Reports that Matter

Investigation of the Challenger Accident · 1986

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  1. 1 Theodore Baumeister, Editor, Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, 7th Ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). pp. 18-35. 1 2 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. H-1.
  2. 3 NASA, "Report to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident," July 14, 1986. (Hereafter r e ferred to as NASA Response to Rogers Commission.)
  3. 64 - 4 2 0 0 - 86 - 2
  4. 64 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 37-40. bid., p. 12.
  5. 64 -420 0 - 86 - 6
  6. 64 -1 143 hid.
  7. 8 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, pp. 917-18.
  8. 8 84 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV. p. 721 85 Ibid., Volume V. pp. 843-45. 86 Ibid., Volume I, p. 101.
  9. 11 I
  10. 11 Discussions with personnel from Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, and Aerojet General, August, 1986. l
  11. 11 01s Channel 216, p. 355. 117 "Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report," 5. NASA, "Hazard to Orbiter Tiles Posejby the Vertical Structure Ice: Mission 51-L," January 30, 1986, p. 3.
  12. 12 2 These include the destructive failures of engine 0204 in September 1981; engine 2013 in April 1982; engine 2208 in August 1982; engine 0108 in February 1984; and engine 2308 in March 1985. l
  13. 31 Cmte Hgs., Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 185.
  14. 32 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. H-73.
  15. 323 John Wark, "Bitter Freeze is Expected to Clobber State Tuesday," The Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 26, 1986,p. B-3.
  16. 33 s3 Ibid.
  17. 41 Ibid., Chart "Conclusions."
  18. 42 s Cmte Hgs,Transcript,June 17, 1986, p. 205.
  19. 43 Ibid., Volume 11, p. K-23.
  20. 45 44 Ibid., Volume I, pp. 192-93. Ibid,. Volume 11, p. K-23. 46 Ibid. 4 7 NASA, The Apollo Spacecraft, A Chronology, 1978, Volume IV, p. 319, Appollo 12.
  21. 13 3 William Lucas, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center, "MSFC Flight Readiness Review (FRR) Board for MSFC Elements for Mission 51-L," January 7, 1986, pp. 1-2. See Appendix . vm-n _*-
  22. 14 Hearin s before the House Science and Technology Committee, "Investigation of the Space Shuttle Chaflenger Accident," 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Transcript, July 15, 1986, p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as Cmte Hgs).
  23. 14 I . 14 Discussion with Mr. McDonald, September 4, 1986. Ibid.
  24. 16 15 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. K-27. After further investigation, the Commlttee has learned that some qualifying remarks are required for Dr. Feynman's characterization of the FAA engine qualification procedures to be totally accurate. The FAA does not permit cracks in what it calls 'critical" engine components. However, cracks located at, or above, the base of a turbine blade are not considered critical by the FAA because: (1) commercial jet engines possess adequate internal shielding to contain any Continued
  25. 16 degree range and the waiver that we wrote yesterday for 51L only gives us allow- ance down to 28 degrees F. UKN. Yeah, we'll have to rewrite that waiver. D. OK. You don't think we'll have any trouble getting that signed? UKN. No, as long as our pressure transducers are OK.
  26. 19 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, 1051, testimony of Jesse Moore. A somewhat different version of the enesis of the August 1 briefing waa presented by Allen McDonald, Thio kol's Director of Solif Rocket Motor Project, in testimony before the Rogers Commission (Bid., pp. 1591-92): Mr. MCDONALD. The meeting that occurred on August 19 came about aa a result of this problem with the nozzle eroding through, and that is what drove that meeting. Headquarters wanted to hear about that. We lost the runary seal and eroded some secondary. We all sat down together a n i f o t together with the engineering people and put together that presentation and collective1 sai , you know, we ought to address the whole seal issue, not Just that failure, because we alf felt that if that ever happened in the field joint we were in bad trouble because the nozzle has a much better cyondary sea! than the +Id joint does. Mr. Sumn. At this meeting on August 19th a t headquarters, that was called because of Thiokol's concern that the joint was reall in trouble? Mr. MCD~NALD. No,, it was cald-we had had another meeting scheduled a t Washington headquarters a t that time that had a problem with the mixer fire earlier in the year, and there was a review of that. I believe Mike Weeks either called Joe or I or one of us and said well, you're here, you ought to come and address a couple of other issues that have happened recently that we are very interested in. One of them is we had broken the structural test article on the filament would case I believe in July down a t Marshall, and they wanted to hear about that. The other one was they were made aware that we had violated the primary seal in the nozzle and wanted to hear about that and what our rationale waa to continue. See also, Cmte Hgs, Transcri t, June 17, 1986, pp. 98-101. 1 7 0 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, Juyy 24, 1986, p. 97.
  27. 28 Engmeering consultants to the Committee have serious questions 88 to how this test relates to actual O-ring performance in flight hardware.
  28. 28 NASA, "SRB Critical Items List," Page A-6A, December 17, 1982, Sheet
  29. 23 ZaNASA, "Shuttle Flight Data and Infli ht Anomaly List, Revision H," Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, January, 1986, pp. 2-f and 2-9.
  30. 26 Rogers Commiasion Report, Volume I, p. 148.
  31. 29 30 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 834.
  32. 34 Ibid., pp. K-23 through K-27; K-31.
  33. 38 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. F-2.
  34. 38 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 15, 1986, pp. 10-12, 61. Discussion with NASA personnel, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1986.
  35. 37 "The second breakdown in communications. . . ," Mr. Aldrich testified before the Commis- sion, "is the situation of the variety of reviews that were conducted last summer between the NASA Headquarters Organization and the Marshall Organ+tion on the ljoint eal.problem] and the fact that that waa not brou h t through my office in elther dlrectlon-that IS, it was not worked through by the NASA Heatquartera Organization nor when the Marshall Organization brought these concerns to be reported were we involved. And I believe that is a critical break- down in process and I think it is also against the documented reporting channels that the prc- gram IS sup to o rate to." Ro era Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1490. JmLarry N&, Marshall &ace F1' h t Center, "Fli ht Readiness Review SRM-24 (STS 6143,'' December 2, 1986, Charta 3-2; 3-2B. %e A pendix VfrI1-G. 30 y r ' O b i s ammission &port, Volume 11, p. . H-P
  36. 48 Michael Isikoff, "Major Flaws Ruled Out in Two Rockets," Washington Post, July 3, 1986, p. A-1.
  37. 48 481bid.rp. 5.
  38. 53 Ibid.
  39. 54 NASA, L.M. Thompson, "SRM/SRB Putty Evaluation," July, 1985.
  40. 55 53 Poise is a measure of viscosity or resistance to flow.
  41. 55 BM-Chemical Division, "Viton Fluoroelastomer," Undated, p. 1.
  42. 56 3 Ibid., p. K-31.
  43. 56 Ibid. 67 Department of Defense, "Milita Specification: Rubber, Fluorocarbon Elastomer, High Tern rature, Fluid, and Compreasion%t Resistant", MILR-83248A. February 17,1984. "rigid, p. 1. 6 9 Ibid p. 3. 6 0 N d A memorandum, William Ra "Visit to Precision Rubber Products Corporation and Parker Seal Company",EP 25 (19-23). JAbruary 6, 1979, p. 1. 6 1 Ibid. 6* bid., p. 2. 8s Ibid.
  44. 57 s' Cmte Hgs Transcri t, June 17,1986,pp. 284-85.
  45. 58 Ibid., p. K-31.
  46. 58 PAS Record A0928$ p. 3.
  47. 59 58 Sbff meeting with NASA personnel, Head uarters, Washington, D.C., May 13, 1986.
  48. 59 Ibid., p. 50.
  49. 60 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 2-31,
  50. 61 67 Ibid., p. 791.
  51. 52 e2 Ibid., p. K-31.
  52. 63 O3 Ibid.,p. K-3.
  53. 77 7 Rogers Commission Report, Volume IV, pp. 792-93.
  54. 78 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. K-32.
  55. 80 Cmte Hgs, Transc+pt, July 15, 1986, p. 62.
  56. 83 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 16, 1986, p. 24.
  57. 84 NASA, documents on the SPC contract, sup lied to the Committee in July, 1986.
  58. 85 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. 6-2-3.
  59. 86 9 s Bid. pp. 579-81.
  60. 89 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-15. 9 0 bid. p. 1-14,
  61. 89 w 9 01s Channel 245, p.
  62. 101 Ibid., Volume I, p. 170. 102 Ibid., p. 174.
  63. 101 "Ice/Frost Team Evaluation Report," p. 4.
  64. 105 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 1-15
  65. 105 1O5 01s Channel 245, pp. 600-601.
  66. 106 lo8 01s Channel 216, p. 345.
  67. 110 0 NASA briefing on STS Production Process by Elaine Hofstetler-Presented to Committee Staff on May 19, 1986.
  68. 111 Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 166-73; Volume 11, pp. 5-26-29,J-33-51. l
  69. 111 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1013
  70. 112 1 * NASA briefing, May 19, 1986. 1 1 5 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. 5-46.
  71. 119 NASA Memo from W.R. Lucas, to James M. Beggs, Administrator, dated August 21, 1981.
  72. 120 lZo Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1455.
  73. 123 123Douglas B. Feaver, "Succeea Relaxed NASA's Vigilence", Washington Post, May 26, 1986, pp. A-1, A-10.
  74. 130 130 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, pp. K25-26 NASA Briefing on July 10, 1986.
  75. 130 "Launch Commit Criteria and Background," p. 5.1-4.
  76. 132 5.1-4. 1 3
  77. 133 3 Ibid., p. 1590; note: Yet it was Mr. McDonald who wrote a letter to the SRB Project Office recommending that the O-ring problem be dropped from the Problem Assessment System (PAS), which was in fact equivalent to removing the launch constraint. L 3
  78. 134 4 Rogers Commission Report, Volume V, p. 1513. 1 3
  79. 135 5 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 151.
  80. 136 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11, p. F-1.
  81. 136 296. 136Jbid., p. 297.
  82. 138 lJsIbid., p. 302. ISs
  83. 139 lS8 bid., Volume I, pp. 114-17. Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 18, 1986, pp. 83-84.
  84. 139 Bid., p. 305.
  85. 141 Ibid., p. 98.
  86. 142 Ibid. June 25, 1986, p. 78.
  87. 142 Ira hid., p.
  88. 143 bid.: June 18. 1986, P. 100.
  89. 145 bid., July 15, 1986, pp. 71-72.
  90. 146 bid., p. 73.
  91. 146 166Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 161.
  92. 147 *7 Ibid.,June 25, 1986,p. 42. Ibid.,p. 44.
  93. 147 157Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80-81.
  94. 148 149 Ibid., p. 49.
  95. 148 158Ibid., pp. 117-18. IsoIbid., June 11, 1986 p 61 2 Former Shuttle Pro am Manager, Robert Thompson, indicated the need for this &a&&, k t i n g : . . and I thinrthe matter of being sure you have the I'. proper people selected and that those people are roper1 indoctrinated and trained for their position and they clearly understand the respnsibiet andrreporting channels of their positions, I think those are all areas for improvement. -Cmte hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, p. 121. 160Material submitted for the record in response to wrltten questions from Chairman Roe (letter dated 9/18/86). That submission includes the following table: NASA LOSSES FISCAL YEAR 1981-86 [In fial years] 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ~ ~~ Total ...................... .......................................... 1,983 1,556 1,176 1,530 1.494 1.169 .......................................... 32 26 13 19 9 5 AST ngineern................... .......................................... 665 503 386 576 569 457 Life scientists...................................................... ............ 6 6 0 3 2 4 .......................................... 261 207 161 156 204 180 "on-Aempace Technologist.
  96. 152 hid., p. 54-55.
  97. 155 153 Ibid., p. 55. 154Ibid., June 11, 1986, pp. 59-70. Ibid., p. 60 material supplied for the record.
  98. 167 Ibid., pp. 123, 125.
  99. 1868 lsaSee,e.g., testimony of L. Michae; Weeks, Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 130; Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 120-140.
  100. 172 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, June 12, 1986, p. 138.
  101. 173 113 Letter from Brian Russell, Manager MTI SRM Ignition System to James W. Thomas, Marshall Space Flight Center, August 9, 1985.
  102. 179 '79 Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 91-2. Ibid., June 12, 1986, p. 141. 181 The issue of whether communications are filtered so that important information is prevented from reaching decision-makers is addressed in Section VI.B.2.b. 1 8 1 Cmte Hgs,Transcript, June 17, 1986, p. 207.
  103. 18 a 3 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 117. I84Ibid., June 17, 1986, pp.215-16
  104. 18 N h , "Evaluation of TWR-12690 CD, Test Plan for Space Shuttle SRM Li htweight Cylinder Segment Joint Verification, dated June 10,1980",EP 25 (80-701, June 1 6 , 1 9 8 , p. 2.
  105. 185 Rogers Commission &port, Volume I, p. 159.
  106. 188 Cmte Hgs, Transcript, July 24, 1986, pp. 80, 87. 189 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 128.
  107. 190 Ibid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
  108. 192 bid., July 23, 1986, p. 10. Ig3 bid., June 25, 1986, p. 101.
  109. 194 Ibid.
  110. 195 196 Ibid., July 24, 1986, pp. 69-70 19e Ibid., p. 17.
  111. 197 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 11. 1g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.
  112. 199 Ibid., June 25, 1986, p. 52.
  113. 200 Ibid., July 24, 1986,p. 94.
  114. 208 Ibid. 2 0 8 Rogers Commission Report., Volume 11, p. H-95.
  115. 2088 *08 NASA Response to Rogers Commission, July 14, 1986, p. 20.
  116. 209 *OQDiscussionwith the NASA Chief Engineer's Ofice, May 13, 1986. Also, Cmte Hgs, response to question by Mr. Roe,Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60. 2 1
  117. 210 0 Cmte Hgs, response to question by Mr. Roe, Transcript, June 11, 1986, pp. 59-60. 2 1
  118. 211 1 Telephone Conversation, August 13, 1986.
  119. 214 Rogers Commission Re rt, Volume I, p. 152. 21bDiacussion with the N E A Chief Engineer's Oftice, May 13, 1986.
  120. 710 .5A, p. 3.
  121. 49 Robert Lindstrom, NASA, Marshall Space Fli ht Center, "Assigning Launch Constraints on dpen Problems Submitted to MSFC PAS," Septem%er 15,1980, p. 1. See Appendix WI-J. 6 1
  122. 65 66 Ibid.
  123. 73 7s Ibid., Volume IV, p. 717.
  124. 74 7' bid., Volume IV, p. 604.
  125. 76 '6 Supervisor of Structures Design, Thiokol. '
  126. 88 Conversations were recorded from the Kennedy ipace Center Operational Intercommunication System (OW, which permits members of the launch crew to discuss problems that occur during the countdown, and permits them to contact various mission support facilities around the country. The transcripts provided to the Committee do not indicate the exact times at which the referenced conversations occurred, and so the flow of conversations has been reconstructed in an attempt to provide logical consistency. Most of the transcripts in this section are drawn from OIS Channel 245, identified as the coordination channel for JSC/MSFC/KSC Engineering personnel in the Engineering Support Area at Kennedy Space Center. Conversations among Rockwell International personnel were obtained from 01s Channel 216, described as the coordination channel for JSC personnel at Johnson and Kennedy centers and Rockwell engineers in Downey, California. Tranacript page numbers a re those supplied by NASA. Continued
  127. 90 570. mid., pp. 570-72.
  128. 92 Ibid., p, 574.
  129. 93 Ibid, pp. 574-76.
  130. 95 516. Ibid., pp. 577-78.
  131. 96 98 bid., p. 578.
  132. 99 09 Ibid., pp. 581-82.
  133. 102 *02 01s Channel 245, p. 595. 1 0 2 a Rockwell rsonnel appearing in House transcripts are identified as follows: RI: Kennedy &ce Center liaison. RTI: Director of Technical Integration. Continued
  134. 104 01s Channel 216, pp. 340-41.
  135. 107 lo' 01s Channel 245, pp. 603-604.
  136. 116 lo01s Channel 216, p. 353.
  137. 113 Ibid., p. 1014. 1 1
  138. 114 4 Ibid., p. 1025.
  139. 1222 122 Mr. George Jeffs, President, North American Space Operations, Rockwell International. 123 Cmte. Hgs, Transcript, July 25, 1986, pp. 71-74.
  140. 125 12501s Channel 245, p. 217. '*@Ibid.
  141. 128 8 See Appendix VIII-L.
  142. 127 &annel 245, pp. 219-20. 1 2
  143. 1330 p bid., 13301SCiannel245, pp. 220-21.
  144. 1340 '3'01s Channel 161, p. 289. Channel 161 is identified as an Engineering channel used for troubleshooting and systems integration.
  145. 137 Bid., p. 299.