Poor information management and sharing

Poor information management and sharing

¶20. Information management and information sharing between and within agencies was often poor. Risk information was not adequately shared between agencies and was lost or diluted over time even within agencies. As a consequence, the significance of subsequent events was seriously underestimated and opportunities to intervene were lost. This was a critical factor in AR’s risk never being properly appreciated. Even as AR’s risk to others was increasing from (at least) late 2021 onwards, the early risk indicators that had been present in late 2019 were not sufficiently understood. As AR increasingly disengaged from any support, he was thereby enabled effectively to conceal his increasing risk from external agencies.

¶21. There are many examples of this process occurring from the very earliest stages of the agencies dealing with AR. Non-exhaustively:

¶a. Information available in October 2019 about AR’s intention to use the knife he had been taking to Range High School was not effectively shared with LCC until after AR had carried out an attack at that school on 11 December 2019;¹⁵¹⁵ LANC000018; LANC000248; T/S: 17/141/14-142/19, T/S: 17/146/13-147/6.,¹⁶¹⁶ Chapter 7: Policing.

¶b. Information about AR having referred to the Manchester Arena bombing as having been a “good battle” at Range High School in June 2019 was not passed to other agencies until December 2019 and was not then properly recorded or passed on;¹⁷¹⁷ Chapter 11: Education.,¹⁸¹⁸ T/S: 29/75/14-76/10, T/S: 29/78/1-3.,¹⁹¹⁹ Chapter 9: Social care.

¶c. Information about AR’s browsing history at The Acorns School was not shared with Prevent for the purposes of the First Referral to Prevent, or with Merseyside Police for the purposes of their criminal investigation after the 11 December 2019 attack;²⁰²⁰ Chapter 8: Prevent and Counter Terrorism Policing.

¶d. Information that AR had seriously assaulted his father, who then retaliated by striking him, in the context of a domestic argument in January 2021 was recorded by LCC (both CYJS and CFWS) but not shared with other agencies.²¹²¹ LCC002311/37 (the Transcript refers to LCC002302 but LCC002311 is a better version of the same document); LCC000488/1, 3; T/S: 29/37/16-39/17, T/S: 30/71/15-77/23, T/S: 30/205/10-210/12. As early as August 2021, the fact that this had occurred had been lost from view even in the context of Children’s Social Care exploring AR’s allegations of violence by his father;²²²² LCC000247; Witness Statement of Ms Haydock LCC001772/§§43-45.,²³²³ Chapter 9: Social care.

¶e. Information about the status of AR’s Prevent referrals was not effectively sought or shared with CFWS in October 2021; conversely, CFWS did not share the information of concern it gained about AR’s political views or online activity with any external agency;²⁴²⁴ T/S: 29/156/19-167/17, T/S: 30/106/7-108/23.,²⁵²⁵ Chapter 9: Social care.

¶f. The Acorns School did not share information with Prevent in relation to AR’s comments in January 2022;²⁶²⁶ T/S: 27/193/4-196/9.,²⁷²⁷ Chapter 8: Prevent and Counter Terrorism Policing and Chapter 11: Education.

¶g. On AR’s transfer to Presfield High School in March 2022, information about AR was not effectively shared between the schools: it was sent by The Acorns School but not accessed by Presfield High School until after 29 July 2024;²⁸²⁸ T/S: 27/222/23-225/17.,²⁹²⁹ Chapter 11: Education.

¶h. In March 2022, following the bus incident (see below for further detail), The Acorns School requested information from Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) “so we can update our safeguarding and risk assessments”.³⁰³⁰ PRE000357/2; Second Witness Statement of Ms Steed AHCH000326/§§31-36. However, the response from CAMHS did not set out details of the bus incident, the knife possession, any precipitating issues, or provide any information that might have assisted in risk assessment.³¹³¹ Chapter 9: Social care and Chapter 11: Education.

¶22. The most marked example of the consequences of poor information management and sharing came on 17 March 2022 when AR went missing from home, was found with a knife on a bus, said to police that he had wanted to stab someone and admitted to (at least) earlier thoughts about using poison. Had the agencies involved in this episode had a remotely adequate understanding of AR’s risk history, AR would have been arrested on this occasion and (in all probability) his home would have been searched leading to police and other agencies gaining critical information about the ricin seeds he had bought, and the terrorist material he had downloaded on his computer.