The arrangements including security at the Hart Space

The arrangements including security at the Hart Space

¶155. One of the issues explored during the Inquiry’s Phase 1 hearings was the security and other arrangements at the Hart Space. Some of the parents of the victims of the attack were concerned that their children should have been provided with a greater degree of protection. The background to this was that the outside door to the communal staircase through which AR entered was unlocked, as were the wooden doors on the upstairs landing that were the entrance to the upstairs studio. A further issue considered was the ratio of adults to children for the event.

¶156. These are sensitive issues. Ms Lucas who was in reality the main organiser of the class was of course a victim of the attack having been – like many of the children – brutally stabbed. Mrs Scholes came to the scene in the aftermath of the attack. She has been badly affected by the events and had to shut down her classes at the Hart Space and completely relocate. Mr Hayes, who on a day-to-day basis had operational control of the Business Centre freehold, was also stabbed. Accordingly, while I have naturally reviewed these issues dispassionately and objectively, it was necessary to traverse the issues with care in the Inquiry’s oral evidence because of the trauma suffered by all of those involved. Indeed, in the event Ms Lucas was not fit enough to give further evidence on these issues, although she was later able to provide a supplementary witness statement.²⁴⁴²⁴⁴ Second Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000061.

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¶157. Seen in isolation through the lens of hindsight (knowing that the attack occurred), it may be tempting to consider that there ought to have been a locked door between AR and the children. However, in order to consider this issue fairly it is important to consider the leasing arrangements in more detail, the duties that were owed in terms of fire exits, and the guidance that was in place for those running activities for ‘out-of-school settings’.

The detailed leasing arrangements

¶158. As I have indicated, Mrs Scholes leased the Hart Space. She originally leased the upstairs studio, named Unit H in the lease. Later she also took on the downstairs studio, named in the lease as Units A and B. The original lease, covering the upstairs studio, was entered into between JGH Developments Ltd and Mrs Scholes (1 September 2019 to 31 August 2022). It included at clause 4.2 that the tenant should “not […] obstruct any part of the Building used for access to the property or to any other part of the Building”.²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ JSC000005/3. This covered the communal areas, including the staircase jointly used with Calculus. There was no requirement in the lease that the tenant should lock the communal door or the door to the studio upstairs. While Mr Hayes, made it clear in contemporaneous correspondence that Mrs Scholes should ensure that the building was “kept secure” at all times, I understood this to mean that the building should not be left unlocked when it was unoccupied, for instance at night.²⁴⁶²⁴⁶ JSC000002/1. The maintenance of the communal areas (which would have included the main entrance door to the communal area) was the responsibility of the landlord, and the costs of cleaning constituted an element of the service charge.

¶159. Mrs Scholes informed the landlord that it was intended to use the premises for teaching baby yoga or classes of a similar nature. She was clear from a very early stage that she intended to sub-let the space for classes with a “similar ethos” and the landlord was aware of this.²⁴⁷²⁴⁷ T/S: 14/16/2-4.

¶160. In turn, the organisers of events who leased the Hart Space by the hour from Mrs Scholes were responsible for the events they were facilitating, although they were able to advertise via the Hart Space social media channels.

¶161. Mrs Scholes entered into an agreement with Ms Lucas, on her standard agreement terms. Although the original could not be found, there is no reason to doubt that Mrs Scholes’ standard terms applied. This included the stipulation that the person hiring the premises “is […] solely responsible to ensure that all of the premises and other facilities and access to and exit from them are safe, suitable and adequate for the purpose of hire […]”. In other words, the event organiser (here Ms Lucas) needed to ensure that the venue was safe, suitable and adequate for the type of class or event that they were running. They needed additionally to ensure that there was appropriate access to and exit from the premises for the event and that they did not cause or allow any obstruction to any access into or exit from the premises. This would have included not obstructing or preventing access to and from the Calculus offices.

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¶162. Additionally, the hirer was obliged to “ensure that a competent responsible person authorised by the hirer to act on its behalf is present at the premises throughout each session and provides overall supervision of each session” and to “provide sufficient staff or others for the running, stewarding, overall supervision and any necessary further supervision of each session […] [and] be responsible for the care and safeguarding of any children or vulnerable adults attending for or in connection with a session […] [and] ensure that the premises are safe for the purpose of hire”. I consider that the presence of Ms Lucas and Mrs Liddle satisfied these requirements, given their experience and training.

¶163. The primary fire exit from the upstairs studio was through the wooden doors out of the studio onto the upstairs landing, down the communal stairs and out through the communal door into the car park. There was a secondary fire exit via the Calculus offices, the door to which unlocks if the fire alarm is activated.

¶164. Against that background, it is necessary to consider the relevant mandatory and advisory obligations governing the Hart Space when used for events of the kind presently under consideration.

The fire safety requirements

¶165. The fire safety requirements are important because leaseholders and hirers of a venue cannot be expected to lock doors if to do so is in breach of their legal duties in terms of fire safety requirements.

¶166. The primary legislative provision governing fire safety in England and Wales is the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (‘the 2005 Order’) which imposes certain legal duties on a ‘responsible person’ (RP). Those coming within the definition of an RP include those who have “control of the premises (as occupier or otherwise) in connection with the carrying on by him of a trade, business or other undertaking (for profit or not)” (Article 3 (b) 1). This is a sufficiently broad provision to encompass both a leaseholder such as Mrs Scholes who was renting out a dance/yoga space, along with the organiser or organisers of a children’s themed dance event hiring the venue by the hour.

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¶167. An RP owes Fire Safety duties under Articles 8 to 22B of the 2005 Order “…so far as the requirements relate to matters within [their] control” (Article 5(2).) These duties are owed to ‘relevant persons’ (put generally, anyone who is or may be legally on or near the premises (Article 2)). The RP’s duties include ensuring that:

¶a. Emergency routes and exits lead as directly as possible to a place of safety (Article 14(2)(a));

¶b. It is possible for individuals to evacuate the premises as quickly and as safely as possible (Article 14(2)(b));

¶c. The number, distribution and dimensions of emergency routes and exits are adequate having regard to the use, equipment and dimensions of the premises and the maximum number of persons present (Article 14(2)(c)); and

¶d. The emergency doors can be easily and immediately opened by anyone needing to use them in an emergency (Article 14(2)(f)).

¶168. The RP must conduct a “suitable and sufficient” risk assessment to identify the precautions required to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed by the 2005 Order (Article 9(1)), with a record being made of the assessment as soon as practicable.

¶169. The Home Office non-statutory guidance ‘Fire safety risk assessment: small and medium places of assembly’ updated 28 August 2024 adds nothing of substance in the present context, save that by section 4 escape routes are to be suitable, and easily, safely and immediately usable at all times.

¶170. The Building Regulations 2010, in addressing fire safety, do not materially expand on the responsibilities and guidance set out above. However, it is reinforced in Schedule 1, Part B that there shall be “appropriate means of escape in case of fire from the building capable of being safely and effectively used at all material times”.

¶171. These, in my view, are the critical provisions. AR was able to walk up the stairs unimpeded and into the dance yoga class, via unlocked doors on the ground and first floors. The key question is whether they, or either of them, should have been locked or otherwise secured.

¶172. The main door giving access between the car park and the communal stairway had a conventional mortice type lock. Similarly, the wooden doors into the upstairs studio could be locked with a key. But for the leaseholder or event organiser to have locked these doors in this way would have been wholly inappropriate while the building was occupied, bearing in mind the requirement that the escape route needed to be “easily, safely and immediately usable at all times”. Put shortly, they would have been locking doors that formed the fire exit; this would have been unlawful.

¶173. In these circumstances, the critical question is not whether the doors should have been locked but whether an alternative, ‘specialist’ fire door should have been fitted in place of the communal ground floor door between the car park and the stairway, and/or in place of the wooden doors to the upstairs studio. The two designs of such fire doors commonly in use are those with a physical push bar allowing easy exit, and doors with a magnetic lock which can be released typically via a green button but unlock in the event of the fire alarm sounding.

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¶174. It is fair to note immediately that:

¶a. A magnetic lock specialist fire door for the upstairs studio doors may have posed obvious practical problems given that it was required as access for children and class participants to access the lavatories on the landing;

¶b. In the case of Mrs Scholes and Ms Lucas, the question is not whether they should have fitted such doors, because they did not own the property. Rather the question is whether they should have requested the landlord to fit them. In the case of the landlord (strictly speaking JGH Developments Ltd, but on a day-to-day operational level, Mr Hayes), the question is whether they were in breach of any duty or guidance in not having fitted such doors.

Guidance for out-of-school settings

¶175. The relevant fire legislation and guidance is aimed at ensuring safe exit in the event of fire. Understandably, it does not address security considerations such as whether an event should have a magnetic locking fire door as opposed to an unlocked door as an exit while the building is occupied.

¶176. In terms of wider and less specific legal duties:

¶a. Both Mrs Scholes (as the leaseholder) and Ms Lucas as the hirer of the venue, are likely to be treated as ‘occupiers’ for the purposes of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957, with their respective duties dependent on the extent of their control over any relevant matters. The duty imposed on them under the 1957 Act is the ‘common duty of care’, namely “to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there” (section 2(2) of the 1957 Act);

¶b. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HWSA), in my view, would not have applied to Ms Lucas as the main organiser of the yoga dance class. Section 4 of the HWSA imposes an obligation on ‘persons concerned with premises’ regarding individuals who are not their employees if non-domestic premises are “made available to them as a place of work or as a place where they may use plant or substances provided for their use there”. The young girls were not using the premises as a place of work and I consider it unrealistic to suggest that they were using plant or substances provided for their use. The leaseholder (Mrs Scholes) may well have been covered by this legislation as regards the dance class organisers who use the premises as a place of work. In any event, however, the obligation was a general one to ensure, among other things, that the premises and means of access are safe.

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¶177. In light of the absence of any specific legal duty as to the standard of security of entrances for such community events, it is important, to look at the guidance that was available and which could have been expected to inform community organisers of the nature of the standards that they should follow.

¶178. For a community event for children such as that being run by Ms Lucas, the only guidance in place at the time was the Department for Education’s September 2023 non-statutory guidance titled ‘After-school clubs, community activities, and tuition Safeguarding guidance for providers’ (the Out-of-School Settings, or ‘OOSS’ guidance).²⁴⁸²⁴⁸ DFE000018/34 – Department for Education (2025), ‘After-school clubs, community activities and tuition: safeguarding guidance for providers’, GOV.UK. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/ publications/keeping-children-safe-in-out-of-school-settings-code-of-practice In the current context, the most relevant section of this guidance was section 3. The advice given to providers in that section included:

¶a. That they “… have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that people will be safe using the venue for the purposes for which they attend”;

¶b. That they should as a minimum annually review and update their risk assessments;

¶c. That they should have an emergency plan in place to help them and any staff respond effectively to an emergency;

¶d. That they should have a fire safety and evacuation plan;

¶e. That they should have a register of children attending;

¶f. That they should have at least one person who has first aid training;

¶g. That they should take reasonable steps to reduce health and safety risks through a health and safety policy although if they have fewer than five employees or volunteers (as was the case for Ms Lucas), it was not necessary to write down the health and safety policy;

¶h. That they have a fire safety management policy and evacuation plan forming part of the health and safety policy.

¶179. However, and importantly, the OOSS guidance made no provision (and indeed was completely silent) about whether providers should ensure that entrance doors to venues were lockable specialist fire doors or be covered by video entry or similar.

¶180. Ms Kate Dixon, Director of Strategy and Safer Streets at the Department for Education assisted the Inquiry on this aspect.

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¶181. Significantly, it was apparent from Ms Dixon’s evidence that the absence of any guidance on specialist fire doors and entry security standards in the OOSS guidance was deliberate. She emphasised that while schools have detailed guidance about school security and premises security, the out-of-school sector is made up over very small providers through to very big providers. As Ms Dixon explained, the Department for Education considers that they need to adopt a proportionate approach that ensures that the department does not stifle the out-of-school sector, but encourages providers to think about, among many other things, the safety of the setting and the personnel that are involved.²⁴⁹²⁴⁹ T/S: 28/128/20-130/6.

¶182. It follows that, at the material time Mrs Scholes was hiring out the Hart Space, and Ms Lucas was planning the Taylor Swift themed class, there was simply no legally binding, or even advisory, guidance to the effect that such small events should only be held if there is at least one door that was locked. Nor was there any guidance or expectation for CCTV, video or telephone entry, or similar.

¶183. In the absence of any such legal requirement or even guidance, I consider it is unrealistic to expect:

¶a. JGH Developments Ltd / Mrs Hayes / Mr Hayes to have fitted specialist fire doors to make the entrance more secure; or

¶b. Mrs Scholes or Ms Lucas to have requested the landlords to fit such doors as a security precaution.

¶184. In the course of the evidence, the Inquiry explored whether there had been issues or incidents that may have changed this position. I find that there were not. Mrs Scholes had experienced someone using the Hart Space lavatories on the upstairs landing, and this had led to lavatory barrel locks being fitted. However, this was not a case of an intruder or stranger getting into the Hart Space, but instead simply somebody else in the Norwood Business Centre premises using the Hart Space’s dedicated lavatory. There had also been a concern about a ‘creepy man’ who was known to send inappropriate messages to hypnobirthing classes. This had become the subject of discussion on Mrs Scholes’ WhatsApp group for class facilitators, and Mrs Scholes arranged for some self-defence classes as a positive and confidence boosting measure for the class facilitators. However, this man had not attempted to get access to the Hart Space, and I do not consider that this very different theoretical risk should have led to the security of the entrance door arrangements being reviewed.

¶185. Finally, in this context, it is relevant to record four further matters which reinforce the conclusions I have set out above.

¶186. The first is that the evidence demonstrated that for relatively small community providers, both Mrs Scholes and Ms Lucas took health and safety matters seriously. For her part, Mrs Scholes:

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¶a. Had a written hire agreement in place for all those hiring the Hart Space (this was, I find, good practice, and by no means something that would always be expected of those hiring venues by the hour);²⁵⁰²⁵⁰ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§43.

¶b. Had a written generic risk assessment in place. I note that this did consider ‘acts of violence’ but in this context, not unreasonably, Mrs Scholes was thinking about the risk of class facilitators being in the Hart Space out of hours and therefore lone working. She did not contemplate the type of random mass knife attack targeting young children perpetrated by AR;²⁵¹²⁵¹ JSC000010; First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§43; T/S: 14/49/20-50/23.

¶c. Had a written class specific risk assessment in place for her own classes;²⁵²²⁵² JSC000011.

¶d. Had taken into account toddlers and children when the interior or the Hart Space was kitted out, (for example, cabinets were secured against falls, there was no high-level storage, to avoid items falling and hurting children, there were child lock cabinets including for cleaning equipment);²⁵³²⁵³ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§§74-75.

¶e. Had a separate check list of questions/information;²⁵⁴²⁵⁴ JSC000012.

¶f. Had a written health and safety policy;²⁵⁵²⁵⁵ JSC000013.

¶g. Had a written fire evacuation procedure;²⁵⁶²⁵⁶ JSC000014.

¶h. Required hirers to provide a copy of their insurance details and were asked to have their own class specific risk assessments;²⁵⁷²⁵⁷ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§85.

¶i. Was selective in those to whom she hired the Hart Space and ran through the relevant assessments and policies with anyone who was hiring the venue for the first time;²⁵⁸²⁵⁸ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§84.

¶j. Was cognisant of the fact that it was the landlord who managed the building fire assessments, alarms, smoke detectors and emergency lighting, but she was aware of the emergency lighting and signage that was fitted.²⁵⁹²⁵⁹ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§90.

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¶187. Mrs Scholes gave oral evidence. While understandably visibly distressed, I have no doubt from her evidence that (consistent with the approach evidenced above), she was careful and thoughtful about her duties in hiring out the Hart Space, displaying a level of professionalism that I am sure would be above average for such a small community venue.

¶188. As to Ms Lucas, she:

¶a. Had appropriate qualifications in yoga for the class she was going to teach;²⁶⁰²⁶⁰ First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§5.

¶b. Had enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) clearance;²⁶¹²⁶¹ First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§6.

¶c. Had safeguarding training and an Advanced Safeguarding, Child Protection and Prevent certificate;²⁶²²⁶² IWS000011.

¶d. Held insurance;²⁶³²⁶³ IWS000024.

¶e. Had a class specific written risk assessment;²⁶⁴²⁶⁴ IWS000027.

¶f. Had a safeguarding policy;²⁶⁵²⁶⁵ IWS000025.

¶g. Was first aid qualified (as was Mrs Liddle);²⁶⁶²⁶⁶ First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§18.

¶h. Had a register for the event, and an online booking form with terms and conditions and consent form;²⁶⁷²⁶⁷ IWS000028; IWS000029; IWS000030; IWS000031; MERP000928.

¶i. Relied (as it seems to me not unreasonably) on the venue fire safety and evacuation plan.²⁶⁸²⁶⁸ First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§38.

¶As with Mrs Scholes, I was satisfied that Ms Lucas was someone who took health and safety responsibilities seriously and approached the organisation of her yoga classes with professionalism. I have noted that in her supplementary statement Ms Lucas has clarified that she was not aware of the emergency exit route through the Calculus office.²⁶⁹²⁶⁹ Second Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000061/§§21-22. While it is fair to observe that Ms Lucas should have been aware of this alternative exit route (because it was in the Fire Evacuation Procedure), I am satisfied that this was irrelevant to the events as they in fact unfolded.²⁷⁰²⁷⁰ JSC000014. The Calculus door would only have been unlocked upon the fire alarm being activated (through being depressed or smoke/fire being detected) and that route would in any event have been a longer route to the outside. In the circumstances, it is – I find – entirely understandable that the shorter direct route to escape was used. I find it improbable that Ms Lucas would have acted differently (in the fast moving and traumatic situation she faced including the injuries viciously inflicted on her) even if she had known of the second exit route.

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¶189. The second matter is that, in my judgement, neither Mrs Scholes nor Ms Lucas can be faulted for not having foreseen (or specifically planned for) an attack of the kind carried out by AR. While it is fair to say that this risk was not part of the risk assessments carried out by either Mrs Scholes or Ms Lucas, I do not consider that a reasonably conscientious organiser of a relatively small community event for young children aged 6 to 10 would have readily foreseen a mass casualty knife attack by a complete stranger deliberately targeting young children.

¶190. The third matter is that, as regards the security arrangements that were in place, the class that was attacked at the Hart Space was by no means out of step with standards for such classes or events elsewhere in the community, I take into account that Mrs Scholes was neither ‘an expert’ nor wholly independent (in the sense that she had a direct involvement in these events). Nevertheless, both as a class facilitator and in her paid employment as a Health and Inequalities Community Engagement Lead, Mrs Scholes has significant experience of visiting a wide variety of community venues for classes for expectant mothers and young children. I accept as fair and accurate, the summary in her written statement which explained that:

100. In my NHS job and as a mother, I attend venues which host after school and holiday clubs. Some have a small gate system, similar to what you would find in a gym to prevent small children from running out, some have magnetic locks, some have nothing. Many places I visit are multipurpose venues, hosting different things at the same time, using the entrance as a communal area for all spaces within the venue. It would not be unusual to have a children’s club running at the same time as other events / classes / services in many venues which have a communal entrance.

104. As part of my NHS employment, I have attended small classes with children and babies around the area and across Cheshire and Merseyside and access to these locations are very rarely locked and many don’t have the provision to do so. Some have gates to keep children inside, but these wouldn’t stop a determined intruder.

105. I can think of many other examples such as roller rinks, holiday clubs and more which are located in multi-use buildings, sometimes open to the general public for other facilities such as gyms. All these places have a much larger public footfall than Norwood Business Centre did. Children’s classes and activities also take place on open public fields. The above statements about other venues are not a criticism of them, it is simply to highlight that The Hart Space ran no differently to other places.”²⁷¹²⁷¹ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§100, §§104-105.

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¶191. The fourth matter is that it – put at its lowest – I cannot be confident that a locked specialist fire door (either the outside door or in place of the wooden doors to the upstairs studio) would necessarily have reduced the risk or the injuries in the face of the devastating attack carried out by AR. Both Mrs Scholes and Ms Lucas have emphasised their view that it may have made matters worse. Ms Lucas considers that had a door to AR been locked, she would likely have opened it, assuming it was a parent or other family member arriving to collect a child (Ms Lucas’s initial reaction when she very first saw AR was that his presence was not unusual – there were other premises in the business centre and parents might come into the Hart Space at pick up time).²⁷²²⁷² First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§53, §§55-56. Mrs Scholes points to the risk that if the outside door had a magnetic lock releasable by a green button, more children could have been even more seriously wounded or killed because, in the panic, they may not have remembered or been able to reach the green button, or the door could have ended up relocked.²⁷³²⁷³ First Witness Statement of Mrs Scholes JSC000003/§116. It seems to me both difficult and unnecessary to seek to resolve this ‘what if’ counterfactual: it is in truth hard to predict what, if any, difference a magnetic lock fire door may have made. I do, however, note that it is by no means certain that such a specialist fire door with magnetic locks would have led to a better outcome on the dreadful facts of AR’s particular attack.

Ratios of adults to children

¶192. Some concern was also raised about the adult:child ratio for the class.

¶193. This arose in part because there is (non-binding) guidance from the NSPCC.²⁷⁴²⁷⁴ NSPCC000001. This guidance makes clear that: “There is no specific guidance about supervision ratios for organisations that are not in the education or early years sectors”. But it goes on to make a recommendation based on “… some best practice guidance to help other organisations work out how many adults are needed to supervise children safely”. On this approach, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) recommendation was for:

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¶“…at least two adults present when working with or supervising children and young people. We recommend the following adult to child ratios as the minimum numbers to help keep children safe:

¶
• 0 - 2 years – one adult to three children
• 2 - 3 years – one adult to four children
• 4 - 8 years – one adult to six children
• 9 - 12 years – one adult to eight children
• 13 - 18 years – one adult to ten children”

¶194. The class on the day of the attack comprised 25 girls aged 6 to 10, with one (Child C6) aged 13 acting as an informal ‘helper’, who would not count towards supervisory ratios. There were two adult supervisors, Ms Lucas and Mrs Liddle. So, the overall ratio was 1:13, which would not be in accordance with the (non-binding) NSPCC recommendations.

¶195. I do not however consider that there was any material failure here by Ms Lucas. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons.

¶a. The NSPCC recommendations only provide organisational guidance, they are not binding;

¶b. The national guidance, the OOSS guidance, does not mandate any ratio. Again, Ms Dixon’s evidence was that this was deliberate because of the need for proportionality in the context of a wide variety of types of event;²⁷⁵²⁷⁵ T/S: 28/130/7-21.

¶c. One relevant factor in considering appropriate adult:child ratios would be the experience and qualifications of the supervisors. Here both supervisors were qualified and highly experienced teaching professionals used to dealing with children of this age, not (for example) inexperienced adult volunteers;

¶d. A further relevant factor would be the nature and location of the activities. This was an indoor event. The activities themselves (children’s yoga and dance in indoor studio spaces) might be thought to be relatively low risk when taught by qualified staff (contrast for example outdoor adventure pursuits, or sports with significant contact or impact);

¶e. For classes of this kind, Ms Lucas normally followed a ratio of 1:15, but she stated that she capped attendance at this event at 26, rather than 30, children to the two adults.²⁷⁶²⁷⁶ First Witness Statement of Ms Lucas IWS000003/§58.

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