The Iraq Inquiry

The full version of this report is coming soon

• Executive Summary - Text version Original PDF

• Volume 1:
  • Introduction
  • Section 1.1 - UK strategy 1990 to 2000
  • Section 1.2 - Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001
  • Section 2 - Decision-making within government
  • Section 3.1 - Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002
  • Section 3.2 - Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 - “axis of evil” to Crawford
• Volume 2:
  • Section 3.3 - Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002
  • Section 3.4 - Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002
  • Section 3.5 - Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 - the negotiation of resolution 1441

Summary

The Iraq Inquiry, also referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry after its chairman, Sir John Chilcot, is a British public inquiry into the nation’s role in the Iraq War. The Inquiry was pursued by a committee of Privy Counsellors with broad terms of reference to consider Britain’s involvement in Iraq between mid-2001 and July 2009. It covered the run-up to the conflict, the subsequent military action and its aftermath with the purpose to establish the way decisions were made, to determine what happened and to identify lessons to ensure that in a similar situation in future, the British government is equipped to respond in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country.

Materials

The Iraq Inquiry website can be found at https://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk

License

Original material was licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0