Prime Minister Blair: 1997 –

Prime Minister Blair: 1997 –

¶3.1 Mr Blair took an early step, by way of the Civil Service Amendment Order in Council 1997, to

appoint Mr Campbell to an unprecedented position, a political or Special Advisor role with the power to instruct permanent civil servants.56 An indication of the considerable importance attached to news management strategies in the early years of the administration, it proved in the end to have been a highly controversial step, which has not been subsequently repeated. Lord O'Donnell viewed the matter in this way:57

"... [this amendment] blurred those lines between what a special adviser does and what civil servants do, and I think, with the benefit of hindsight, it didn't work as well as it should have done because it created the idea that the civil servants were obeying some rules by someone who was politically appointed, which meant that they also would be politically biased, and so it ... I don't think it was a good idea. I was very pleased when it was abandoned, and I did advise that it should be abandoned, and that's very good. I don't think it's an experiment we will try again, I hope".

¶3.2 Mr Blair himself observed with the benefit of hindsight: "in the event, apparently, we didn't need [it]".58 I 3.3 Mr Campbell told the Inquiry that many of the other changes relevant to relations between

Government and the media made by Mr Blair during his time as Prime Minister were designed to ensure that politics, and media coverage of it, was more 'on the record', in an effort to make politics more accessible to the public.59 These included 'lobby' briefings both being put on the record and made available online, monthly Prime Ministerial press conferences, and the agreement that Mr Blair would attend select committees in addition to answering Prime

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Minister's Questions. These changes addressed the more formal aspects of the relationship between the press and politicians; not all of them were popular on the press side. Adam Boulton said:60

"After 2003 Tony Blair attempted to restore media relations by establishing regular monthly news conferences. He honoured these punctually even when the chosen date coincided with a 'crisis'. However, they were never popular with the press who felt the electronic media benefitted disproportionately and neither Brown nor Cameron have continued with regular extended news conferences."

¶3.4 Mr Blair articulated his overall strategy in this way:61

"My view was this: I, as say, took a strategic decision that this was not an issue that I was going to take on ... when I came to office ... there was a whole set of things we wanted to do. My view, rightly or wrongly, was that if in those circumstances, I had said 'Right, I've decided what I'm going to do is take on the media and change the law in relation to the media", my view is that – and I think it's still my view actually – that you would have had to clear the decks. This would have been an absolutely major confrontation. You would have had virtually every part of the media against you doing it, and I felt that the price you would pay for that would actually push out a lot of the things I cared more about".

¶3.5 He added:62

"We'd ... been out of power for 18 years. We got into a rhythm which is very much the rhythm of opposition. So we were still, as it were, campaigning, you know, in the first few months, possibly the first year of government, but frankly after that time, you got into a proper rhythm of government and we had a very strong media operation...".

¶3.6 Mr Campbell said:63

"I don't make any apology for the changes we made in opposition because they helped us to win. I don't make apologies for the changes we made in government because they helped us to communicate more effectively and I think that helped the Prime Minister to govern more effectively. What I do accept is that at times, we probably were too controlling, that at times we did hang on to some of the techniques of opposition when we should have dumped them at the door of Number 10, but I'd also ask you to bear in mind the sheer volume of issues we were expected to deal with, be on top of. 24/7 media means just that. You are dealing with this 24 hours a day at a time when, in my case, also trying to be in charge of overall strategy as well".

¶I

¶3.7 The issue which has been much analysed subsequently is the extent to which the transition from Opposition to Government ought properly, in the public interest, to be reflected in

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distinctive and observable differences in the conduct of relations between politicians and the press. As Lord Mandelson put it:64

"Because of the particular and specific public duties of a minister, and the requirement for these to be carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, my strictures would apply more to government than opposition politicians, but not exclusively. And, of course, the circumstances of a minister's job are very different from opposition. The intensely scrutinised fishbowl world of government places incredible demands on the time, energy and focus of those who inhabit it. Ministers have less and less time in the day for policy deliberation and formulation because of media (as well as parliamentary) demands. On the other hand, politicians – ministers in particular – have greater opportunities than ever to communicate directly with electorates."

¶3.8 Mr Blair's Government enjoyed a 'honeymoon period' with the press; Mr Campbell summarised the trajectory in this way:65

"Though the press largely turned against him at various stages of his premiership, and some continue to campaign relentlessly against him even now, we did have a fairly benign media environment for some years, and by the time they turned, most of the public knew him well enough to have a fairly settled view".

¶3.9 And, in Lord Mandelson's view:66

"I think Mr Blair ... rescued and made good Labour's relations with the media. I think he was two or three years into government and they started taking a further dive, and climaxed, in a way when they became their worst at the time of the Iraq War".

¶3.10 The personal dimension of the relationship is, again, an interesting one. Mr Blair took the

view that, as time wore on, he, and more particularly his family, were often unfairly subjected to personal intrusion and attack. Although the Blairs were friendly with the Rothermeres, he cited the Daily Mail as being, from his perspective, particularly personal in this respect. He said:67 68

"The fact is, if you fall out with the controlling element of the [newspaper] ... you are then going to be subject to a huge and sustained attack. The [newspaper] for me – they've attacked me, my family, my children, those people associated with me, day in, day out, not merely when I was in office but subsequent to it as well. So that is – and they do it very well, very effectively, and it's very powerful ... With any of these big media groups, you fall out with them and you watch out, because it is literally relentless and unremitting once that happens and my view is that what creates this situation in which these media people get a power in the system that is unhealthy and I which I have felt, throughout my time, uncomfortable with".

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¶3.11 In May 1997, the relationship between Mr Blair and Mr Murdoch was not close; they had

only met on a handful of occasions and there were references in Mr Campbell's diaries to Mr Blair's ambivalence about such meetings ("...he felt that there was something unpleasant about newspaper power and influence"), although he recognised their importance and value.69 The relationship grew closer although, on Mr Blair's account, did not develop into personal friendship until after 2007 by which time he had left office.70

¶3.12 Lord Mandelson's evidence was along these lines:71

'It is also arguably the case, however, that personal relationships between Mr Blair, Mr Brown and Rupert Murdoch became closer than was wise in view of the adverse inference drawn from the number of meetings and contacts they had.'

¶3.13 Mr Blair did not accept that his relationship with Mr Murdoch was too close in that sense. He spoke more generally of the danger of relationships which were 'unhealthy'; he said:72

'...but the relationship is one in which you feel this – this pretty intense power and the need to try to deal with that...'

that is to say by managing rather than confronting it,73 by building a relationship with Mr Murdoch and others within NI. This entailed meetings and contact in private as well as in an official context.

¶3.14 Mr Blair's relationship with Rebekah Brooks may well have been warmer, when he was

in power, than his relationship with Mr Murdoch. Although Mr Blair was careful to point out that Mrs Brooks was not a key decision maker within the company,74 he accepted her characterisation of him being 'a constant presence' in her life.75 Mr Blair also accepted that, after his third election victory in 2005, both Mrs Brooks and Mr Murdoch were a sympathetic pair of ears in an increasingly hostile media landscape.76 As with Mr Murdoch, Mr Blair said his personal friendship with Mrs Brooks did not really develop until after he left office: as he put it, when free from the constraints of power.77

¶3.15 Both Mr Blair and Mr Campbell emphasised to the Inquiry that, viewed objectively, there

were many aspects of the Government's media policies which ran contrary to the interests of NI:78

'I mean, if you just look at the big policy decisions we took, the biggest in the media sphere is probably the rise of the BBC licence fee. They weren't terribly happy about

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that. Ofcom, I think Mr Murdoch said in his evidence, not terribly happy about that. He tried to take over Manchester United and was blocked. The digital switch, there were differences. ITV, Channel 5 – there were lots of areas where you'd be hard- pressed to say that the Murdochs and the Murdoch businesses were getting a good deal out of the Labour government.'

¶3.16 Again, although the party changed its policy in relation to the Euro notwithstanding Mr Blair's

sympathy in principle with the idea of entering the single currency, the fact that the eventual Government position aligned with Mr Murdoch's is explicable by reference to very many objective factors.

¶3.17 The perception of influence has, however, been a persistent point of debate. In March

1998, Mr Murdoch confirmed to The Times that he had requested Mr Blair to ask the Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, whether the Italian Government would allow Mr Murdoch to acquire Mediaset, Italy's leading commercial television network. It should be noted that Mr Murdoch's intention was not that Mr Blair seek to persuade his Italian counterpart to waive the bid through, in obvious contravention of EU and domestic law, but rather that Mr Blair ascertain whether it was worth his making a formal bid, given that he was not an Italian or EU national. The acquisition did not in the event proceed.

¶3.18 Mr Blair confirmed that he did speak to Mr Prodi about Mr Murdoch's proposed acquisition of

Mediaset, but that the call had come from Mr Prodi himself and had not been initiated by Mr Blair. He said he had asked about the proposed acquisition, and Mr Prodi had communicated to him that he wanted an Italian purchaser for Mediaset. Mr Blair explained that he would have done the same for anyone with substantial British interests:79

"... the call was initiated from Romani Prodi, and basically I ... raised the issue of whether the idea of having someone from the outside come and own part of Mediaset would be resented or not. He gave me an answer and I can't remember how it was relayed back, but I'm sure it was. But my point is that I would have done that for anyone with substantial British interests. I would have done that if another media group had asked me to do it."

¶3.19 In his evidence, Mr Campbell quoted a contemporaneous No 10 briefing he had given on the issue, and added:80

"The call from Prodi was not about [the proposed acquisition] ... It was about something completely different, and Prodi had asked for us not to brief on it... Rupert Murdoch had mentioned this company to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister, as I recall – we did have a discussion about whether there was anything wrong in him raising it. In the end he didn't raise it until this phone call came along on something I else and he mentioned it and Prodi said words to the effect that Murdoch's wasting his time and I don't think it went any further".

¶3.20 Whether Mr Blair would have telephoned Mr Prodi to intervene on Mr Murdoch's behalf

had the latter not telephoned him first on another matter is unclear. In any event, taking full account of the fact that Mr Murdoch was seeking very limited benefit from the intervention,

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what may be more important is what can be inferred from the fact that Mr Murdoch was able to ask the Prime Minister to make the enquiry in the first place.81

¶3.21 The war in Iraq was a landmark event in Mr Blair's political fortunes. Some commentators82

have argued that Mr Blair's decision to go to war in Iraq was influenced by Mr Murdoch's firm and enthusiastic views on the subject. Mr Blair rejected that suggestion:83

"I disagree completely with Paul Dacre's assertion over Iraq. I had a view about this issue. I was prepared to lose a vote and resign over it. I had taken a position since 9/11 to stand with the US. I strongly believed it was right to remove Saddam Hussein. It is correct I spoke to Rupert Murdoch in the days leading up to the vote. I can't recall at whose instigation. I would have obviously wanted to explain what I was doing and why to the Head of Media Group that was most disposed to support the action; but I had long since made up my mind on it and the notion that I required "lobbying" by him or anyone else is plain wrong. And I have no doubt that the Mail would have attacked me whichever course I took".

¶3.22 Mr Blair was asked by the Inquiry about three telephone calls made on 11,¹³¹³ http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Ruling-on-the-role-of-the-assessors-PDF-102-KB. pdf This evidence included hearsay, anonymous material which Michelle Stanistreet the General Secretary of the National Union of Journalists sought to adduce from a number of journalists who feared for their careers if they spoke out in public. An application for this evidence to be heard was challenged by other Core Participants and subject to 'gateway' rulings by the Inquiry: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous- Witnesses-Ruling-PDF-64.5-KB.pdf and http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous- Evidence-28-November-2011.pdf. These were issued along with a protocol http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Protocol-regarding-Applications-for-Anonymity.pdf. The rulings were the subject of unsuccessful challenge in the Administrative Court (Toulson LJ, Sweeney and Sharp JJ): see R (on the application of Associated Newspapers Ltd v. The Rt Hon Lord Justice Leveson as Chairman of the Leveson Inquiry [2012] EWHC 57 (Admin), http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/assoc-news-v-chair-leveson-inquiry.pdf. There was then a substantive ruling on the merits of the application which was granted: http://www.levesoninquiry. org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Anonymous-witnesses-ruling-7-Feb-2012.pdf [2006] QB 468 p3 para d), Professor Baroness Onora O'Neill, http://levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/witness- statement-of-Professor-Baroness-ONeil See, however, the observations of Dr Manson on the nature of privacy rights in 'public' spaces and the difference between degrees of intensity in the public gaze: pp15-20, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2012/07/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf; p8, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/07/Witness-Statement-of-Dr-Neil-Manson.pdf p19, lines 10-21, Professor John Tasioulas, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-16-July-2012.pdf pp99-100, Spencer Feeney, Mike Gilson, John McLellan and Jonathan Russell, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp- content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-18-January-2012.pdf http://www.newscorp.com/corp_gov/MSC_reporting_structure.html p4, para 13, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Mark- Thompson.pdf p3, para 5, ibid Snoddy, R, The Good, the Bad, and the Unacceptable: The hard news about the British press, p84 p55, para 125, ibid p52, lines 4-18, DCI Gilmour, ibid Care was taken over this issue which became the subject of some controversy during the hearing and was the subject of a ruling: see http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Operation-Motorman-and- ANL-10-July-2012.pdf. Associated Newspapers Ltd later confirmed that it did not advance a positive case contradicting the position that there exists prima facie evidence that journalists did act in breach of s55 by obtaining information which, prima facie, could not be justified in the public interest. That group thus fell into line with all other press core participants. p22, lines 18-24, Keith Surtees, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-29-February-2012.pdf p2, para 6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Fourth-Witness-Statement-of-DAC-Sue- Akers.pdf pp97-98 passim, Margaret Watson, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-22-November-20111.pdf p4, para 5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Fifth-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Caseby.pdf p26, para 54, ibid p18 lines 13-18, Colin Myler, ibid pp30-31, lines 23-4, Robert Jay QC, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-May-2012.pdf; p16, para 38, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ Witness-Statement-of-DCI-John-Macdonald.pdf p5, line 11; p38, line 25; pp46-47, lines 24-12; p58, line 21; p26, line 14; p78, lines 4-11; JK Rowling, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-24-November-20112.pdf p119, lines 5-17, Hugh Whittow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-January-2012.pdf; pp12-13, lines 15 –18, John Witherow, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of-Afternoon-Hearing-17-January-2012.pdf; p10, para 42, http://www. levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Witness-Statement-of-Dominic-Mohan.pdf p6, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-Ed-Stearns.pdf http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/4262.htm pp110-111, lines 4-10, Lord Stevens, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-6-March-20122.pdf p30, lines 2-11, Elizabeth Filkin, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Transcript-of- Afternoon-Hearing-5-March-2012.pdf pp4-5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/First-Witness-Statement-of-Richard- Thomas-CBE.pdf It is, perhaps, worthy of note that Mr Thomas appears to focus on the profile of s55 DPA rather than the underlying issue of the practices of the press p55, lines 3-6, Richard Thomas, ibid pp22-23, lines 23-6, Christopher Graham, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ Transcript-of-Morning-Hearing-26-January-2012.pdf Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data p85, lines 9-14, Richard Thomas, ibid Part H, Chapter 5, para 2.73 pp33-34, lines 3-6, Kelvin Mackenzie, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-9-January-2012.pdf p39, lines 17-23, Sir John Major, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Transcript-of- Morning-Hearing-12-June-2012.pdf p24, para 71, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Witness-Statement-of-David- Cameron-MP.pdf pp2-6, Rupert Murdoch, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KRM-5.pdf p5, para 3.2, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Witness-Statement-of-James-Rupert- Jacob-Murdoch.pdf p34, lines 16-22, ibid pp12-14, paras 41-44, ibid p22, para 5.10 ibid Part E, Chapter 4 Chapter 32, para 3.4 Having paid fulsome tribute to Mr Abell's witness statement, I should also record my admiration for the Media Standard Trust's work in this area. The relevant material and submissions is on the Inquiry website. Given its comprehensiveness, I have sought to boil the issues down somewhat p1, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Covering-Letter-from-Ofcom.pdf Part K, Chapter 1 p7, paras 22-23, ibid p3, para 5, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Submission-by-Media-Regulation- Round-Table.pdf Defamation Act 2009 s44, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf http://www.lemonde.fr/actualite-medias/article/2009/12/30/les-editeurs-de-presse-en-ligne-se-repartissent-20- millions-d-euros-d-aides_1285932_3236.html p1, para 7, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Joint-Submission-by-Core-Participant- Victims1.pdf Part B Part F, Chapter 6, para 2.74 Part K, Chapter 7, para 4.32 News Verlag GmbH & co KG v Austria (2000) 31 EHRR 246 at paragraph 39Show full note and 19 March

¶2003 in the run up to the Iraq War. He said this:84

"Look, this is a huge issue, obviously. I mean, my recollection is that I initiated one of those calls. I actually remember only two, but the records show there were three, although I think they were no more than 45 minutes in total for all three. But you know, I would have been wanting to explain what we were doing, and I did this – I think I had similar calls with the Observer and the Telegraph, and indeed I had a lunch later with the Guardian. So you know, I think that's – it's not – I wouldn't say there's anything particularly unusual or odd about that when you're facing such a huge issue. Now none of these calls was particularly long, but they were important... I think with him, probably, I would also have been asking him what the situation was in the US, for example, in Australia, which were also major parts of the coalition. But no, it would not have been about the tone of the coverage. I mean, look, they were supportive of it and that was that".

¶3.23 Although Mr Blair did not have a clear recollection of the precise content of these calls (and

nor did Mr Murdoch when asked about them), it is interesting that he made time to discuss these issues with a newspaper proprietor speaking from the USA. It is also interesting that Mr Murdoch's 173 newspapers worldwide all supported the war.

¶3.24 In his evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Blair explained that although he had considered throughout I his period of office that, while he had views about press conduct and standards, addressing

them was not a priority, by the time he had come to the end of his term as Prime Minister he had concluded that the issue had become far more pressing.85 On 12 June 2007, approximately two weeks before leaving office, Mr Blair gave a speech on Public Life to the Reuters Institute

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of Journalism, in which he made some trenchant criticisms of the press, famously describing at least sections of the industry as 'feral beasts'.

¶3.25 He made four specific points:86

"The media is increasingly and to a dangerous degree driven by 'impact'... First, scandal or controversy beats ordinary reporting hands down. News is rarely news unless it generates heat as much as or more than light. Second, attacking motive is far more potent than attacking judgment. It is not enough for someone to have made an error of judgment. It has to be venal. Conspiratorial ... But misconduct is what has impact. Third, the fear of missing out means today's media, more than ever before, hunts in a pack. In these modes it is like a feral beast, just tearing people and reputations to bits. But no one dares miss out. Fourth, rather than just report news, even if sensational or controversial, the new technique is commentary on the news being as, if not more important, than the news itself".

¶3.26 He suggested that the "relationship between public life and media [was] ... now damaged in

a manner which [required] repair", that "a way needed to be found" to ensure that the press remained accountable, and that serious concerns about unbalanced reporting would be addressed in the future. He noted that broadcasting, for example, was regulated by Ofcom.87

¶3.27 The speech was almost universally criticised by the press itself. The Daily Telegraph on 13

June 2007,88 carried a headline "Blair's Last Enemy: Freedom of Speech" above an article which, while accepting that some of the points that Mr Blair had made were valid, considered his call for reform would "impair freedom of speech and the liberties of the subject...[and] eventually make them obedient to the government of the day", and concluded that "... we do find his argument deeply disturbing, founded on false premises and worthy of the strongest refutation".89

¶3.28 A Mail Online article of the same date was headlined "The Magnificent Self-Delusion of Mr

Blair".90 It also rejected the idea of statutory regulation, describing such thoughts as "decidedly sinister" and suggested that it was odd for Mr Blair to 'attack' the press in this way, as he had "enjoyed for most of his years as Prime Minister a more approving and more docile press than any British leader in living memory". It went on to assert that "for the most part, the media acted like a great sloppy Labrador which repeatedly bestowed its affections on Mr Blair".91

¶3.29 A Guardian leader of 13 June 2007 was headed "Right Sermon, Wrong Preacher".92 It

considered the speech to be a "heartfelt homily" which "deserved a serious response", but noted that "it is pretty rich to be lectured on such matters by this prime minister who, more than any other, has marginalised parliament through a combination of sofa government, selective leaking and sophisticated media manipulation". The article concluded:93 I

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"It has been a consistent pattern – witness terror briefings to the Sunday newspapers. Truly, he helped feed the animal he now wants to chain".

¶3.30 Mr Campbell confirmed that the issue of addressing press standards had been discussed in

2002 and 2003 but not pursued.94 In an article in the Guardian published in July 2011,95 Lord Mandelson reflected that 'we were cowed from reforming the media'.