Reports that Matter

An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press

Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

Section 25 of 140

Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

Functions, remit and powers 8.1 Jane Furniss, Chief Executive Officer and Accounting Officer of the Independent Police

Complaints Commission (IPCC), explained that the Commission was established by the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA) and became operational in April 2004. Its primary statutory function

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is to secure and maintain public confidence in the police complaints system in England and Wales. In addition to this statutory responsibility, part of its guardianship role involves an obligation to measure, monitor and where necessary, seek to improve the current system. Ms Furniss makes clear that the IPCC is independent by law, and that its Commissioners cannot have worked for the Police Service in any capacity. The IPCC makes its decisions independently of the police, Government, complainants and interest groups.1105 Ms Furniss described its broad remit in these terms:1106

"It is the body that provides oversight of the complaints system for the police. There are other organisations we also have responsibility for [Since 2004 the IPCC's remit has been extended to include serious complaints and conduct matters relating to staff at the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the UK Border Agency (UKBA)],1107 but … I'll focus on the police. It's a slight misnomer, a name that Parliament gave us, which gives the impression, of course, that we deal with complaints against the police. In fact, we don't, largely. Matters come to us in three different ways. The public can seek our advice and assistance in making a complaint against the police, but those complaints are the responsibility of the Police Service to deal with. The public can then make – they have a right of appeal to us if they're dissatisfied with how the police dealt with their complaint, and we get about 7,000 of those each year. Perhaps most importantly, the police are required under law to refer matters to the IPCC, so certain categories of misconduct by the police or incidents that have caused concern are required by statute to be referred to us. To illustrate the point, when someone dies as a result of police action or as a result of police inaction or allegedly so, they're required to refer it to us. Other serious misconduct. The police can also choose to refer matters to us if they believe it would be in the public interest to do so …"

8.2 Furthermore, Ms Furniss explained that although the IPCC had responsibility for the police complaints system overall, the Commission investigated only a very small proportion of G cases themselves, usually only the most serious complaints and allegations of misconduct

against the police in England and Wales. Each Police Force had its own Professional Standards Department (PSD) which dealt with the vast majority of complaints and conduct matters against police officers and police staff.1108 Ms Furniss told the Inquiry how the IPCC fulfilled its remit:1109

"In relation to complaints and appeals, our process is that a member of staff, suitably trained, will assess the matter that comes to our attention. In an appeal, they have the responsibility to determine – there are different kinds of appeals, which makes it even more complicated to explain, but different kinds of appeals against, for example, the Police Service's decision not to record a complaint against how they've handled it and against the findings or outcome of how they've handled it, and what my staff do is review the evidence – it's a paper exercise, the appeal. They would review how the matter had been dealt with and determine whether the police had actually come to the right decision based on the evidence, and as a result of that, we can require the police to take further action. We can uphold the appeal and require the service to

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Chapter 3 | The Press and the Police: The Harm and the Response reinvestigate, for example." 8.3 As well as the appeals and complaints element of the IPCC, there is also an investigative arm.

The IPCC has its own team of investigators, about 150 staff, who support the investigative work, none of whom are currently serving police officers, although a proportion have worked as police officers or police staff prior to joining the IPCC.1110 Most, however, are individuals that the IPCC has recruited from outside of the policing world, including some lawyers, and a training programme is in place for those investigators. Ms Furniss told the Inquiry that the IPCC's investigators had similar powers to that of a constable, and could arrest and interview suspects under caution: these powers are used on a regular basis.1111 Ms Furniss described the use of this investigative element:1112

"… one of the most important decisions that the Commission makes is the mode of investigation for a matter that's been referred to us. So a decision needs to be made as to how this matter should be investigated, and we have three options ourselves, and a fourth one that the IPCC can decide that the matter should be independently investigated by our own staff, fully by our own staff. [Secondly i]t can decide to manage the investigation under our direction and control but where most of the work will be done by local police staff and usually Professional Standards Department police officers. Thirdly, we can supervise it, where the direction and control is with the force, but the IPCC receives the report at the end of it. Fourthly, we can decide that it's perfectly capable of being investigated by the police without our intervention …"

Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales 8.4 It was within this context, and following the concerns about the propriety of relationships

between some police officers and the media, including allegations of illegal payments by journalists in exchange for confidential information, that the terms of reference for this part of the Inquiry were formulated. In addition, using her statutory powers under Section 11 (2) of the Police Reform Act 2002, the Home Secretary asked the IPCC to prepare a report on G their experience of investigating corruption in the Police Service.1113

8.5 The first part of this two stage report, 'Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales'

was published by the IPCC in August 2011.1114 It described the role of the IPCC, the definitions of corruption and the issues arising from it. Based on its experience, the IPCC concluded that it seemed likely that corruption amongst police officers was relatively rare by comparison with some other jurisdictions. However, the report rightly recognised that any allegation or finding of corruption impacted on the standing of all forces. Furthermore, it suggested that the damage that could be done to all of the professional, hard-working and dedicated police officers and staff by the corrupted few should not be underestimated.1115 The IPCC's second and final report, 'Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales: Second report – a report based on the IPCC's experience from 2008 to 2011',1116 was published on 24 May 2012. Part two of the report sought to set the current concerns in the context of police corruption

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more broadly. It examined the public view of the nature, extent and effect of corruption in the police, and analysed corruption-related complaints recorded by police forces in England and Wales and those cases that are referred to them by the IPCC. The report also provided case studies of the serious corruption investigations carried out by the IPCC.1117

8.6 Given the broader concerns about police integrity and corruption, the report was

commissioned alongside that of the HMIC report, 'Without Fear or Favour', and Elizabeth Filkin's report on the relationship between the MPS and the media, all of which have run parallel to this Inquiry. Along with the other reports, those presented by the IPCC provided a very useful window on this general topic. At the same time, the IPCC had been carrying out or supervising investigations into allegedly corrupt relationships between police officers, mainly in the MPS, and the media. To such extent as is possible without prejudicing ongoing investigations, I deal with the product of those investigations elsewhere.

8.7 In summarising the view of the IPCC, Dame Anne Owers, its Chair, concluded that although

the overriding message was that corruption within the Police Service was not widespread, nor considered to be widespread, where it did exist, it was corrosive of the public trust which was the central tenet of policing by consent. She asserted, and I entirely agree, that public confidence in and acceptance of the police exercising their considerable powers over the population was heavily dependent on a belief in the integrity of individual officers.1118 Having said that, Ms Owers reports that some of the investigations undertaken by the IPCC had revealed serious corruption within the Police Service, sometimes at a senior level and sometimes preying upon precisely those vulnerable individuals whom the police were required to protect. On the other hand, providing a measure of reassurance, she pointed out that many of these cases had come to light as a direct result of the action taken by local forces and police authorities.1119

8.8 The report provides a summary of the outcome of all police corruption cases investigated by the IPCC between the period 2008/9 and 2010/11:1120 G

• Of the 104 independent and managed investigations considered during this period, the IPCC referred 47 (45%) cases to the CPS. In the 42 of those cases completed [at the time of the report's publication], involving 51 officers,18 pp1-14, lines 1-17, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Afternoon- Hearing-15-May-2012.pdf Paras 25 and 42 et seq, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Application-of-Rule-13-of- the-Inquiry-Rules-2006.pdf p4, Professor Baroness Onora O'Neill, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness- Statement-of-Professor-Baroness-ONeil.pdf Appendix 4 pp83-84, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-16- July-2012.pdf ibid p75, lines 2-5, Sly Bailey, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Afternoon- Hearing-16-January-20121.pdf http://www.economist.com/node/18958553 pp6-7, lines 25-1, Mark Thompson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-23-January-2012.pdf Channel 3 network includes 15 Regional licences Great Britain, Royal Commission on the Press 1961-1962: Report, p8 p86, para 193, ibid Information Commissioner's Office, What Price Privacy?, p5, para 1.8 pp42-43, para 85, ibid p5, para 20, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Third-Witness-Statement-of-DAC-Sue- Akers.pdf p2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Submission-by-Samaritans.pdf December 2011, and various articles and dates hereafter pp5-8, paras 14-23, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of- DAC-Sue-Akers.pdf pp33-34, lines 24-2, Mazher Mahmood, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-12-December-2011.pdf pp27-28, lines 6-3, Gerry McCann, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-23-November-2011.pdf p47, lines 2-14, JK Rowling, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-24-November-20112.pdf; p14, para 29a, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-JK-Rowling2.pdf p13, lines 8-18, John Witherow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-17-January-2012.pdf pp6-7, ibid p10, para 30, ibid pp46-47, lines 13-1, Michael Sullivan, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-15-March-2012.pdf Part G Chapter 3 Section 2 p2, ibid p50, lines 17-23, Richard Thomas, ibid pp24-25, lines 24-7, Philip Coppel, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-17-July-2012.pdf http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Third-Witness-Statement-of-Richard-Thomas- CBE1.pdf Part H, Chapter 6, para 4.3 p12, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-statement-of-Andrew-Neil.pdf pp68-69, lines 24-13, Harriet Harman, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-12-June-2012.pdf p46, lines 14-20, David Cameron, ibid pp4-31, ibid p5, Dr Vince Cable, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Exhibit-VC1-2.pdf p23, lines 20-24, ibid p24, lines 16-22, ibid p8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Robin-Foster.pdf For example, note the self-reporting and notification requirements imposed and encouraged by the Solicitors J Regulatory Authority in relation to the conduct of solicitors. See also the legal obligation imposed on banks and other financial services firms to report suspicious activity in the context of money laundering and terrorist financing to the Serious Organised Crime Agency if they know or suspect, or have reasonable grounds to know or suspect, that another individual or person is engaged in money laundering; and the information came to them in the course of their business in the regulated sector. It is an offence for an individual working in the regulated sector not to report to their 'Nominated Officer' or SOCA if the conditions for reporting have been met. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 also makes it an offence for a nominated officer not to disclose to SOCA if the conditions for reporting have been met (see sections 330 and 331) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtdefam/203/20302.htm pp4-5, para 25, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Baroness- Buscombe1.pdf p18, para 40, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Closing-Submission-from-Associated- Newspapers-Ltd.pdf K p7, para 15, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Lord-Black-of- Brentwood1.pdf p12, 9.1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Early-Resolution.pdf Defamation Act Schedule 2.5, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf as described in Part K, Chapter 4 Paul Dacre, The future for self regulation? Seminar 12 October 2011, p3, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2011/11/RPC_DOCS1-12374597-v1-PAUL_DACRE_S_SEMINAR_SPEECH.pdf Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.36 (1994) 19 EHRR 34, ECtHR January 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities No C 44/34 officers were charged and prosecuted,13 http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Ruling-on-the-role-of-the-assessors-PDF-102-KB. pdf This evidence included hearsay, anonymous material which Michelle Stanistreet the General Secretary of the National Union of Journalists sought to adduce from a number of journalists who feared for their careers if they spoke out in public. An application for this evidence to be heard was challenged by other Core Participants and subject to 'gateway' rulings by the Inquiry: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous- Witnesses-Ruling-PDF-64.5-KB.pdf and http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous- Evidence-28-November-2011.pdf. These were issued along with a protocol http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Protocol-regarding-Applications-for-Anonymity.pdf. The rulings were the subject of unsuccessful challenge in the Administrative Court (Toulson LJ, Sweeney and Sharp JJ): see R (on the application of Associated Newspapers Ltd v. The Rt Hon Lord Justice Leveson as Chairman of the Leveson Inquiry [2012] EWHC 57 (Admin), http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/assoc-news-v-chair-leveson-inquiry.pdf. There was then a substantive ruling on the merits of the application which was granted: http://www.levesoninquiry. org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous-witnesses-ruling-7-Feb-2012.pdf [2006] QB 468 p3 para d), Professor Baroness Onora O'Neill, http://levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/witness- statement-of-Professor-Baroness-ONeil See, however, the observations of Dr Manson on the nature of privacy rights in 'public' spaces and the difference between degrees of intensity in the public gaze: pp15-20, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf; p8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Dr-Neil-Manson.pdf p19, lines 10-21, Professor John Tasioulas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf pp99-100, Spencer Feeney, Mike Gilson, John McLellan and Jonathan Russell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-18-January-2012.pdf http://www.newscorp.com/corp_gov/MSC_reporting_structure.html p4, para 13, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Mark- Thompson.pdf p3, para 5, ibid Snoddy, R, The Good, the Bad, and the Unacceptable: The hard news about the British press, p84 p55, para 125, ibid p52, lines 4-18, DCI Gilmour, ibid Care was taken over this issue which became the subject of some controversy during the hearing and was the subject of a ruling: see http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Operation-Motorman-and- ANL-10-July-2012.pdf. Associated Newspapers Ltd later confirmed that it did not advance a positive case contradicting the position that there exists prima facie evidence that journalists did act in breach of s55 by obtaining information which, prima facie, could not be justified in the public interest. That group thus fell into line with all other press core participants. p22, lines 18-24, Keith Surtees, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-29-February-2012.pdf p2, para 6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-DAC-Sue- Akers.pdf pp97-98 passim, Margaret Watson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-22-November-20111.pdf p4, para 5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Fifth-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Caseby.pdf p26, para 54, ibid p18 lines 13-18, Colin Myler, ibid pp30-31, lines 23-4, Robert Jay QC, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-May-2012.pdf; p16, para 38, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ Witness-Statement-of-DCI-John-Macdonald.pdf p5, line 11; p38, line 25; pp46-47, lines 24-12; p58, line 21; p26, line 14; p78, lines 4-11; JK Rowling, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-24-November-20112.pdf p119, lines 5-17, Hugh Whittow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf; pp12-13, lines 15 –18, John Witherow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-17-January-2012.pdf; p10, para 42, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Dominic-Mohan.pdf p6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Stearns.pdf http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/4262.htm pp110-111, lines 4-10, Lord Stevens, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-6-March-20122.pdf p30, lines 2-11, Elizabeth Filkin, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-5-March-2012.pdf pp4-5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/First-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Thomas-CBE.pdf It is, perhaps, worthy of note that Mr Thomas appears to focus on the profile of s55 DPA rather than the underlying issue of the practices of the press p55, lines 3-6, Richard Thomas, ibid pp22-23, lines 23-6, Christopher Graham, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-26-January-2012.pdf Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data p85, lines 9-14, Richard Thomas, ibid Part H, Chapter 5, para 2.73 pp33-34, lines 3-6, Kelvin Mackenzie, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-January-2012.pdf p39, lines 17-23, Sir John Major, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-June-2012.pdf p24, para 71, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-David- Cameron-MP.pdf pp2-6, Rupert Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KRM-5.pdf p5, para 3.2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-James-Rupert- Jacob-Murdoch.pdf p34, lines 16-22, ibid pp12-14, paras 41-44, ibid p22, para 5.10 ibid Part E, Chapter 4 Chapter 32, para 3.4 Having paid fulsome tribute to Mr Abell's witness statement, I should also record my admiration for the Media Standard Trust's work in this area. The relevant material and submissions is on the Inquiry website. Given its comprehensiveness, I have sought to boil the issues down somewhat p1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Covering-Letter-from-Ofcom.pdf Part K, Chapter 1 p7, paras 22-23, ibid p3, para 5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Media-Regulation- Round-Table.pdf Defamation Act 2009 s44, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2009/12/30/les-editeurs-de-presse-en-ligne-se-repartissent-20- millions-d-euros-d-aides_1285932_3236.html p1, para 7, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Joint-Submission-by-Core-Participant- Victims1.pdf Part B Part F, Chapter 6, para 2.74 Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.32 News Verlag GmbH & co KG v Austria (2000) 31 EHRR 246 at paragraph 39 were found guilty and 10 were imprisoned. In terms of rank, most of the officers were constables, with one being a sergeant and one being of ACPO rank.

  • Of the 113 officers subject to completed IPCC investigations,87 ibid evidence of Jamie East to Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions Q336, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ joint-committees/Privacy_and_Injunctions/JCPIWrittenEvWeb.pdf p35, lines 8-11, Lord Smith, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-22-May-20121.pdf http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/evolving.html para 44, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Lord-Macdonald- QC1.pdf; Letter of advice not published http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2012/may/01/rupert-murdoch-newsinternational p67, lines 8-21, Neville Thurlbeck, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-December-2011.pdf pp27-28, lines 11-16, Gordon Brown, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-11-June-2012.pdf pp29-30, lines 13- 2, ibid p68, lines 18-25, Dick Fedorcio, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-13-March-2012.pdf p40, lines 15-19, Gillian Shearer, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-26-March-2012.pdf p108, lines 11-19, Sir Christopher Meyer, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-31-January-2012.pdf pp66-67, line 22-2, George Osborne, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-11-June-2012.pdf p37, lines 8-19, Stephen Dorrell MP, ibid p12, para 47, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Witness-Statement-of-Vince-Cable- MP.pdf pp1-9, Stephen Abell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Exhibit-SA-–-D8.pdf pp2-3, para 3.1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lord-Black-of-Brentwood- Annex-B1.pdf p64, lines 9-12, Lord Black, ibid p54, ibid There have been three resignations by previous chairs in the last four years Part I, Chapter 9, para 2.8 Ibid, at para 39 (77%) were the subject of misconduct proceedings. These resulted in a finding of gross misconduct or misconduct for 76 (87%) of officers. In 18% of cases, officers were dismissed or required to resign, 34% of officers were given a written warning and 29% were subject to management action.

8.9 Although concluding that there was nothing to suggest that police corruption was endemic,

or that police forces and authorities were not making serious efforts to identify and deal with it when it did occur, the report did however identify a number of suggested areas for change. These included:1121

  • It was suggested that there was a need for clearer information for the public on what
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constituted police corruption. To this end the IPCC would produce a regular analysis of the corruption cases that it had dealt with, identifying any emerging themes.

  • The report concluded that there should be a requirement for Chief Constables to ensure greater consistency in the recording and referral of corruption cases to the IPCC. The Commission had written to Chief Constables making clear its expectations; this would be reinforced in the Statutory Guidance it intended to issue later in 2012.
  • The report suggested that there was a need for a more effective national system for handling allegations against very senior officers i.e. those of ACPO rank. The IPCC reported that it would work with HMIC, the new National Crime Agency (NCA) and the CPS to establish a more formalised and robust system for escalating such complaints.
  • Given that most corruption allegations would continue to be dealt with by the individual forces concerned, including by their own standards and anti-corruption units, the IPCC would consider whether its oversight of these processes needed to be strengthened, and what resources would need to be available to do so.
  • The report understandably concluded that the public expected serious corruption to be investigated by an organisation independent of the police. The IPCC recorded that it stood ready to take on more corruption cases if additional resources could be made available. Moreover, the report made clear that within existing resources, the IPCC would continue to conduct a small, but increased, number of independent investigations into corruption cases, prioritising those involving senior officers, serious criminal allegations and gross abuse of police powers.
  • Finally, the IPCC suggested that additional powers were necessary to enable it to conduct the most effective corruption related investigations. They identify that this was particularly so in respect of contractors, access to third-party data and the power to require the police and other responsible bodies to respond formally to their recommendations. The IPCC G recorded that discussions were under way with Home Office officials and Ministers to take this forward.

8.10 The Home Secretary confirmed that last point and provided the Inquiry with her summary of the key findings. She said:1122

"I think the key findings that come out of this in many ways chime in with those previous work that's been done, particularly by the HMIC, about the need for greater clarity both for the public in terms of what's police corruption and therefore what is appropriate to bring to the IPCC, but also greater clarity in terms of – perhaps greater consistency in recording incidents that have taken place from force to force. They identify that different forces appear to have … different levels of reporting of complaints about corruption and the question is raised as to whether that's because of a different definition being used rather than the behaviour in relation to the forces. Crucially, it refers again to the issue of additional powers and also about resources, and these are issues that we intend, when legislative time allows, to be able to make changes to the powers to the IPCC and we are looking at the case that they've put forward in relation to additional resources."

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8.11 I certainly support these proposed changes and share the IPCC's view that in order for the

system to work as it should, it is vital that all police forces are both alert to allegations of corruption and are capable of dealing with them effectively and appropriately.1123 I also agree that this is an area in which independent oversight is essential, particularly from the standpoint of public perception, not least because the confidence of the public in the police is fundamental to its legitimacy and to the absolutely critical co operation and compliance that, as an organisation, it needs both to expect and also to achieve.

  1. HMIC report: 'Without Fear or Favour'

Functions, remit and powers

9.1 An inspectorate of police was established pursuant to the provisions of the County and

Borough Police Act 1856, and the first Her Majesty's Inspectors (HMIs) were then appointed for the purpose of inspecting the efficiency and effectiveness of individual police forces. In 1962, the Royal Commission on the Police formally acknowledged the contribution to policing made by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) and established the Inspectorate as both a monitor of, and a catalyst for, policing change.1124

9.2 Between 2004 and July 2012,1125 HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary was Sir Denis O'Connor

who had himself served both as an Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police and then as Chief Constable of Surrey. He made the point that, over the last two decades, there has been a notable acceleration in the pace of police reform, which had served to broaden the scope of the Inspectorate to the role it performed today.1126 Currently, HMIC independently assesses police forces and policing activity ranging from neighbourhood teams, serious crime and the fight against terrorism. Sir Denis told the Inquiry that in preparing their reports, HMIC asked the questions which informed citizens would ask, and published the answers

G in accessible form, using their expertise to interpret the evidence. HMIC also provide

authoritative information to allow the public to compare the performance of their force against others and their evidence is then used to drive improvements in the service provided to the public.1127 HM Inspector (HMI) Roger Baker, formerly Chief Constable of Essex, who now has responsibility for police forces in the Northern Region, described the functions of HMIC in his own terms:1128

"I think it's a police watchdog, in that it assesses policing and police forces in the public interest. So that can range from looking at local efficiency and effectiveness of a police force to broader policing issues such as the riots of last summer … we ask questions that the public would want us to ask and we report it back to the public in hopefully straightforward terms."

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9.3 HMIs are appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and report

to HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, who is independent of both the Home Office and the Police Service.1129 There are currently four HMIs in addition to the Chief Inspector: only two of the five have a background in policing. Mr Baker described the make-up of the team at the time of the Inquiry:1130

"… it's a broad church … There should be four inspectors and one chief inspector. Of the four, two of us are ex-chief constables. One is now the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Bernard went across. He was an inspector. He's now the Commissioner of the Metropolitan, and the other two inspectors currently don't have a police background. One was a chief crown prosecutor in London and one worked for the Audit Commission. So there's a mixed range of skills."

9.4 In addition to HMIs, the Inspectorate has a workforce of 150 staff, of which 44% are permanent,

41% are seconded and 15% are casual, agency or contract staff. Sir Denis told the Inquiry that this enabled HMIC to bring a wide mix of skills and disciplines to the organisation in order for them to carry out work across a diverse range of subject areas and areas of expertise.1131

9.5 HMIC's principal statutory duties are set out in the Police Act 1996 (as amended in 2002)

and the Police and Justice Act 1996.1132 Within this statutory framework, Sir Denis described HMIC's role as providing an incentive for police forces to improve effectiveness and value for money in a monopoly sector.1133 Unlike many regulators, HMIC does not have the power to impose standards or prices but instead seeks to secure improvement through the provision of an independent, professional assessment of police work.1134 Against this backdrop, Sir Denis described HMIC's powers over individual police forces:1135

"HMIC has the power to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces and currently police authorities. That will change in November. It will be restricted to the police forces. Since January 2, I have sought and at my behest, we have had power to seize documents and to enter premises, in order to pursue our duties. Not, dare I say, that we have been challenged, but it is best to be prepared, not just legislate for G good times."

9.6 Sir Denis told the Inquiry that in normal circumstances, police authorities and, in future, Police

and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) would regulate the activities of police forces. However, in extreme circumstances of sustained failure, HMIC could provide advice to the Home Secretary who had powers to direct the authority (or the IPCC).1136 When an issue emerged as being of national importance or one which was clearly systemic in nature, the Home Secretary may ask HMIC to conduct a review or, with a degree of independence, HMIC may initiate one

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itself.1137 Sir Denis told the Inquiry that, by emerging convention, if a clear and present issue emerged, HMIC could tackle that issue whether or not required to do so by the Home Office or identified within the business plan.1138 By way of example, he referred to the G20 summit and Anti-Social Behaviour.

9.7 Sir Denis told the Inquiry that HMIC did not have any formal coercive legal powers in relation

to any recommendations they might make, but, as an organisation, had considerable influence over police forces and currently police authorities. He said:1139

"… depending on the nature of the recommendations, the seriousness of the issue, we will pursue it, but what we try to do is seek agreement from the chief officer and the chair of the authority, depending on what the recommendations are … We have some influence, and we try to know our place as well. The only other thing I would say is it is sometimes mistaken from – externally that the publication of a view by an independent body like ourselves is a matter of some significance to chief constables and police authorities and there is … I suppose a degree of leverage that flows from the publication of what you've found and then any follow-up is still found to be wanting. It may sound rather like soft power. It is obviously less of an obvious sanction that [sic] some other regulators, but it has its place."

'Without fear or favour – a review of police relationships'

9.8 Immediately following her statement to the House of Commons on 18 July 2011 about the

MPS and the associated matters of police integrity and public confidence,1140 and in addition to her request to the IPCC, the Home Secretary formally asked Sir Denis to carry out a review to consider instances of undue influence, inappropriate contractual arrangements and other abuses of power in police relationships with the media and other parties, with a view to HMIC making recommendations to her about what needed to be done.1141

G 9.9 On 22 July 2011, the Home Secretary wrote to all Chief Constables to inform them that she

had asked HMIC to conduct such a review, but also to make clear that this work, as well as that of the IPCC and Elizabeth Filkin, was not intended to pre-empt the outcome of this Inquiry. Rather it was to ensure that any lessons that were capable of being applied immediately could be identified sooner rather than later.1142

9.10 Sir Denis asked Roger Baker to lead the review, which was conducted over a period of three

months. A draft was provided to the Home Office in November 2011, and the final report was published in December 2011.1143 As well as gathering evidence from stakeholders within the Police Service and liaising with media experts, including the CRA, HMIC looked at the issue from the perspective of the public. Quantitative and qualitative research was conducted with

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members of the public from across England and Wales, in an attempt to ascertain the public's perception of what represented integrity (with corruption as the antithesis of integrity), how prevalent the public thought corruption was within the Police Service, and whether their attitudes had been affected by recent events.1144 Sir Denis provided the Inquiry with his views on the value of public opinion in this domain:1145

"… it's another anchor point, I suppose, in police legitimacy … With a measure of public sentiment, anything is possible. Without it, progress is very difficult. In relation to this, I was actively interested to see, frankly, whether what had occurred last summer had made a real dent in the police reputation, in the public's belief in them and the trust, and that's why myself and Mr Baker undertook this work …"

9.11 The internal Police Service evidence gathering included 500 interviews with affected

personnel, and approximately 100 focus group sessions were conducted within the forces and police authority's that HMIC visited during the course of the review.1146 Mr Baker explained why this exercise was important and summarised the general views expressed during these evidence gathering sessions:1147

"… we wanted to get a view from the workforce on how they saw these issues, and I think it's right to say here that their moral compass was very strong on these things. They were very clear that lots of these things, in their view, were not acceptable … The staff were clear in two parts … One, where there was clear leadership from the top, they understood what the rules were and were happy to go along with that. And secondly, where it was less clear and when they were talking about what gratuities and hospitalities it was right to receive, in my words their moral compass was very strong. There was a clarity of, you know, most things were not acceptable. Teas and coffees were; beyond that then the Police Service shouldn't be engaging in it."

9.12 HMIC also undertook a number of benchmarking exercises across the public and private sector,

both nationally and internationally.1148 Mr Baker provided a summary of the findings:1149 G "… we contacted not only police forces, nationally and internationally, but other organisations to take a view on all of the component parts of this report. So what were their relationships with the media and how did they manage it, some of which is cited in the report. So the New South Wales Police media policy, how New York Police Department dealt with integrity testing, because they have a 650-strong team on internal affairs that are separate from the police, if you like. I don't necessarily advocate that model. But also other organisations such as banks, charity organisations – so third sector – on how they were dealing with inappropriate disclosures of information and relationships. So not just about policing, but added the Police Service benchmark, and we didn't find the cure for this in any other organisation. In fact, in many parts, the Police Service in England and Wales was a lot stronger than many

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… organisations, nationally and internationally, that we spoke to. So if you took in appropriate disclosure of information recorded by the Information Commissioner, there are far more complaints about other organisations than there are about policing, for example. So the police came out of that strongly. I know it's easy to put them in the spotlight with this, but whilst they have a way to go, whilst you'd find on policies and procedures 70 or 80 per cent of forces would have some sort of policy, if you applied that to most of the sectors, you were down to 20 and 30 per cent had got policies around it. In some cases, the Police Service were outshone by other organisations, but generally in just one component part of what we looked at."

Summary of key findings

9.13 The report neatly set out the essence of the issue that it was seeking to evidence and address in these terms:1150

"The aftermath of the phone hacking affair has generated a number of enquiries into the relationships between the media, the police and others, and the conflict of interests that can arise from them. A conflict of interest arises where police officers or staff give (or appear to give) preferential treatment to one interest over others. At best, this behaviour may be regarded as inappropriate; at worst, as corrupt. Potential conflicts of interest include: • The access and influence accorded to individuals and organisations; • Inappropriate disclosure of information to the media and others, whether for financial gain or otherwise; • Excessive or inappropriate hospitality, especially when offered to senior officers and other decision makers; • Question marks over contractual arrangements and police-supplier relationships;

G and

• Secondary business interests which may conflict or be perceived to conflict with the integrity of the police role (including employment taken by staff while serving with a force, and employment taken up immediately after leaving the Police Service)."

9.14 The report found that whilst corruption was not endemic in the Police Service, forces

and authorities were generally unsighted of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with relationships with others, including the media. The report noted that the absence of clear boundaries for police relationships with others was a cause for concern, as was the lack of consistent standards, policies and procedures across forces and authorities.1151 Of particular significance as far as I am concerned, the point is also made that from the perspective of the public, the Police Service needed not only to act fairly, but must also be seen to be acting fairly.1152 Mr Baker told the Inquiry that he placed perception at almost the same level of importance as reality, and said:1153

"… I think it was particularly important that – not only as a regulator but all of us, that

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we take the public's view, particularly if you're talking about the public interest, and that's what, on this occasion, 3,500-plus members of the public who were surveyed said, "That's what we think."

9.15 HMIC found that the public associate integrity with being treated fairly by the police. Mr Baker

pointed out that the public association of integrity with fairness suggested that they saw inappropriate relationships, and the conflicts of interest that might arise as a consequence, to be one, but not the only, dimension of police integrity. He suggested, entirely correctly in my view, that this had implications for the police if they were seeking to tackle corruption and inappropriate relationships from the perspective of the service user or the public more generally. This clearly included the relationship between the police and the media.1154

9.16 The term "corruption" obviously covers a broad spectrum of behaviour and the report makes

it clear that frank corruption, that is to say, money passing hands and clearly at one end of the spectrum, is thankfully relatively rare. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is what Sir Denis described as 'soft corruption'. He explained the type of behaviour which would encapsulate this concept and the importance that the public places on it in these terms:1155

"… it's doing favours, treating something much more favourably, one institution than another, you know, a place where hot dogs or something are served, one particular franchise much more favourably than another. That would raise a question in their mind because they're obviously seeing things on the street every day, and it kind of anchors us a little bit that even at the lower end, as some people would see it, of what happens, there is an expectation of the police, thankfully, which is hugely inspiring.89 p4, para 2.9, ibid p56, lines 1-3, Camilla Wright, ibid p24, lines 6-14, ibid http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/evolving.html Operation Caryatid Update as of Thursday 20 July 2006 (not published) p6, NI Group Limited Report and Financial Statement for 03 July 2011; http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/ may/02/news-corp-standards-committee For example, National AIDS Trust; UK Drug Policy Commission; Youth Media Agency p66, lines 3-15, Tom Crone, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-13-December-20111.pdf p9, paras 31-32, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Closing-Submission-from- Rebekah-Brooks.pdf pp48-51, lines 21-2, Dawn Neesom, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf; pp110-115, lines 4-1, Hugh Whittow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf p40, lines 14-25, CC Andy Trotter, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-hearing-28-March-2012.pdf p25, lines 3-11, Nick Davies, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-28-February-2012.pdf Part J, Chapter 4 ibid p48, lines 9-20, Andy Coulson, ibid p1, para 2(a), http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-statement-of-Rt-Hon- Virginia-Bottomley-of-Nettlestone-signed-30.04.12.pdf Article 4, Enterprise Act 2002 (Protection of Legitimate Interests) Order 2003 p11, Stephen Abell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Exhibit-SA-E1.pdf p5, para 23, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lord-Black-of-Brentwood-Annex-C1. pdf pp6-7, lines 21-3, Lord Black, ibid http://www.pressassociation.com/about-us/shareholders.html Bauer Media Group own both publishing and media brands worldwide that include UK's Bella, Take a Break, that's life! and Q and Kerrang! magazines Part I, Chapter 9, para 3.9 Ibid, at para 45 per cent of the public think that they should be better than others in regard to their mission and what they do and be very even-handed about it …"

9.17 Given the importance of perceptions, the report suggested that the over-arching principle of

police relationships with the media was that the Police Service should not seek to constrain the media but rather allow them to accurately report news so that the principal beneficiary was the public. However, the report makes equally clear that forces should take account of G the level and intensity of these relationships and not least how they would be perceived by the public.1156 Sir Denis elaborated on this point:1157

"… if the relationships become, as it were, visible and particularly focused on one or two individuals or one particular news organisation – this really is in more of a national level than a local level, where very often, frankly, there is only one local newspaper – then the point is that people may have the wrong perceptions of it, or maybe the right perception, but … it may cause them to become concerned."

9.18 There has been much debate during the course of this Inquiry as to the differences between

the position of the MPS compared with that of regional police forces. HMIC suggested that this debate missed the point. The report argued that we were living in a world of virtual

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communications, with issues being followed in real-time through a range of new technology and social media.1158 Sir Denis said:1159

"I think intense inquiries which will generate competition for information can happen anywhere in this country. That's a fact. If you look at Cumbria – you know, think of the last couple of years. Cumbria, Northumbria, Bristol. So those kind of inquiries which draw the most intense scrutiny can happen anywhere and with that potential conflicts of interest and issues, but running alongside that is a whole new world which is unwrapping around us, as people twitter this Inquiry and as people engage in a huge range of social media, and that includes people who are serving police officers and members of staff who may or may not be aware of just how much of themselves they are revealing, and we did not find that that issue was restricted to the Metropolitan Police."

9.19 The report described as the key contributor to promoting integrity "visible consistent

leadership". Mr Baker said that the evidence to support that conclusion lay in the Inspectorate's visits to forces where they found:1160

"… the chief officer and the chief officer team were very clear on what was right and what was wrong and that was being articulated in not only bits of paper but the way they behaved, you would get that feedback from the staff, but you'd also see it when you tested some of those areas of business. Where they would bring in that clarity to it, we found a difference."

9.20 The report also made clear that visible and consistent leadership was a key factor in ensuring

good force corporate governance and oversight. HMIC argued that this was more than just systems and processes, but also required those in charge of the organisation and those who represented it to be consistent in demonstrating appropriate behaviour: they should promote its values in pursuit of its objectives.1161 As Sir Denis put it, "they are stewards of the reputation of the organisation."1162

G

9.21 To that end, the report suggested that:1163

"… chief officer teams should review their corporate governance and oversight arrangements to ensure that they were fulfilling their function in helping promote the values of their force and the delivery of its objectives, and that they were, through their actions and behaviours, promoting the values of the organisation and making sure good corporate governance was seen as a core part of everyday business." Sir Denis elaborated on the key issues to be considered by forces in looking to manage the

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"… there are patterns and lessons to be learnt in the way relationships can develop, and something that started relatively innocently can become more problematic. It's bound to be associated with particular kinds of posts, the targeting of individuals and particular kinds of posts, and with individuals' own obligations, whether they're financial – for example, currently it's been assessed about 8.8 per cent of police officers and staff are financially stressed. There are ways of looking at people who work for your organisation and what they do, and looking at the potential to safeguard, as it were, them, to prevent things happening, and during the 1990s, when it was looked at in relation, as it were, to conventional corruption, criminal activity, they profiled the shape of this so that there was, if you like, an intelligence profile of the most vulnerable areas. I guess what we're looking at is if you want to avoid conflicts of interest, if you want to avoid a slippery slope, it is worth considering how you profile vulnerabilities of your organisation and its relationships with whatever other people or sectors you engage with."

Recommendations 9.22 HMIC stressed that at the heart of the issues that it considered within its review was the

importance of integrity, both personal and organisational, which they say was evident and transparent in the way individuals behaved and how forces and authorities conducted their business.1165 It was against this backdrop that HMIC made the following principal recommendations:1166

  • "Forces and authorities institute robust systems to ensure risks arising from relationships, information disclosure, gratuities, hospitality, contracting and secondary employment are identified. Monitored and managed. They should ideally do so on the basis of national standards and expectations – there are no geographical variables when it comes to integrity and there should not be local differences in standards. This work on national standards should be encouraged G by the Home Office and promoted by leaders in the Service locally.
  • There should be clear boundaries and thresholds in relation to these matters. Such limits should be consistent and Service wide. This in effect means identifying a clear message for staff on these issues as to what is acceptable, what is unacceptable and what areas of vulnerability to avoid. ACPO should lead this work in partnership with staff associations and those involved in police governance.
  • Training courses should include appropriate input in relation to integrity and anti-corruption. In particular, given the importance of leadership to securing high standards of integrity (a theme which runs through this review), the Strategic Command Course (in January 2012) and the High Potential Development Scheme should encompass these issues. Chief Constables should review how much effort is being put into briefing their staff on the standards as to what is acceptable, unacceptable and on the areas of potential vulnerability.
  • Chief officer teams should review their corporate governance and oversight
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arrangements to ensure that those arrangements are fulfilling their function in helping promote the values of their force in the delivery of its objectives, and that they are, through their actions and behaviours, promoting the values of the organisation and making sure good corporate governance is seen as a core part of everyday business. • HMIC expects the Service to have detailed proposals in the above areas ready for consultation with all relevant parties by April 2012. • An assessment relating to these matters should be conducted by HMIC by October 2012 to inform incoming Police and Crime Commissioners and Police and Crime Panels."

9.23 Having received a draft version of the report in late November 2011, the Home Secretary

wrote to Sir Denis on 6 December 2011 setting out her initial views on the findings and recommendations. The Home Secretary understandably welcomed HMIC's finding that corruption was not endemic in British policing, but stressed that, more generally, the conclusions of his report presented an urgent wake up call for police leaders. She accepted the proposed recommendations of HMIC as "valuable steps" towards addressing the concerns raised by the review.1167 However, the Home Secretary also pushed for a greater sense of pace and urgency from the Police Service in developing more robust and consistent arrangements, and requested that a more direct challenge be made to current police leaders to make the point that dealing with the findings of the report was their personal responsibility, individually as well as collectively.1168 These two points were addressed within the final version of the report published in December 2011, and encapsulated within the recommendations reproduced above.

9.24 Having identified a number of recommendations to tackle the issues identified by the HMIC

report, in his evidence to the Inquiry Sir Denis synthesised the key steps that now needed to be taken by the Police Service to recalibrate its relationship with the media in this way:1169

G

"… I take the view that there does need to be a significant revision in the way the relationship operates, but I would absolutely want to reassert with you: not actually in order to shrink the relationship but to put it on the right footing. Now getting it right means putting, to me, as a starter at least … some kind of framework for integrity in those dealings, which would have three components … These are some considerations in developing the right relationship, and I think that's probably the best one can say about them, but they're based on the idea that you put some kind of framework of integrity in place and then you support it in a number of ways … Three considerations in that would be: in their interactions with the media, there must be a legitimate policing purpose, whether it's a constable or a chief constable, and it should be more than relationship-building and relate to the core values and standards of policing. That's why I think it's important to establish those values, standards … part of the challenge is there are several sets around from the attestation, which I think, if you are familiar with it, you know, is quite moving, all the way through to – covers professional conduct to a statement of professional values. My instinct is that they're all worthy and as long as they crystallise what we hope from the police, they're a reference point in whether you actually have a legitimate policing purpose, which is likely to prevent crime and help people and help the investigation, than not …

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The second consideration is how; the manner in which the relationship is conducted. In essence, I think it should operate without favouritism and with integrity, and I say this is about integrity of the mission policing. So that kind of questions exclusive contact. It doesn't eliminate it, but it questions it. So it has real bite in that sense, and it also accepts that because of the police mission to investigate, you will consider what's presented to you, as it were, even if the media are presenting it to you as a real prospect. Now, what will need to happen underneath that is some very practical things for people who perhaps won't have all the time to watch this Inquiry or read all of these papers. That can be converted – "without favourite, with integrity" – to something a police force does about the range of contact it thinks is acceptable, about records, about briefing, authorisation … so it [is] establishing some boundaries … And then the third consideration is [how] the police handle information and access to it. They must seek to avoid a conflict of interest, given their obligations around confidentiality in particular but unexclusively. I think that those three points will help. If developed, can help. I'm quite prepared to accept – and there is a dialogue going on with people in the Police Service and elsewhere – that this actually may be a prompt for a better set of ideas, but they're designed to be specific, although they may appear at first blush rather general …"

9.25 Sir Denis also suggested that there may need to be some mechanism whereby a police officer

or member of police staff who was particularly concerned about an aspect of police behaviour (such as, for example, the suppression of an investigation) was able to report that concern and have it seriously considered without having to use the press as a vehicle to expose the wrongdoing.1170 The value of a route for whistle-blowing is that serious concerns could be addressed without prompting an allegation of disloyalty to the police although, ultimately, always leaving open the ability to go to the press in the public interest.

9.26 Sir Denis accepted that in providing an alternative route to raising concerns with the press, in

parallel, the police would have to be more ready to admit where things had not gone as well as they might have done.1171 Sir Denis also accepted an obvious potential danger with such a G system: that by moving to a stronger framework which tightened down the basis for contact, there was a risk of closing off an important avenue for revealing wrongdoing.1172 This "public interest safety valve process"1173 as it was described by Sir Denis, is obviously a very important part of what the press is in a position to achieve and one of the responsibilities that it has in our society: it is a role which I have no doubt that they should be able to continue to perform. This is an important issue and one to which it will be necessary to return in the concluding sections of this chapter.

The response 9.27 The HMIC report and its recommendations have generally been well received and welcomed

from those within the policing world. Commissioner Hogan-Howe, for example, told the Inquiry that the MPS had "actively contributed to the HMIC review and welcomes the national picture their report provides",1174 and Chief Constable Vaughan felt that it had been a "valuable

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publication within this area of business."1175 Similarly, Lord Condon thought that the report was a "valuable contribution to the debate"1176 and Lord Stevens felt that it was "in the right space" with the challenge in its implementation.1177

9.28 Julie Norgrove, the Director of Audit, Risk and Assurance for the Mayor's Office for Policing

and Crime (MOPC), also fully endorsed all of HMIC's principal recommendations.1178 Ms Furniss for the IPCC expressed a degree of surprise that some of the recommendations were necessary given that, in her view, some of what was said "ought to have been fairly obvious" to the Police Service.1179 However, that point having being made, she said of the HMIC report's recommendations "given that it clearly has been necessary, then I think they will be very helpful, actually."1180 That is not to say that there were not concerns expressed at some of the recommendations, particularly in relation to the potential creation of additional bureaucratic burdens for the Police Service. Lord Blair for example was "reasonably content with the thrust of the recommendations"1181 but felt that they were overly complicated.1182

9.29 As could perhaps be expected, the reaction to the report and its recommendations from

the media was mixed. Sandra Laville thought that the HMIC report highlighted some "very sensible broad principles for police forces"1183 and applauded its emphasis on integrity, both personal and organisational. She said:1184

"If police forces can instil integrity and a strong moral compass into its police officers this is far more effective for tackling corruption than any amount of top down rules and regulations."

9.30 Sean O'Neill considered the report to be a "largely reasonable document"1185 but had strong

views on the recommendation that all contact between police officers and journalists be formally noted; he suggested that this was "bureaucratic, unworkable and ultimately a threat to legitimate whistleblowing and freedom of expression."1186 Jon Ungoed-Thomas shared this viewpoint, to the extent that he objected to the recording of contact between police officers

G and the media. He told the Inquiry:1187

"… some officers are already wary of dealing with journalists, and I think that the key is the training of officers, and they understand the parameters in which they have exchanges with journalists. I think the difficulty is whenever you put in an audit

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trail, for whatever it is, you have to have a very, very good understanding of the possible impact and the amount of work that it generates, and what I'm concerned at is that it will be easier for police officers just to say no, and not bother with the monitoring procedures, rather than just have a quick conversation with a journalist. For an organisation which is – ie the police, which is so reliant on an inflow of public information, I think that would be a mistake to unnecessarily restrict exchanges between journalists and police officers, and I think that the consequence of that kind of mechanism would be a restriction of exchanges."

9.31 John Twomey agreed with Mr Ungoed-Thomas and felt that any requirement for police

officers to record their contact with journalists would "have kind of a freezing effect."1188 p44, lines 12-16, John Twomey, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-19-March-20121.pdf James Murray was even more strident in his criticism; he argued that the report "lacked credibility as the evidence of any wrongdoing between journalists and the police was not evident".1189 In respect of the recommendations, he said that they:1190

"… seem overly wordy and lacking in clarity. My view is that police officers and journalists are sensible people who have intelligent interaction and both sides have high ethical standards … Sensible officers know what corruption is and will not need to go on a long course to be told what it is." The issue of recording contact between police officers and the media and the possible consequences of such a requirement is clearly extremely important, and one which is raised again in the context of Elizabeth Filkin's report and recommendations. Again, it will be necessary to return to it in the concluding section of this chapter.

9.32 ACPO is leading the response to the HMIC report on behalf of the Police Service1191 and, by

October 2012, HMIC will have conducted a further assessment of the progress made by police forces and authorities in addressing the recommendations contained within the report.1192 In relation to the general response by the police to the issues raised by this report, and with an eye to the future, the Home Secretary said:1193 G "... I'm very keen that ACPO take the lead in this, as they are now beginning to do. The only thing I would add is that of course, in the future, there will be a different structure available within which these sorts of matters can be considered by the police, namely the police professional body which the government is establishing, which will be established by the end of this year, which will be looking at standards across a whole range of activities in relation to policing, for police officers and police staff."

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  1. Elizabeth Filkin's review of the relationship between the MPS and the Media

10.1 After the fallout from the phone hacking that took place at the NoTW in July 2011, concerns

were raised that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) may have failed to thoroughly investigate the matter, particularly after the discovery that the practice had been more widespread than initially perceived.1194 There was also much speculation regarding the 'cosy' relationships which existed between some senior MPS officers and NoTW journalists, and whether this was simply a general perception, or a matter of fact.1195

10.2 With these concerns in mind, the then Commissioner of the MPS, Sir Paul Stephenson,

appointed Elizabeth Filkin to conduct a review into the relationship between the MPS and the media.1196 Mrs Filkin has explained to the Inquiry that these concerns were "largely the reason that Sir Paul Stephenson had invited me to do this piece of work, it was obviously very pertinent to the piece of work".1197 The perception issue was of key importance for the MPS, who felt that the relationship between the force and the media had damaged public confidence in the MPS. Mrs Filkin has said in this regard that the MPS were:1198

"… embarrassed by much of the coverage, who were concerned that it might turn out to be true, who felt that they had done their duty throughout their careers and this was being now seriously undermined, and they were worried that public trust would be undermined."

10.3 As such, the purpose of Mrs Filkin's review was to provide recommendations to Sir Paul and

the MPS Management Board, in relation to: general issues around the ethics of police and media relationships; the purpose of this relationship across all levels in the MPS; methods of improving public confidence in police and media relations; the issue of transparency of such relations; the rules and acceptance of hospitality between the police and the media;

G and whether any evidence in relation to any of these issues should be led by the MPS to this

Inquiry.1199

10.4 Although Mr Stephenson and the then Assistant Commissioner, John Yates, resigned shortly

after the commission of the report, Mrs Filkin commenced with her work in August 2011 under the oversight of the incoming Commissioner, Bernard Hogan-Howe.1200 The final report was published and presented to the MPS on 5 January 2012.1201

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The Filkin Report: the ethical issues arising from the relationship between police and media

10.5 Mrs Filkin conducted her evidence gathering process over the course of five months. This

process comprised of interviews with a range of sources across the Metropolitan Police; stakeholders within the newspaper industry; as well as politicians and reputable business individuals. Mrs Filkin has told the Inquiry to this effect that:1202

"I put out a request on the internal intranet for the Metropolitan Police asking anybody within the Metropolitan Police who would like to give me information, evidence or opinion to be in contact with me, either in writing or in person, and I offered to do that in confidence if people wished that. I requested interviews with a range of people across the Metropolitan Police Service, all of whom I'm very pleased to say agreed to be interviewed by me, and I did the same with a list … … who were journalists, editors, politicians, business people, who I though might have something to give me. I also sat down with a number of internal groups in the Metropolitan Police ... a range of staff groups, of different groups, different ethnic backgrounds, et cetera, to get their opinions, too."

10.6 As well as gathering evidence from these interviews with 137 people, and the consideration

of written material, Mrs Filkin also consulted with MPS officers working on Operations Weeting, Elveden and Tuleta; and this Inquiry. She told the Inquiry that she exercised "my own judgement about whether people were trustworthy when I talked to them."1203 These interviews were presented as confidential conversations, and Mrs Filkin has only attributed quotes to those interviewed, with their consent, in her final report. Where she has questioned the validity of some of the views expressed through her interviews, Mrs Filkin has made this clear in the report. She told the Inquiry that:1204

"… as you will have seen, a large number of people did allow me to attribute their quotations to them, but some did not. And I have respected that, but I didn't quote G people without making any comment about it where I didn't think – I didn't support people unless I thought that what they were saying was trustworthy. That didn't mean to say I didn't also include some quotes from people whose views I did not accept."

10.7 Mrs Filkin has also explained to the Inquiry that her report sought to consult as wide a view as

possible, in order to ensure that the evidence was representative across the board, particularly given that there were different opinions held by the media and the MPS on the key findings of her report. She has stressed to the Inquiry that the report is entirely a reflection of her own findings.

Summary of key findings 10.8 The Filkin Report conveyed four key issues which became evident over the course of Mrs

Filkin's research. These issues were reported to the MPS Management Board and the Commissioner's Policy Forum at the time of her Inquiry. They covered:1205

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  • "The core principles to be established to govern the relationships between the MPS and the media.
  • The changes necessary to the leadership and management of the MPS to put these into practice.
  • The changes necessary to the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA).
  • The prevention of unethical relationships between the police and the media in the future."

10.9 Mrs Filkin has described the key problems around the perception of leaks from the MPS to the

media, interlinked with the 'cosy' relationships which have developed between the two. She concluded that this disclosure of information; the context of the relationship which fosters this disclosure; and the extent to which these relationships are regulated, should be addressed by the MPS in order to ensure complete oversight of an ethical practice, which would restore any damage to the public trust.1206 She elaborated on the issue of excessive hospitality and favours to the Inquiry, and reflected the view of many of the lower ranks within the MPS, in relation to the relevantly recent introduction of hospitality register publication:1207

"… many of the police officers and staff that I interviewed were obviously highly shocked by the amount of hospitality that the senior people appeared to be receiving; either hospitality in the sorts of things of dinners and lunches and so forth at rather expensive restaurants, but also some of them were receiving very large numbers of tickets to very expensive sporting events, so there were a set of things which some senior people had been receiving, others had not, others had not accepted, and that was clear." The issue of perception was raised again in this respect, as Mrs Filkin explained that "people across the Met saw these things all as one and thought they should all be described as

G corruption".1208

10.10 In addressing these issues, Mrs Filkin produced seven key findings and recommendations,

which focussed on: the methods of communication between the MPS and the public; the infrastructure within the MPS for such communications; corporate issues including leadership and trust within the MPS, as well as the management of ethical issues; the core principles outlining methods of contact with the media; and the transparency, and prevention of further unethical practices.1209

10.11 Mrs Filkin concluded that there was too much reliance on the print media by the MPS, which

has affected the impartiality and independence of the force in the public eye.1210 The role of the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) has also come under scrutiny through the interviews conducted for the report. Mrs Filkin has expressed her concerns about the reluctance of information provision to the DPA, which have been shaped by two particular perceptions. She reported that there is a view that "the DPA is unwilling in some instances to provide information to the public. Secondly that information is sometimes misused". Mrs Filkin has

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argued that the current infrastructure of communications is damaging any attempts at a "transparent corporate response in providing information to the public".1211

10.12 The report has also recognised a disparity in rules for senior leaders and lower ranks of

police officers, in relation to the policy of receiving gifts and hospitality from the media. The report found that there "has been no clear standard set by the senior team for police officers and staff to use as a guide for their own behaviour and in some instances the standards set have been poor and have led to consequent damage."1212 This particular issue was noted as a requirement for a change in the culture across the MPS, with clearer systems in place to monitor the exchange of hospitality between the media and the police. In this regard, the report also found that there has been a lack of consistent leadership in relation to the handling of information between the MPS and the media, particular the increased risk of "improper disclosure to the media".1213

10.13 In her summary of findings, Mrs Filkin has referred to the problems identified by Sir Denis

O'Connor's report on the review of police relationships. She has argued that the MPS should map ethical risks in order to "keep such issues consistently on the agenda".1214 This would improve the corporate management of the MPS and provide guidance to staff for understanding appropriate conduct when faced with decisions on their interactions with the media.

10.14 As well as the issue of leadership and corporate management, the report concluded that

the lack of transparency has also fuelled the perception that the relationship between the MPS and the media is secretive in nature. Mrs Filkin has reported on the fear expressed by journalists in relation to the suggestion for a greater degree of transparency in their contact with the police. Some, such as Nick Davies, have argued that this transparency risks stifling genuine investigative journalism in the public interest. Mrs Filkin has told the Inquiry that this is "a real fear, and certainly journalists have expressed it very forcefully to me."1215

10.15 Lastly, Mrs Filkin concluded on the issue of prevention. Some of the sources she interviewed G

for the purpose of the report have expressed their views that the culture of leaks within the MPS is generally tolerated by the force. Mrs Filkin adds that she "accept[s] that leak investigations are costly and often unproductive".1216 In this regard, Mrs Filkin has said that officers would welcome a "stronger stance" in the challenging, publication and deterrence of improper disclosure to the media.

Recommendations of the Filkin Report 10.16 In light of the key findings of the report, Mrs Filkin has made the following recommendations

to Commissioner Hogan-Howe and the MPS Management Board, in response to the terms of reference set out at para 10.3 above:1217

  • "A new approach to communication based on more extensive, open and impartial provision of information to the public is needed. Relationships with the media need
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to be part of this but not the driving force. I recommend that the Commissioner delegates responsibility and resources to a member of his senior team to champion a new approach to providing public information. Increasing openness with the public should be monitored through performance indicators. • The MPS senior team must signal a change in culture and set a consistent example for all staff on the ethical standards they expect, including how they relate to the media and the interpretation of the gifts and hospitality register. • I recommend that the Commissioner delegates responsibility and resources to a member of his senior team to initiate change in the way the MPS approaches integrity and ethics issues at all levels. This role will provide the support and direction for staff to implement change and ensure improvements are tracked. This role holder will collaborate with the Public Information Champion. Responsibility for leadership on these issues is shared by all as peer pressure is the most effective way of improving behaviour. • I recommend that all police officers and staff who provide information to the media should make a brief personal record of the information they provide. This record should be available if required by a line manager. Some of these records will be audited on a random basis. Wherever possible, published information should be attributed to the person giving it or more generally to the MPS. • The MPS must establish the core principles which should underpin contact with the media. I recommend that contact with the media is permissible but not unconditional. This should be the overarching principle. Police officers and staff need to have new guidance that helps them understand the value of providing information to the public and supports them in making ethical decisions when doing so. Advice on contact with the media is an essential part of this. So are improved training, supervision and appraisal to ensure the principles become

G embedded.

• The MPS must reinforce the public service responsibilities of the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) and local communications work. These functions must operate collaboratively and with equal status. The MPS must make better use of alternative routes for communicating with the public and there must be a predisposition to release much more information than in the past both to the external and internal audience. • The MPS must create an environment where the improper disclosure of information is condemned and deterred. Senior managers should make messages of deterrence strong and effective. Where leaks cannot be proved to the evidential standard required for a criminal prosecution, robust management action should nevertheless be pursued. However, whether there has been genuine harm should always be assessed before proportionate action is taken. Investigations should be seen as an important but subsidiary part of a broader preventative approach."

MPS response to the Filkin Report

10.17 The Filkin report and its specific recommendations have been positively received by the

Metropolitan Police Service. Commissioner Hogan-Howe confirmed that the MPS would be

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implementing the recommendations set out by Mrs Filkin. He has told the Inquiry that the report is:1218

"… being considered by the new Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey, who will provide an organisational response. This means that all the current policies concerning contact with the media and hospitality are to be reviewed and, as appropriate, amended to address the recommendations made in the Filkin Report. Fundamentally I want a principle of openness to be established. If we communicate with the press we need to be open about it, explain what contact there is and why."

10.18 In his evidence to the Inquiry, he also expanded on the MPS's response to the report and

said specifically that "we accept the findings. The conclusion that Elizabeth Filkin draws, we accept".1219 He explained that there would be some practical discussions in relation to the implementation of these recommendations. In this regard, the MPS are:1220

"… doing a little more work just to make sure that we operationalise that, and there was an appendix to Elizabeth's work which was trying to make more practical some of the principled findings. There are one or two areas in that which probably we want to discuss a little more before we actually say that we accept that in total, but on the whole the broad thrust of the report we accept."

Media response to the Filkin Report 10.19 There have, however, been some criticisms by the media in response to the Filkin Report. Sean

O'Neill, the crime editor of The Times, has strongly disapproved of the recommendations and the general tone of the report, using the term "East German Ministry of Information"1221 as a description of the language used by Mrs Filkin. He disagreed with the overall recommendations which "give more power over the control of information, which it calls transparency."1222 Mr O'Neill specifically questions the accountability of the senior officers, who are "the same senior officer class who have brought all these problems upon the Met's head in the first G place. It doesn't seem to me a sensible course of action."1223 He has said that the report has already contributed to a climate of fear and discouraged police officers, making them afraid of talking to the press.

10.20 Mr O'Neill also elaborated on how the report has perceived women reporters, and has told

the Inquiry that, "if I were a female crime correspondent I would be furious, because it seems to imply they're just a bunch of women in short skirts who are out flirting with people, and I don't think that's the case."1224 John Twomey, crime reporter of the Daily Express, has also told the Inquiry that the 'ideas for practical guidance' were largely condescending and "didn't

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quite go with the seriousness of the earlier part of the report".1225 p59, lines 14-19, John Twomey, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-19-March-20121.pdf He also agreed that "I think there's some condescending remarks about women in there."1226

10.21 Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe has firmly disagreed with the suggestions that the Filkin

report has been 'patronising' or 'condescending' to police officers, and has told the Inquiry that:1227

"… I didn't take it in that way, and I thought it was written in a sensible style and encouraged people to think differently about something that had become a problem. So I couldn't see that myself. I didn't take it as patronising for police officers, but I can't speak really, I suppose, for the journalists who did."