p6. 37. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 14 July 1986, SYP000096970001, p381. A copy of the Home Office's

¶Fire Safety and Safety at Sports Venues document can be found at SYP000096970001, pp383-431. 38. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000096940001, pp17-18. 39. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SYCC, 15 July 1980, SYP000096970001, pp103-104. Reply from SYCC to

¶Eastwood & Partners, 18 July 1980, SYP000096970001, p105. 40. See for example annual inspection report for 1980 at SYP000096970001, pp108-115; report for 1981 at

¶SYP000096970001, pp155-156; report for 1982 at SYP000096970001, pp163-164; report for 1983 at

¶SYP000096970001, pp174-175.

¶would provide access between the three areas, fastened open during matches to allow movement when necessary.41

¶2.1.47 Dr Eastwood envisaged that the discrete areas would be 'serviced and served by individual and specific dedicated facilities'.42 While the introduction of radial fences was accepted, the proposal to provide each area with access via discrete turnstiles and dedicated facilities was not pursued. Thus there would be no way of knowing accurately how many fans were in each area.

¶2.1.48 On 11 September 1981 a meeting was held attended by representatives of SYP, SYCC, Eastwoods, the Fire Service and the Buildings Department. According to Superintendent W O'Neill of SYP, 'the only reservations expressed were by the Fire Service, who indicated that the security gates – which will be open during football matches – should not in any way restrict the egress routes, which they feel are of minimum width as it is'.43

¶2.1.49 SYCC wrote to Eastwoods stating that radial barriers were acceptable but with some reservations.44 The correspondence considered the management of the rear radial fence gates. The 'increased control on the Terrace' was welcomed but 'concern was expressed as to the problems which could occur with opposing fans mixing at the rear of the West Stand and/or at the entry/exit gates'. This would be known only with 'experience' and 'if realised, whether the problem was of such a small scale that it could be easily coped with by the police'. Consequently 'the Officer Working Party at this stage sees no objection to the proposals to install two 1680mm high radial barriers, with 1.15 metre gates at the rear'. A key condition was that the 'new gates at the rear of the Terrace' would be 'under police control'.

¶Radial fence gates: a police responsibility? 2.1.50 In its subsequent submission to Lord Justice Taylor, the Fire Service reiterated its understanding that the radial fence gates were 'manned' at all times by a police officer.45 The Officer Working Party, of which SYP was a member, noted in its minutes of a meeting in August 1985 that 'the gates at the top of the Terrace [were] under the control of the Police'.46 Contrary to this generally accepted and agreed assumption, however, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, the Match Commander through the 1980s, stated that 'at no time did the police agree to steward the gates or permanently man them'.47 He affirmed that control of the gates was restricted to segregation purposes only and 'keys were in the possession of the police, who determined which pens were to be utilized and either locked or opened and fastened back gates to necessitate segregation'.

¶2.1.51 C/Supt Mole was unequivocal: 'our role being one of the maintenance of public order through observation and segregation of opposing fans'. Fences restricted sideways

Letter from Eastwood & Partners to D Vaughan of South Yorkshire County Council, 2 September 1981,

¶SYP000038710001, pp74-75. 42. See resumed inquests transcript of day 75, 21 March 1991, SYC000001300001, pp276-277. 43. Internal police minute, 11 September 1981, SYP000096960001, p160. 44. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 14 September 1981, SYP000038710001, p78. Original minutes of Officer

¶Working Party meeting, 11 September 1981, SYP000038710001, p129. 45. Final Submission to Lord Justice Taylor on behalf of the South Yorkshire County Fire Service and Civil Defence

¶Authority, SYP000098170001, p21 (quote from SYP summary of the submission). See also letter from Chief Fire

¶Officer to SYCC, 30 April 1985, stating 'it is understood that these gates will be supervised by either the police or club officials', SCC000001960001, p263. 46. Minutes of Officer Working Party meeting, 7 August 1985, SYP000038710001, p154. 47. Undated statement of Chief Superintendent Mole describing a meeting which took place at SWFC on 7 August 1985, at which the Safety of Sports Grounds Act was discussed, SYP000123550001, p112.

¶movement, avoiding pressure created by the sway of the crowd. Regarding the wide expanse of the Spion Kop, C/Supt Mole explained, 'we never experienced that with a wide mass on the Kop end in the same way that the confined narrowness, the sway created pressure against the fence'.

¶2.1.52 SYP were satisfied with the installation of the radial fences in late 1981, effectively creating three pens. Within months they commented to SYCC, 'the fences are working particularly well and proving to be most satisfactory in effecting the segregation of opposing groups of fans'.48 The Officer Working Party also responded positively, confirming that the fences 'appear to be working well and satisfactorily effect the segregation of opposing groups of fans'.49

¶2.1.53 However, SYP were concerned that some of the existing barriers protruded through the radial fences thus enabling fans to climb between pens.50 SYP wanted these barriers removed. SWFC and Eastwoods disagreed and in November 1981 it was accepted that the barriers would remain for the next match.51 That took place on 17 November and as there were no problems it was agreed the barriers would be retained. Police concerns, however, persisted.52

¶2.1.54 Eastwoods' position was that removing part of the barriers would decrease capacity and would leave a funnel down the steps without crush barrier protection, resulting in 'a major hazard'.53 This was raised at the Officer Working Party meeting in February 1982 when it was agreed that 'on balance, it was preferable from a safety point of view to prevent crowd surge by the existing barriers being extended up to and/or through the new radial barriers than to completely prevent persons being able to climb from one pen to another, subject to review at the end of the current season'.54

¶1985: further alterations to the terrace 2.1.55 According to Dr Eastwood, SYP were actively involved in discussions about adaptations to the radial fences. The disclosed correspondence indicates the negotiations concerning the introduction of further radial fences in 1985.55 The Officer Working Party met on 18 April 1985 and agreed Eastwoods' proposals in principle with several qualifications.56 These proposals included the provision of additional gates, the division of the central pen by an additional lateral fence between the mouth of the tunnel and the perimeter fence, a further lateral fence and further exit gates in the perimeter fence and minimum width of gates. The Fire Service had 'requested additional time to consider the escape aspects'.

¶2.1.56 Eastwoods, however, queried a request for a second gate to be included mid-point in each radial fence, stating that 'if these gates are meant for use in emergency it would mean having a steward in attendance on each occasion, the expense of which would hardly be justified. It is our view that in the event of emergency, spectators can be evacuated

Letter from SYP to SYCC, 18 January 1982, SYP000038710001, p80. 49. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 20 January 1982, SYP000038710001, p82. 50. Letter from SYP to SYCC, 18 January 1982, SYP000038710001, pp80-81. 51. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000096940001, pp19-20. 52. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 20 January 1982, SYP000038710001, pp82-83. 53. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SYCC, 26 January 1982, SYP000046570001, p237. 54. Minutes of Officer Working Party meeting, 4 February 1982, SYP000038710001, p131. 55. See SYP000028310001, pp 326-328: 2 April 1985: Eastwoods' letter to SWFC enclosing drawings creating a corridor or no man's land; 9 April 1985: letter forwarded to SYCC and SYP; 19 April 1985: Eastwoods' letter to SWFC records SYP suggestion of a central fence to divide the middle section of the West Terrace; 2 May 1985: SYCC letter to Eastwoods outlines that the police suggestion of a radial fence to separate the central area of the terrace was accepted. 56. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 2 May 1985, SYP000038710001, pp88-89.

¶quickly enough by the gates on to the pitch and by the normal exit gates at the rear'.57 Although the original request for a second gate came from SYP, they conceded on this issue if their other recommendations were met.58

¶2.1.57 Dr Eastwood met SYP on 13 June 1985 and discussed policing the segregated terraces. A proposal emerged to construct a double fence with a gate onto the perimeter track forming a corridor between the pens in which the police could stand.59 Dr Eastwood described how 'Chief Superintendent Moseley was favourably disposed towards the creation of a "corridor" of "no mans land" with a gate to the pitch, following the experience of his officers at the recent match between the Club and Liverpool FC. The corridor would provide an easy access for the Police to the pens on either side via the gates at the rear of the radial fences'.60

¶2.1.58 Dr Eastwood wrote to the police about this proposal on 25 June 1985 and, following further discussions, it was agreed that 'a central fence should be installed for the time being, provided that it did not make the packing of spectators in the west terrace "impossible"'.

¶2.1.59 The Officer Working Party again considered the proposals for segregation on 29 July 1985. The detailed plans were accepted with minor modifications. With reference to 'stewarding of new gates' it was considered 'essential that all the new gates are fully supervised by Stewards who must be fit, able and properly trained'.61 Construction work on further radial fences began on 22 July 198562 at the request of SYP to prevent lateral movement. It is clear from the documents disclosed to the Panel that lateral fences were introduced as an aid to segregation when away fans were accommodated for league matches rather than as a means to manage 'packing' or the distribution of fans on the Leppings Lane terrace.63

¶Gates in the perimeter fence 2.1.60 Following the modifications, there were seven gates in the perimeter fence of the Leppings Lane terrace. Four had been in place when Eastwoods took instructions from SWFC. During the August 1987 inspection the Fire Service and SYP raised the issue of gate release devices as they could not be opened easily when pushed from the terraces.64 A prototype device was prepared and fitted.65 SYP then inspected the new devices66 and they were fitted to all the remaining gates.67 The specialist welding company fitting the devices suggested that some hinges 'could do with replacing'.68 Eastwoods, however, instructed: 'just weld them and get the gates working properly'. SYP requested installation

Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SYCC, 8 May 1985, SYP000038710001, p94. 58. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 10 May 1985, SYP000038710001, p95. 59. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 17 June 1985, SYP000038710001, pp96-97. 60. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000096940001, p22. 61. Minutes of Officer Working Party meeting, 29 July 1985, SYP000038710001, pp151-152. 62. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to Corderoy & Co., 26 September 1985, SYP000038710001, p98. 63. West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, Club Secretary, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp89-90. 64. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 15 January 1988, SYP000096970001, pp499-500. See also letter from Fire Service to SCC, 18 February 1987, regarding their inspection of the ground on 17 November 1986,

¶SYP000096970001, pp472-476. 65. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SCC, 3 February 1988, SYP000096970001, pp501-506. 66. Phone memorandum between Inspector Calvert and John Strange (Eastwood & Partners), 23 February 1988, arranging to meet on 25 February 1988 to inspect the new gate release devices, SYP000096970001, p607. 67. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to Specialist Welding & Engineering Services Ltd., 26 February 1988,

¶SYP000096970001, p605. 68. Phone memorandum between Mr Strange (Eastwood & Partners) and Specialist Welding & Engineering Services Ltd., of a close mesh net on the gates as the existing mesh was too large, allowing the devices to be tampered with.69

¶2.1.61 Between 1978 and 1985 the width of the perimeter gates was the focus of considerable discussion led primarily by SYP and the Fire Service. To maintain control of the crowd, SYP did not want the gates widened. The Fire Service, however, considered the gates as an important means of evacuation in an emergency.70 The 1976 Green Guide made no recommendations with regard to the width of gates. The 1986 Green Guide, however, stated they should be a minimum of 1.1m wide. The seven gates were between 0.63m and 0.94m, all installed pre-1979 except Gate 3, installed in 1985 when the central pens were created. Gates 3 and 4, serving central pens 3 and 4, were 0.85m and 0.83m respectively. The width of all perimeter fence gates was thus significantly less than the 1986 Green Guide minimum.

¶Tunnel ramp 2.1.62 Access to the Leppings Lane terrace included a tunnel under the West Stand leading to what eventually became the central pens, 3 and 4. Its relatively steep gradient was raised in Dr Eastwood's submission to the Taylor Inquiry in which he noted that entrance to the stadium was planned as controlled entry via turnstiles. With a 1 in 6 gradient, the tunnel breached the Green Guide recommendation but, Dr Eastwood noted, 'any alternative arrangement (reversing the slope or even levelling it) would not have led to greater safety'. He addressed the gradient in terms of a mass evacuation rather than mass entry. The 'guidance regarding the slope of ramps is expressly stated to apply to ramps which have a downward slope when being traversed by a heavy crowd flow, that is at the time of leaving the ground not when filling it'. He noted that the 'length of the ramp' was 'relatively short', albeit 'steeper than 1 in 10', but 'when the ground is filling up spectator flow is light, because it is controlled by turnstiles'; thus he 'believe[d] that the ramp is consistent both with the spirit and the letter of the Guide'.

¶Alterations to the turnstiles 2.1.63 As stated in Part 1, the outer concourse on Leppings Lane was severely restricted yet it provided access to all turnstiles for the North Stand, the West Stand and the Leppings Lane terrace. In 1981 SWFC had approached Eastwoods to consider alterations to the Leppings Lane turnstiles. In August 1981 Eastwoods prepared drawings of additional turnstiles but the plans stalled. In 1984 SYP suggested a complete rebuild of the turnstiles. Insp Calvert presented 'a rough sketch that the whole of Leppings Lane turnstiles – then a crescent shape – should be demolished with new ones built parallel to and near rear of stand with access to individual pens and to the stands'.71 Senior SYP officers were consulted before the proposal was presented to SWFC. Dr Eastwood's 1985 proposal included the construction of two new banks of turnstiles (17–21 and 22–29) with new fencing and gates.72 2.1.64 The Bradford fire on 11 May 1985 led to unanticipated work being prioritised at SWFC (the South Stand timber decking and roof).73 In an interview with West Midlands Police in 1990 the Club Secretary, Graham Mackrell, stated that the economic climate at the

Phone memorandum between Mr Strange (Eastwood & Partners) and SYP, 15 March 1988, SYP000096970001, p597.

¶See also letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 21 March 1988, SYP000096970001, p507. 70. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, supporting documents, SYP000028310001, pp329-341. 71. Recollection of Inspector Calvert, 2 May 1989, SYP000111290001, p4. 72. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SYCC, 9 April 1985, SYP000038710001, p84. 73. Dr Eastwood's submission to Lord Justice Taylor, supporting documents, SYP000028310001, pp348-349.

¶Figure 3: Proposed alterations to the turnstile layout at Leppings Lane, April 1985 Original available at SCC000002050001, p56.

¶time prevented the complete demolition of the turnstiles and a compromise was reached by the addition of a few turnstiles.74 Despite the risk to safety being identified, both Mr Mackrell and C/Supt Mole were confident that, with the few additional turnstiles, the appropriate flow rate of fans into the stadium could be achieved.

¶2.1.65 The possibility of the late arrival of fans was considered, but this was balanced against segregation issues. Reflecting on overcrowding on the Leppings Lane outer concourse at the turnstiles, Mr Mackrell later reflected that it was 'no worse than a lot of other grounds' and he claimed it had never been brought to his attention as a problem by Eastwoods or any other agency. 2.1.66 Despite alterations to the turnstiles, in November 1985 SYP reported to the Officer Working Party on 'the continuing problems caused by the merging of spectators from all parts of the Stadium at the Leppings Lane end'.75 The meeting 'agreed that it was difficult to see how this could be overcome, as the physical restraints to achieve this could conceivably be more of a danger than allowing the present position to continue'.

¶The removal of barrier 144 2.1.67 After a further lateral fence was introduced, creating central pens 3 and 4, the location of an existing terrace crush barrier (barrier 144) became an issue. Because of its location it blocked crowd movement and its partial removal was suggested by SYP during an inspection on 7 August 1986.76 Arthur Butler, Sheffield City Council surveyor, was clear that the partial removal of barrier 144 would alleviate the problem of spectators backing up within the tunnel, that any incoming crush would be seen on the terracing rather than be hidden inside the tunnel, that any problems on the terrace could also be easily seen from the police control box which was relatively near, that the means of escape from the area was excellent from both pens, at that point, due to the existence of the tunnel, and that it was understood that the area of the tunnel mouth would be kept clear throughout the duration of the game by the Police, who in that position could easily monitor and resolve any incidents of overcrowding and localised crushing. 2.1.68 Further, Mr Butler considered that removing part of barrier 144 would increase the load on the barrier lower down the terrace, making it 'necessary for the spectators to be encouraged to spread into the other areas of the pens'. Mr Butler assumed that fans would always enter the terrace through the turnstiles. While mass evacuation was considered, mass admission was not anticipated. During barrier testing in 1988, barrier 144 showed considerable movement and Eastwoods recommended its replacement.77 Following the partial removal of barrier 144 without replacement, there was no adjustment to maximum capacity. Certainly the impact of the removal of parts of barrier 144 on barrier 124A was not foreseen.78 2.1.69 The disclosed documents show that in 1990, when SWFC Secretary Graham Mackrell was interviewed regarding the impact on the terrace of removing parts of barrier 144, he accepted that ground safety was the responsibility of the Club. Yet he admitted

West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp142-146. 75. Letter from SYCC to Eastwood & Partners, 14 November 1985, updating them on a meeting of the Officer Working

¶Party of 13 November 1985, SCC000001960001, pp282-283. 76. Statement of Arthur Butler, Principal District Surveyor with Sheffield City Council, 27 July 1990, SYP000038720001, pp350-352. 77. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 2 August 1988, SYP000096970001, p546. 78. Statement of Arthur Butler, Principal District Surveyor with Sheffield City Council, 27 July 1990, SYP000038720001, p352.

¶that while not being a 'technical expert' he had presumed the potential consequences of removing parts of the barrier had been taken into account.79 The partial removal of barrier 144 materially affected pen 3's capacity and 'its removal made it the more easy for fans coming down the tunnel to spread out into the pen and we believe that its absence did result in a greater flow down the pen'.80

¶2.1.70 In their eventual submission to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) following the disaster, West Midlands Police investigators concluded that at the time of the terrace alterations neither SWFC nor Eastwoods could have foreseen the influx onto the terrace.81

¶Increased capacity and the safety certificate 2.1.71 During its August 1984 inspection of the stadium the Officer Working Party noted 'the numerous alterations to the Stadium since the issue of the General Safety Certificate on 21 December 1979'.82 The Working Party 'agreed that updated plans were required for incorporation into the General Safety Certificate in order to indicate the present facilities at the Stadium'.

¶2.1.72 In 1986 substantial extension and modification to the Spion Kop increased its capacity by 5,981.83 There were three conditions for extending its capacity to 21,000, one of which was 'the provision of extra stewarding to the satisfaction of the Police and Fire Service for the next two matches'.84

¶2.1.73 It was noted that the 'original Safety Certificate has never been formally amended in terms of the additional crowd capacity or need for extra stewarding'. In July 1986 the Club wrote to Eastwoods following a request from the local authority to 'consider the terms and conditions relative to same and express any recommendations we may have for amending the conditions'.85 Eastwoods' reply in September 1986 was minimal, commenting only on provision for people with disabilities and a reference to 'adequate number of police officers'.86

¶2.1.74 Dr Eastwood was aware that alterations to the terraces would impact on capacity yet he did not directly address this issue. In February 1987, John Strange, Dr Eastwood's assistant, queried: 'Has any account been taken for alteration done on Leppings Lane over the last few seasons? Is the 10,200 or so figure still correct? I said that in my opinion it needs to be adjusted, better do it now than later'.87 A record of a subsequent telephone call noted Dr Eastwood's response to 'leave the capacity at Leppings Lane end as it is, providing police have gates under West stand open so that people can distribute throughout the terrace evenly'.88

West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp97-98. 80. Final submission to Lord Justice Taylor on behalf of Treasury Counsel, SYP000098180001, pp18-19. 81. West Midlands Police report to the DPP, SYP000038850001, p123. 82. Minutes of Officer Working Party meeting, 9 August 1984, SYP000038710001, p145. 83. See SYP000096970001, pp433-436 for background correspondence on increasing capacity of the Spion Kop, August
1. Original safety certificate – Hillsborough Stadium, A Brief Assessment, June 1989, SYP000027590001, p5. 85. Letter from SWFC to Eastwood & Partners enclosing a copy of the safety certificate, 17 July 1986,

¶SYP000096970001, p432. 86. Letter from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC regarding updating the safety certificate, 10 September 1986,

¶SYP000096970001, pp437-438. 87. Transcript of proceedings in the contribution trial, SYP000098630001, pp13-14. Original internal Eastwood & Partners memorandum, 26 February 1987, SYP000038710001, p104. 88. Phone message from Eastwood & Partners to SWFC, 2 March 1987, SYP000038710001, p105.

¶2.1.75 SWFC Secretary, Graham Mackrell, recalled consulting Mr Strange about the safety certificate because of the alterations since it had been issued: 'I wondered if it had been amended by way of correspondence or whatever'.89 Mr Mackrell's concern was in response to a standard annual communication from the FA requesting updated information on stadium capacity. Eastwoods, responsible for calculating capacities for the original safety certificate, were unconcerned. They replied that 'providing the police had the gates under the West Stand open, so that people can distribute themselves throughout the terraces, there was no problem with the capacities remaining'.

¶2.1.76 Mr Mackrell's concern about capacity related to the stadium as a whole rather than each discrete area. He assumed that the figures and distributions were accurate. His primary motivation was to comply with the FA request, knowing that the information provided would in part determine whether the stadium would be deemed suitable for an FA Cup semi-final. On reflection, Mr Mackrell considered his approach appropriate given involvement in negotiations 'right from day one of the ground being designated'.90

¶Safety inspections 2.1.77 The safety certificate inspections comprised a walk around the stadium with Officer Working Party representatives, particularly Sheffield City Council and Eastwoods, accompanied by SYP officers. Issues were then raised in subsequent letters or reports. According to Mr Mackrell, issues relating to barriers, the elevation of the tunnel or the width of perimeter gates were 'never brought up' nor raised by SYP.91

¶2.1.78 In 1988 the annual safety inspection was moved from August to May 'to give the Club plenty of time to carry out any necessary work that might be required as a condition of issuing the licence'.92 Eastwoods routinely carried out an inspection prior to the Officer Working Party inspection 'to make sure that, so far as we can, it is in first class condition before the Safety Committee inspect. In fact as part of the process the consulting engineers will issue a certificate confirming their inspection, and they are also required to carry out certain tests – for example tests on crush barriers'.

¶2.1.79 Mr Mackrell stated he had no knowledge of concerns regarding capacity following the 1987 or 1988 FA Cup semi-finals. After each match he held informal debriefs with managers and no issues were raised in either year about the terraces.93 Reflecting on these matches he commented later: 'the fact is that the Police after the 87 and 88 semi-final never at all came to me and told me that there were any problems with the way that the, that the actual, the great game had been run for want of a better word'.

¶2.1.80 SWFC retained an annual contract with SYP for policing the stadium on league match days and, according to Mr Mackrell, the Club deferred to the police and their requirements: 'the position is that if the Police with their knowledge of policing matters ask me to cooperate with them in relation to particular matches I will always attempt to do so in every way possible and I would not for example require a detailed explanation from them as in that instance as to why they wished a particular change to be made'.94 An example he gave concerned the change to the kick-off time in 1987 in response to a police request.

West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp46-54. 90. West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, p119. 91. West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp41-42. 92. Graham Mackrell's written statement to Lord Justice Taylor, 26 June 1989, SYP000096840001, p407. 93. West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp74-80. 94. Graham Mackrell's written statement to Lord Justice Taylor, 26 June 1989, SYP000096840001, p408.

¶2.1.81 At a meeting with their legal counsel soon after the 1989 disaster, SYP noted the difficulties regarding the administration of the safety certificate.95 Deputy Chief Constable Peter Hayes stated: 'Chief Superintendent Denton tells me that we wrote to the new Sheffield City Council about this Safety Certificate. We received a reply and Mr Denton referred them to a specimen of the certificate that they may wish to use in drawing up their new certificate'. The certificate that emerged, however, 'had been diluted in many areas, including the section which deals with the policing of the ground'. C/Supt Mole responded: 'It seems we [SYP] have been ruled out of the safety considerations'.

¶2.1.82 The safety certificate was not updated after the introduction of the two radial fences in late 1981 and the radial fence from the middle of the tunnel in 1985 (creating pens 3 and 4).96

¶Hillsborough as an FA Cup semi-final venue 2.1.83 In 1987 discussions were held to consider Hillsborough's reinstatement as an FA Cup semi-final venue. Months earlier Sheffield City Council had invited SYP, the Fire Service and the building surveyor to comment on the condition of the stadium.97 In January 1987 SYP informed the City Council that 'both stadia [including Sheffield United], so far as the police are concerned, meet our requirements under the 1975 regulation'.98 Sheffield City Council wrote to SWFC stating that the police 'are quite satisfied with the stadium and have indicated that the degree of cooperation which they receive is very satisfactory'.99 The building surveyor did not comment but the Fire Service was not satisfied and raised its concerns with the City Council in February 1987. These focused on whether regular inspections, and compliance with certification, were carried out effectively. The Fire Service presented five pages of concerns regarding safety and evacuation procedures that required attention, including the need to install more effective release devices on the perimeter gates. 2.1.84 There was some discussion between Eastwoods and the Fire Service about the provision of a ramp to meet the requirements for the disabled. Initially SWFC and Eastwoods appear to have ignored the issues raised by the Fire Service and were pressed for a response by Sheffield County Council.100 SWFC's eventual response suggested that the Fire Service was overly critical and that some of the requirements were excessive.

¶Safety inspections 2.1.85 Arthur Butler, the City Council's Building Surveyor, was requested to report on whether the stadium complied with the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975. He stated that a full survey would be 'a long and time consuming job which should not be approached in anything other than a thorough manner'.101 2.1.86 In 1987 the annual inspection took place in August.102 Following the inspection, the Director of Health and Consumer Services raised 'minor' concerns and referred to SWFC's agreement to appoint a safety officer of 'adequate status and authority'.103 It concluded:

Minutes of meeting with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000096360001, p97. 96. Report to the DPP Part 1 – Ground Staff, 20 April 1990, SYP000038670001, p11. 97. Letter from Sheffield City Council to SWFC, 22 April 1987, SYP000038710001, pp107-108. 98. Letter from SYP to Sheffield City Council, 6 January 1987, SYP000028310001, p586. 99. Letter from Sheffield City Council to SWFC, 22 April 1987, SYP000038710001, p107. 100. Letter from Sheffield City Council to Graham Mackrell, 4 December 1987, SYP000096960001, p433. 101. Memorandum from Arthur Butler to David Bownes, Head of Administration and Legal Department, Sheffield City

¶Council, 24 June 1987, SYP000096960001, p389. 102. Letter from Chief Fire Officer to Sheffield City Council, 13 August 1987, SYP000096960001, pp412-413. 103. Internal memorandum from D Moore, Director of Health and Consumer Services, to David Bownes, Head of

¶Administration and Legal Department, Sheffield City Council, 18 August 1987, SYP000096960001, pp414-415.

¶'During the inspection ... it became obvious that the stands and associated areas are subject to excellent standards of maintenance and upkeep ... I was suitably impressed with the level of ground management being maintained'. 2.1.87 In October 1987 Sheffield City Council wrote to SWFC drawing attention to the publication of the Popplewell Report and requesting written confirmation that the Club had obtained and would keep at the ground a copy of the Green Guide; that the Club and its officers were familiar with the Guide and intended to carry out management responsibilities accordingly; and that they would appoint a safety officer without delay.104

¶2.1.88 Mr Mackrell replied, confirming that the Club had received a copy of the Guide and that his role incorporated the function of safety officer.105 Yet it was unclear how safety issues concerning building works and maintenance were handled at the Club. The security officer, Doug Lock (previously a senior SYP officer who had assisted C/Supt Mole in the Police Control Box), was also involved with maintenance connected to the safety certificate but expenditure had to be referred to Mr Mackrell who was also safety officer. An SWFC director, Keith Addy, sometimes dealt with proposals for works with Eastwoods. On other occasions 'we relied on our consulting engineers' – Eastwoods.106 The relationship with Eastwoods was reactive rather than proactive. 2.1.89 On 14 November 1987 emergency evacuation procedures were practised under operational conditions. This led to the discovery that the public address system was inaudible and required upgrading.107

¶Concerns about stewarding 2.1.90 Early in 1988 a member of the City Council's Building Surveyors' staff attended a match. He expressed concerns about the lack of effective stewarding on the Spion Kop which had resulted in the crowd occupying radial gangways and other areas throughout the match. He stated: 'stewarding must be of a quality and of such numbers as to maintain these gangways free from congestion during performances'. 2.1.91 There was also reference to the turnstile capacity at Penistone Road, the opposite end of the stadium to Leppings Lane, as 'many of the spectators were still entering the ground up to 15 minutes after kick-off'. He was concerned that the 'combination of late arrival and ineffective stewarding could lead to dangerous occurrences ... a matter that should be raised at the next meeting of the Working Party so that the police and fire authority comments may be sought'.108

¶The 1987 FA Cup Semi-Final 2.1.92 The first FA Cup semi-final to be played at Hillsborough since 1981 was held on 12 April 1987, between Coventry City and Leeds United. Kick-off was scheduled for 12.15pm with access to the stadium from 9.30am. The day (Sunday) and the earlier kick-off time were intended to prevent fans' alcohol consumption before the match.109 The FA all-ticket ruling

Letter from Sheffield City Council to Sheffield Wednesday Football Club, 15 October 1987, SYP000096960001, p423. 105. Letter from Graham Mackrell to Sheffield City Council, 23 October 1987, SYP000096960001, p424. 106. West Midlands Police interview with Graham Mackrell, 22 June 1990, SYP000038890001, pp20-30. 107. Letter from SYP to Graham Mackrell, 4 December 1987, SYP000046570001, p381. 108. Memorandum from Arthur Butler to David Bownes, Head of Administration and Legal Department, Sheffield City

¶Council, 2 February 1988, SYP000096960001, p436. 109. SYP Operational Order for the 1987 FA Cup Semi-Final, 1 April 1987, SYP000097650001.

¶on all Leeds away games was lifted for the Semi-Final and tickets were on open sale. It was judged that the early kick-off would assist with policing.110 2.1.93 The pre-match briefing took place on 20 March and involved SYP, the participating clubs and SWFC, represented by Graham Mackrell, the Club Secretary. A total of 51,372 supporters attended the game.111 Leeds fans were allocated the Leppings Lane terrace and Coventry fans were allocated to the Spion Kop. C/Supt Mole was the Match Commander. Assistant Chief Constable Walter Jackson assumed overall control of planning and operational policing. He attended the 1987 match in uniform 'because it was a Leeds– Coventry match and at that time Leeds had a bad reputation'.112

¶2.1.94 There were plans in place for monitoring the Spion Kop's capacity and, according to the Operational Order, the police, not the stewards, assumed this responsibility: 'In the event of parts of the Spion Kop terraces becoming crowded to capacity these Officers will close the approach ramps and direct fans to appropriate entrances where access may be gained to the terraces'.113 There was no equivalent reference to monitoring crowd capacity in the Leppings Lane terrace.

¶2.1.95 The SYP/SWFC relationship had been poor following the 1981 incident but by 1987 it had improved. A letter from Sheffield City Council to SWFC, dated 22 April 1987, reflected the improved working relationship: 'The Police have indicated that as at 6th January, 1987 they are quite satisfied with the stadium and have indicated that the degree of co-operation which they receive is very satisfactory'.114

¶1987: delayed kick-off 2.1.96 The 1987 Semi-Final kick-off was delayed. Vehicles leaving the motorway intersection were checked by the police, slowing the traffic. Both groups of supporters were affected by the delays. Shortly before kick-off the police decided to delay the match by 15 minutes to ensure that arriving fans could be accommodated. The decision was announced over the public address system.

¶2.1.97 C/Supt Mole, the Match Commander, accepted that the delay was partly caused by police operations yet within SYP was a broadly held assumption that some fans chose to arrive late. A 1987 document presented to the Taylor Inquiry within the Association of Chief Police Officers' submission noted that delayed kick-offs were 'another situation where supporters were seen to be forcing the police into taking action against their better judgement'.115 The document stated that it had 'become increasingly apparent that large numbers of spectators are arriving extremely late at the ground, this may be related to the restricted access to alcohol in grounds and the prohibition on taking alcohol into grounds'. Consequently, to avoid disorder, 'police ground commanders have occasionally requested that the kick-off be delayed' but 'this pressure should not be acceded to in future, the police should not be dictated to by supporters'.

Daily Mail journalist David Walker in evidence to Lord Justice Taylor, HOM000026140001, p61. 111. Internal SYP memorandum from PC Rosevear (Football Liaison Section) to Chief Superintendent Mole, 13 September

¶1990, SYC000001360001, p3. 112. West Midlands Police interview with ACC Walter Jackson, 28 June 1990, SYP000038910001, p13. 113. SYP Operational Order 'F' for the 1987 FA Cup Semi-Final, SYP000097650001, p24. 114. Letter from Sheffield City Council to SWFC, 22 April 1987, SYP000038710001, p107. 115. Association of Chief Police Officers' submission to Lord Justice Taylor, Appendix D: 'Notes of the meeting of second division football league police commanders and liaison officers held at Greater Manchester Police Training School on

¶Thursday/Friday 28th/29th May 1987, 27 June 1989', written by Mr J David Phillips, SYP000038690001, p164.

¶2.1.98 The issue of delay was investigated further in 1989 at the Taylor Inquiry. C/Supt Mole was questioned about whether the reason for delaying the kick-off was relevant to the decision. He confirmed that the reason was irrelevant, the key concern being processing fans through the turnstiles.116 Other factors to be considered in the decision to delay included whether or not the players were on the field and the attitude of the fans in the stadium to the prospect of a delay.

¶1987: an experience at the turnstiles and the tunnel 2.1.99 Reflecting on the 1987 Semi-Final, Ferenc Morath, a Leeds United fan, recalled that his ticket was checked by police before he disembarked from the coach and was checked again as he approached the ground. At the turnstiles there was 'just a mass of people outside, with no orderly queues being formed'.117 Police officers were on foot and on horseback. By the time he entered the stadium the match had started, 'there was no direction being given by police officers or stewards inside the ground and everyone like myself headed for the tunnel under the West Stand'. He continued:

¶As I entered the tunnel I noted that the crowd was back up the tunnel. I believed this was the only way onto the terraces, not having seen any other signs directing otherwise. I therefore, pushed my way through the tunnel not knowing what was ahead of me. I noted that people, generally fathers with young lads or girls, were pushing back out of the tunnel, away from the pitch. At this point there was what I would describe as a bad crush.

¶2.1.100 The crowd was tightly packed and he was unable to clap his hands. He saw fans climbing the fencing and others helped up into the West Stand. For the second half he left the central pen and moved to pen 7. He concluded that 'outside the turnstiles and inside the ground there was a total lack of organisation'. Events in 1987 are discussed further in Chapter 3 from paragraph 2.3.31.

¶1987: debrief 2.1.101 According to C/Supt Mole, the 1987 debrief did not mention overcrowding or crushing.118 A post-match summary form had been introduced during the 1980s to inform the national football liaison officer network. A subsequent report in October 1989 noted that the content and quality of post-match reports fell far short of what was anticipated. The report made specific reference to the delayed 1987 match noting 'the fact that the kick off was delayed and the reasons leading to the delay were not recorded in the post match summary report'.119

¶The 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final 2.1.102 The 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest was played at Hillsborough on 9 April 1988. The pre-match briefing was held on 23 March 1988 involving SYP, the participating clubs and SWFC. SYP also met with the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS).120 A total of 51,622 supporters attended the 116. Transcript of Chief Superintendent Mole's evidence to Lord Justice Taylor, day 6, 23 May 1989, SWF000002030001, pp52-53. 117. Statement of Leeds United supporter Ferenc Morath, 12 May 1989, SYP000038700001, pp87-89. 118. Statement of Chief Superintendent Mole, 26 April 1990, SYP000038700001, p191. 119. 'Review of National and Local Arrangements to deal with football related intelligence/information' by Superintendent

¶Brookfield, October 1989, SYP000097020001, p51. 120. Inspector Sewell's evidence to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000123550001, p5.

¶match.121 Early in 1988 a meeting of Sheffield City Council Safety of Sports Grounds Advisory Group had identified a trend in latecomers to matches, noting 'a pattern has developed of people arriving some 15 minutes before the start of the game hoping to gain admission'.122

¶2.1.103 Interviewed by the DPP in 1990, Superintendent Bernard Murray (who was assistant to the Match Commander in 1988 and 1989) stated that during C/Supt Mole's briefing for the 1988 match he did not mention that there had been overcrowding in 1987.123

¶2.1.104 On 9 August 1988 a meeting was held at Hammerton Road Police Station between SYP and the fire and ambulance services to consider the emergency response to a major disaster at SWFC. The meeting was chaired by Supt Murray and attended by Superintendent Roger Marshall, Chief Inspector David Beal and Inspector Steven Sewell, Deputy Chief Ambulance Officer Alan Hopkins and Assistant Chief Ambulance Officer (Operations) Jones, SYMAS and Assistant Divisional Officer Rowlands of the South Yorkshire Fire Service. 2.1.105 It was noted that a senior ambulance officer attended all home matches at Hillsborough and was allocated a complimentary ticket for the South Stand. Insp Sewell commented that while the North Stand offered better access to the gymnasium, 'Sheffield Wednesday Football Club only wish to allocate the complimentary tickets to the ambulance service for use in the South Stand, so that the club physio, Alan Smith, can signal straight away to the ambulance officer if an ambulance is required for a Wednesday player'.124 This view was not shared by SYMAS, who regarded the presence of liaison officers as important in the event of a major incident and not only to treat players who might be injured.

¶1988: fans' experience of crushing 2.1.106 In correspondence written after the 1989 disaster it became clear that fans had experienced crushing on the Leppings Lane terrace in 1988. One fan wrote to the Football Association outlining the full extent of his experience of congestion, beginning in the tunnel feeding the central pens. Once out of the tunnel, 'if anything the situation became worse and the pressure behind became worse, causing many fans to stumble and fall down the steps only to disappear under the crowd'. 2.1.107 His letter continued:

¶… it was impossible to move sideways as the momentum of the crowd continued to push us forward. We were forced to duck under metal barriers or suffer even more crushing. Finally we were forced right up against the barriers which prevent the fans from getting on to the pitch. During the match we had to constantly bear the crushing force of the crowd swaying forward from behind. It would not have been so bad if we had been able to move sideways, away from this central part, but it was so packed, and the constant pushing, jostling and surging of the fans made this prospect appear even more dangerous.

¶During the game some fans actually collapsed or fainted and were passed over peoples [sic] heads towards the front of this section of the ground …

Internal SYP memorandum from PC Rosevear (Football Liaison Section) to Chief Superintendent Mole, 13 September

¶1990, SYC000001360001, p3. 122. Minutes of Safety of Sports Grounds Advisory Group, 23 March 1988, SYP000038710001, p166. 123. West Midlands Police interview with Superintendent Murray, 25 June 1990, SYP000038900001, pp15-21. 124. Memorandum from Inspector Sewell to Chief Superintendent of 'F' Division, 9 August 1988, SYP000047780001, p273.

¶Some fans tried to open this gate but it had been padlocked. Some fans attracted the attention of a policeman or steward, I can't remember which, but he appeared to be totally unaware of the situation …

¶During the whole of this game we were very concerned for the safety of our youngsters but the police were only allowing injured fans through the gate. After the match finished we all vowed never to enter the Leppings Lane end ever again.

¶As far as I am concerned, when there is a large crowd entering this part of the ground, it will always be a death trap.125 2.1.108 Other fans also referred to problems in 1988 in their statements to West Midlands Police: 'I have been to this ground several times and have been into the central pens before and it has always been uncomfortable. Last year I climbed over the fencing and went to the terrace near to the North Stand'.126 2.1.109 In the immediate aftermath of the 1988 Semi-Final, a fan wrote to the Minister for Sport and the FA. Unfortunately, his letter to the Minister for Sport was sent to an incorrect address and never arrived. He received no reply from the FA. When asked in 1989, the FA could not trace a record of having received his letter. He wrote that:

¶I attended the above football match on Saturday April 9th 1988, and write to protest in the strongest possible terms at the disgraceful overcrowding that was allowed to occur (in an all ticket match) in the Leppings Lane Terrace area …

¶The whole area was packed solid to the point where it was impossible to move and where I, and others around me, felt considerable concern for personal safety (as a result of the crush an umbrella I was holding in my hand was snapped in half against the crush barrier in front of me). I would emphasise that the concern over safety related to the sheer numbers admitted, and not to crowd behaviour which was good.

¶My concern over safety was such (at times it was impossible to breathe) that at half time when there was movement for toilets, refreshments etc. I managed to extricate myself from the terrace, having taken the view that my personal safety was more important than watching the second half.127

¶Debriefing: who knew what after the 1988 Semi-Final? 2.1.110 The 1988 Semi-Final was considered a success.128 Retrospective evidence from a police officer on duty at the Leppings Lane turnstiles suggested there were no serious public order problems.129 According to SWFC 'everything went extremely smoothly'.130 C/Supt Mole stated that the 1987 and 1988 debriefing sessions made no mention of any injuries due to overcrowding or crushing.131

Letter to the Football Association, 16 April 1989, FFA000003180001. 126. Statement from Liverpool fan, 17 May 1989, SYP000069080001. 127. Letter from Liverpool fan, 13 April 1988, HOM000028660001, p4. Internal FA note, 'Surely someone must have filed it somewhere', 15 May 1989, FFA000004940001. 128. The police operation and the experience of spectators is discussed further in Chapter 3, at paragraphs 2.3.35, 2.3.45 and from paragraph 2.3.102. 129. Statement of PC Ian Selwood, 29 April 1989, SYP000038800001, p39. 130. Statement of Graham Mackrell, 19 May 1989, SYP000038670001, p80. 131. Statement of Chief Superintendent Mole, 26 April 1990, SYP000038700001, pp190-193.

¶2.1.111 Thus C/Supt Mole's planning for the 1989 Semi-Final was based on the previous year's operation. He claimed that the only changes were the removal of air cover and the removal of a serial of police officers from the Leppings Lane concourse area. Yet according to Supt Murray, Mole also requested SWFC to reconsider the colour and presentation of tickets to avoid problems at the turnstiles.132

¶2.1.112 The ACC responsible for operations, Walter Jackson, was in overall control of planning and operational policing for the 1988 Semi-Final. He did not attend but, interviewed by the DPP in 1990, he recalled receiving reports following the match indicating the occurrence of a 'minor pitch invasion' at the end of the match which had been handled quickly and efficiently.133 Overall, he continued, it had been 'a fairly joyous occasion' and he was not aware of crushing or overcrowding in 1987 or 1988.

¶2.1.113 In his 1988 debrief Supt Murray informed C/Supt Mole that 'we have noted locally the lessons that were learned and the improvements that can be made for any similar future event. Generally I was well satisfied with the event'.134 In his debrief, Sergeant Hoyland informed C/Supt Herold that 'generally the operation went well and was certainly an improvement on last year's operation'.135 A lesson learned from 1988 related to traffic and the need to have contingency planning for tailbacks in 1989.136

¶2.1.114 Supt Marshall could not remember a debrief in 1988 and, interviewed in 1990, he indicated initially that he had not held a debrief with his inspectors. Later, however, he stated that inspectors produced a written debrief and C/Supt Mole 'would always have a debrief after a game'.137 He concluded that he may have been off duty when a debrief was held or he may have been absent. Regarding overcrowding and crushing, Supt Marshall stated he was unaware of injuries on the terraces and concluded 'there is obviously the possibility that injured people had gone off themselves and gone to hospital'.

¶2.1.115 In their submission to the Taylor Inquiry SYP referred to the 1988 debrief.138 They noted that 'some resources', meaning police officers, were 'under employed in and around the ground, particularly in peripheral areas', mainly as a consequence 'of the general change in policy for policing semi-finals in that during normal matches officers are used for more than one role and are moved to different locations during the various phases of the match'.

¶2.1.116 At semi-finals 'officers would be allocated a specific task and would remain with that task throughout the operation, the intention being to ensure that the police had control both inside and outside the ground throughout the operation in an effort to thwart those individuals intent on causing disorder or attempting to enter the ground without tickets'.

¶2.1.117 This statement makes the first mention of policing 'anticipated roaming gangs of disappointed supporters causing disorder during the match'. Despite this unsubstantiated claim, 'the levels of officers available was found to be excessive, particularly at the Liverpool end of the Stadium where this type of activity had been expected as a consequence of their reputation and considerable following of supporters'.

West Midlands Police interview with Superintendent Murray, 25 June 1990, SYP000038900001, pp41-43. 133. West Midlands Police interview with ACC Jackson, 28 June 1990, SYP000038910001, pp14-16. 134. Superintendent Murray debrief for 1988 Semi-Final to Chief Superintendent Mole, 14 May 1988, SYP000047780001, p277. 135. Three-page debrief on 1988 match from Operations Room duty Sergeant to C/Supt Herold, 11 April 1988,

¶SYP000047780001, pp278-280. 136. Internal police minute from C/Supt for Operations and Traffic to ACC for Operations, 26 April 1988,

¶SYP000047780001, pp282-283. 137. West Midlands Police interview with Superintendent Roger Marshall, 19 June 1990, SYP000038880001, pp16-21. 138. SYP submission to Lord Justice Taylor, SYP000047780001, pp362-363.

¶2.1.118 Evidence from fans and police officers identified overcrowding in 1988. The level of knowledge within SYP and the steps taken to manage the crowd are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. There is no confirmation that SWFC directors were aware of overcrowding and crushing in 1988. According to Mr Mackrell, the SWFC Club Secretary, 'everything went extremely smoothly and indeed I have referred to the file I kept for that fixture and the records indicate that we had comparatively little by way of damage to the ground afterwards'.139

¶Conclusion: what is added to public understanding • In 1981 before the FA Cup Semi-Final between Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton

¶Wanderers there was serious congestion at the Leppings Lane turnstiles and crushing on the confined outer concourse. It resulted in the opening of exit Gate C to relieve the crush.

¶The disclosed documents indicate that entry into the stadium was managed by South

¶Yorkshire Police (SYP) officers on duty and Sheffield Wednesday Football Club (SWFC) stewards. • What followed was a serious crush on the terraces in which many people were injured and fatalities narrowly avoided. At that time lateral fences did not divide the Leppings

¶Lane terrace into pens, and fans were able to move sideways along the full length of the terrace; others escaped onto the perimeter track through the narrow gates in the perimeter fence. • The disclosed documents show that police officers located on the inner concourse, between the turnstiles and the rear of the terrace, restricted access to the central tunnel under the West Stand, diverting fans to the side access points to the terrace, thus relieving pressure at the centre. Crowd density figures available to the Panel demonstrate that the maximum capacity for the terrace was significantly exceeded. • The disclosed documents demonstrate that, following the 1981 incident, there was a breakdown in the relationship between SWFC and SYP. SWFC refused to accept the seriousness of the incident and held SYP responsible for the mismanagement of the crowd. SYP considered that the maximum capacity for the Leppings Lane terrace, set at 10,100, was too high, a view strongly contested by SWFC. • On the recommendation of SYP the construction of lateral fences in 1981 created three pens, with movement between pens limited to a small gate at the head of each lateral fence. According to SYP these gates were used to manage segregation at league matches but were not 'stewarded' by the police. • From the earliest safety assessments made by safety engineers commissioned in 1978 by SWFC, it was apparent that the stadium failed to meet minimum standards under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 and established in the Guide to Safety at Sports

¶Grounds (known as the 'Green Guide'), 1976. Documents released to the Panel confirm that the local Advisory Group for Safety at Sports Grounds carried out inadequate and poorly recorded inspections. There is clear evidence that SWFC's primary consideration was cost and, to an extent, this was shared by its primary safety consultants, Eastwood

¶& Partners. • Following the near tragedy in 1981, Hillsborough was not used for FA Cup semi-finals until 1987. During this period the Leppings Lane terrace underwent a series of significant modifications and alterations, none of which led to a revised safety certificate. The

Statement of Graham Mackrell, 19 May 1989, SYP000038670001, p80.

¶introduction of further lateral fences created two central pens accessed via the tunnel beneath the West Stand. Recommendations to feed fans directly from designated turnstiles into each pen, thus monitoring precisely the distribution of fans between the pens, were not acted on because of anticipated costs to SWFC. • Consequently, the turnstile counters were rendered irrelevant. Although they provided a check on the overall numbers entering the terrace, there was no information regarding crowd distribution between pens, each of which had an established maximum capacity. • It is evident from the disclosed documents that SYP were preoccupied with crowd management, segregation and regulation to prevent potential disorder. SWFC's primary concern was to limit costs. The Fire Service, however, raised concerns about provision for emergency evacuation of the terraces. As the only means of escaping forwards was onto the pitch, concern was raised specifically about the width of the perimeter fence gates which was well below the standard recommended by the Green Guide. The gradient of the tunnel under the West Stand leading down onto the terrace also significantly breached the Green Guide's recommendation. • While modifications were made inside the stadium, the issue of congested access to the turnstiles outside the stadium remained unresolved. As Lord Justice Taylor's Interim

¶Report noted, of the stadium's 54,000 capacity, over 24,000 fans were channelled through

¶23 turnstiles feeding the North Stand, the West Stand and the Leppings Lane terrace. • Following alterations, the safety of the existing maximum capacity for the Leppings Lane terrace was questioned repeatedly yet the decision was taken by the Club and the safety engineers not to revise the figure. • From the documents disclosed to the Panel, key issues – positioning of safety barriers, elevation of the tunnel, adequacy of the perimeter fence gates – were not discussed or recorded at the annual safety inspections. Following the delayed kick-off at the

¶1987 FA Cup Semi-Final and the crushing at the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final, it is evident that debriefings held by all parties were inadequate. Crucial information arising from these events was not shared within SYP, nor was it exchanged between SYP and other agencies. There is no record provided by SWFC of debriefings held between Club stewards and their managers. The Club denied knowledge of any crowd-related concerns arising from the 1987 or 1988 FA Cup Semi-Finals.