An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press
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¶10.12 In evidence to the Inquiry, representatives from the Daily Star emphasised the importance
of showbusiness and celebrity stories to that paper. Ms Neesom, told the Inquiry that as the title was a relatively young newspaper it did not have the same established readership as some of its competitors.516 The paper therefore needed to ensure that the content it carried appealed to its readership. Ms Neesom said that reader interest lay substantially in stories about the lives of celebrities and other individuals with a public profile.517 A number of these stories were sourced from members of the public responding to the call for stories published in the Star newspaper itself.518
¶F
¶10.13 The Daily Express also advertises for stories through its website. Readers are encouraged
to contact the paper through a number of media, including telephone, email and SMS text message. It is notable that the Daily Express website makes no mention of payment in exchange for information.
¶Levels of payment for material
¶10.14 Levels of payment for information vary from newspaper to newspaper. Peter Wright, the
697former editor of the Mail on Sunday, said that at the Mail Group payments of up to £50,000 were made for information during his tenure.519 However, he was also clear that such an amount would be paid in exceptional circumstances and only for a story of substantive and significant interest to the readers of Mail Group newspapers. Typically, such a story would take the form of an in-depth interview or a book serialisation.520 More typically, Mr Wright said, the amounts paid by the Mail Group for stories, and particularly to members of the public, were much smaller: in 2010, the highest amount paid was £3,500, and 'they would most be a lot less than that'.521 Mr Wright said that whilst most payments were made electronically, the Mail Group would also make cash payments, because some of those individuals supplying material might not have bank accounts.
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¶10.15 In this respect, the operation of payment systems at the Daily Mail was similar to that at
The Sun. There, cash payments were still made in a small number of circumstances. It was for individual journalists to make such requests for payments to senior staff and managing editors for authorisation. Whilst the amounts that could be paid for information to third parties could be significant, they were dependent on the final size of the story when published and also the likely interest of the subject of the story to the readers. Typically, payments for stories made by The Sun ranged from between £600 and £10,000 depending on the size and nature of the story.
¶10.16 A similar scale of payment for information also existed at the NoTW. Mr Thurlbeck said that
information leading to a front page splash might result in payments of up to £20,000.522 Mr McMullan explained that journalists working at the title, particularly those journalists working at the showbusiness desk, had access to substantive budgets without real oversight.523 Mr McMullan has said that, as deputy features editor, he was able spend amounts of up to £10,000 on stories that resulted in a double page spread.524 In this position, he was able to make payments of up to £3,000 for a page lead, and sums of between £5,000 and £10,000 for larger stories.525 Payments of more than £1,000 for any other story had to be authorised by the then editor.
¶10.17 Although the Inquiry has heard that payments for stories supplied by members of the
public would not normally exceed £10,000, other witnesses have suggested that in certain circumstances, payments for certain stories, in particular "kiss and tell" stories involving individuals with a significant public profile, could be much higher. Mr Shear explained that competitive pressures could put significant upward pressure on payments made if the papers concerned understood the stories in question to be profitable.526 Mr Shear said that if stories F involved a significantly high-profile celebrity, a kiss-and-tell story might cost: "something like 10k to half a million."527 Indeed, Mr Thurlbeck claimed that Rebecca Loos was paid a six figure sum for information about her relationship with the footballer, David Beckham.528
¶10.18 Similarly, in Mr Atkins' discussions with a NoTW journalist in relation to his 'medical records
sting', the journalist set out the paper's willingness to pay amounts substantially greater than £10,000 for stories of likely interest to readers and therefore of potential value.529 Mr Atkins recorded the journalist as suggesting that the NoTW might be willing to pay £80,000, depending on the strength of the story.530
¶10.19 Irrespective of the final amounts that have been paid it is clear that issues around payment
698formed an important part of discussions between journalists and their interlocutors. Mr Atkins evidence described his efforts to supply and sell information to a number of newspapers including the Sunday Mirror and the NoTW explaining that levels of payment were raised at the very outset of his discussions with the journalists from each newspaper.
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Accuracy and the credibility of material supplied by members of the public Corroboration
¶10.20 The specific concerns at payments for information crystallise not principally around the type
of information disclosed by sources in exchange for payment, but rather that the fact of payment might encourage the sources of that information to exaggerate, distort or simply fabricate the information that they seek to sell. The section above dealing with Mr Atkins' 'fake stories' sting suggests that the mechanisms for corroborating such information given by third parties may not be particularly effective.
¶10.21 The Inquiry has received evidence from a number of different newspapers about the
processes followed to establish the credibility of stories and the veracity of accusations that may have been made by members of the public in the information they seek to sell. These processes were also designed to protect newspapers from potential legal actions for libel or defamation.531 Although not uniform, the descriptions of such processes in evidence to the Inquiry from journalists at The Sun, the Daily Mirror and the Daily Star, as well as at the NoTW, are similar.532 It is illustrative of practices across parts of the press that these processes were not formal and whilst a number of witnesses to the Inquiry have claimed that they were generally practised, they were not obligatory or uniformly enforced.
¶10.22 Mr Smart described in broad terms the efforts made by journalists to establish both the credibility and reliability of stories that were provided by members of the public. These F efforts might include journalists separately seeking corroboration of any allegations made
through a number of sources.533 This might be done through contacting the subject of the story directly or indirectly through their agents or other representatives.534 Mr Smart said that the showbusiness journalists at The Sun had excellent contacts, particularly with the likely subject of stories submitted to the paper by members of the public; these contacts enable these journalists who might be pursuing such stories quickly to stand them up.535
¶10.23 A similar process is also followed at the Daily Mirror in response to potential stories supplied
699to the paper by members of the public. The practice there is to discuss potential stories with those who cold contact the paper, to make an initial assessment of the credibility as well as the value as a news item all during the initial telephone call. In those circumstances where journalists perceive stories to be credible, they might meet with the source to discuss the material further. Mr Owens suggested that journalists at the Mirror newspapers might also discuss the merits of a story with more senior colleagues on the news desk before deciding whether to pursue it further. Mr Owens also said that journalists working at the Sunday Mirror had access to a lawyer in the office at all times, to whom any concerns with stories could be addressed.536 In-house lawyers might also be involved in discussions with the news desk about the merits of a given story.537
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¶10.24 Ms Neesom explained that it was the practice at the Daily Star to seek to corroborate all
stories that were supplied by third parties.538 However, Ms Neesom also accepted that, in some cases, corroboration was not always possible, as the individuals in question were not always contactable.539 A failure to corroborate a story might not prevent its publication; this was so, particularly, if the story were unlikely to lead to the launch of legal challenge by the individual concerned. She also suggested that, in many cases, stories leaked to the newspaper by PR representatives working on behalf of particular celebrities would not be checked, given that they stories were essentially coming from the celebrity him or herself.540 The Inquiry was told that information submitted to the paper by members of the public, particularly in relation to so-called "kiss and tell" stories involving celebrities and other individuals with a public profile, was difficult to corroborate satisfactorily with the result that it was now less likely to be published than it once was.541
¶10.25 These informal mechanisms and processes for establishing the credibility of a story are also
described and elaborated by Ms Marshall in her memoir, Tabloid Girl. Ms Marshall explained that when contacted by members of the public, journalists would pose a number of questions relating to that celebrity. According to Ms Marshall, the purpose in asking such questions was intended to help separate those members of the public who may possess stories of potential interest to readers from those who had contacted the newspaper in the hope of securing payment for either spurious or fabricated information. Ms Marshall explained that the questions asked by journalists in these circumstances were often informed by the specialist knowledge that they may have about the celebrities about whom they wrote.542 This knowledge may be the result of relationships built up over a number of years with the celebrities in question. F Numbers
¶10.26 Although representatives of the press who have given evidence to the Inquiry have not
provided exact figures for the number of calls received from members of the public seeking to supply stories, they were clear that the numbers were substantial and provided the source material for a significant proportion of showbusiness stories each year. Mr Smart provided some sense of the scale of the information supplied in this way, as well as the demands on journalists working on showbusiness stories which accounted for the majority of telephone calls received.
¶10.27 Mr Smart explained that the Bizarre column at The Sun received many thousands of
700telephone calls in response to advertisements in the paper calling for readers to sell their stories. He noted that the small team of journalists working on the Bizarre column produced approximately 60,000 stories each year. On average, each journalist working on that column was responsible for researching and writing up over 3,000 individual stories.543 He explained that those stories provided by members of the public were important to helping achieve those targets.
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¶10.28 Similarly, Mr Owens suggested that the volume of information received from members of the
public at the Sunday Mirror was significant. Mr Owens said that the Sunday Mirror received "dozens" of stories each day from members of the public.544 Mr McMullan also reported that, during his time at the NoTW, he would receive up to 30 telephone calls each day from members of the public seeking to sell their stories.545
¶10.29 As a consequence, Mr Smart suggested that the volume of work required to produce sufficient
copy as well as the very real limitations on resources available to journalists militated against the corroboration of all stories.546 Mr Smart said that it was the practice of the showbusiness desk only to seek to stand up the two lead stories or those which were most contentious.547 Smaller stories and those which were unlikely to cause offence or reputational damage would not normally be fully corroborated.548 Mr Owens also admitted that, given the quantities of information received from the public, it was not always possible to run full checks on stories.
¶Judging whether a story is credible
¶10.30 A decision to run a story without having fully established the credibility of a source might be
justified on a number of grounds. First, journalists might seek to establish some of the facts around a story but not necessarily all details, proceeding with the publication of the story on the basis of that partial corroboration. Second, as described in evidence by Mr Smart, journalists might judge that a story was credible given their knowledge of the individuals concerned or the knowledge of others individuals linked to that person.549 As an example, Mr Smart said that he decided to publish stories supplied to him by the documentary film-maker
¶F Mr Atkins, which later turned out to be fabricated, because they chimed with his knowledge
of the people concerned. In response to questions about the likely veracity of a story supplied by Mr Atkins about the film maker Guy Ritchie (who it was alleged had injured himself while drunkenly juggling cutlery in a London restaurant), Mr Smart suggested he had known that Mr Ritchie had been in the restaurant in question at the time, and that he had managed to corroborate that Mr Ritchie was drunk at the time and was 'misbehaving'. Mr Smart said that the references to juggling came only at the end of the article and were an "insignificant" part of a "trivial story".550 However, Mr Smart did concede that it was unacceptable that somebody should be able deliberately to make up a story and that such a story should then appear in a newspaper.551
¶10.31 In relation to a story by Mr Atkins alleging that the singer Sarah Harding had a library full
701of books on astro-physics, Mr Smart suggested that, as a personal acquaintance of Miss Harding, he was well placed to judge the credibility of Mr Atkins' claim. Mr Smart told the Inquiry that he knew that Miss Harding had "quite an impressive library".552 He also said that he contacted Miss Harding's agent who said "it wouldn't surprise me if she owned a book like that".553 Mr Smart explained that this provided sufficient verification to decide in favour of
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publishing the story, even though the fundamental allegation in the story remained untrue. It is to note that, although in both of these cases the central allegation remained untrue, the general corroboration of some of the details of the allegations by the respective agents of Miss Harding and Mr Ritchie enabled Mr Smart to stand up the story sufficiently to mitigate the risk of legal action from either party.
¶Risks of payments for stories 10.32 There are two significant risks associated with the advertisement by newspapers for stories:
first, that it may incentivise fabrication and/or exaggeration, and second that it may encourage breaches of privacy. The Inquiry has seen evidence of both.
¶Incentivising fabrication and exaggeration 10.33 In his evidence, Mr Atkins argued that the willingness of newspapers to pay for stories
encouraged distortion and exaggeration on the part of sources and incentivised fabrication of material, particularly as the materials provided may frequently go unchecked and unverified.554 Mr Atkins also said that, in his view, given the potentially very high level of payments involved, those members of the public seeking to sell stories to newspapers were often motivated more by profit than accuracy.555 Further, he suggested that the journalists he spoke with encouraged him to exaggerate the more sensational aspects of the stories in question, in order that they might deliver more newsworthy content to their editors. Mr Atkins noted in his evidence that the more "outlandish" and sensational the stories he offered to the newspapers, the higher the level of payment that was offered in return.556 F
¶10.34 By way of example, Mr Atkins described to the Inquiry his attempt to sell a story about the
Canadian pop singer, Avril Lavigne. Mr Atkins explained that he contacted the Daily Express and attempted to see if he might be able to interest the newspaper in a story about the singer falling asleep in the nightclub, Bungalow 8. Although the story was rejected by the journalist at the Express, that journalist suggested that the title would be more interested in running the story if Mr Atkins could come back with a story that Ms Lavigne had been found "smoking crack". Mr Atkins was able to sell the original story to the Daily Mirror for £50 and the story was published without verification.557 Trinity Mirror has since accepted that it was wrong to have published the article and have published both a correction and issued an apology to Miss Lavigne.
¶10.35 Mr Davies explained that the Guardian had adopted the approach that, as a matter of
702principle, it would not pay for stories. He sought to explain that reasoning as one driven by practicalities rather than ethical, legal or financial considerations (although consideration of those issues had helped to inform the Guardian's position).558 Essentially at one with Mr Leigh, the position of Mr Davies was that the purchase of information might lead individuals to fabricate material or exaggerate the extent and impact of material in order to increase the value of that information.559
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¶10.36 Mr Leigh gave a specific example of a situation in which the Guardian had maintained this
position, even where the information for sale was thought to be in the public interest. He spoke of a potential story about the infiltration by a major weapons manufacturer of the Campaign Against the Arms Trade. The source of the information, who Mr Leigh and his colleagues believed to be credible, had requested payment of approximately £20,000. Mr Leigh said that whilst he believed that the story was in the public interest, he could not in the circumstance justify the sum of money requested and also because it caused concerns that relevant details had been embellished or exaggerated.560 Mr Leigh also made it clear that he did not think that it would be possible to stand up the story without the information held by his source.561
¶10.37 The Guardian's approach is admirable and, by adopting a hard line on payments for
information, the risk of fabrication and/or exaggeration is substantially limited. However, in saying that, I should not be interpreted as saying that the Guardian's approach is the only legitimate approach and should therefore be adopted by all titles. As noted above, the Daily Telegraph paid a substantial sum of money for the information which led to the MPs' expenses scandal and I have made no criticism of the Telegraph's decision to pay that money. The Times, The Independent and the Daily Telegraph also made clear that they would pay for stories, exceptionally, if they perceived there to be a clear public interest in the story in question. I accept that there may be many circumstances in which payments for information are justified in the public interest.
¶10.38 I also accept that payments for information may also be acceptable in the pursuit of pure entertainment stories or diary pages, provided that the publication does not lead to the F publication of fiction, and/or the breach of privacy (see below).It is essential that titles which
choose to make payments for stories (whether in the public interest, or merely because they interest the public) are fully aware of the risks involved, including the very real risks of providing an incentive for fabrication and/or exaggeration. It seems that at present, parts of the press are not sufficiently aware of those risks and do not seek to corroborate or check the stories published.
¶Providing an incentive for intrusions into private life
¶10.39 A further concern arising from the solicitation of stories for payment is that the practice provides
703an incentive for breaches of privacy. The "kiss and tell" is a prime example of this. While the evidence heard by the Inquiry suggested that traditional "kiss and tell" stories are declining, they are clearly not merely of historic interest and continue to appear in tabloid newspapers. Sometimes, these will involve breaches of privacy justified by the public interest,562 but other times they will not be so justified. What is clear is that the offer of payment by the individual titles is often a significant motivating factor for the (generally) women who sell their stories. The Inquiry also heard that the offer of payments to (generally) women involved in intimate relationship with well-known people can lead to conduct at least verging on the blackmail of those people: Mr Flitcroft said that one of the women with whom he was involved demanded £3,000 to keep quiet; a second woman demanded £5,000. One can only infer that those sums were close to the sums offered by the newspaper for their stories.563
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¶10.40 In addition, the evidence emerging from the "medical records sting" in Chris Atkins' Starsuckers
(discussed above) supports the conclusion that the offer of payments for stories incentivises breaches of private life. Notable in that evidence was the discussion between Mr Atkins and a journalist from the Sunday People, in particular on how the private information could be used without revealing that it derived from medical records; the journalist suggested instead that a woman who had allegedly had a breast enlargement could be featured in a "silhouette spread" or a "have they, haven't they story". This causes some concern because it suggests that even information that a newspaper judges too private to publish in the form disclosed by the source may be used as the foundation for a different story, which is not based directly on the source material.
¶10.41 Further, as Steve Turner of the BPPA has noted, the request by some newspapers for readers
to send photographs of people in the public eye, in return for payment, has led to the development of "amateur celebrity chasing paparazzi" or "stakerazzi". As discussed above in Section 5 of this Chapter, this has caused significant invasions of privacy for many people in the public eye.
¶10.42 It is important to note that the payment for information about the private life of an individual
may not always be unethical. It may also be ethical in certain circumstances to pay for a photographs provided by members of the public. I should make it absolutely clear that I am not advocating the banning of payments for information, even payments for private information. What concerns me is the degree to which some newspapers appear to rely on the provision of private information to fill their pages, and therefore actively encourage the disclosure of private information via eye-catching advertisements which offer monetary reward. This approach risks the wholesale disclosure of private information without consideration of the F public interest in doing so. Even if the newspaper does not subsequently publish the disclosed information, the disclosure is itself a breach of privacy.
¶Conclusions 10.43 Plainly, there are circumstances where the making of payment for information for stories is
clearly illegal as a matter of criminal law: the Bribery Act 2010 forbids the payments to public officials, and there is no defence based on actual or perceived public interest. The extent of such criminal activity is not a matter for this Inquiry given that it forms the basis of Operation Elveden.564
¶10.44 Beyond the specific confines of the Bribery Act, the paying of sources for information is not
704contrary to the criminal law (although it should be noted and underscored that the general principle which permits the protection of the confidentiality of sources does not justify paying money to a public official and then 'protecting' his or her identity), although it may often be unethical, for a number of clear and obvious reasons. First, the source may require payment for the very reason that he or she has obtained the information in question by illegal, unethical or otherwise dubious means, and the payment is, as it were, the price for taking the risk. Second, the fact that a source apparently requires payment for supplying the information in question may well be an incentive for exaggeration and embellishment. Put another way, it is legitimate to argue that a source who provides information without seeking remuneration for it is more likely to be acting out of sound motives. Third, the offering of money for stories may well encourage members of the public to engage in intrusive methods in circumstances where there is no clear public interest.
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¶10.45 Overall, paying for information may be seen as increasing the risk of unethical if not illegal
conduct by the source and, in consequence, by the journalist acting on the information purchased. In order to reduce these risks to acceptable levels, if newspapers are to continue to offer payment for stories, at the very least what is required are clear and effective internal systems of accountability and reporting, together with an acute assessment of where the public interest lies. In large parts of the press, this does not appear to have been occurring.
- Treatment of critics
¶11.1 The way in which an individual, an organisation, or an industry treats its critics can reveal
a lot about its culture. Openness to legitimate criticism is the hallmark of many thriving organisations and industries. By contrast, defensiveness and intimidation in response to legitimate criticism tends to be a feature of closed-minded and entrenched industries. The phone hacking scandal as a whole revealed that large parts of the press tended to the latter: over the course of five years, much of the press showed a complete unwillingness to engage with those critics who pointed to evidence of unlawful and unethical practices within one newspaper, and to practices which are likely to have taken place in others too. Indeed, rather than engaging with those critics, much of the press subjected them to intense scrutiny, occasionally amounting to intimidation.
¶11.2 The clearest example of this is the approach adopted by NI in response to high profile phone
hacking critics. As discussed above,565 lawyers bringing claims against NI were subjected to ongoing surveillance, commissioned with a view to trying to force them to remove
¶F themselves from the litigation. Similarly a member of the CMS Select Committee was placed
under surveillance during its investigation of phone hacking. Mr Webb confirmed that he was instructed to place Tom Watson MP under surveillance for a period of a week, trying to prove an alleged affair (which was not in fact taking place) in order to pressure Mr Watson to step back from the phone hacking issue. Another member of the Select Committee Mr Bryant, told the Inquiry of his experience of direct intimidation. In early 2011 he was called by a friend who informed him that two people close to Rupert Murdoch had warned that it would be wise for Mr Bryant to desist from the phone hacking investigations, or Mr Murdoch would "get him, in time". While there is not the slightest evidence to suggest that Mr Murdoch had in fact made any threats, there is no reason to doubt that a phone call between Mr Bryant and his friend took place and that something which could be construed as a threat purporting to be from Mr Murdoch was passed on. Mr Bryant said that further threats were passed on in March 2011.566
¶11.3 Mr Grant, who was seen as a figurehead of the Hacked Off campaign, was also the subject of
threats. The mother of his child was called by an anonymous caller when he was on television discussing the phone hacking issue and told to "Tell Hugh Grant to shut the fuck up!"567
¶11.4 These examples of surveillance and intimidation in the context of the phone hacking scandal
705are particularly egregious. It seems clear that certain people within the NoTW, or, perhaps, unsought supporters, were determined to prevent many of the facts discussed at elsewhere568 Chapter 4 from being revealed, and so resorted to deeply unethical methods to prevent that from happening. However, although the evidence as a whole did not suggest that the use
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of direct threats and the like by the press was commonplace, the limited evidence of those methods in the context of the phone hacking scandal was consistent with evidence given by a number of the Core Participants complaining of press misconduct, who spoke to a general atmosphere of intimidation by parts of the press. The evidence of that atmosphere came in two forms: first, evidence of the press launching direct personal attacks on critics; and second, evidence from a wide range of witnesses of a failure to speak out or criticise, litigate, or seek assistance from the regulator, for fear of the personal consequences.
¶11.5 The Inquiry saw numerous examples of parts of the press adopting attack as the best form
of defence against critics. When Mr Peppiatt resigned from the Daily Star and published his resignation letter in the Guardian, he was subjected to a campaign of harassment and threats. He received phone calls and text messages telling him, for instance, he was "a marked man until the day you die", or "RD will get you", which he understood to be a reference to Daily Star proprietor Richard Desmond: again, there is no evidence that Mr Desmond was personally responsible for any such communication. An individual with long established links to the tabloid world has apparently been warned by the police in connection with the harassment of Mr Peppiatt.569
¶11.6 A more conventional example of the attack by a newspaper of a critic is the Daily Mail's story
about Mr Grant and his alleged 'mendacious smears', which is discussed in detail above.570 That article followed several others attacking and criticising Mr Grant, partly in relation to his role as spokesperson for Hacked Off. One prime example included an ad hominem attack par excellence: the article sought to undermine Mr Grant's arguments in favour of press regulation by attacking his character, describing him as an "oleaginous, womanising lounge- lizard" who was a "lonely, bitter man consumed with hatred of the media who helped make F him a star".571 Similar articles were written to discredit Mr Coogan's arguments in favour of press reform.572
¶11.7 The Sun's response to Mr Brown's allegation that the newspaper had unlawfully accessed his son's medical records was a further example of attack as defence.573
¶11.8 Witnesses who had pursued litigation against newspaper titles gave evidence that parts of
the press sought retribution against those who brought claims against a newspaper title. Mr Thomson, said that a successful action invariably led to retribution. He explained:574
706"I've acted for Naomi Campbell, Loreena McKennitt, Sienna Miller at the time she was complaining she was chastised for complaining, for whingeing about her privacy. Max Mosley was – every possible claimant, whether it's a footballer, they have all been chastised for complaining, for going to law to get remedies, and it's a sort of tactic to undermine their vindication by trashing the claimant. … Of course they can comment on the judicial process in the sense of, "Oh, well, I don't think that injunction should have been granted", but – this is my opinion,
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my suspicion is: well, if they go to law, we'll give them a good trashing and it will deter other people from doing the same. That's my view about the strategy behind it because it happens, as I said, almost invariably. Let's make it difficult for them, let's deter others, let's trash them and maybe other people will think long and hard about doing it in future."
¶11.9 Mr Shear gave similar evidence in relation to one of his clients who had sued for libel in
respect of allegations of homosexual activity. Having succeeded in the libel action, the client became a target of interest for the newspaper and the victim of what Mr Shear described as "a revenge-fuelled fervour", and a determination to prove something that was damaging to his reputation or to his private life as part of "the quid pro quo of having the temerity to take on the national media in those circumstances."575
¶11.10 Ms Rowling gave an example of what might be thought of as small-scale retribution by the
press. In 2005, she had complained to the PCC in respect of the Daily Mirror publishing her address. A matter of five days after the complaint was made, the Mirror published a photograph of Ms Rowling's daughter as a baby, despite the fact it was well known that she was fiercely protective of her children's privacy and objected to the publication of their photographs. Her view was that the Daily Mirror's decision to publish the photograph was a deliberate act of spite in response to her complaint.576
¶11.11 Mr Mosley provided a considerably larger scale example when describing the course of his
privacy litigation against the NoTW. In response to Mr Mosley's application for an injunction to prevent (re)publication of the offending article and video, and while awaiting judgment,
¶F the NoTW splashed another front page article concerning the events in question under the
heading "MY NAZI ORGY WITH FI BOSS". Further, for reasons which to my mind could never do them credit (whatever other justification might be advanced), the NoTW sent a copy of the video to Formula 1 bosses, presumably in what transpired to be an unsuccessful attempt to get Mr Mosley dismissed from his position.577
¶11.12 In the light of behaviour of this sort, it is not, perhaps, surprising that a number of witnesses
gave evidence to the effect that they avoided litigation or complaints: it seems that many people in the public eye would rather endure breaches of privacy or small libels than conduct litigation, face the repetition of the offending story and endure the aggressive press response that comes from it.
¶11.13 Mr Grant said to the Inquiry: "to speak out and criticise is to invite a terrible press storm on your
707head".578 As a consequence, his evidence was that he had avoided litigating or complaining about unethical press practices, except in the most serious cases. Mr Coogan gave similar evidence. He said:579 "if you stick your head above the parapet or you criticise the papers or you make a point of taking action, then they'll come after you, you know. Insofar as my legal action is concerned, I was – I was advised by my publicists that – they actually said
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to me, "Do you –" When I was considering taking action against News International, my publicists said to me, "Do you really want to make enemies of these people?" By implication – well, the inference being that if – and when I asked them to elaborate, they said, "Well, in the future if they decide to run another story, we can use it as a bargaining chip. We can say that you could have taken legal action and you didn't, therefore why don't you drop the story?" But when they said "these people", they meant that – the inference was clear, that if you make life difficult for them, they will use their newspapers as a weapon against you."
¶11.14 Ms Church580 and Ms Gascoigne581 had, for significant periods, adopted the same approach,
avoiding litigation and avoiding complaint except in the most serious circumstances, in order to avoid the aggressive and unpleasant response with which a complaint would be met. Ms Church's evidence indicated that aggressive attacks have a corollary: preferential treatment for those who cooperate with newspapers. She recalled that when she was asked to sing at Rupert Murdoch's wedding in 1999, her manager was offered the choice between $100,000, or no fee but favourable treatment in the NI press. Her manager advised her to accept no fee.582
¶11.15 The evidence as a whole highlighted a point I made during the course of the Inquiry. The
press are in a unique position as they carry a very large megaphone: if people cooperate, that megaphone can be used to enhance careers; for those who complain or challenge titles, the megaphone can be used to destroy them. Whereas complainants or litigants against individual titles have a limited forum to air their complaints, the press have a ready and captive audience of hundreds of thousands if not millions of readers who will read their response. As a former NoTW news editor noted in an unguarded moment, the megaphone F can be used to "destroy people's lives".583
¶11.16 Evidence of aggressive attacks on press critics, and self-censorship by potential critics,
708extended beyond the celebrity world and into the judicial and political field as well. In response to the Max Mosley judgment, a number of tabloid newspapers launched an aggressive and personal campaign against the judge in the case, Mr Justice Eady.584 In his speech to the Society of Editors, Mr Dacre described his judgments as "arrogant and amoral" and criticised his "subjective and highly relativist moral sense".585 Although Mr Dacre stated that he had attacked the judgments and not the man,586 some might be forgiven for reading the speech differently, particularly when reading it alongside Daily Mail articles such as, 'As cold as a
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frozen haddock, Mr Justice Eady hands down his views shorn of moral balance...'.587 The key point, it seems to me, is that if Mr Dacre and others had a strong objection to the development of protection of a right to privacy in UK law, they were perfectly entitled to express that objection in forceful terms. But by directing the rhetorical fire at an individual judge who was seeking to apply the principles set down by higher courts and whose judgments were capable of challenge on appeal, that objection takes on the appearance of being aggressive and intimidating. Furthermore, it was an attack to which, by judicial convention, Mr Justice Eady was unable to respond.
¶11.17 Similarly intimidating and aggressive attacks have been directed at politicians who have
criticised aspects of the press. Rather than engaging with the arguments made by the critics, parts of the press have engaged in ad hominem attacks. A prime example is the treatment of critics of Page 3 who have been labelled variously as "fat", "ugly" "harridan", "battleaxe" and "jealous of beautiful women". Their arguments have been described as "potty", "senseless" and "furious rants".588
¶11.18 However, the preponderance of evidence suggests that overt intimidation of politicians
by the press is rare. What is far more widespread is a self-restraint by politicians fearful of criticising the press. The evidence received from a number of politician witnesses indicated that fear of press attack was a significant factor in the failure of successive Governments to tackle the issue of press behaviour, notwithstanding a recognition that better regulation was required. This is discussed in greater detail elsewhere, but for the purposes of this chapter it worth noting Lord Mandelson's view that the Blair and Brown Governments were 'cowed' by the power of the press and the threat of a hostile response to any attempts to address press
¶F regulation.589 The Rt Hon Ed Miliband agreed that fear played a significant part in the failure
to address press regulation during the Blair and Brown years.590 When Mr Blair attempted to articulate his concerns about some aspects of the culture of the press in a speech delivered prior to his departure from office,591 the almost universally critical press response, including a number of personally directed attacks, appeared to confirm those fears.592 As Mr Paxman noted in his MacTaggart lecture in the same year:593
709"…I thought the way we responded to Tony Blair's speech was pretty pathetic. Again, let's be frank. These two trades, politics and media have a great deal in common. Both deal in words and images, both involve a contract with the public based upon fairly explicit promises… By and large, the response to Blair's attack just pressed the F12 key. Yah booh. You're a politician. We're media yahoos. Get over it."
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¶11.19 Assessed as a whole, it is appropriate to conclude from the evidence that a practice has
existed within parts of the press, at certain times and in certain circumstances, of seeking to intimidate or seek retribution against complainants and critics. While that approach may not have been widespread, it has been sufficiently prevalent to create a generalised fear amongst those in the public eye of criticising or challenging the press owing to concerns about personal attack and vilification. I repeat that the press is entitled to hold whatever opinions it wishes and, subject to defamation, is equally entitled to express them: it cannot complain, however, if the inference is drawn that this practice is a form of special pleading and that the attack follows a challenge to the way in which they go about their business.
- Complaints handling 12.1 An issue related to the way in which the press treats critics is the manner in which it deals
with those who make complaints in relation to specific stories. The Inquiry heard a great deal of evidence of good practice on this issue, in particular in relation to the use of readers' editors at a number of titles. But there was also substantial evidence of poor practice, showing first, that the complaints process can be (sometimes, it was thought, deliberately) protracted, complicated and expensive; second that there is a strong reluctance in parts of the press to apologise even when it is not in dispute that a story was incorrect; and third, that apologies, retractions and corrections are frequently given substantially less prominence than the offending article and therefore fail to satisfy those who are aggrieved. Although evidence was heard on these issues from many witnesses, I focus only on three examples which I treat as case studies: the identity of the titles concerned is not to the point. F
¶12.2 The first example was the response of a number of newspapers to complaints made by
the McCanns in light of defamatory reporting of the circumstances of their daughter's disappearance.594 Although some of the narrative has already been described,595 it bears brief repetition here. In September 2007, the McCanns' solicitor Angus McBride met with all the editors of the national newspapers to convey the McCanns' concerns about the defamatory reporting of Madeleine's disappearance and the harmful impact this reporting was having on the search for her. That first meeting appeared to have no effect and, after continuing libellous reporting by a number of daily newspapers, further meetings were arranged between Mr McBride, Clarence Mitchell and the editors responsible. Those further meetings also appeared to have no effect and the defamatory reporting continued. On 26 September 2007, a solicitors' letter threatening libel proceedings was sent to those newspapers which appeared to be the worst offenders. That letter, and a further letter sent on 10 October 2007, appeared to have no impact on the continuing libellous reporting.596
¶12.3 In January 2008, the McCanns' representatives sent a formal letter before action in advance
710of a libel claim to both the Daily Express and the Daily Star newspapers. Notwithstanding the fact that the newspapers were aware they had no clear factual basis for any of the libellous stories published,597 the Express Group wrote that they were not willing to publish an apology for the libels, but were willing to offer the McCanns a "platform" to tell their side of the story, and offered them an exclusive interview and photo-shoot with OK! Magazine. Unsurprisingly, the McCanns rejected the (astonishingly misjudged) offer. As Dr Gerry McCann wrote:598
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"I found it simply breathtaking that they would think it appropriate to offer us interviews or other coverage in their own newspapers that they would subsequently make money from, as an appropriate remedy for the distress and hurt they had caused."
¶12.4 Although the Express Group subsequently published what they described as an
"unprecedented" front page apology to the McCanns, that was not matched by their apology to the friends of the McCanns who had also been falsely accused (on the front page) of covering up the truth about Madeleine's disappearance: their apology in the Daily Express was found on page five.
¶12.5 The McCanns also brought proceedings against Associated Newspapers Ltd (ANL), on the basis
of defamatory coverage in the Evening Standard and Daily Mail. The claim was settled with a substantial payment to the Find Madeleine fund, and an apology in the Evening Standard. The Daily Mail offered the McCanns free advertising for the Find Madeleine fund, but refused to apologise essentially on the basis that the defamatory stories published by the title had been balanced with a number of favourable reports about the McCanns. Unsurprisingly, the McCanns were disappointed by the newspaper's stance, but chose not to continue a protracted dispute.599
¶12.6 The second example of poor practice in responding to complaints is Neil Morrissey's
experience of a complaint against the Daily Mail.600 On 19 March 2011, the Daily Mail had published an article alleging that Mr Morrissey had been banned from a pub in France for
¶F drunken and rowdy behaviour. The story was untrue, the Daily Mail had been told in advance
of publication that it was untrue, and the Daily Mail eventually accepted it was untrue and apologised. But the process leading to that apology was unnecessarily protracted.
¶12.7 On 23 March 2011, immediately after publication, Mr Morrissey's lawyers wrote to ANL
stating that if an immediate apology and retraction were published, no claim for damages would be issued. That letter and a subsequent one went unanswered for a month. ANL eventually replied on 21 April 2011 refusing to publish an apology or retraction even though it appears that they did not claim in terms that the story was true, insisting instead that the story presented Mr Morrissey "in a sympathetic light".
¶12.8 Mr Morrissey issued a libel claim on 21 June 2011. A further six weeks passed before, on 5
August 2011, the Daily Mail accepted that the story was untrue and made an offer of amends. Although ANL claim that it was only then that it became clear that the story was untrue,601 it is difficult to understand why it took almost five months to reach this conclusion.
¶12.9 Once the Daily Mail accepted its error, the parties entered negotiations to agree the format
711and placement of an apology. The original article was published on page 19, took up a full page of the Daily Mail, was around 600 words long and included four large photographs. Mr Morrissey originally requested a 160 word apology under its own headline, but entered into negotiations with the Daily Mail over wording.602 After six weeks of negotiations, the Daily Mail published a 67 word unilateral apology on its "corrections and clarifications" column on
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page 2.603 Mr Morrissey complained that this apology did not have anything approaching the same prominence as the offending article.
¶12.10 The Inquiry heard evidence from a number of witnesses with regard to correction and
clarification columns and their benefits and disadvantages. Although I accept that there are significant benefits, a legitimate criticism that needs to be addressed is how to distinguish an apology for defamation or breach of privacy from simple factual corrections or clarifications. The apology to Mr Morrissey was published alongside a correction of the price paid by the NHS per loaf of gluten-free bread, and it seems reasonable in that context for Mr Morrissey to complain that the placement of the apology devalued it. In my view, an apology should at least be headlined with "apology" or "sorry" or something to clearly mark it out as something distinct from a simple factual correction. In the absence of such a clear marker, it is unsurprising that some witnesses inferred that newspapers seek to bury their apologies.
¶12.11 The third example was provided by the organisation Carbon Brief, and evidences an inadequate
response to complaints of inaccuracies that harm the public interest.604 Carbon Brief noted a series of articles in the Daily Mail which suggested that there was an average £200 "green tax" on household energy bills, which accounted for 20% of total household energy costs. The claim was inaccurate (the best accurate figure was around £80 or 8%), but was being used to justify a number of opinion pieces critical of the government's green agenda. Carbon Brief was concerned that the error fed into the Mail's "editorial line on the matter, which can be summarised as a campaigning stance against green policies to encourage renewable power or energy efficiency".605
¶12.12 Immediately after publication, Carbon Brief wrote to the Daily Mail to identify the error, but F
received no response. A subsequent complaint to the PCC was defended by the Daily Mail by reference to a 2008 report by the think-tank Civitas. However, that report did not in fact support the Daily Mail's £200 or 20% claim. Accordingly, the Daily Mail published a correction some three months after the claim had first appeared, and after it had been repeated many times in other titles.606
¶12.13 That was not the end of the matter. Less than two weeks after the correction had been
published, the 20% claim was repeated in the Mail on Sunday. Carbon Brief wrote to the Mail on Sunday to identify the error but, once again, received no response. Carbon Brief therefore made a second complaint to the PCC. Pending the resolution of that complaint, and despite the fact the Mail on Sunday was aware of both the PCC complaint and the previous correction in the Daily Mail, it published a further article making the same claim, saying that "the country is overrun with wind farms and energy costs are skyrocketing, with green stealth taxes adding 15 to 20 per cent to the average domestic power bill." The Mail on Sunday subsequently published a correction, but then, two months later, once again repeated the claim.607
¶12.14 Carbon Brief summarised its complaint in the following bullet points:608
712
- "This has been a time consuming and involved process, over a fairly straightforward factual inaccuracy.
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- The MoS repeated a figure that had already been corrected twice while there was a PCC complaint about the figure with the paper.
- Despite two successful PCC complaints about a specific statistic and published corrections in both the Mail and the Mail on Sunday, the Mail group are still repeating the figure.
- Either the Mail group's internal processes for noting complaints are inadequate, or they do not take PCC negotiated corrections seriously."
¶12.15 To those bullet points might be added a fifth point, namely that complaints to the PCC would
never have been required had the titles replied to the original letters sent by Carbon Brief direct to the newspapers. Accordingly, the example raises concerns about the ability, or willingness, of some newspaper titles to respond to complaints made direct to the newspaper by readers. Sensibly, most complaints should be resolved at that level without the need to refer a complaint to the regulatory body. But the Carbon Brief example suggests that, in some cases, some newspapers ignore complaints entirely, or delay in responding for significant periods, until the regulator, or the courts, are involved.
¶12.16 The three examples above provide evidence of each of the three specific concerns raised by
witnesses in relation to inadequate complaint handling by parts of the press: i) the delay and expense of bringing a complaint, ii) the reluctance of parts of the press to apologise or correct errors, and iii) the failure to give due prominence to apologies and corrections.
¶F Unnecessary delay and over-complication of the complaints process
¶12.17 Full Fact provided the Inquiry with evidence of all three issues. In relation to the delay
occasioned by parts of the press when dealing with complaints, Full Fact suggested that some newspapers deliberately complicate and draw out the complaints process as a tactic to avoid making apologies and corrections. They wrote that "little effort is made on the part of newspapers to avoid making the process extremely awkward and time consuming for complainants".609 610 Will Moy spoke of their regular experience as follows:611
"Where the first offer you get is, "We'll amend the headline online only". Then you get the offer of "We'll print a letter from Full Fact disagreeing with our article but we won't change the article or admit there was anything wrong with it". Then you get page 12, then you get page 6, then you get page 4, then you get page 2. All of this, rounds and rounds of correspondence, weeks between them, takes forever, deeply tiring. And all of this, of course, after the actual inaccuracy has been accepted."
¶12.18 A specific example of apparently deliberate awkwardness was Full Fact's evidence that on
713three occasions, after a long process of negotiating agreed corrections, and after having reached agreement, the Daily Mail had contacted the PCC to seek changes to the agreement on the night before publication. The organisation noted:612
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"This means unilaterally reopening the complaints process on an evening before publication, when complainants may not be in a position to respond immediately. Indeed, this means demanding a response time from the complainant that we never receive from newspapers themselves. That this has been done on three separate occasions over four complaints to our knowledge, all by the same newspaper and not just to Full Fact, gives such moves the impression of a considered tactic to disrupt the process."
¶12.19 Although it is not necessary to reach a conclusion as to whether the Daily Mail's approach
on the three occasions cited was part of a deliberate tactic, the simple fact is that it is part of a general tendency within parts of the press to delay and complicate what ought to be a reasonably simple process of prompt correction and apology. Mr Snow gave evidence of what he considered was unnecessary argument with ANL over the precise format of an apology to be published after he had been defamed. He said:613
"The confession was that it was completely untrue and they accepted it was untrue and they retracted it and apologised. The apology was 1.5 inches by a column and then the wrestling was over whether there should be a photograph of me above it. They didn't want the photograph because that would draw attention to the apology. Actually, in the end, we got the photograph, but I mean, this is pathetic. Wrestling over 1.5 inches when you have had five pages of something which the paper itself deems untrue? That is not the way forward… That is the process we have at the moment. That is justice; that is the way any reader who – or any person offended by a paper who has something wrong gets redress." F Reluctance to publish corrections and/or apologies, even where error is clear
¶12.20 In relation to a reluctance within some titles to publish apologies and/or corrections, Full
Fact's 'churnalism' project was instructive.614 Along with Mr Atkins, Full Fact published a number of fictional press releases that were adopted and published by newspapers without sufficient checking. One, published in the Metro, told of a fictional stammerer who had decided to undergo unorthodox speech therapy to cure his stammer in time for Valentine's Day. Another, published by the Daily Mail on the basis of a Facebook page, reported claims that the Prime Minister's new cat was actually stolen from a council estate in South London. Full Fact informed the newspapers that they had published hoax stories but both refused to publish corrections or clarifications, despite extensive correspondence. Full Fact noted:615
714"… it once again raises the question of why newspapers are so adversarial on the issue of acknowledging errors at all. It is extremely rare for us to submit a complaint about a significant factual inaccuracy that is not initially dismissed by the paper. Even in cases where papers have been indisputably wrong (such as over a basic error leading to stories reporting life expectancy on a Merthyr Tydfil estate was lower than in Haiti) several rounds of correspondence over several weeks have been required to get a worthwhile correction printed.
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One of the problems at the heart the issue is not that papers get their facts wrong or indeed borrow heavily from press releases, but an unwillingness to acknowledge and act on the problems that may arise as a consequence. Given the time and resource pressures in the media it is inevitable that mistakes get made, so why not be more willing to acknowledge and correct them when they are pointed out? Perhaps it would make the embarrassment from these kind of hoaxes a little easier to swallow."
¶Lack of due prominence
¶12.21 The identification of a reluctance to publish apologies and/or corrections feeds into the
third issue identified: lack of due prominence when an apology or correction is made. Full Fact616 and the Media Standards Trust617 gave evidence on this point. Considered together their evidence suggests that it is extremely difficult to find any adjudications, apologies or corrections that are given equal prominence as the offending article. It is of course correct that "equal prominence" is not what is required by the Editors' Code, but it is also clear that what parts of the press consider to be "due prominence" is not the same as what victims of inaccuracies, defamations and breaches of privacy consider it to be.
¶12.22 Ms Mills,618 Ms Gascoigne,619 Ms Miller,620 Mr Coogan,621 Mr Snow622 and Ms Diamond623 all
spoke of the insufficient prominence with which apologies were published after complaints of breach of privacy or libel. They were consistent in complaining that corrections or apologies were nowhere near as prominent as offending articles and noted that the damage
¶F to reputation or privacy caused by a front page splash, or full page article, could not be
remedied by the publication of a two inch apology within a corrections and clarifications column, or elsewhere in the newspaper.
¶12.23 Exemplifying this problem was The Sun's editor's evidence (supplemented by a further letter
715to the Inquiry on behalf of the Sun)624 in relation to a PCC adjudication relating to The Sun's article entitled "Boy, 12, turns into girl". The article was held by the PCC to be inaccurate and a breach of the girl's privacy. The original article had appeared on the front page of the newspaper, with a further full page on page 5. The adjudication was published on page 6, at the request of The Sun and agreed by the PCC, in a narrow column on the right of the page, adjacent to an eye catching article headlined "£1m Baby P Bungle". That the adjudication was published further back in the newspaper than the article was directly contradictory to Mr Mohan's written evidence, where he had written: "Corrections are never placed further back
¶Chapter 6 | Criticisms of the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press
in the newspaper than the original article, except for those connected with page one stories where the correction is published on page two".625 Nonetheless, Mr Mohan appeared to defend the prominence claiming that it was one of the longest adjudications ever published.626 That may be so, but if Mr Mohan was claiming the publication of this particular adjudication as an example of due prominence, that causes significant concern.
¶12.24 Mr Blair's evidence indicated the potential importance of due prominence in correcting errors
in political reporting. He recalled the front page vehemence with which parts of the press had attacked Lord Mandelson's alleged lies in relation to the Hinduja passport scandal and compared that vehemence to the relative lack of publicity given to the subsequent official report which cleared Lord Mandelson of any wrongdoing.627
¶12.25 Although some editors and journalists resisted the suggestion that apologies and corrections
were "buried" within newspapers, a number accepted that there was at least a perception that this was the case. Rebekah Brooks noted that, in her experience, "correcting inaccuracies does not cost a great deal for the press, but it is given low priority and minimal projection" and she accepted that the NI newspapers were as much at fault for this as others.628 She said:629 "one of the biggest complaints I used to get, not necessarily about my own newspaper but about the press in general, was the prominence of apologies when an inaccuracy had taken place… The page 37, one paragraph type thing."
¶12.26 In light of Mrs Brooks' evidence, it was somewhat ironic that James Murdoch complained of
a lack of prominence of apologies in articles concerning NI. He said:630 "Look, I think it's – you know, I have personal opinions about this, and actually, as the subject of a lot of press coverage over the last year myself, to be honest, I've F had cause for reflection, and I have been concerned with things like the ability to make a case, the ability to reply. I have been concerned with things like prominence of corrections. The Guardian alone I think has had to correct stories about News Corporation over 40 times in the last ten months or so, none of which seemed to have the same prominence as the original story, and that worries me. I think clearly it shows that somewhere in that code strengthening needs to occur with respect to accuracy and creating accountability there, but you know, I think this is going to be a matter for this Inquiry and for the industry."
¶12.27 Former PCC Chairman Sir Christopher Meyer acknowledged that during his tenure between
7162003-2007 there was a problem ensuring that corrections and apologies were given due prominence; his view was that the problem remained today. In large part, he accepted that the problem lay with the fact that the PCC had no power to direct where corrections and apologies should appear, and no power to direct their size and prominence.631
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
¶Conclusion
¶12.28 Looking at the evidence in the round, it appears that parts of the press have adopted an
adversarial approach to complaints, whereby even when clear errors have been identified, there has been a failure to provide swift and complete remedies to complainants. Plainly, there are common themes here with the section of the Report addressed to the treatment of critics [see section 11 above]. Parts of the press have, at times, sought to avoid corrections and apologies and have sought to minimise the prominence of those corrections and apologies. I agree with Sir Christopher Meyer that any new regulator must address this issue and must have the power to order editors where, when, and how they should publish apologies, retractions, corrections and/or adjudications.
¶F
717Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Introduction 1.1 The foregoing review of just a representative sample of the vast quantity of evidence
submitted to and considered by the Inquiry has served to identify a real problem within the culture, practices and ethics of the press. In setting out this evidence at some length I have provided my own evaluation of it, but I believe that I have done so in such a way that anyone reading this Report with care will be able to reach his or her own view.
¶1.2 I need to re-emphasise a point which I have already made more than once. There is a difference
between saying that there is a real problem within the press (including a section of the press) on the one hand and saying that this problem is so widespread that it infects the majority of press practice on the other. I am not saying the latter. The unethical practices to which the evidence points afflict only a section of the press, and even then not for the majority of the time. Furthermore, in cases where the relevant section of the press has been identified, I am not to be understood as criticising all desks or departments within any individual title, still less the majority of journalists working there. The evidence points to a less sweeping conclusion, but one which is nonetheless a cause for significant concern. Although unethical practices have been perpetrated by or within some parts of some titles only for some of the time, the coverage or strength of the evidence I have read, seen and heard is more than sufficient to indicate the presence of a culture (or sub-culture – the precise terminology does F not matter) which subsists and needs to be addressed.
¶1.3 The term 'culture', and the approach I should adopt, has been subjected to lengthy analysis
and critique in some of the submissions the Inquiry has received. I have considered all of these submissions with great care. Whereas this Report is hardly the place for an in depth sociological debate into the meaning of complex terms, my approach may be simply stated. I have focused in particular on unethical practices: these fall four-square within my Terms of Reference. My conclusions as to an unethical culture, or sub-culture, flowing from the identification of such practices are necessarily inferential. The evidence has very often demonstrated the existence of identical practices in more than one title, and on many occasions across several titles. The prevalence of such practices will vary as between titles, and the Inquiry has in any event largely avoided an attempt to carry out a quantitative as opposed to a qualitative evaluation. But what this Inquiry has focused on throughout is the presence of practices which are more than isolated, coincidental or accidental both within individual titles and, viewing the matter more widely, a relevant section of the press. In other words, evidence of a culture within a title, or a part of a title, which is common to, similar, or identical within another title, or part of another title, can be regarded as evidence of a culture within a section of a press; and, furthermore, of a problem which needs to be addressed (not least by the provision of an appropriate regulator) by the press as a whole.
¶1.4 Another highly relevant factor is that it is not too difficult to discern common themes and
patterns within the categories of unethical conduct described and evidenced earlier.1 These categories are already to some extent artificial, and they undoubtedly overlap. Take the example of phone hacking. True, it is illegal, and many forms of subterfuge are not; but on analysis it shares much in common with other forms of unethical conduct which the Inquiry
¶Part F, Chapter 6
718¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
has examined. Surveillance of targets in search of a story full of prurient details but devoid of public interest, and the blagging of information to support a similar sort of story, are in essence not vastly different in moral – as opposed to technological – terms from listening into a voicemail in pursuit of similar tittle-tattle. Furthermore, hovering above all of these practices are additional matters of commonality: in particular, a failure to respect the personal autonomy of individuals, and a concomitant tendency to treat celebrities in particular as objects rather than as individuals, because they have 'sold' any entitlement to privacy; a tendency to regard the public interest as a form of trump card, on the basis that the work newspapers do is right, because they are surrogates for their readers and are exercising the right to free speech; and, in more extreme cases, a propensity to regard journalism as above the law, because newspapers are the ultimate guardians of both free speech and the public interest.
¶1.5 On this approach, one may even more readily detect a problem, in the form of a collection of
similar practices, which may fairly be described as cultural. Plainly, my approach is somewhat in contrast with the thesis that some have advanced that the real problem within the culture, practices and ethics of the press is, or rather was, that of phone hacking which is therefore sui generis or 'special', and peculiar to one (now defunct) title. Some go even further, and have sought to argue that current police investigations into phone hacking and other criminal conduct have been unfair and disproportionate. For reasons which, by now, I have made crystal clear, I totally reject these forms of special pleading. They ignore the evidence the Inquiry has received and, in their most extreme form, come close to suggesting that journalists should not be subject to the rule of law. But in my view there is no more precious principle in a mature democracy.
¶F
¶1.6 Those reading the whole of Part F of this Report may be forgiven for thinking that the pages
covering good practice are far outnumbered by those covering the bad. I have already made the point that it would be a gross error to measure my assessment of the press in terms of the number of words expended. It is in the nature of public inquiries to investigate areas of public concern and adduce detailed evidence to enable those areas to be probed. The preponderance of good practice within the press, including those sections of the press which have been the focus of criticism, has been recognised by most of the witnesses who have testified; it also chimes with my own experience. This statement requires more than mere recognition; it deserves explanation and elaboration, and the Chapter above meets these pre-requisites.2
¶1.7 I have already exempted the regional press from the generality of my findings, but I should
address the position of magazines. In their submissions to the Inquiry, News International (NI) invited me to desegregate magazines from newspapers for this purpose on the basis that there is no evidence that they share a common culture, practices and ethics. A number of publishers of magazines have addressed this issue more directly, and have pointed out that the pressures on magazines are somewhat distinct from those operating on newspapers: they are published less frequently, and there is less of a call for the eye-catching headline or the sensationalised story, as one such publisher put it to me. Additionally, the Inquiry only heard from three magazine editors and their evidence was confined to the admittedly important issues of celebrity, intrusion, breaches of privacy, and harassment by paparazzi. Some of this evidence did not place these magazines in an altogether favourable light, and has been covered elsewhere. But save in these specific respects it is appropriate that I exempt magazines from the generality of my findings.
¶Part F, Chapter 2
719¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
¶1.8 It is not the purpose of this concluding section on the culture, practices and ethics of the
press simply to summarise that which has already been set out at length. Instead, I intend to apply a somewhat broader perspective.
- Possible causes 2.1 Turning now to this wider perspective, a number of possible causes of the problem have
been raised and ventilated during the course of the Inquiry, and it is appropriate to address these. Some have suggested that a press which rightly prides itself on its irreverence and fearlessness is almost destined to manifest a tendency to go too far and overreach itself. A press, they say, which is fearful and overly cautious would be inclined to be supine, and fail to discharge its primary function which is to hold power to account.
¶2.2 Others have suggested that unethical press practices are the result of one of two broad
sociological factors. First, many would argue that the modern celebrity culture cannot simply be an artefact of a certain section of the press; it is a reflection of the fact that many people appear to be endlessly curious about the personal lives of sportsmen and women, film and pop stars, fashion models and those who attain celebrity status without having done much more than create or benefit from a public persona which attracts interest. Whereas the public as a whole were rightly horrified by the revelations at News of the World (NoTW) because that title's methods so obviously crossed a red line into illegal and unethical territory, the self same public might well take a different view as regards lesser degrees of intrusion. Secondly, many have also argued that elements of the press in this country have acquired a sense of impunity, of being above the law, because they have become too powerful, their economic F and social power having become concentrated into too few hands.
¶2.3 I have set out these possible causes without necessarily endorsing any of them. This is so for
two reasons. First, many of these potential causes, assuming that they have been correctly identified, are beyond the scope of this Inquiry to the extent that it is difficult if not impossible to devise an antidote or a solution. If, for example, the problem lies within society as a whole, there could be little or nothing I could say or recommend to encourage (let alone force) the tectonic plates to move into an altogether different place. Secondly, and in any event, the Inquiry has not investigated many of these alleged causal factors to the extent necessary to reach clear conclusions on these complex issues, and I doubt whether it would have had the expertise to do so in all instances.
¶2.4 That said, there are three aspects of the wider problem which merit further attention: first,
the impact of commercial pressures in a shrinking newspaper market; secondly, the range of issues surrounding the modern employment context and the pressures exerted on journalists, and finally, issues of internal governance and leadership. These issues have been explored in the evidence and in submissions, and the Inquiry is in a position to examine them.
¶Commercial pressures 2.5 Many have pointed to the impact of commercial pressures in a dwindling marketplace. These
720pressures encourage excessive risk taking by titles that are in an incessant circulation war with one another; there are also pressures which operate on journalists at the metaphorical 'coal-face', some of which may require them to meet unrealistic targets and deadlines, and to cut corners as regards the exigencies of fact checking and adherence to the letter and spirit of the Editors' Code.
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
¶2.6 The Inquiry has been told by a large number of witnesses that the economic environment in
which newspapers operate is challenging; indeed, this is a hard fact which cannot seriously be disputed. Certainly, newspaper publishers in the UK operate in a highly competitive market where margins are tight and the competition for stories is intense: these factors exert considerable pressure both on editors trying to fill newssheet and journalists seeking copy.
¶2.7 Although some newspapers are highly profitable, the overall market is in decline and has
been for many years, this is increasingly characterised by shrinking revenue streams and low profitability. Market share has been steadily eroded over the last eighty years or so: first by radio, and then the advent and growth of television, from one channel in the early days, to the explosion of channels made possible by the introduction of satellite television services and the rollout of digital television. This loss of market share has been further exacerbated over the last 20 years by the growth of the internet and the close to exponential increase in the availability of mixed media services through that medium.
¶2.8 Whilst some newspapers have been able to halt the decline in sales, most newspapers have
lost sales at a rate that threatens the future economic viability of many titles. This is a trend that is more acute at, but not restricted to, the local and regional level than at national level.
¶2.9 The ability of newspapers to grow their own sales in the context of this overall decline is
also constrained by the tribal loyalties of readers. Clare Enders of Enders Analysis has told the Inquiry that overall only 2% of the market is contestable. It is unsurprising therefore that the commercial need to sell stories believed to be of interest to the public is an increasingly potent consideration.
¶F
¶2.10 The impact of these pressures is not uniform. The evidence has also indicated that a difference
in commercial imperatives exists between the broadsheets and tabloids. The journalist Nick Davies has suggested that the ownership and financial management of the Guardian by the Scott Trust has enabled the paper to distance itself from any commercial expectation to maximise profit.
¶2.11 By contrast, Mr Davies has suggested that tabloid newspapers are likely to place a greater
emphasis on circulation numbers than the broadsheets. In part, this view has been substantiated by the evidence to the Inquiry presented by both tabloid and middle market newspaper editors, as well as by evidence presented to the Inquiry by the former tabloid journalists Richard Peppiatt, Mathew Driscoll and Paul McMullan. On the other hand, Mr Richard Desmond, the owner of the Northern and Shell Group and publisher of the Daily Express and Daily Star newspapers, said in evidence that he did not believe that there was a direct correlation between stories and sales. Other witnesses from his titles (and indeed elsewhere) expressed the same view, drawing on circulation data relating to the period when the story of the abduction of Madeline McCann featured heavily on the front page of the Daily Express.
¶2.12 The Inquiry need not resolve this issue, but I make the following broad observation. It may
721well be that the examination of any one individual case, such as the McCann example, will fail to demonstrate a 'spike' in sales over a relatively short period of time. However, it is a different question, and one less verifiable by empirical evidence, as to whether the publication of particular types of story over many months and years is responsible, at least in part, for long term trends and patterns in newspaper circulations.
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
¶Employment issues 2.13 The demand for circulation appears to create, at least within some newspaper titles, a
significant pressure on journalists to perform. Some of the journalists who have given evidence to the Inquiry make clear that the pressures to secure copy are extreme, and that their jobs and livelihoods are at stake on an almost daily basis, particularly for those on temporary or informal contracts. The challenges operating in the print market are most obviously manifest in the reduction in journalist headcount across the national and regional press. The consequences for those journalists who remain are broadly uniform; they must produce more stories of interest to readers on reduced resource.
¶2.14 In evidence to the Inquiry, a number of journalists have explained that they were required
to produce a particular number of bylines in a given time frame. In many cases there were sanctions if these targets were not met; for those on short term contracts this might mean the termination of that contract. The former NoTW journalist, Paul McMullan has told the Inquiry that he kept his own cuttings in order to keep a record of the minimum of 12 bylines per year he was required to produce at the NoTW. The Guardian journalist David Leigh has suggested that, as a consequence of this pressure to generate a tangible product, at some newspapers there existed a real culture of fear among journalists if targets were not met.
¶2.15 James Hipwell, the former city correspondent for the Daily Mirror, described similar pressure
at that title and recalled occasions where staff would receive emails from the then editor, Piers Morgan, berating them for not delivering enough exclusive stories for the paper.
¶2.16 The challenging economic circumstances in which many newspapers operate and the continual F
pressure on the bottom line of most newspaper businesses has led many newspapers to introduce new ways of working, often built around short term contracts, a growth in the use of freelancers and a reduction in the number of permanent staff posts. Michelle Stanistreet, General Secretary of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), has suggested that this increased casualisation of journalists' employment across the newspaper industry has created an environment of great uncertainty for many newspaper employees. Ms Stanistreet claimed that journalists employed on a casual or short-term basis were forced to work under even greater pressures than permanent members of staff. She articulated the concerns that had been raised with the NUJ by freelance journalists. These included employment without job security and a failure to provide journalists with the basic resources they needed to undertake their work; such as the failure to provide a laptop, mobile phone and the ability of claiming expenses. Ms Stanistreet also said that casual and freelance journalists worked with permanent staff in the same pressurised newsroom environment, but invested greater resources and faced higher potential losses should they fail to deliver stories or other achievements.
¶2.17 This characterisation of short term and temporary contract work presented by Ms Stanistreet
was echoed in the evidence of Steve Turner, General Secretary of the British Association of Journalists. He highlighted the apparent injustice of journalists being forced to work on short- term contracts for many years, and the fact that reporters were put under impossible pressure to produce stories without being given the resources to do so. This was also reflected in the evidence of the journalists Richard Peppiatt and Sharon Marshall.
¶2.18 The Inquiry has heard from journalists working at both tabloid and broadsheet titles who have
722spoken about the prevalence of bullying in some newsrooms and, in particular, the bullying of relatively junior and sometimes vulnerable staff by senior management teams, including
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
editors, and the impact that such behaviour has on the working practice of journalists. In Part F, Chapter 4, I found that bullying had taken place at the NoTW.
¶2.19 It must be noted, however, that the majority of the journalists who testified before the Inquiry
denied that there was a culture of bullying in the newspapers in which they worked. They freely acknowledged that the environment was competitive and pressurised, but it might be said that the same descriptors could be applied to many work places in different walks of life.
¶2.20 I am not suggesting for one moment that any witness deliberately misled the Inquiry when
giving evidence along these lines. But had there been, for example, a culture of bullying or of turning a blind-eye to ethical standards at any title, I doubt whether many journalists would have been prepared to tell me that in terms. Furthermore, whether a work-place is 'competitive and pressured' is to some extent a subjective impression, as is the subsidiary issue of whether pressure is a force for the good or the bad.
¶2.21 Apart from the anonymous evidence adduced through Ms Stanistreet, and the evidence from
Steve Turner, General Secretary of the British Association of Journalists, a limited number of former journalists did speak to the existence of a bullying and less than ethical culture in the papers in which they worked. The qualitative deficiencies of the anonymous evidence must be recognised, and in respect of each of the former journalists there are reasons for treating their evidence with caution. I have examined their evidence in previous sections of the Report, but here I set out two pieces of evidence which struck a particular chord with me: this is because of the way in which the evidence was given, its inherent plausibility, and its consistency with other evidence.
¶F
¶2.22 Matthew Driscoll, formerly of NoTW, told the Inquiry in an extended sequence of answers:
723"Q. You tell us in your witness statement at paragraphs 7 to that you spoke to colleagues about this blagging technique and they told you that the practice had gone on for some time and also that the obtaining of medical records was common practice. Do you recollect that? A. It was certainly something that wasn't a rarity, no. Q. Did you ever raise your concerns with your sports editor or with anyone else at the time? A. No. I mean – well, I certainly raised my surprise that anything like that could be done. That was all new to me, having come from the Daily Star. But, you know, as I've thought about it long and hard, it would be a very brave journalist, certainly in the early years of his career on the paper, to suddenly say, "I'm not happy with these techniques that are being used." You'd be basically making a decision over your career there. Anyone on that floor who complained too much would find themselves pushed out, certainly. Q. Can you assist us with why you think this type of practice was going on? What was the purpose? Why did they have to resort to this? A. The main reason is to make sure a story's true. You know, this is kind of the irony, really. Tabloid newspapers are very fearful of getting a story badly wrong, and the lawyers are just as – the in-house lawyers are just as scared of that because it costs a lot of money if you do get it wrong. Not only do you have the humiliation of putting an apology in the paper or it being followed up and being disproved by other papers, it can then cost you a lot of money in out-of-court settlements, and money is the be all and end all of tabloid newspapers, really, and the pressure was on to make sure
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
a story was correct and that you wouldn't get any comeback legally. So there was a pressure to use, as it now turns out, almost any means necessary to make sure that a story was 100 per cent true. Q. Are there any other blagging incidents that you'd like to draw to our attention? A. Only ones I heard of. The examples I've given you are the ones I'd directly worked on, yeah. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sorry, I just have to follow up the last answer. So everything that was done was done to avoid libel? A. That's my opinion, yeah, certainly. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Any consideration given to concepts of propriety or privacy A. I'm sure there would have been sometimes, but I think the biggest priority was to make sure that that story was true, to make sure there would be no litigation further down the road. I think that's where the onus lied."
¶2.23 I recount this evidence without making any judgment about the managerial approach at the
NoTW (beyond that expressed in Chapter 4 of this Part of the Report) but it is important as providing an insight into press culture for a number of reasons. For present purposes, the focus is on what Mr Driscoll had to say about an environment which effectively precluded whistleblowing or speaking out.
¶2.24 James Hipwell, the former Daily Mirror journalist, emphasised the commercial and competitive
pressures on journalists:3 F "It was quite common to be threatened with the sack. Frankly, if a journalist doesn't bring in enough exclusives or enough stories, then what use is he to a newspaper? This is a highly competitive industry. You can easily be replaced. It takes you years and years to get to – you know, to get onto a national newspaper, very often, and, you know, you don't want to blow it by not pulling your weight, and the fact is if you don't bring in great copy, great exclusives, you're not going to last in the job."
¶2.25 I appreciate that both Mr Driscoll and Mr Hipwell have been challenged on the basis of
bias, the former because of his complaints directed at the NoTW and the latter following his treatment (and his conviction) while working at the Daily Mirror. The entirety of the evidence received by the Inquiry, however, points strongly to the conclusion that journalists were and are reluctant, if not afraid, to speak out about whatever unethical or illegal activities they came across, however frequently or infrequently that might have been. Equally, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the failure to provide protection to whistleblowers contributed to this reluctance.
¶2.26 Piers Morgan, former editor of the NoTW and the Daily Mirror, did not express concern that,
to his knowledge, there were no "whistleblower" policies in place at NoTW or the Daily Mirror during his period as editor at these papers.4
¶2.27 Richard Peppiatt, a former journalist at the Daily Star, vividly described a culture in which whistleblowing was deterred:5
724¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
"It seemed to me that reporters' employment contracts were structured specifically to limit the possibility of any ethical protest. Many, including myself, were on casual contracts, which is to say they can be terminated at anytime. The spectre of being 'let go' at any moment is a powerful deterrent against sticking your head above the trench if you disagree with something that is occurring. Even if someone was bold enough to complain, no channel existed for employees to raise concerns about ethical or journalistic practices. My feeling was certainly that the further up the chain of command you went the less, not more, concern over newsroom behaviour existed."
¶2.28 Whistleblowing is usually protected under the provisions of the Employment Rights Act 1996
to the extent that employers are not empowered to act to the detriment of employees in relation to public interest disclosures. However, there is a strong argument for recommending greater protection in this regard, and in my view the case advanced by the NUJ to the effect that 'conscience clauses' should be routinely introduced into the contracts of employment of journalists is more than justified.
¶2.29 The NUJ goes yet further, and has argued through its General Secretary, Michelle Stanistreet, that:6
"... there is a connection between the anti-trade union culture at News International and the moral vacuum that's been allowed to proliferate. The culture stems from the top of the organisation yet it is ordinary working journalists who are being sacrificed and whose livelihoods have been destroyed whilst those at the top of News International enjoy impunity."
¶F
¶2.30 Although I can see the clear possibility of a causal connection between a culture where
journalists are reluctant to speak out and the presence and in particular the perpetuation of unethical practices, Ms Stanistreet's point about a similar anti-trade union culture and such practices is a more controversial proposition. She may be right, but I am not in a position to express a concluded view about this on the limited evidence I have heard.
¶2.31 Taken together, these different pressures (a competitive market, growth of new media,
declining circulation, reduction of journalist headcount, reduced budgets, a casualisation of workforce, a lack of support to whistleblowers, and a sometimes bullying culture) risk the prioritisation of the pursuit of a story over all other, ethical, considerations. It is of interest that in her evidence to the Inquiry, Ms Marshall has said that in her experience there were no ethical conversations in journalism. Her evidence echoed the view of Northern and Shell proprietor, Richard Desmond, when he told the Inquiry that: "We do not talk about ethics or morals because it's a very fine line, and everybody's ethics are different."7 While that appeared to be a minority view across the industry as a whole, it nonetheless reflects the culture of a section of the press.
¶2.32 It should be emphasised that what is here being identified is the enhancement or magnification
725of risk. Just as poor systems of governance may increase the risk of unethical practice, so does the existence of the sort of commercial factors identified here. But these risks may or not mature in the real world and separate consideration needs to be given to that. For example, an unpromising commercial environment might nonetheless engender exemplary newsroom practices in any given case: this would be the consequence of there being editors and journalists of sufficient calibre to withstand the pressures and temptations operating on
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
them at all material times. That said, it cannot sensibly be denied that, in the real world, the existence of an environment whose attributes might well be described as unfavourable to good practice will have a tendency to generate bad practice.
¶Leadership and governance 2.33 I have mentioned commercial pressures on titles and personal pressures on journalists, but
many would say that the emphasis should be more specific. To the extent that the Inquiry has identified a real problem within the culture, practices and ethics of the press, many would argue that the proximate cause of that problem should be visualised as being one of a failure of leadership and internal governance. The culture and tone of an organisation is set by and from the top: in terms of leading by example, insisting on adherence to standards, and implementing systems of governance which serve to identify and eliminate both legal and ethical risk at all levels of the organisation.
¶2.34 The Inquiry does not propose to comment in depth on the quality of leadership at NoTW
(or higher up the corporate ladder into NI or News Corp) in any greater detail than set out earlier, since to do so might prejudice the criminal trials of at least two (if not many more) individuals. By extension, I will need to take care in examining the position in relation to other titles in case my reasoning and conclusions are transposed back onto NoTW or run the risk of offending what I have described in the Introduction as the self denying ordinance. I repeat, not for the first time, that this part of the Inquiry has been focused on aspects of the practices of the press at a higher level than the specifics 'who did what to whom, who authorised it and who knew about it'; its purpose is to address issues of regulation. Within these obvious and F ever-present constraints, it is both possible and appropriate to set out some concerns, even if these fall short of amounting to clear-cut and transparent conclusions.
¶2.35 A review of the evidence adduced before the Inquiry and already analysed has given rise to
concern in at least two respects. First, it is suggestive of leadership and internal governance failures in relation to the use of private investigators and the making of cash payments: on any view, these were high risk areas which warranted a firmer hand on the tiller. Second there are concerns in relation to the use of 'sources'.
¶2.36 It has already been pointed out that a number of editors and lawyers confessed to having no
726knowledge that private investigators and search agencies were used at their titles. By way of example only, the editor of the Daily Star, Dawn Neesom, stated that she was not aware that search agencies were being used until their existence was brought to her attention by her legal team.8 This was also the case for Hugh Whittow, editor of the Daily Express and his predecessor in that role, Peter Hill. Hugh Whittow stated that he "had no knowledge of [the use of private investigators] at all until it started appearing in the newspapers and on television"9 and had only recently discovered that some reporters at the Daily Express had used the services of search agencies.10 More surprisingly, neither he nor Mr Hill could recall being made aware of the Information Commissioner's 2006 report 'What Price Privacy Now',
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
even though it identified seven journalists at the Daily Express as being involved in enlisting the services of private investigator Mr Whittamore.11
¶2.37 Elsewhere, executives, editors and lawyers who were aware of the use of private investigators
and search agencies, conceded that they had no knowledge of the methods deployed to obtain information. Few expressed concern about this lack of knowledge, even with the benefit of hindsight. This lack of concern was evident in the evidence of Nicole Patterson, head of legal at the Express and Star titles. Ms Patterson expressed the view that newspapers were entitled to expect search agencies and private investigators would operate within the law to obtain information:12
"Longmere Consultants, Searchline, SystemsSearches and Express Locate are all names of search agencies that I know that are used by law firms to find and serve people with papers, and totally legitimate as far as I was aware, and I'm not sure that when you employ anybody that you ask in great detail whether they – how they go about doing what they do. You employ a company to do something for you and you expect that they would do it within the law. You expect that. Not that you don't care. You expect it."
¶2.39 Ms Patterson also expressed the view that, as head of legal, the question of what methods were used were not within her remit; such considerations were editorial matters.14 However, F as has already been noted, Ms Neesom, Mr Whittow and Mr Hill, each editors at titles owned
by the Northern & Shell during Ms Patterson's time as head of legal, gave evidence that they were unaware of the use of search agencies and private investigators. At its lowest, this revealed a degree of confusion within management as to the allocation of responsibility for overseeing the use of external providers of information.
¶2.40 It was also revealing that most lawyers who gave evidence to the Inquiry had backgrounds in
727corporate law or media law.15 None described having expertise in criminal law and a number confessed to having no knowledge of criminal law or the legality of information gathering techniques.16
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
¶2.41 John Witherow, editor of The Sunday Times, was clear in his evidence that the editor bore
responsibility for the conduct of any third party used to obtain information.17 However, when questioned about the extent to which it was possible to police external providers of information, Mr Witherow conceded that it was down to individual journalists to ensure that private investigators "behave in what we regard as a proper way".18 Mr Witherow was not alone in delegating responsibility for the supervision of private investigators to journalists. The former editor of the Daily Mirror, Richard Wallace, stated:19
"During my time as Editor of the Daily Mirror we have used, on occasion, the services of private investigators. I have not directly commissioned or had direct contact with them. They would, of course, have been paid for their services, but I would not be involved in their instructions have knowledge of what they were doing or be involved in the nuts and bolts of their payment."
¶2.42 Against this backdrop, it is of some concern that the evidence to the Inquiry from most editors
was that there was no procedure or protocol in place in relation to when private investigators or third party sources could be used, how they were identified, or the methods they were permitted to employ.20
¶2.43 In place of protocols or procedures, emphasis was placed on the expectation that third parties would operate within the law.21
¶2.44 The Sunday Times was the only title to give evidence that they have adopted a more formal
728approach to the use of external providers of information since the phone hacking scandal. As Mr Witherow explained:22 F "[I]n the light of the phone hacking scandal we have naturally checked to make sure we operate within the PCC Code and the law. As one precaution we are drawing up formal understandings with freelancers to make sure they abide by the law and the PCC Code, although most are already accredited to reputable organisations which require such behaviour. We have also introduced a more formal approach when considering subterfuge. This involves the reporter making his case in writing and this
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
being discussed by the heads of news, the newspaper's lawyers and the Editor and Managing Editor, with a formal minute made of the decision."
¶2.45 It appears that, at the majority of titles, there is no formal system in place to govern when
journalists may engage external providers of information, and on what basis. Without the adoption of such a system, editors and lawyers will continue to have difficulties in controlling third party sources and holding accountable those responsible for unethical conduct. If the conditions which enabled the use of private investigators to go unchecked for so long are to be avoided, significant improvements must be made to systems for monitoring and supervision.
information. It appears that until recently such expenditure was dealt with as ordinary expenses claims, with the result that there was little oversight at editorial level.23 A number of editors gave evidence that the amounts paid to external sources were small and did not attract attention so that there was never any cause to question the expenditure.24
¶2.47 Some titles have acknowledged the need to improve the financial accounting system
and have introduced new systems to monitor expenditure. For example, at NI there was acknowledgement that the payments control system was inadequate and it was replaced in September 2011.25 Before then it was left up to the discretion of the managing editor whether or not to question individual payments. Under the new system the policy makes clear that journalists should use non cash methods of payment for information, and only when the source insists on a cash payment is it acceptable to pay in cash. The journalist requesting the cash must obtain agreement from his or her departmental head that payment be made,
managing editor. It is notable, however, that the new system does not necessarily require the identification of the recipient of cash payments and there is no limit to cash payments.26
¶2.48 Other titles have failed to acknowledge the difficulties presented by informal accounting
729systems. Mr Desmond gave evidence that "the company operates stringent costs management, which I believe helps us to ensure that the company's money is not used for any unlawful purpose".27 But tight purse strings are not a surrogate for proper accounting systems, and Paul Ashford, Northern & Shell group editorial director, conceded that there are flaws in the company's financial accounting system.28
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
that a balance has to be struck between on the one hand micro-managing each and every story to the extent that sources are identified and checked for accuracy and reliability, and on the other hand trusting the journalist's say-so that source X is reliable. The former would be unworkable in practice, not least given the pressure of deadlines and the fact that many stories by their nature do not need this degree of close attention. The latter is unacceptably laissez-faire. Overall, there is considerable room for improvement in this regard, and more should be done at management level, by editors and lawyers in particular, to interrogate and verify the sources of information prior to authorising publication of a story.
¶2.50 Most of the editors who gave evidence to the Inquiry acknowledged that responsibility for
deciding whether to publish a story rests with them. However, most also stated that they would frequently authorise publication of a story without knowing the identity of a source.29
¶2.51 Editors expressed the common view that primary responsibility for checking sources lies with
730the journalist. This in itself is an appropriate delegation of responsibility. However, it has become clear that there are inadequate systems in place to verify sources. The gravamen of the evidence received by the Inquiry was along the lines that only if something about the story caught an editor's attention would the reliability of sources be questioned.30 A number of journalists stated that they were rarely asked to verify the facts of a story.31 The approach was justified, in part, by the need to protect source anonymity.32 More generally, editors emphasised the importance of trust in the reliability and integrity of individual journalists as being fundamental to the operation of the newsroom.33 Mr Wallace's view epitomised that expressed by most editors:34 F "To the best of my knowledge and belief, my journalists (like me) do comply with the law and the Code and I must trust them to do so. In the absence of any reason to call this relationship of trust into question, I do not believe that I should necessarily (or in some cases, properly) be aware of my journalists' sources and methods."
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
¶2.52 Although a degree of trust in subordinates is required in the operation of any organisation,
there is concern as to the extent of unchecked discretion afforded to journalists across the newspaper industry, and it is certainly arguable that this sort of laissez-faire attitude engendered a climate in which more serious ethical and legal breaches could be permitted to occur. Furthermore, this lack of supervision and excessive degree of trust may well have fostered a culture in which journalists feel able to publish stories on the basis of a single, unverified source.
¶2.53 The complacency evidenced in the presumption that individual journalists would act lawfully
and ethically is all the more concerning when viewed in the context of the failure within the press to develop effective systems to govern standards of conduct. In an industry which relies so heavily on the delegation of responsibility to journalists, it is essential that stringent codes of conduct and systems of accountability are developed and implemented. However, the available evidence suggests that there was a failure across significant sections of the industry to develop and implement appropriate systems to govern conduct and ethics. The Editors' Code of Practice provided a reasonable benchmark for adequate practice, but the evidence examined in Chapter 6 above suggests that not enough was done to ensure compliance, and that such systems as were in place were and are informal in nature and defined by the personalities of the individuals in positions of leadership.
¶2.54 Mr Peppiatt provided the following account of the treatment of the PCC Code during his time as a journalist at the Daily Star:35
¶"I would describe corporate governance at the Daily Star as laissez-faire at best. F There was little or nothing in the way of documents or official policies governing
conduct. I was never asked or offered the opportunity to sign a code of conduct, nor did there exist to my knowledge an 'employee handbook' type resource to reference. The PCC Code was not something that I ever heard referenced in relation to how a story should be handled, although certain limitations such as not trespassing in hospitals were implicitly acknowledged. I have admitted that some stories I wrote at the Daily Star were wholly inaccurate, often written under pressure from superiors to distort the facts at hand. For me to have referenced the PCC Code to protest against this I would have been laughed out the door."
¶2.55 Asked to describe how the Editors' Code of Practice was enforced at the Daily Star, Ms Neesom gave the following evidence:36
"It's just expected of the staff and it's enforced by people not being very happy with them if they mess up … The journalist concerned will probably be warned by the news desk that they have done something wrong … I personally probably wouldn't talk to the journalist concerned, but the news desk or my deputy editor would."
¶2.56 Systems of supervision at other titles were similarly informal. Colin Myler, former editor of the
731NoTW, in somewhat vague terms described relying on "a culture of individual and collective responsibility for ensuring compliance with the PCC Code and the law" during his editorship.37
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
Mr Wallace explained that one of the checks on conduct at the Daily Mirror is to position senior reporters alongside more junior reporters.38
¶2.57 Dominic Mohan, editor of The Sun emphasised how he sought "to foster a culture of honesty,
integrity and high ethical standards at the Sun"39. However, when asked how he had tried to foster those qualities, his answer revealed that ethical controls at The Sun are similarly ad hoc, relying on the judgment of individual journalists and the initiatives and attentions of individual managers rather than being systematic:40
"I think just on – an editor can – their contact on a day-to-day basis with their staff, so whether that be in morning news conference, during my features conferences, during my lunchtime plot meetings or my presence on the back bench in the newsroom on a daily basis, I think people know what I expect of them and know what standards and ethics that I stand by."
¶2.58 In the absence of formal systems of enforcement, even instances of clear and serious breaches
of the Codes did not result in significant disciplinary action. The Inquiry has already examined in depth the response of senior management at the NoTW to Mr Justice Eady's strictures in relation to the thinly-veiled threats to two of the women involved in the Max Mosley privacy claim, and has touched on that of senior management at Trinity Mirror in relation to the Starsuckers investigation. These are indicative of a cultural tendency metaphorically to circle the wagons, defend that which has been criticised (even judicially) and attacking those who utter the criticism and, in some cases, garnering support from others in the industry. Free speech is, of course, of critical importance; judges (among others) are not infallible and are well used to being criticised without having the ability to respond. Similar criticism can be F advanced about appellate decisions. What is missing, however, is internal reflection about (and action in respect of) breaches of the Code which are worthy of censure.
¶2.59 Putting to one side that fact that an editor is ultimately responsible for what is published,
questions naturally arise as to whether the real problem within the culture, practices and ethics of the press which this Inquiry has identified should be regarded as a failure of leadership. For reasons which have already been fully explained, it is unnecessary to venture into the territory of whether an editor at any particular title must have been aware of specific malpractice merely by virtue of his or her position. I have in fact already made clear that a number of editors were unaware, for example, of the extensive use of private investigators within their organisations, and if this evidence is to be accepted (and there is nothing directly to contradict it) it does tend to suggest that the editorial role does not automatically carry with it knowledge and understanding of every journalistic practice which is in play in the title for which the editor is responsible.
¶2.60 Approaching the issue at a far higher level of generality, however, it is possible to express
732a number of tentative views. The point has already been made that the culture or tone of an organisation is set by or at the top. If ethical failings have been highlighted, it would be counter-intuitive to regard these as largely attributable to the isolated frailties of individual 'rogue' journalists. As in other walks of life (evident, for example, in relation to the police),
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
journalists take their lead from the example set by the leaders and managers within their organisations, and are guided and influenced by the culture within the industry as a whole. Although it would be equally counter-intuitive to regard journalists as purely the 'victims' of such a culture, or of an ethical vacuum created by inaction at the highest levels within the organisation, the significance of this factor does need to be acknowledged.
¶2.61 Insight into issues of this sort was provided by Richard Desmond's candid evidence to the
Inquiry, betraying a reluctance on his part to engage with what might be thought to be a basic questions that all those in journalism should be prepared to focus on. He said: "Ethical – I don't know what the word means, perhaps you would explain what the word means," before adding, as noted above: "We do not talk about ethics or morals because it's a very fine line and everybody is different".41
¶2.62 Even when those in a leadership role acknowledged errors of judgment, they were unwilling
to confront the ethical component of that failure. Many editors expressed regret at the way in which the Christopher Jefferies story was reported; yet none sought to explore what ethical standards had been transgressed in this episode. For example, Mr Wallace viewed the failings which led to the publication of the Jefferies story as a "black mark" on his career, stating that "I think Mr Jefferies' name will be imprinted on my brain forever more. It will change very much the way I deal with any story of this nature in the future".42 However, he did not consider that any practical changes could be made to reduce the risk of recurrence, stating:43
"Ultimately it's down to the judgments of editors and, you know, as I found in this regard and other mistakes have been highlighted, we all make mistakes. I'm not
¶F seeking to downplay those mistakes or dismiss them; I'm just saying you can have as
many safeguards and checks and balances in place you would like but these errors are going to happen. It's about creating a climate, I believe, which makes all editors think perhaps a little bit longer than they have previously."
¶2.63 In the absence of clear leadership on ethical standards, it is at least arguable that journalists latched on to alternative barometers of what amounted to acceptable conduct.
¶2.64 Another trend emerging from the evidence considered above is that the press tend to
subsume ethical considerations within an assessment of legal risk. This type of reasoning process was encapsulated in the explanation provided by Mr Desmond which follows his answer about ethics and identifies the approach taken at his titles:44
733"I think that we are in a business to give readers/viewers what they want to read and watch and as long as it is legal that is what we aim to do. We do not talk about ethics or morals because it is a very fine line and everybody's ethics are different. However, we do of course care about the title's reputation and so we would not run a story if we thought it would damage that or seriously affect someone's life."
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
¶2.65 One of the consequences of this approach was that legality, or in some cases, the risk of being
sued, became the touchstone of acceptable conduct. A number of editors and executives gave evidence that they would be more likely to engage in conduct which might amount to a civil wrong if they knew that the subject of a story or photograph was not likely to bring a civil action. This was to some extent evident in the evidence provided by Mail on Sunday editor, Peter Wright, who said:45
"Sometimes [duty lawyers] are overcautious, and in particularly on celebrity stories, you have to take a view to – we're talking about libel here – there are certain individuals who are very likely to sue and other individuals who, for whatever reason, are very unlikely to sue, and because I've been doing this job for a very long time, I may have a better knowledge of that than the duty lawyer. The duty lawyer will point out to me, "Look, this could be – there could be a risk here", and it's their job to point out the risk. It's my job to take the decision."
¶2.66 The prioritisation of the management of legal liability over ethical risk was present in the
legal departments of some newspapers. Senior lawyers who gave evidence to the Inquiry narrowly defined the scope of their responsibilities to exclude any comment on ethical risk as opposed to legal risk and liability. This was particularly evident in the legal department at NI. Lawyers would not advise about the legality of methods used to obtain information,46 nor would they advise on the PCC Code which was an editorial matter.47 Their remit focused on all aspects of libel law and the legal risks attendant on defamation; dealing with post publication complaints; and copyright complaints.48 The position was the same at Express Newspapers.49
¶2.67 The consequences of the focus on legality over ethics were eloquently captured in the F
evidence of Mr Peppiatt. He commented on the distinction between a legal and a moral sense of truth:50
734"The legal sense of truth is sort of: what can we get away with saying? That's sort of the legal sense. The moral sense would be more: what would be a fair way to represent this? What would be an accurate way to represent this? Now, tabloid newspapers have no interest in the moral sense. All they want to do is think: what can we get away with saying? How far with we push the boundaries and get away with it? As you see when you have these monsterings of people, it's sort of: how far with we push it? If one newspaper pushes the line, everyone rushes to fill the void behind them. It's just a matter of: what can we get away with saying? There's no consideration of: what are the ethics? What are the moral considerations?"
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
¶2.68 It appears that sometimes the fact that conduct was legally permissible became an excuse
not to probe whether conduct was also morally acceptable. This is particularly so in relation to libel (can we prove it is true?) as distinct from privacy (does it transgress Article 8 rights?) although the latter is increasing in prominence as the law has had to deal with an increasing number of complaints in this area.
¶2.69 Another damaging tendency was, and is, for editors to measure the rectitude of their reporting
against the conduct of their competitors. A number of editors and journalists, when asked to justify some of the more egregious examples of misconduct discussed in this Report, relied heavily on the fact that other titles were printing the stories.
¶2.70 For example, Mr Desmond would not accept that Mr Hill behaved unethically in relation to his
stewardship of the coverage of the McCann story. When asked whether he agreed that it was up to the editor not to behave in such a way, he replied "No, not at all. Every paper – I didn't bring every paper with me, but I'm sure we can justify my statement – every paper every day for that period of time was talking about the McCanns. It was the hot story – it was the story."51
¶2.71 Mr Hill was likewise unrepentant about the coverage of the McCann case. He justified it as follows:52
"My decision was made because I believed that the stories were true and that the readers of The Daily Express had an interest in them. The Daily Express was not the only medium that published offending stories. They appeared widely in the press and on every TV station. I have never made up a story or asked anyone else so to do. Of
¶F course, if there is a big story, there is also pressure to get the best lines because it is a
highly competitive industry. However, that does not mean that journalists will invent stories and that newspapers will print made up stories."
¶2.72 It is notable that his justification again relied heavily on the fact that other titles were printing
the stories, as if that in itself provided a basis for vindicating the accuracy of the story. Editor- in-Chief of Associated Newspapers, Paul Dacre, whilst accepting that errors had been made in the reporting of Mr Jefferies' case, emphasised that coverage by the Daily Mail was less offensive than at many other titles.53 In this respect, he agreed with the suggestion that there is a snowball effect that impacts on the way in which other newspapers report the same story, observing: "I think the way the boundaries are pushed by the press collectively almost encourages some papers, not all papers, to push the limits too far".54
¶2.73 An element of relativism was again evident in Mr Dacre's appraisal of Daily Mail's coverage of the McCann story:
735"I think looking back there was obviously the odd article that we regretted. I think – but I think, on a balanced view of the Daily Mail's performance on that story over the years, I think we were at the more responsible end."55 p2, para 8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-John-Witherow.pdf pp35-36, lines 24-2, Jim Gray, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-23-January-2012.pdf p28, para 32.2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Richards. pdf Home Office (1990), Op cit, p74 p5, lines 13-15, Lord Black, ibid pp1-2, para 8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fifth-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Thomas-CBE.pdf p76, lines 12-23, ibid p10, lines 13-17, DAC Sue Akers, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-23-July-20121.pdf p59, lines 4-12, William Lewis, ibid Part F Chapter 5 p66, lines 10-19, Neville Thurlbeck, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-12-December-20111.pdf p3, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Witness-Statement-of-Daniel-Sanderson.pdf p5, para 16, ibid p81, lines 9-13, Paul Dacre, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-6-February-20121.pdf; pp85-86, lines 22-6, Dawn Neesom, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf pp64-65, lines 18-11, Gillian Shearer, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-26-March-2012.pdf pp47-48, lines 8-3, Sandra Laville, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-14-March-2012.pdf p1, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Exhibit-RJT5.pdf p15, lines 13-15, Christopher Graham, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-26-January-2012.pdf http://www.dfpni.gov.uk/consultation_misue_of_personal_data.pdf p21, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-Sir-John-Major.pdf pp55-56, lines 1-15, Tony Blair, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-28-May-2012.pdf, Mr Mullin is diarising a conversation he had with Mr Blair on 17 November 1994. The direct speech is Mr Blair's p107, line 3, David Cameron, ibid p30, lines 7-11, David Mellor MP, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-26-June-2012.pdf p37, ibid pp33-34, paras 5.74-5.79, ibid pp1-2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Lord-Wakeham-Letter-to-Inquiry.pdf p116, lines 13-22, Lord Black, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-July-2012.pdf p4, para 5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lord-Black-of-Brentwood-Annex-D1.pdf p81, ibid p1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Exhibit-to-Submission-by-Professor-John- Horgan-Irish-Press-Ombudsman.pdf s3 Communications Act 2003 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/3 Part H, Chapter 5, paras 2.93-2.94 [2002] EWCA Civ 274 at para 5
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
Mr Dacre described the pressure within the newsroom to carry the same stories as other papers.
"[T]his was the most extraordinary story. There have only been two or three in my lifetime. You could actually see, when you got the circulation reports of other newspapers that week, people putting the McCanns on the front pages, their circulations went up. I remember the rows and recrimination in our offices that we weren't carrying these stories. Well, in retrospect, I'm glad we didn't carry those stories."56
¶2.74 The Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP, characterised the combined effect of some of these factors
as amounting to or creating a 'race to the bottom in standards'.57 No doubt he was deploying all his rhetorical skills to make his point, but putting the same point another way and certainly somewhat less aggressively, it must be accepted that there is not a race to the top. The combined effect of the predominance of commercial considerations, the lack of clear ethical direction from the top, the subordination of ethical considerations to legal risk, and the element of moral relativism involved in seeking to justify one's own conduct with reference to what others were doing at the same time, gives rise to the strong suspicion that ethical practice was not always given the central position it deserved within the culture of a significant section of the press.
¶2.75 Aside from the issue of leadership, that of internal governance also falls to be addressed.
The point has already been made that governance within newspapers has a tendency to be informal and personality based. Given the nature of this type of business, much will always depend on the personal qualities of those at the top of the organisation, and it is understood F that proprietors in search of profit in a declining market will naturally enough be tending to focus on the commercial and charismatic qualities of their editors, in particular on their ability to enhance the saleability of their product. That said, it is clear from some of the evidence received by the Inquiry from those in senior editorial and management positions that a high value is placed on the maintenance of ethical standards in certain sections of the press, and on that basis there is no reason why this level of practice should not be capable of being replicated across the board.
¶2.76 Proper internal governance also involves the creation and implementation of systems of
standards, training, supervision, audit and review. In most titles the evidence pointed to the existence of systems which may fairly be described as informal and cursory. Many editors have informed the Inquiry that in a fast-moving news and current affairs environment it would be quite unrealistic to expect anything more formal, still less the imposition of systems which would entail undue bureaucracy and sclerotic decision making. I am not proposing this sort of regime because I too understand the practical realities as well as the obvious risk that going too far would be counter-productive. Nonetheless, it is clear to me that more could and should be done to ensure that potentially problematic cases are addressed in a more structured manner with key decisions recorded, with short reasons given, in order both to improve the decision making process and enhance accountability.
¶2.77 I have already made the point that much of the content of newspapers is uncontroversial in the sense that it does not create significant legal and ethical risks. I also fully understand and
736¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
appreciate that the majority of celebrity reporting is based on information provided directly by the individuals themselves, or by their agents. However, experienced editors, sub-editors and lawyers must develop an accurate sense of which stories are likely to test the boundaries of legal and ethical reporting, and, in any event, systems should be in place to assess risk in these respects. For example, the 'big' stories which attracted a significant proportion of the time and attention of this Inquiry quite obviously fell in that category even before they ever saw the light of day; and the same applies, albeit to a lesser extent, to many of the smaller stories which the Inquiry has examined.
¶2.78 Equally, and in this regard it is appropriate to speak very generally, stories which appear to
have been obtained by surreptitious means are likely to attract greater risk. I believe that had more time been taken in these instances for discussion about both the legal and ethical risks, and the quality and reliability of the sources, with that discussion noted contemporaneously for review and audit after the event, it is probable that far fewer of these objectionable stories would ever have been published. Furthermore, the implementation of systems which require a greater element of formality and accountability is likely to lead in the longer-term to the fostering of a culture which is both more risk averse and more respectful of the legitimate private rights of individuals.
¶2.79 Finally, I would also like to add a word on journalism training. I have not sought to look at
the adequacy of the training available to, or provided to, journalists. However, a number of professors of journalism have given evidence to the Inquiry and it is apparent from their evidence that the schools of journalism are committed to offering high quality training in which ethical journalism plays a full part. Largely as a result of the financial pressures on
¶F parts of the press, journalism training is increasingly moving away from newsrooms and into
the universities. There is also an important role for ongoing in house training, including in relation to new laws and ethical or compliance issues that are highlighted by particular cases. A number of titles have told the Inquiry that they work with the PCC to deliver training on specific issues as appropriate. It is clearly important that the industry generally, and employers in particular, should place a high priority on training to ensure, inter alia, that all journalists understand the legal and ethical context within which they work.
- The relevance of the internet
¶3.1 Many editors and commentators have argued that the burgeoning of the internet is likely to
render irrelevant much of the work of the Inquiry even assuming that it has not already done so. If, for example, celebrity X's privacy is violated online, then the metaphorical cat is well out of the bag, and there is no reason why open season should not exist in the printed media. A clear exemplification of that argument is the justification used by The Sun in relation to the Prince Harry photographs, discussed in Chapter 5.
¶3.2 In my view, this argument is flawed for two reasons. Putting to one side publications such as
737the Mail Online which bind themselves voluntarily to the Editors' Code of Practice (and which is legitimately proud of the world-wide on line readership that it has built up), the internet does not claim to operate by any particular ethical standards, still less high ones. Some have called it a 'wild west' but I would prefer to use the term 'ethical vacuum'. This is not to say for one moment that everything on the internet is therefore unethical. That would be a gross mischaracterisation of the work of very many bloggers and websites which should rightly and fairly be characterised as valuable and professional. The point I am making is a more modest one, namely that the internet does not claim to operate by express ethical standards, so that bloggers and others may, if they choose, act with impunity.
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
¶3.3 The press, on the other hand, does claim to operate by and adhere to an ethical code of
conduct. Publishers of newspapers will be (or, at least, are far more likely to be) far more heavily resourced than most, if not all, bloggers and websites that report news (as opposed to search engines that direct those on line to different sites). Newspapers, through whichever medium they are delivered, purport to offer a quality product in all senses of that term. Although in the light of the events leading to the setting up of this Inquiry and the evidence I have heard, the public is entitled to be sceptical about the true quality of parts of that product in certain sections of the press, the premise on which newspapers operate remains constant: that the Code will be adhered to, that within the bounds of natural human error printed facts whether in newsprint or online will be accurate, and that individual rights will be respected. In contrast, the internet does not function on this basis at all. People will not assume that what they read on the internet is trustworthy or that it carries any particular assurance or accuracy; it need be no more than one person's view. There is none of the notional imprimatur or kitemark which comes from being the publisher of a respected broadsheet or, in its different style, an equally respected mass circulation tabloid.
¶3.4 The second reason largely flows from the first. There is a qualitative difference between
photographs being available online and being displayed, or blazoned, on the front page of a newspaper such as The Sun. The fact of publication in a mass circulation newspaper multiplies and magnifies the intrusion, not simply because more people will be viewing the images, but also because more people will be talking about them. Thus, the fact of publication inflates the apparent newsworthiness of the photographs by placing them more firmly within the public domain and at the top of the news agenda. As Professor Baroness Onora O'Neill made clear58, it is important: F "to recognise the extent to which exposure to media content is unchosen – particularly by children, those in institutional settings, and those in public places. Regulation should have regard to the realities of media penetration rather than assuming that it always reflects consumer choices."
¶3.5 Ultimately, this is most decidedly not a debate about free speech. A newspaper's right
to publish what it chooses within the general law (whether or not it complies with the Editors' Code) is not in question, although within a more robust regulatory framework the consequences of a breach of the Code, publication having occurred, might well be such as to have a deterrent effect. To turn this into a debate about free speech both misses the point and is in danger of creating the sort of moral relativism which has already been remarked on. This is, or at least should be, a debate about freedom with responsibility, and about an ethical press not doing something which it is technically quite able to do but decides not to do. This freedom (and where the editors choose to draw the line whether rightly or otherwise) was neatly encapsulated by the decisions taken in relation to Prince Harry and the Duchess of Cambridge.
- The press response to this Inquiry 4.1 Our free press has been and is entitled to comment as it chooses on the work of this Inquiry,
738and although I am equally entitled to exercise my own right of free speech, I am firmly of the view that it is not for me to reflect any commentary back onto the press. However, it is right that I make an observation on one matter.
¶PART F | The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: the Press and the Public
¶4.2 The publicist, Max Clifford was asked to comment on the effect, if any, that the Inquiry and the general public mood were having on the current work of the press. He said this:59
"Q. Do you have any feel for what's going on at the moment? Has the scandal which broke last summer had a chilling effect on the types of methods which are being used now to obtain stories? A. I mean hopefully yes, I mean, it's frightened people and made them stop those kind of things, which is what I believe and sincerely hope, but also the effect of this Inquiry, I think, has frightened editors, so, you know, for example, in recent months there's several major stories which would have dominated the headlines that I'm aware of which haven't come out. Q. I don't want you on that topic to say anything which would invade any individual's privacy, but can you give us some idea of what exactly it is which is holding editors back from publishing the sort of story you have just mentioned? A. Well, I think it's a backlash. It's a public backlash. I mean, what really got the British public angry was Milly Dowler and the McCanns, wasn't it? People like that. You know, stars having their phones tapped, people like myself that are successful, wealthy, have done very, very well out of the media or films, television, so what, those people don't care, they have far more important things to worry about. But when they read and heard about Milly Dowler, when they read and press. It's the best chance anybody's got, otherwise we're like Chinese and Russians and just slaves to the system. But are they savage? Can they be savage? Absolutely right. Of course
¶F some of the most successful papers are the most savage because an awful lot of people would much rather read nasty things about other people than nice things."
¶4.3 I have no hesitation in accepting the way in which Mr Clifford characterises the present
position. He gave his evidence in a forthright manner and had no reason or motive to mislead the Inquiry. I do not interpret his evidence as suggesting that press conduct has been exemplary since July 2011, and that in any event would not accord with my own experience: indeed, three of the case studies as discussed earlier,60 post date the commencement of this Inquiry, and, whatever view might be taken of these stories, indicate that the chilling effect of the Inquiry (if it exists at all) is limited.
¶4.4 If, as appears likely, the press, or certain sections of the press, have exercised a substantial
739measure of self-restraint for the reasons explained by Mr Clifford or otherwise, I do have to ask myself what will happen after this Report has been published and memories begin to fade. I have little hesitation in concluding that, unless something is done about it, the press would fairly speedily revert to type: in other words, it would start printing the sort of stories to which Max Clifford has alluded. It is not difficult to come to such a conclusion given the history of self-regulation of the press, and the lessons to be derived from that. Part D Chapter 1 of the Report recalled the cyclical nature of press self-regulation. In the aftermath of the three Royal Commissions, the Younger Report, Sir David Calcutt QC's two reports, and the death of Princess Diana, the press has shown signs of reform and signs of self-improvement only to regress in the years that follow, prompting the need for a further Royal Commission, public inquiry or similar. The fact is that many of the root causes of the problems in the culture practices and ethics of the press (in particular, commercial pressures in a declining market-
¶Chapter 7 | Conclusion
place) endure, and, to be blunt, a fairly basic understanding of human nature suggests that the problems identified are unlikely to be eliminated by self-control.
¶4.5 This is not to be interpreted as an altogether pessimistic message. There are many who argue
that it would be a mistake to swim against the tide of human nature. That viewpoint may or may not be correct in other contexts, but in my view it does not apply in the present. A laissez faire approach would carry with it a pessimistic message, but that is both negative and unrealistic. The real problem which I believe exists within the culture, practices and ethics of the press justifies, if not demands, a more robust system of independent press regulation which is capable of addressing that problem head on.
¶4.6 Not merely would such a system have the obvious benefit of meeting the immediate needs of
those who have suffered at the hands of the press, it would also bring about, incrementally and over the course of time, lasting change within the culture, practices and ethics of the press to a point when it would no longer be appropriate to speak of practices which are cultural. Instead, we would have arrived at a state of affairs in which any failings or lapses would indeed be isolated and straightforward examples of frank human error or, as one press core participant has put it, 'unadorned errors of judgment' which would not be evidence of a sub standard culture or practices.
¶4.7 Putting to one side the current investigations, the clearest message which comes out of the
entirety of this lengthy part of the Report addressing the culture, practices and ethics of the press overall is that, time and time again, there have been serious and uncorrected failures within parts of the national press that may have stretched from the criminal to the indefensibly unethical, from passing off fiction as fact to paying lip service to accuracy. In doing so, far F from holding power to account, in these regards the press is exercising unaccountable power which nobody holds to account. In my view, the maintenance of the status quo is simply not an option; the need for change in internal but most importantly in external regulation has been powerfully identified.
¶4.8 There is a corollary point which I also wish to emphasise. Lord Black told the Inquiry that in
his view the phone hacking scandal by itself was '[i]n terms of the architecture of the system... the most obvious example of why urgent reform of the system is needed'.61 Lord Black did not provide any further examples justifying the need for urgent reform, but the lengthy pages of this Part of the Report most certainly do. It has not been my purpose or endeavour to apportion blame but it has been necessary to set out the substantial, if not overwhelming, weight of evidence which not merely justifies but requires regulatory form in a manner which meets public expectations and the public interest. In my view the case for such reform has been proven many times over.
¶4.9 Having made this fundamental point strongly as I am able, I return to what I said at the very
start of Part F of the Report. I recognise the constitutional important of free speech within the context of a responsible press, and I also recognise that most of what the press does is good journalism free from the sort of vices I have had to address at length. No one reading this Report in full should come away with the impression that the press as an industry is shot to pieces. It is not; but at the same time as acknowledging that, I also state and repeat that what has come out of the investigation that this Chapter of the Report summarises demonstrates that it is essential that the need for a fresh start in press regulation is fully embraced, and a new regime thereafter implemented.
¶Chapter 1 | Policing with Consent: The role of the press parT G
¶The Press and the Police: the Relationship
¶G
743Chapter 1 Policing with Consent: The Role of the Press
- Introduction 1.1 The issues addressed in this Part of the Report, driven largely by understandable public concern, were expressed succinctly by Robert Jay QC in opening Module Two of the Inquiry:1
"Public concern hereabouts may be expressed in just one sentence: the relationship between the police and the media, and News International in particular, was, at best, inappropriately close and if not actually corrupt, very close to it. Furthermore, the nature of this relationship may explain why the police did not properly investigate phone hacking in 2006 and subsequently in 2009 and 2010, preferring to finesse the issue on these later occasions by less than frank public statements."
¶1.2 In seeking to address these key questions, the Inquiry's Terms of Reference require an
examination of the relationship between the press and the police, a review of the extent to which the current policy, practices and regulatory framework has failed, and a consideration of any recommendations as to the future conduct of relations between the police and the press.
¶1.3 Although this requires the Inquiry to consider the conduct of the police, that scrutiny only
applies to the extent that that conduct meshes with the relationship between the police and the press, rather than more generally. The primary focus of the gathering of evidence has been directed towards possible recommendations for the future; inevitably, that has involved a reflective and analytical investigation of the past which identifies areas of practice which can be subject to critical appraisal. G
¶1.4 During Module Two, the Inquiry heard oral evidence from 93 witnesses.36 p111, lines 12-22, Professor Christpher Megone, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf ibid, p14 pp57-58, lines 13-13; p59, lines 1-16, Mark Thompson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-23-January-2012.pdf http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/other/media-ownership-research/rulesreview ibid, pp235-236 p61, lines 9-14, Baroness Buscombe, ibid pp19-20, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Exhibit-RJT-49.pdf p21, lines 8-23, Philip Williams, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-29-February-2012.pdf; http://www.newscorp.com/news/news_499.html Decision of the Information Tribunal Case Reference numbers: EA/2007/0060, EA/2007/0061, EA/2007/0062, EA/2007/0063, EA/2007/0122, EA/2007/0123, EA/2007/0131 available on http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. uk/20110206200309 /http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/Public/search.aspx?Page=27 Part F, Chapter 2 p9, para 4.19, Michelle Stanistreet, ibid pp88-89, Richard Desmond, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf pp5-6, para 21-23, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Steve- Coogan3.pdf p37, lines 1-22, Dawn Neesom, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf p101, Iines 13-14, DCI Philip Jones, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-27-March-2012.pdf p10, lines 10-24, Sir Paul Stephenson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-5-March-2012.pdf; p8, para 23, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ Witness-Statement-of-Sir-Paul-Stephenson2.pdf p9, para 24, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Stearns.pdf http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RJT-Exhibit-512.pdf p83, lines 18-25, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of-morning-Hearing-9- December-2011.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/13 p7, para 4.5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Alexander- Owens1.pdf pp4-5, ibid p5, para 7, ibid pp54-55, lines 19-19, George Osborne, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-11-June-2012.pdf p18, ibid p27, Dr Vince Cable, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-30-May-2012.pdf p64, lines 4-19, ibid pp 35-36, ibid pp40-41, para 5.119, ibid See R v. FB, R v. AB, R v. JC [2010] EWCA Crim 1857 and the cases therein cited and R v. SH [2010] EWCA Crim 1931 McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 QB p59, lines 1-5, Lord Hunt, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Afternoon- Hearing-31-January-2012.pdf see para 3.14 for an explanation of the appointments process for the first Board K pp34-36, lines 24-1, Lord Black, ibid pp13-14, paras 39-40, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Lord-Hunt- of-Wirral.pdf p92, lines 1-17, Professor John Horgan, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-13-July-20121.pdf p40, lines 5-9, Evgeny Lebedev, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-23-April-2012.pdf Part K, Chapter 4, para 5.41 Paragraph 34 of these were
744serving or former police officers, including the current Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and 11 Chief Constables. Evidence was also taken from 25 journalists. Much of the evidence has testified and paid tribute to the high standards maintained and hard work carried out by the Police Service, often in very challenging circumstances. There has been real support for the positive aspects of the relationship between the police and the press and the way in which they can work together (for example in relation to appeals for witnesses). However, the Inquiry has also heard evidence which leads me to conclude that the relationship is in need of recalibration. Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Commissioner of the MPS, conceded on arriving to the role in September 2011 that "…it is right to observe that those relations [that is to say, the relationship between the MPS and the media] were in neither a normal nor an entirely healthy state…".2 Furthermore, the Commissioner went on:3 "I recognise that there is a need to review and improve our relationship with the media. It seems clear from recent events relating to phone hacking…that the
¶PART G | The Press and the Police: the Relationship
boundaries between the MPS and the media need to be reconsidered and reset. However, I would not wish to return to a police service which is perceived as secretive and unaccountable by the public and considered unprofessional by the media."
¶1.5 The stark suggestion that the original police phone hacking investigation in 2006, Operation
Caryatid, was curtailed because of pressure from News International is covered in detail in Part E, Chapter 4 of this Report. In reaching conclusions and considering recommendations for the future in this part of the Inquiry, I have considered and examined the different potential manifestations of the arguably over-cosy relationship between the police and the press, both through the detailed example of Operation Caryatid and the experiences of the day-to-day relationships that we have heard about from both the press and the police; it is only through this process that the exact nature of the underlying problem might be ascertained. Mr Jay provided a summary of these manifestations, in no particular order, in his opening submission to Module Two:4
"First, the acceptance and conferring of inappropriate hospitality. The risks here are self-evident. Secondly, the giving and receiving of 'off the record' briefings. Again, the risks here are pretty much self-explanatory, but apart from the obvious lack of transparency the person doing the briefing will often have an agenda and each party will be hoping for, if not expecting, future favours. Thirdly, the kindred problem of 'leaks', putting to one side genuine whistle-blowing. Fourthly, the equally associated problem of the attribution by the Press of 'police sources' to stories. This is a term which is redolent of impropriety, or at the very least carries with it the possibility of inappropriate behaviour, either because the police officer has indulged in gossip or leaks, or because the term is in truth a cipher or fig- leaf for an invented story because the source does not in fact exist. It should also be recognised…that the so-called 'police source' may not be a police officer but someone
¶G associated with the Police but from outside the MPS.
Fifthly, the Press turning up at incidents, or at newsworthy occasions, because they have been tipped off by a Police officer. Again, this is indicative of an unhealthy relationship existing between individual police officers and individual members of the press…"
¶1.6 These five potential features or manifestations of what may be an underlying problem in the
745relationship between the police and the press are not intended to be an exhaustive list of the issues that are considered in this part of the Report. It is also important to emphasise that some of these issues have also been dealt with or touched on in the recent reports of Sir Denis O'Connor (then HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary)5 and Mrs Elizabeth Filkin (reviewing the position at the MPS).6 I have been much assisted by their work, which is covered in more detail in Chapter Three below.
¶Chapter 1 | Policing with Consent: The role of the press
- The purpose of the relationship and public confidence 2.1 The relationship between the press and the police, and between the press and the public, is a keystone in the foundation of a democracy and an effective criminal justice system.
¶2.2 The approach to policing in this country can be explained as 'policing by consent'. Commissioner
Hogan-Howe described this concept as meaning policing with, and on behalf of, the public. It is axiomatic therefore that public confidence in the police is a key element in sustaining this model. Commissioner Hogan-Howe stressed in his evidence to the Inquiry that the public have been, and must continue to be, partners in preventing and solving crime, and that this is most effectively achieved through the conduit of the media which enables witnesses to come forward and provide evidence. It can also be said that an effective and professional relationship with the media can often prevent an operation being jeopardised. Agreements can be reached between the media and police officers that the former will not run a particular story until such time as it is operationally safe to do so; it is argued, with real force, that this is a vital part of the relationship. Similarly, victims can be protected in cases such as kidnapping and murder, where the running of news stories prematurely could either prevent the release of the victim or the apprehension of the suspect.7
¶2.3 Cressida Dick, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations in the MPS, expanded on this point:8
"…It's very important that the public understand policing as much as they can, and also that they hold us to account, and they can only do that by knowing about policing. We need the public to help us in a variety of ways. Obviously we need information about crimes that have happened, but also we need people to have confidence in the police and in the whole system, so that they will give us intelligence or give us evidence, be witnesses, provide observation posts…"
¶2.4 In his evidence, Sir Denis O'Connor described the importance of public opinion "…it's another G
anchor point…in police legitimacy…with a measure of public sentiment, anything is possible. Without it, progress is very difficult…"9 http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/people/assessors/sir-paul-scott-lee/ s1(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 Observer and Guardian v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153, para 59 See, for example, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006; European Union Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. p19, lines 10-25, Professor Tasioulas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf ibid pp5-6, lines 23-4, Mark Thompson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-23-January-2012.pdf; p2, para 4, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ Witness-Statement-of-Lord-Patten1.pdf. http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_ govern/charter.pdf Part I, Chapter 8 O'Malley, T and C Soley, Op cit, p55 Described as 'the Chair' throughout the Report p48, lines 6-15, DCI Gilmour, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-9-May-2012.pdf p18-19, lines 16-25, Alexander Owens, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-30-November-2011.pdf p24, para 58, ibid http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-DAC-Sue-Akers.pdf; passim pp54-55, lines 12-7, Dominic Mohan, ibid Part E, Chapter 5 p10, lines 12-16, James Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-24-April-2012.pdf p19, lines 14-21, Sally Dowler, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-21-November-2011.pdf pp22-24, lines 17-20, Charlotte Church, ibid p115, lines 9-13, Hugh Whittow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf p7, Iines 5-8, Sir Denis O'Connor, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-12-March-2012.pdf pp26-27, lines 24-3, Lord Condon, ibid p71, lines 17-23, James Murray, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-19-March-20121.pdf The ACPO 'Advisory Group 2010 Guidance' http://www.acpo.presscentre.com/imagelibrary/downloadMedia. ashx?MediaDetailsID=238, referred to at paragraph 2.23, Part G, Chapter 3 above p33, line 13, Alexander Owens, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-5-December-2011.pdf p37, lines 23-24, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf Q1843 and Q1859, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcumeds/362/9090208.htm http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/13 pp1-4, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Exhibit-RJT231.pdf Part H, Chapter 5, para 1.107 p10, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-statement-of-Andrew-Neil.pdf p2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-Harriet-Harman-QC-MP. pdf p30, para 94, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-David- Cameron-MP.pdf pp16-17, ibid in the case of News Corp, a global media company which owns British national newspapers through News International p3, lines 2-4, ibid p1, para 7, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Aidan-Barclay.pdf p25, para 5.40, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Ofcom-Measuring- Media-Plurality1.pdf Appendix 4 In a speech to the Society of Editors in November 2008 J pp42-45, lines 9-19, Mark Thomson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-24-November-2011.pdf BBC Editorial guidelines, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/page/guidelines-privacy-introduction http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Lord-Black-of-Brentwood1.pdf UKPCA proposal, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Second-submission-from-Mike- Granatt1.pdf K p1, para 7, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Joint-Submission-by-Core-Participant- Victims1.pdf Defamation Act 2009 s26, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf p60, lines 1-25 and p60 lines 1-2, David Cameron, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-14-June-2012.pdf There are definitions of 'newspaper in the 'Newspaper Registration and Libel Act 1881, and in guidance issues by HMRC in respect of VAT; both rely on print publication Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.39 Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.25 [2006] UKHL 55 Further, the HMIC report, 'Without Fear or Favour: A review of police relationships', argues that the police are part of the community they serve and therefore need relationships with it, including with the media, to carry out their role effectively.10
¶2.5 Given that the police operate with the consent of the public, the media also play a key role in
746holding the police to account by providing transparency and challenge. HMIC suggests that the police use the media for a variety of reasons, including to reassure the community they serve, to reduce the fear of crime, and to enhance public confidence in the Police Service. Furthermore, HMIC contends that the overarching principle of police relationships with the media is that the Police Service should not seek to constrain the media but allow them accurately to report news from which the principal beneficiary is the public.
¶PART G | The Press and the Police: the Relationship
¶2.6 Appropriate and transparent contact and communication between the police and the press
is, therefore, crucial to ensure that this accountability is maintained. It might be said that, where relations are poor and there is insufficient engagement, public confidence will suffer. That was certainly the view of Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, the former Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), in his evidence to the Inquiry. He explained, in relation to another key part of the criminal justice system, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), that when he took up the post of DPP "…there had been a long legacy of mutual distrust. I believe the CPS was seen by the media (and by the public) as opaque, remote and unaccountable…".11 Lord Macdonald took the view that this was extremely damaging to the CPS and to public confidence in the criminal justice system more generally. As a result, he initiated a policy of closer engagement between the CPS and the media and argued that this impacted positively on the way that the CPS was portrayed by the media, not because journalists were somehow lulled into reporting on the organisation more favourably, but because it was able to speak to journalists more openly about the positives. More importantly, Lord Macdonald stressed that this openness emphasised the accountability of the CPS as a public service.12
¶2.7 There is, therefore, a clear and overwhelming public interest requirement for the police
to communicate with the public. The police, acting corporately, currently reach the public primarily through the filter of the media.13 For this reason the relationship between the press and the public is also vitally important: this serves to emphasise the significance of the concerns outlined in Part F of the Report. Peter Clarke, formerly Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations in the MPS, sought to describe this interrelationship:14
"…there's an extent to which the police interest and the public interest overlap, but overwhelmingly, the police exist to serve the public interest, so the public interest is obviously paramount."
¶2.8 A close and transparent working relationship between the police and the media is also essential to guaranteeing fair reporting and effective policing. As the MPS argued in its G opening statement to the Inquiry:15
"Properly structured, such a relationship improves the scope, depth and accuracy of press reporting and enables the police better to perform their duty of protecting the public. It is through healthy and open contact with the police that the media are able properly to report on the criminal justice system. It is through contact with an honest and intelligent press that the police are able to engage and inform the public – not just with a view to solving crime but also as a means of warning and protecting the public where necessary."
¶2.9 Commissioner Hogan-Howe identified five areas in which keeping the media properly
747informed about policing and criminal matters was critical to the functioning of the MPS (and, presumably, to the functioning of the Police Service more generally). First, through the media, the organisation is able to communicate its key messages regarding the prevention and detection of crime. Second, a healthy relationship with the media can serve to increase the public's understanding of how the MPS goes about its work of policing London. Third,
¶Chapter 1 | Policing with Consent: The role of the press
the relationship provides an important means by which the MPS can seek the assistance of the public in that work. Fourth, contact with the media, properly handled, serves to increase public confidence in the police and to promote a greater understanding of MPS policies and initiatives. Fifth, it provides the means by which the public can scrutinise police actions and policies. It also allows the police to test the persuasiveness of their strategies, policies and tactics. It is suggested that a plan that can withstand a searching press conference is usually at least credible.16
¶2.10 The importance of the relationship was echoed in the evidence throughout this part of the
Inquiry by police and press alike. By way of example, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Lord Condon told the Inquiry how strong relations with the media were "…essential and in the public interest."17 http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Key-Questions-Module-2.pdf p8, para 24-25, http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/linkedfiles/baha_mousa/key_documents/rulings/ standardofproofruling7may2010.pdf p66, lines 1-12, Dr Rowan Cruft, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf p4, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Professor-Christopher- Megone.pdf pp66-67, line 25-6, Professor Baroness Onora O'Neil, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf p85, lines 10-15, Richard Peppiatt, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-29-November-2011.pdf ibid Article 5 of the Royal Charter, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/charter. pdf p4, para 7, ibid O'Malley, T and C Soley, Op cit, p58 p85, para 190, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Stephen- Abell.pdf p2, para 6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Second-Witness-Statement-of- Richard-Thomas-CBE1.pdf; p2, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RJT- Exhibit-47.pdf pp34-35, para 66, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Witness-Statement-of-Peter- Clarke.pdf pp5-8, paras 19-27, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Third-Witness-Statement-of- DAC- Sue-Akers.pdf; p5, para 15, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness- Statement-of-DAC-Sue-Akers.pdf pp56-57 passim, Helen Belcher, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-8-February-2012.pdf February 2012, and various articles and dates thereafter p41, lines 6-8, Paul McMullan, ibid p14, lines 7-13, Gerry McCann, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-23-November-2011.pdf pp49-54, lines 1-12, JK Rowling, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-24-November-20112.pdf; p7, para 19-22, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-JK-Rowling2.pdf p14, line 20, John Witherow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-17-January-2012.pdf; p9, para 33, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-John-Witherow.pdf p24, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Witness-Statement-of-Lord-Condon.pdf p12, para 34, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Witness-Statement-of-Lord-Stevens. pdf p2, para 6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Witness-Statement-of-Michael-Sullivan. pdf Interim ACPO Guidance for Relationships with the Media, para 10.3, http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/report s/2012/201204IntGuiMediaRels.pdf pp1-2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fifth-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Thomas-CBE.pdf p70, lines 21-22, Richard Thomas, ibid pp40-41, lines 23-1, Christopher Graham, ibid p17, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Philip-Coppel-QC-redacted. pdf pp45-47, lines 25-3, Francis Aldhouse, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-5-December-2011.pdf Part H, Chapter 5, para 2.108 Part I, Chapter 5 p23, lines 2-7, Jack Straw, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-16-May-2012.pdf p47, lines 7-13, David Cameron, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-14-June-2012.pdf pp2-3, Rupert Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KRM-91.pdf pp70-71, lines 23-20, James Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-24-April-2012.pdf pp26-27, lines 13-3, ibid p16, lines 21-25, ibid pp1-3, paras 1-8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Claire-Enders- Enders-Analysis.pdf For example, the majority of organisations operating as financial services markets, exchanges and firms which are regulated by the Financial Services Authority, and firms defined as the regulated sector under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 commonly have compliance departments Numerous examples were provided by the evidence both of victims and solicitors acting in these cases: p10, J lines 2-11, Sally Dowler, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-21-November-2011.pdf; p39, line 15, Christopher Jefferies, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-28-November-2011.pdf; pp92-97, lines 21-5, Mark Lewis, http:// www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-23-November-20111. pdf; p44, line 20, Gerry McCann, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-23-November-2011.pdf; para 39: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ Submission-on-behalf-of-Neil-Morrissey.pdf. In addition, when making submissions to Lord Justice Jackson, almost all claimant firms placed great importance on the role of CFAs in offering non-wealthy claimants access to justice p17, para 103, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Gerald- Patrick-McCann.pdf p1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Further-Submission-from-Professor- Christopher-Megone.pdf paras 3.9-3.14 below K p1, ibid p2, para 7, point 3, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Joint-Submission-by-Core- Participant-Victims1.pdf http://www.presscouncil.ie/about-the-press-council.77.html http://www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/norway/ p9, Speech by Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales 19/10/2011 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/ Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj-speech-annual-justice-lecture-2011.pdf Part K, Chapter 4, para 16.4 Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.40 See Applications 8384/78, 8406/78, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeck v Netherlands 18 DR 187 (1979), EcomHR (racist literature); Application 9325/81, X v Federal Republic of Germany 29 DR 194 (1982), EcomHR (Nazi leaflets); They enabled him to give confidential briefings to the press on sensitive issues such as terrorism, preventing potential leaks that would have damaged police investigations.18 Similarly, Assistant Commissioner Dick described the relationship as: "…crucial and important…".19 In addition, many crimes were solved as a direct result of assistance from the media who communicate with the public at large.20
¶2.11 As a counterpoint to this relationship, Sandra Laville, crime correspondent for the Guardian,
argued, I have no doubt correctly, that journalism had a legitimate and proper role in a democratic society to interrogate, challenge and question in the public interest or, in other words, to be the peoples' eyes and ears.21 Mrs Filkin, in her evidence to the Inquiry, agreed with this contention and reiterated the importance of the police maintaining a strong working relationship with the media given the coercive powers afforded to policing.22 Mrs Filkin argued therefore that the police should actively protect proper scrutiny of their work:23
"…the police have very, very extensive powers, and those powers, for the rest of us, need to be under constant scrutiny, to make sure they haven't overstepped their mark in the powers that they have and they've operated those powers properly. Obviously, they have to do that themselves as well, but we need outside agencies who constantly also scrutinise what these very powerful organisations do, and the G media is important for doing that. And I would hope that as an important public institution, the police would also see that they had a role in protecting that scrutiny, that that scrutiny was valuable to them in helping them do their job properly…"
¶2.12 It is clear that the MPS faces its own challenges in ensuring that the public are informed
748about the work of its officers and staff and the organisation as a whole. Mr Tim Godwin, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the MPS, observed that from 2000/2001 the media focus appeared to shift towards individuals, predominately to senior police officers.24 This, he said, replicated the rise of the "celebrity police chief" in the USA where individuals were credited with significant crime reduction in particular cities. Mr Godwin said of this media approach:25
¶PART G | The Press and the Police: the Relationship
"…I thought that that actually undermined the efforts of lots and lots of people who were doing great things and that generally an individual wasn't in themselves able to bring about things like crime reduction in a city like London."
- Tensions in the relationship between the media and the police
¶3.1 Dr Rob Mawby, lecturer in criminology at the University of Leicester, suggested that tension
was endemic to the police-media relationship. Dr Mawby argued that this was understandable given that the media and the police occupied roles in public life that periodically brought them into conflict.26 As to the root of this tension, Dr Mawby offered this view:27
"The root of the tension is the different roles and objectives of the police and the media. The police are in place to detect crime, to maintain order. The media are there to maximise their audiences, to run successful businesses, and also to hold the police to account. So although they have things in common, there's always going to be a bit of tension in that relationship, which will ebb and flow."
¶3.2 On this point, Ed Stearns, Chief Press Officer in the Directorate of Public Affairs within the
¶MPS, observed:28
"…the media will want to know everything, and there are reasons why the police, operationally or for personal – in terms of victims, well, I can't give them everything. So there is a tension and I think it's something that has probably been around for many years."
¶3.3 Dr Mawby went on to suggest that this inbuilt tension in the relationship between the press and the police may actually be in the public interest, "…as long as that tension operates within G a healthy framework, where the police are trying to be open and accountable and the media are trying to hold them to account and where there's clear channels to pass information."29 p10 line 15 et seq, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing- 14-November-2011.pdf, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Afternoon- Hearing-14-November-2011.pdf; http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-15-November-2011.pdf; http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-15-November-2011.pdf; http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-15-November-2011.pdf; http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-16-November-2011.pdf Part J Chapter 2 p5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Professor-Christopher- Megone.pdf p10, lines 12-16, James Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-24-April-2012.pdf ibid p15, para 40, ibid Snoddy, R, Op cit, p88 p61, lines 2-8, Baroness Buscombe, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-7-February-2012.pdf p99, lines 1-10, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf p18, para 24, ibid p10, para 28, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-DAC- Sue-Akers.pdf p4, Matthew Parris, The Times, (23 May 2009, London) p73, lines 6-15, Anne Diamond, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-28-November-20111.pdf p3, Matt Driscoll, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing- 19-December-2011.pdf p62, lines 16-22, David Pilditch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-21-December-20111.pdf pp69-70, lines 15-3, JK Rowling, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-24-November-20112.pdf pp47-49, lines 1-7,Richard Wallace, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-16-January-2012.pdf; p7, para 27, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Dominic-Mohan.pdf; p5, para 11, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Dawn-Neesom.pdf; p3, paras 12-13 and p6, para 22, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-John-Witherow.pdf p82, lines 6-10, Dr Rob Mawby, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/lev030412am.pdf p27, line 2, Stephen Wright, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-15-March-20121.pdf pp7-8, para 40, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Witness-Statement-of-Sean-ONeill. pdf Part G Chapter 3 pp14-15, Richard Thomas, ibid p53, lines 5-12, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf pp43-44, lines 16-7, Philip Coppel, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-17-July-2012.pdf Part F, Chapter 6 p5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Second-Witness-Statement-of-Alastair- Campbell.pdf p41, lines 17-19, Tony Blair, ibid p110, lines 17-21, David Cameron, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-14-June-2012.pdf p6, ibid pp94-96, lines 1-7, Alex Salmond, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-13-June-2012.pdf Part I Chapter 6 above pp14-15, paras 71-72, Jeremy Hunt http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/JH-Witness- statment-MOD300005597.pdf http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/guidance_for_prosecutors_on_assessing_the_public_interest_in_cases_ affecting_the_media_/ Where the Court of Appeal had power to order a new trial on the ground that damages awarded by a jury were excessive or inadequate, this provision allowed the Court "to substitute for the sum awarded by the jury such sum as appears to the court to be proper" p511, para 110, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Stephen- Abell.pdf http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Tim-Suter-of-Perspective- Associates.pdf; http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Sumission-from-Jeremy-Hunt-MP.pdf pp23-24, para 37, ibid p5, para 11, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lord-Black-of-Brentwood-Annex-B1. pdf pp11-12, lines 20-3, Lord Black, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-July-2012.pdf; pp13-14, para 2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ Submission-by-Lord-Black-of-Brentwood1.pdf K p82, lines 12-22, Nick Clegg, ibid Part K, Chapter 7, para 6.5 Application 22824/04, [2008] ECHR 746 at para 26
¶3.4 This inherent tension sometimes leads to discontent on the part of the media that they are
not receiving all the information they want, and concerns on the part of the police that the activities of the media may interfere with operational policing. In relation to the first point, for example, Adrian Faber, Editor of the Wolverhampton Express & Star, complained that there were often delays in the release of the names of people killed in road accidents or other incidents. Mr Faber fully accepted the need for the police to inform relatives before the details were released, but suggested that the release of the names of the deceased could take several days, by which time the information became journalistically worthless as it had already appeared in the social media as well as being known in the general community.30
¶3.5 In relation to the second point, the evidence the Inquiry has heard indicates that, particularly
749when high profile incidents catch the attention of the public and the media alike, the level of press interest can be enormous and, furthermore, that this can impact on police investigations.
¶Chapter 1 | Policing with Consent: The role of the press
¶3.6 Tensions in the relationship can also be caused by the individual needs of the different sections
of the media. Lucy Panton, former crime editor of the News of the World, for example, said that as the 'Sunday' representative for the Crime Reporters Association (CRA) she had spent "years trying to better the police's understanding on what Sunday newspapers needed from them. It has always been the case that police briefings are directed at meeting the needs of daily papers. I used these meetings to try and inform and change the way police used the Sunday papers."31 p62, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-10-May-2012.pdf The fact that occasional attempts have been made to introduce private Member's Bills (none of which have progressed) is hardly sufficient p2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Dr-Rowan-Cruft.pdf Snoddy, R, The Good, the Bad, and the Unacceptable: The hard news about the British press, p124 Section 6 of the BBC Editorial Guidelines, http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/page/guidelines-fairness-right- of-reply// p16, para 42, ibid ibid, p71 p17, paras 2-11, Sir Christopher Meyer, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript- of-Afternoon-Hearing-31-January-2012.pdf p109, lines 1-9, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf pp23-24, lines 21-1, Keith Surtees, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-29-February-2012.pdf p10, para 28, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-DAC- Sue-Akers.pdf) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7233560.stm p14, lines 15-23, Professor Baroness Hollins, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-2-February-2012.pdf pp52-53, lines 20-3, Matt Driscoll, ibid p20, line 9-17, Peter Hill, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Afternoon- Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf p1, para 2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Steve-Coogan3. pdf p5, paras 33-34, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Nick-Fagge.pdf pp7-8, para 8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Lucy-Panton. pdf p13, lines 2-22, Sir Paul Stephenson http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-5-March-2012.pdf; pp6-7, para 17, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ Witness-Statement-of-Sir-Paul-Stephenson2.pdf p117, lines 6-16, Thomas Pettifor, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-20-March-2012.pdf ibid; MPS 36 – The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/03/MPS-36-The-Police-Conduct-Regulations-2008.pdf; and CCMC 11: Home Office Guidance – Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures (not available on the Inquiry website) p33, lines 15-16, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf pp48-49, lines 19-3, Richard Thomas, ibid page 6-8, ibid p111, lines 7-22, Richard Thomas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-9-December-2011.pdf p10, lines 20-24, Alastair Campbell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-14-May-2012.pdf p43, line 23, Tony Blair, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-28-May-2012.pdf pp9-10, para 39, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Witness-Statement-of-Andy- Coulson.pdf p13, ibid p5, Dr Vince Cable, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Exhibit-VC1-2.pdf. This transaction was the subject of a Competition Commission report, appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal and thereafter to the Court of Appeal pp26-28, lines 13-4, Kenneth Clarke, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-30-May-2012.pdf pp82-83, lines 24-9, Andy Coulson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-10-May-2012.pdf p7, ibid [2002] UKHL 11 [2008] EWHC 1777 QB; Eady J said (at para 214) that "the purpose of damages, therefore, must be to address the specific public policy factors in play when there has been an 'old fashioned breach of confidence' and/or an unauthorised revelation of personal information. It would seem that the law is concerned to protect such matters as personal dignity, autonomy and integrity". He went on (at para 216): "Thus it is reasonable to suppose that damages for such an infringement may include distress, hurt feelings and loss of dignity". p9, para 31, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Second-Witness-Statement-of-Lord- Wakeham.pdf p45, para 94, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-Lord- Black.pdf part K, chapter 2, section 8 p44, lines 1-12, Lord Black, ibid pp17-18, para 58, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Media- Regulation-Round-Table.pdf p59, lines 8-24, Professor John Horgan, ibid para 187, report of Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/ jtselect/jtprivinj/273/273.pdf. This may fall foul of what might be described as an entirely legitimate requirement of the press that any regulation must be independent of politicians (and the Government) whom the press are required to hold to account Part K, Chapter 7, para 6.23 See for example, Application 19983/92, De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium (1998) 25 EHRR 1 at paragraph 39; Application 29183/95, Fressoz & Roire v France (2001) 31 EHRR 2 at paras 54-55; Application 21980/93, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125 at para 65
¶3.7 Jerry Kirkby, Assistant Chief Constable of Surrey Police, explained that following the
disappearance of Milly Dowler, Surrey Police media relations officers described the media demands made upon them as "alien", "a steep learning curve", "just immense", "relentless" and "overwhelming".32 Senior police officers involved in the case described elements of the press as "extremely demanding, and in some respects mischievous", and the level of interest as "unprecedented and immense".33 The unprecedented demands also meant that some parts of the media felt that they were not being given the information that they required, and this led to some tensions.34
¶3.8 This tension in the relationship between the press and the police can also have unwanted
consequences for those caught in the middle of a major investigation. Christopher Jeffries, who was arrested in connection with the murder of Joanna Yeates, described the media interest in him as "enormous". He said that he was effectively under house arrest moving between friends' houses like "a recusant priest."35 p93, lines 3-5, Dr Rowan Cruft, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf Snoddy, R, The Good, the Bad, and the Unacceptable: The hard news about the British press, pp124-128 p12, para 34, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Lord-Patten1. pdf para 2.8, Media Ownership The Government's Proposals, May 1995 ibid, p13 p88, lines 16-17, Baroness Buscombe, ibid pp4-5, para 13, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/First-Witness-Statement-of- Richard-Thomas-CBE.pdf paras 5.3-5.5, provide an exposition of the weight of the terrorism investigations which were over-stretching the resources of S013 and had required Mr Clarke to "borrow" resources not only from other departments within the MPS but other police forces p9, para 6.2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Thomas- Mockridge.pdf; http://www.newscorp.com/news/bunews_452.html#top http://www.cfoi.org.uk/macleanbill.html Part F, Chapter 6 p5, para 2.2, Michelle Stanistreet, ibid p84, lines 18-23, Richard Desmond, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf p4, para 16, ibid p1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of-Richard-Peppiatt.pdf p15, Iines 3-12, Chris Jefferies, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-28-November-2011.pdf p6, para 16, ibid pp50-51, lines 24-5, Ed Stearns, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/lev030412am.pdf p82, lines 14-23, Richard Thomas, ibid pp10-11, para 4.16, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Witness-Statement-of- Alexander-Owens1.pdf p18, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Philip-Coppel-QC-redacted. pdf p13, para 37, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/First-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Thomas-CBE.pdf p2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-Sir-John-Major.pdf p1, para 2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Second-Witness-Statement-of-Alastair- Campbell.pdf p5, para 7.3, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-George- Osborne-MP.pdf p10, ibid p2, Dr Vince Cable, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Exhibit-VC1-2.pdf p54, lines 8-12, ibid p34, Lord O'Donnell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of-Morning- Hearing-14-May-2012.txt p38, para 5.100 ibid p23, line 13, Keir Starmer QC, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-8-February-2012.pdf Douglas v Hello! [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch). The award of Lindsay J was upheld by the Court of Appeal pp7-8, lines 24-2, Sir Christopher Meyer, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript- of-Morning-Hearing-31-January-2012.pdf Part D, Chapter 1 p7, para 15, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Lord-Black-of-Brentwood-Annex-D1. pdf p116, lines 13-22, Lord Black, ibid p19, para 64, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Media-Regulation- Round-Table.pdf p2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Professor-John-Horgan-Irish- Press-Ombudsman.pdf p11, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Witness-Statement-of-Sir-Christopher-Meyer. pdf Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.28 Loc. cit. Referring to the decision of the ECtHR in Application 21980/93, Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125 at para 66 From the police perspective, Detective Chief Inspector Philip Jones described it as "an unrelenting media interest from the point that Joanna was reported missing".36
¶3.9 Dr Gerry McCann said of the media interest following the disappearance of their daughter
Madeleine: "Nothing could have prepared us for the unprecedented media coverage, particularly in Portugal and the UK which followed" and spoke of "the intensity of media focus".37 G
¶3.10 In December 2006, following the discovery of the bodies of five young women in Ipswich over
a ten day period, there was an explosion of press coverage. The Senior Investigation Officer, then Detective Chief Superintendent Stewart Gull, said that:38
750"the level of interest shown by not only the local and regional media but also national and international media was unprecedented".
¶PART G | The Press and the Police: the Relationship
¶He went on:39
"There were at times somewhat I considered to be unhelpful, unjustified and unbalanced media reporting which at best was misleading and at worst caused further anxiety and worry within the local community."
¶3.11 For the duration of the investigation of the Ipswich murders, known as Operation Sumac,
Suffolk Constabulary implemented a dedicated media strategy.40 One of the key lessons learned from this was that maintaining positive media relations took up a vast amount of time for the officer nominated as spokesman, and that needed to be accounted for in the investigative structure so that operational policing could continue effectively.41 Suffolk Constabulary took the conscious decision that all comment would be on the record and there was a constant drip feed of information provided to the media.42 Their handling of the media during this particular investigation was widely praised.43
¶3.12 In describing some of the consequences of this sometimes tense relationship, it is perhaps
worthy of note that these sorts of events are rare for county police forces, but are certainly more commonplace for the Metropolitan forces, such as the MPS, Greater Manchester Police, West Yorkshire Police and West Midlands Police. This is a theme to which I will return in subsequent sections of this Report.
¶G
751Chapter 2 The History of the Relationship: Different Approaches