The Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon Ed Miliband

¶3.1 In his interviews and public statements following the phone-hacking revelations in July 2011,

Mr Miliband acknowledged that politicians had become 'too close' to News International. He was asked in oral evidence to explain precisely what he meant by that, and he said this:8

"I've obviously read a lot of the evidence you've had and thought a lot about this. I think the way I very specifically view this – I believe the thing I'm looking for is the interview I gave to Andrew Marr, actually, just after the phone hacking Milly Dowler scandal broke, because I believe I said in that interview that we were too close, in the sense that it meant that when there were abuses by the press, we didn't speak out. That is my version of "too close", my view of the consequence of "too close". Now, different people – the reason I say I refer to your other evidence is different people have used different phrases for that word. Mandelson said "cowed", Tony Blair said "unhealthy". There's a whole range of other adjectives that have been used. I suspect they may be more accurate as ways of thinking about this issue, that it was a sense of fear, I suppose, in some sense, or unwillingness or worry, anxiety about speaking out on those issues, issues that were affecting ordinary members of the public, issues where I think that if it had been any other organisation in another walk of life that had been perpetrating some of what happened, action would have been taken earlier."

¶3.2 I made a connection between this analysis and some of the evidence I had heard from previous

Prime Ministers, including Sir John Major and Mr Blair. The latter, for example, explained that for him 'too close' should not necessarily be taken to suggest something which was amicable and collaborative; the power of the press was also experienced as something creating a degree of circumspection in dealing with matters affecting the press's own reputation and commercial interests. I understood Mr Miliband's comments in that context; that this experience of the power of the press led to a correlative reticence in politicians, an unwillingness to speak out about problems in the culture, practices and ethics of the press, including those exposed in evidence to the Inquiry. Mr Miliband was including himself in that analysis.9

¶3.3 He said that when senior politicians did decide to speak out, this was perceived as 'crossing

a Rubicon because this would be seen by News International as pretty much an act of war'.10 His assessment was that issues of power and influence could not be divorced from issues about the concentration of market share in a limited number of hands and the associated megaphone effect, and that issues of press misconduct equally could not be divorced from the fact of economic power, since it created:11

¶I

"...[a] sense of power without responsibility, which is what I believe it was, came from the fact that they controlled 37 per cent of the newspaper market before the closure of the News of the World, and I don't think we can divorce these questions of ownership, quasi-monopoly et cetera, from – or at least concentration of power, better put than "quasi-monopoly" – concentration of power – I don't think we can divorce those questions from the behaviour of some parts of the press. And add in, by the way, the Sky platform, which then became – and Sky. All that became an issue

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¶Chapter 7 | Further Political Perspectives on Relationships with the Press

around BSkyB, but I think that is a big concentration of media power, and I think part of the arrogance – and I use the word advisedly; in a way, it's a mild form of the word I might use – came from that."

¶3.4 He set out his commitment to do everything in his power to seek to work on a cross-party

basis to ensure that the Inquiry's recommendations provided a basis for the future of press regulation. As he put it:12

"I think we have a huge responsibility and I want to say, really, echoing something you said at the beginning of this week and something that Tony Blair said in his testimony, that for any Prime Minister this is going to be very difficult and I want to say that I will do everything I can to seek to work on a cross-party basis so ensure that your recommendations provide a framework for us for the future."

¶3.5 On the question of his personal approach, Mr Miliband was asked about his dealings with Mr

Murdoch and in particular his attendance at the News International summer party on 16 June 2011. He said this:13

"I say I recall a relatively short conversation with Rupert Murdoch for a few minutes at the summer party. I believe it was about US politics and international affairs, and I believe I should have raised the issue of phone hacking with him. I didn't, which is something I think I said last summer."

¶3.6 In his written evidence, Mr Miliband was asked to explain the circumstances in which he

hired Tom Baldwin as Director of Communications of the Labour Party on December 2010. Mr Baldwin had previously worked at The Times for about 11 years. Mr Miliband's explanation was as follows:14

"A number of candidates were considered. In respect of the role which Tom was appointed to fill we were looking for someone with significant experience as a journalist, with an outstanding understanding of the world of politics, and, crucially as far as I was concerned, with a genuine commitment to the values of the Labour Party. My then Acting Chief of Staff, Lucy Powell, and I spoke to a number of colleagues, associates and others in whose judgement we had confidence – including fellow politicians and media experts – in connection to Tom, and other candidates', suitability for the role(s) prior to appointing him. At no point did anyone raise concerns about Tom's journalistic integrity. Indeed the opposite was the case ... Tom Baldwin's connection to News International was as an employee of Times Newspapers Limited in which News international has a controlling interest. He was I not someone who had close or privileged relationships with the senior executives at News International. His connections with News International played no role in, and had no significance for, his recruitment. He was employed for his skills and his commitment to the Labour party. Neither I nor my Chief of Staff had any conversations about Tom's recruitment with executives of News International. Before offering Tom Baldwin the job he and I discussed whether there were any reasons why his appointment could be the cause of any embarrassment to either me

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¶PART I | The Press and Politicians

or the Labour Party. This discussion included the references to Tom Baldwin in Lord Ashcroft's book "Dirty Times, Dirty Politics" which was first published in 2005. I should underline that the book contains no allegations "linking Mr Baldwin to the unlawful and unethical acquisition of information". Lord Ashcroft refers in his book to Tom Baldwin being given information about some of Lord Ashcroft's financial affairs some time after its acquisition by Times Newspapers in defence of a legal action against the paper by Lord Ashcroft. The more serious allegation that Tom Baldwin had himself commissioned the blagging of this information was made only subsequently by Lord Ashcroft in a blog in summer last year when Tom Baldwin had already been working for me for six months. When this was raised with Tom Baldwin (including by me) he made it absolutely clear that it was entirely false. My Acting Chief of Staff followed up with the Editor of the Times at the time of the events Lord Ashcroft describes – Sir Peter Stothard. He made it clear that in his view Lord Ashcroft's allegation was false. He went out of his way to praise Tom Baldwin's professional integrity and journalistic acumen."