Reports that Matter

Investigation of the Challenger Accident

PANEL ON TECBRICAL EVALUATION OF RASA'S PPOPOSED BZDESICII

Section 39 of 54

PANEL ON TECBRICAL EVALUATION OF RASA'S PPOPOSED BZDESICII

OF TEE SPACE 8WRI.l SOLID R O C R T BOOSTER

NAE D r . H. Guyford S t e v e r , CHAIRMAN Dr. Alan N. Cent . NAS F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y P r o f e s s o r of Polymer P h y s i c s

N a t i o n a l Academy of Engineering The I n s t i t u t e o € Polymer S c i e n c e

2101 C o n s t i t u t i o n Avenue, N.W (NAS 307) U n i v e r s i t y o f Akron

Washington, DC 20418 Auburn S c i e n c e B u i l d i n g , Room 325

Akron, Ohio 44325

U r . Laurence J. Adam8 ( R e t i r e d Former P r e s i d e n t , U r . Dean K. Hanink Martin m r i e t t a Corporation) ( R e t i r e d Manager of E n g i n e e r i n g 13401 B e a l l Creek Court Operations. R e t r o i t D i e s e l ) Potomac, M) 20854 145 Uaple C r e s t Drive Carmel, I N 46032

Dr. David Altman NAE Dr. James W. Uar ( R e t i r e d Manager o f Engineering Jerome C. Hunsaker P r o f e s s o r o f U n i t e d Technologies Company) Aerospace Education 1670 Oak Avenue Dept. of A e r o n a u t i c s h A s t r o n a u t i c s Uenlo P a r k , CA 94025 U a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e of Technology One Surf Way, Apt. 119 Uonterey, CA 93940 U r . R o t e r t C. Anderson ( R e t i r e d Vice P r e s i d e n t , '72 HIT O f f i c e : TRW Energy Development Group, E l e c t r o n i c s b Defense S e c t o r ) P r o f e s s o r Edward W. P r i c e E n g i n e e r i n g and Uanagement C o n s u l t a n t Regents ' P r o f e s s o r 840 5 5 t h Avenue, N.W. School of Aerospace E n g i n e e r i n g Salem, Oregon 97304 Georgia I n s t i t u t e of Technology A t l a n t a , GA 30332

D r . J a c k L. Blumenthal Chief E n g i n e e r Ur. Robert D. Watt TRW ( R e t i r e d Group Leader, U a t e r i a l s and Chemistry Applicakions Stanford Linear Accelerator Center)1 For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide and assist in the performance of a technical or management function. g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11. Space P a r k , B u i l d i n g 01, Room 2010 11117 P a l o s Verde D r i v e Redondo Beach, CA 90278 C u p e r t i n o , CA 95014

D r . Robert C. Forney NRC S t a f f

E x e c u t i v e Vice P r e s i d e n t

€ . I . duPont de Nemours 6 Co., I n c . N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h C o u n c i l , JH b15

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Department 2101 C o n s t i t u t i o n Avenue, N.W. DuPont B u i l d i n g , Room 9000 Washington, DC 20418

Wilmington, DE 19898

D r . R o b e r t H. Korkegi (Co-Director)

D r . Hyron F. Uman (Co-Director)

u s . V i v i a n e S c o t t (Adm. A s s i s t a n t )

VI-c

loace aev.1 For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide and assist in the performance of a technical or management function. g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11. I I

I Failure Mace Effccts analvsis I 2 I Rp-zsm I I I Sucmiczal h i e c u i e :1 For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide and assist in the performance of a technical or management function. g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11. I I I submit updates a t 6-wnth intervals r i t h s u t ~ ~ i t t a l linked t o n e a e s t sckedule CIL I I FSR submittal. I ! II Conwacr S W rieierencr: iI II Exhibit 4. 3.3.3 I use:

  • Ercireeriro Succort I I I

II To identify c r i t i c a l f a i l u r e motes t o be used as a b a s i s f o r sucpor: o f : (1) I

I I Additional Design Action; (2) SPfeCY A n a l y s i s ; and ( 3 ) Mission U n t i n ~ e n c yPlanning. I I , I I I I inrerzeiatisnsnip: I I I I I I I I - c , p e - i o n c e n t s - r o ~ a t - ~ a i n K ~ n a n c - i J v e r e n tiuxnrsneo 0at3: I I I 1. Sccoe/Cmtmts -

Failure mooe e f f e c t s analysis w i l l be preiarad f o r each Criuier venicle Suosystm, including the following: I I

I I I I I

  • a. Systern/Subsystem/Assembly/It~~ i c e n t i f i c 3 t i o n o f X s n f o r rnicn the mEj\ is being ccnducted. I I

I I I I

b. - Preca?o/Approved a y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of anaiyst *no PerforTed the FWEA and I indiviccals responsible ?or overall FVE4 e i f o r : . I

1 I c. Revisicn - Oat2 i n d i v i l u a l ?ages arz izvis2d. I I d. Item Identification: I I I (1) Name I I I I I

(2) - i d e n t i i f c a t i c n Number Drawing numoer by rniCn the Ccntzactor l d e n t i f i e s and describes eacn ccmponent o r mccule. I I

I I I ( 3 ) Drawing ileference Cesisnaticn

module on the sccernatic. - I c e n t i f i c a t i c n of the ccmponent or I

I I I I (4) Quantit.{ - Total ncmcer C J ~i:ems i n the s ~ c s y s i o a . I I I e. FWm Numcei - A nmcer t h a t uniguely i c e n t i f k s tne sucsysten, c:rnpcnent,

and f a i l u r e moce. I

I I I I f. Funccicn - Ccccise statenent of :x f w c z x n per'zrnea. I

I I I I I I I I I I I PaSe 1 of 3 I

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NTPJ4l'ICN AEZUIXXNT O E C X i T I C N

I iiue: iOacs iiev. I I I I I Feilurs Moce Effects Analvsis I W-267E3 I I

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I 2. Cccoe/Ccntents (Cmntlnced) -- '

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n. - Remartts/Hazmls Statement o f my remarks, reccrmendatians, and Fotential hazards a s required. I I I

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  1. Vehicle Effectivity - Identification of the vehicle e f f e c t i v i t y for the failurr? made identifizd. I I I

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-- I 3. Format To be preparzd in mntzact3r's fornat. I

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I 4. Haintenancs To be maintained by paqe ;evision/total reissuance, as aPPlicable.1 I

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  • I 5 . Coverrment Furnished Data Not ZppliC2ble. I -

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I I I I I I I Pese 3 JI'3 NASA, "Report to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presi- dential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident," July 14, 1986. (Hereafter r e ferred to as NASA Response to Rogers Commission.) j

324

i Failure mce Effects Analysis I 2 IRA-26N I I 1 suopzcza l - t i s u m i t updates a t 6-nonth intervals rith s a i t t a l linked t o nearest schedule CIL i I m submtttal. I

'- I I

I I I a n t - a c c s n Reference:

. I I

I Exhibit A, 5.3.3 I use: - Eroineerino Succcrt I I I I I To identify c:itical fatlure modes t o be used a s a b a s i s for support of: (1) I I Additional Oesign .%%.ion; (2) S a f e g Analysis; and (3) Mission Continpncy P l a n i n g . I I I I I I incerreiatiwsnrp: I I I I I I I I Sc;peicncencs-r-ormat-~~ntenancsijverrmentiunrsneo gata: I I I I 1. SccoeKontents I - Failure moce e f f e c t s analysis w i l l be proparod for eactl Crater venicle Suosystsm, including the follcwing: I I I I I a. Systm/Subsystem/Assembly/I~s! - I d e n t i f i a t i o n of it&! f o r which the FMEA II is being ccnductel. I I I I I tl- - Preparea/Approved a y Identification of ma:yst wno perforned t h e FMEA a d I indiviouals rrsponsible for overall FYEA aiforr. I I I

I c. Revision - Date indiViZUal ?aCes aro revissl.1 For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide and assist in the performance of a technical or management function. g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.

I I I d- Item Identification: I I I I (1) Name I I I (2) Identi?icaticn NUmOef - Ornwing numoer by wnicn t h e Ccntractor LlentiPLes and b e s c n b e s eacn CcmFonent or mcculs. I I I I I I (3) Drawing ileference Cesisnaticn mocule on the schenatic. - 1centi:icatian 01' the ccmponent cr I I I I I I I (a) Quantity - TcWl numcer of itzms in the ;~Csysiern. I

I e. FMEA Number - A number that unicuely i c e n t i f i e s w e sucsystea, cCmccnent, ana f a i l u r e moce. I I I I I I r. Fw,cricn - Ccccise s t i t e n e n t o f :ne f m c t i c n per'zraea. I I I I I I I I I I I I I P a p 1 cf 3 !

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I ' I 2. SccoeKcntmts (Ccntinued) . I I I n. - Renarks/Hazmis Statament of any remarks, rxcnmendaticns, and p o t e n t i a l hazards a s required. I I I 0. Vehicle Effectivity - Identification of the venicle effectivit'/ f o r the f a i l u r a mode l d f f l t i f k d . I I I 3. - To t e Dreparsd in Csnrractir's fomat.

I *. Halntenancs - To be maintained 3y page r e v f s i o n / t o t l l raissuanca, a s applicable. I I 1 - 5. Coverment Furnished Data - Not applicible. I I I I I I I I

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VI-D

Date: January 31. 1984 Page 1 o f 34 Approved:- RELIABILITY V.P. Ostrander. Mgr., R e l i a b i l i t y DESK INSTRUCTION Space S h u t t l e Pro- NO. 100-26

FLIGHT HAROUARE FAILURE WOE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

i

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

_(. References: ( 1 ) EOM 70 1-5.1.1.1

70 2-6.3.1 ( 2 ) R e l i a b i l i t y Desk Instruction No. 100-1 Eva1 uati on - Reliability

( 3 ) R e l i a b i l i t y Desk Instructlon No. 100-12 Element Interface - Shuttle

INIROOUCTION

R e l i a b i l i t y of t h e design is t h e ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of Design. However.' i t i s incunbent on o t h e r Engineering functions. Including R e l i a b i l i t y . t o support t h e design engineer i n d l x h a r g i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b i l l t i e s . The Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEAI Is p r l m r y r e 1 i a b I l i t y technique f o r providlng design and program support and c o n s t i t u t e s a documented record of the design s t a t u s and coordinated declSiOnS.

1.0 PURPOSE

This desk Instruction defines t h e procedures f o r generating. documenting and . maintainlng F a i l u r e Mode Effects Analyses (FMEA) and C r i t i c a l Items Lists (CIL) f o r t h e Space S h u t t l e Orbiter subsystems i n o r d e r t o v e r i f y design adequacy w i t h respect t o inherent r e l i a b i l i t y .

7-

2.0 DEFINITIONS

  1. -- is t h e l n a b l l l t y of a system. subsystem, component. o r p a r t t o perform its required function within specified lirits uider specified

conditions f o r a specified duration.1 For the purpose of this report, a procedure is a formal set of instructions designed to guide and assist in the performance of a technical or management function. g8 mid., July 24, 1986, p. 11.

01 #O. 100-26 Page 2 34 of

  1. F a i l u r e Mode - a description o f the manner i n which an ftem can f a i l . 3. Hazard - i s the presence of a potential r i s k s i t u a t i o n caused by an unsafe a c t o r condition.
  1. Redundancy (depth o f ) - describes the a v a i l a b l e (number o f ) ways of performing a function.

'' 5. - Backup Mode of Operation describes t h e a v a i l a b l e ways of performing a function u t i l i z i n g 'like" ( i d e n t i c a l ) hardware.

    • Alternate Mode of Operation describes any additional ways o f performing a function u t i l i z i n g "unlike" hardware.
  1. Criticality - i s the categorization of a hardware item by t h e worst case potential d i r e c t e f f e c t of f a i l u r e of t h a t item. In assigning hardware c r i t i c a l i t y , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of redundancy (backup o r a l t e r n a t e ) modes of operation i s considered. Assignment of functional c r i t i c a l i t y , however, assumes the loss of a l l redundant (backup or a l t e r n a t e ) hardwari Inments. The d e f i n i t i o n of c r i t i c a l i t y i s shown i n Table 2.0. Table 2.0 - C r i t i c a l i t y Definition