Consequences

¶50. Drawing these issues together, AR had clearly revealed the extreme danger that he presented to others by as early as 11 December 2019. On that day, he took weapons to his former school, with the pre-meditated intention of killing an identified pupil whom he perceived had previously bullied him. On it becoming apparent he would not be able to attack his intended victim, AR instead assaulted another pupil at random. This followed AR having earlier repeatedly carried a knife to the same school in October 2019, again with the intention of using it to kill or do really serious harm in response to AR’s perception that he had been slighted or bullied. It also followed the identification by The Acorns School that AR was searching for concerning content on the internet and expressing disturbing interests in violence and in atrocities.

¶51. The incident on 11 December 2019 was, in my view, a watershed event: it put beyond doubt that AR was motivated by an enduring desire to inflict severe harm on and possibly kill another pupil, on a pretext of perceived bullying, for which there was either no objective basis at all, or which was at best grossly disproportionate to any difficulty he had experienced with other pupils. Taken with the other information available at the time, this should have led all agencies involved to a conclusion that AR posed a high risk of harm to others. As the subsequent narrative will reveal, nothing occurred during the next five years to indicate that this level of danger had diminished. To the contrary, as time passed the authorities, with certain minor exceptions, had an ever-reducing understanding of AR’s preoccupations and intentions. Interaction between AR and the relevant organisations became, at best, something of a token. They were unaware of his continuing chilling internet preoccupations and his accumulation of lethal weapons, as well as the ingredients for a lethal poison.

¶52. It is significantly troubling that no agency within our public services had the responsibility to monitor, investigate and take steps to neutralise a risk of this order of magnitude. This was a risk that had been clearly established between October and December 2019. The most acute example of this is that had AR’s further carrying of a knife (with self-confessed intent) on 17 March 2022 been judged and responded to by the relevant agencies with a proper appreciation of his past risk, AR would have been arrested. Thereafter his serious further criminality (possession of ricin seeds with chemical equipment, possession of the Al-Qaeda manual) would have come to light. Instead, two probationary police constables were essentially left to deal with this incident on the ground, in circumstances where poor systemic information management meant that they had very little understanding of AR’s past behaviours and risk.

¶53. Wholly separately, therefore, from my view that the attack would not have occurred had AR’s parents reported what they knew in late July 2024, if appropriate arrangements and reasonable resources had been in place to address the risk that AR posed to others from December 2019 onwards, it is highly likely that the tragedy of 29 July 2024 would not have occurred.