Reports that Matter

Investigation of the Challenger Accident

The new Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and

Section 5 of 54

The new Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability and

Quality Assurance must assure that any pressures to increase the Shuttle flight rate do not adversely influence mission preparation. The Associate Administrator must have the authority not only to stop a particular flight, e.g., at a Flight Readiness Review, but to stop the whole mission planning process if necessary.

  1. Where appropriate, NASA should take steps to make the mis- sion planning process standard and routine to reduce the time and resources needed to plan a mission. Before requesting more re- sources for the existing mission planning process (manpower, facili- ties, equipment), NASA should identify ways to improve the proc- ess.

d. Other Safety Issues Issue 1

What is the criticality of landing safety associated with pro- grammed and abort landing sites and their local characteristics? Findings

  1. The Committee finds that many of the normal and abort land- ing safety problems will be alleviated when the Rogers Commis- sion's and the Committee's (Section VI. A. 1. b., this report) recom- mendations to upgrade the landing gear system are implemented. When the landing gear system is understood, straightforward cal- culations and operational rules will determine acceptable runway dimensions and conditions.

  2. The Committee found no reason to fault NASA's current pro- cedure on launch constraints based upon operational judgment and conservative rules on local conditions at planned abort and landing sites. However, since an obvious finding is that the Orbiter is a de- velopmental system, it is axiomatic that unanticipated "dicey" cir- cumstances will arise.

  3. It was found that for the least landing gear system stress, runway preference is Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) (concrete), KSC, and Rogers Dry Lake (EAFB "lake bed") in that order. No reason was found to invalidate the KSC runway design. The rea- sons for the "dry" course surface still prevail over concern about wear on tires designed for one landing. Additional constraints at KSC because of lesser lateral stabilized overrun area may be needed to bring its safety to the level of the EAFB runway.

  4. The NASA Landing Safety Team's proposal to provide stand- ard landing aids and arresting barriers at all sites and their em- phasis on runway surface characteristics for repetitive tire use takes on a new dimension that is in addition to the Rogers Com- mission's recommendations.

  5. Weather, by far, is the most significant factor governing oper- ational decisions, Orbiter damage, and landing safety. The con- straint is simply that acceptable weather must be forecast with confidence within the time frame needed. Ultra-conservative rules prevail because of the predictable unpredictability of Cape weather. New and innovative local weather analysis and forecasting research is a high priority. The African Coast and southwestern United States sites enjoy more stable and predictable weather. Recommendations

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The first priority to achieve an acceptable degree of landing safety and to have a sensible base to work from for improvement is to implement the recommendations of the Rogers Commission and the Committee on the landing gear system improvements to attain an operational capability. Then:

Instrument the system, and schedule all landings at Edwards runway for systematic concurrent testing until the landing gear system is understood.

Write a clean sheet set of rules based on results. Determine the risk of accident with the B-747 Shuttle Carri-

er Aircraft (SCA) and its impact upon the Shuttle program.

Extend every reasonable effort to assure a mission planning process to minimize the need for abort site landings.

Reevaluate and determine the degree of risk acceptable at abort site landings and bring abort site capability up to meet that risk level.

Expand astronaut matched team flight landing practice to cover all known exigencies. Propose additional training craft if necessary.

Join in a venture with NOAA to invent new technology and techniques to learn new ways to understand the dynamics of

Cape Kennedy weather phenomena to supplant current inadequacy to forecast two hours ahead. Issue 2

Has adequate provision been made for crew safety in case of in- flight emergencies? That is, has adequate provision been given to launch abort options and crew escape options? Findings

  1. Crew escape options were considered when the Shuttle was originally designed and the basic situation has not changed. Many initially attractive options do not significantly reduce risk to the crew either because they may not reduce exposure to the principal hazards or because they add risks of their own.

  2. A crew escape system for use in controlled gliding flight might be feasible and worthwhile.

  3. Crew escape during the ascent phase appears infeasible.

  4. Launch abort during SRB burn appears impossible but it may be possible to decrease risk to the crew after SRB separation, pri- marily through mission design. Recommendation

NASA should continue to respond to the recommendations of the Rogers Commission regarding (i) crew escape during controlled gliding flight and (ii) increasing the possibility of successful emer- gency runway landings. NASA should reexamine all crew survival options and report to the Committee on its findings.

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MANAGEMENT ISSUES