TXIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION

¶r v

¶Tkiokol presented an approach to the SRM Program which clearly focused on m a x i m u m utilization of existing facilities a d low early year funding. In-house production efforr would be accomplished in the Wasatch Division,.Utah facility.

¶Increment 111 production would be accomplished by acquisition of portion of the adjacent Air Force Plant 7 8 as Air force reqLirements Shased out. A p requirements would be met by increasing the capability of existing facilities in nearby

¶Henderson, Nevada. Use of an existing, skilled, stable work force in a low labor rate area would minimize new hires and provide low labor costs. Thiokol's decision to fabricate nozzles in-house provided cost savings and good control over this extremely critical component: however, the Board concluded that this introduced some early risk because of lack of experience in fabricating nozzles of this size. Facility location resulted in high transportation cost of the SRM's:

¶however, these costs were more than offset by low facility investments. The Thiokol proposal received the second highest overall Mission Suitability score by 'he SEB, being tied with UTC. The SEB ranked Thiokol fourth under the

¶Design, Development and Verification Factor, second under the

¶Manufacturing, Refurbishment and Product Support Factsr and first under the Management Factor.

¶Design, DeVelODIIIent and Verification

¶The Thiokol case design met the general SRM requirements;

¶however, the cylindrical segment was close to the upper limits of size capability of the case fabricator. The nozzle design

257

¶7 included a b l a t i v e m a t e r i a l s not c u r r e n t l y develcped o r characterize&. This o f f e r e d p o t e n t i a l savings i n program c o s t , but with atyendant t e c h n i c a l and program risk. ~n expanded c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n and development proqam would be required. The thickness of t h e nozzle m a t e r i a l was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o m e e t required s a f e t y f a c t o r s and thus degraded r e l i a b i l i t y . The amount of m a t e r i a l required to c o r r e c t t h e deficiency was s u b s t a n t i a l and tile Geficiency could r e q u i r e a reaesign of , . the m e t a l p o r t i o n s a s w e l l as t h e a b l a t i v e p o r t i o n s . The design was complex and would c o n t r i b u t e t o d i f f i c u l t y i n manufacturing. The Thiokol motor c a s e j o i n t s u t i l i z e d dual O-rings and test p o r t s between s e a l s , enabling a simple l e a k check without p r e s s u r i z i n g t h e e n t i r e motor. This inno- v a t i v e design f e a t u r e increased r e l i a b i l i t y and decreased operations a t the launch s i t e , i n d i c a t i n g good a t t e n t i o n t o low c o s t DDT&E and production. The thic-mess of t h e i n t e r n a l i n s u l a t i o n i n the c a s e a f t dome was marginal and c r e a t e d a technical r i s k . Thiokol provided cumprehensive test plans and development v e r i f i c a t i o n objectives: however, they proposed t o v e r i f y p r o p e l l a n t burning c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by t e s t i n g f o u r t o six f u l l scale mixes vhich was excessive, and could be reduced by e s t a b l i s h i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s with smaller mix size d a t a c?uring DDT&E. Also, Thiokol proposed t o hydroburst two motor case assembly specimens, whereas one t e s t would be s u f f i c i e n t .

¶Manufacturina, Refurbishment and Product Support Thiokol had extensive processing experience with t h e i r proposed propellant formulation, having processed over 150 m i l l i o n pounds of t h i s generai type of p r o p e l l a n t . Thiokol's major weakness i n t h i s a r e a of evaluation was i n t h e a r e a of case f a b r i c a t i o n . The segment f a b r i c a t o r would be unable t o f a b r i c a t e t h e case s e r p e n t s strengthened with s t i f f e n i n g rings as proposed by Thiokol f o r a l t e r n a t e water ent-y load conditions, i f required. This would probably r e q d i r e a case and g r a i n redesign. Thiokol's manufacturing approach provided a good mechanized method of i n s t a l l i n g i n s u l a t i o n , coupled with an innovative method of preparing the i n s u l a t i o n surface f o r t h e l i n e r by p e e l i n g off a dacron c l o t h from t h e inner s u r f a c e of the i n s u l a t i o n . A minor w e a k n e s s in t h e manu- f a c t u r i n g approach was the d e c i s i o n to f a b r i c a t e nozzles in-house.due t o Thiokol's lack of experience i n f a b r i c a t i n g nozzles of this -size.

a - - --=posed ;= c t i l i z e e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s wkicl?. W .Z L. ~

¶----- -..-OS~L m i ; L..*- 47 - .

¶aoc:;xaticns, were t Q t a l l y adeqgate f o r 211 t h r e e incrszenzs. The one except'-on t o Llis was a f a i l u r e t o m e e t Quancicy Distance s a f e t y requirements between c a s t i n g p i t s f3r 1ncrP;nezt ITI, however, t h e r e a r e ways t o adequately ,-e t h i s aroblem. Thiokol maximized t h e ref'urbishment of C*'- c3mDonents and t\e p o t e n t i a l c o s t savings grovided by ref.z-Sish- m e s t . a.cz'ker less s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e n g t h was the enhancement

of s e p e n t assemjiy providea by t h r e e alignment p i n s thereby r e d m i n g =he assembly hours on the launch pad. Thiokol f a i l e d t o provide enough new cases and nozzles t o m e e t the launch schedule. Eight a d d i t i o n a l c a s e s and nozzles would Se r e c p i r e d t o provide assurance t h a t launch d a t e s could be met.³³ NASA, "Report to the President Actions to Implement the Recommendations of the Presi- dential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident," July 14, 1986. (Hereafter r e ferred to as NASA Response to Rogers Commission.) , i c k s l str-xt.i=ed t h e development groqram so t h a t a l l mzjor c o s t s were defsrred. t o t h e l a t e s t p r a c t i c a b l e date. This - -es..? Led i n low e a r l y year funding, wnich i s a key program o j j e c r i v e . The a v a i l a b i l i t y of an operating p l a n t , with ample expezienced personnel and a proven organization which c x i d be pnased t o t h e SRM e f f o r t with minimum modification '

¶added considerable maturity and confidence and proved t o be c o s t effec=ive. The Board considered t h i s t o be a major s t r e n g t h f o r all three increments. A strong matrix manage- ment was evident and key l i n e organization supervisors w e r e experienced and had worked together a s a team on many successful development and production programs such a s Minuteman a d Pcseidon. Strong management p a r t i c i p a t i o n and v i s i b i l i t y i n variance a n a l y s i s was another strong f e a t u r e a s was t h e approach t o c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n s and t h e i r e f f e c t on estimate-co-complete. Procurement Management was 'thorouqh and well planned. SRM commodity purchases would be consoli- dated wizh t h a t of o t h e r programs a t Wasatch, which should r e s u l t i n lower c a s t . The Procurement of major items was w e i l matcked. t o o v e r a l l SRM schedule requirements. Thiokol proposed a strong Configuration Flanagement System wnicn inclzdod thcrouc:? i d e n c i f i c a t i o n and t r a c e a b i l i t y during D D T G , p r r d u c t i o n and refurbishment. me t e n t a t i v e decision to make t h e molded and t a p e wrapped nozzle in-house was considered a s t r e n g t h i n t h i s area. It would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e low c o s t - p e r - f l i g h t goal by using a v a i l a b l e resources, avciding s-ontract f e e s , lowering overhead r a t e s , and taking advantage of lower c o s t labor. The i n h e r e n t r i s k management aspects a l s o were considered.

259

¶In :he area of Key Personnel, the prcposed Procra!!. 5irect3r was considered exceptionally strong and. naci successf.Lly perfo-med as a Project Manager on other mE3cx p-roqra!~.~.Be is widely known f o r his excellent perfomance. The 2r3posed Deputy Program Director would also be the Chief Projecz Encineer. :ie ha8 important and successful engineerinq management roles in previous major motor programs a d has -an-excalient 'reputationin the trade. .- --- ..- . Alkhough adequately qualified for tneir proposed assiqments, &&e proposed Functional Managers and their Team Members in the Project Organization did not reflect the degth of experi- ence available in the Functional Departments of the ThioKo1 matrix type organization and had not previously performed as a team. This was not consiciered a significant we2uness sy the 3oard because of the strong experienced matrix organization at Thiokol.

260

¶V-B

¶DRNO. 5-6

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS A N D SPACE AD=-RATION GEORGE C. M A - U SPACE ?- CENTER

¶MARSHALL SPACE F Um C m R ALABAMA

261

Director S o l i d Rocket Motor

¶Ueleaemd by:

¶I$.

a\ C. Tibbittm

¶PROCMn PLAN

PROTECTION O? SPACE SHUTTLE Su( P R W Y HUT011 S w 8

1.0 INTRODUCTIOR

¶Thara hava been incidanta on S11( flight and atatic taat motOK* h e r e a primary o-rint haa haan alightly charred by hot gaaaa vhich penetrated through the vacuum putty batriar. Hotora affactad thua far ara S T S - U aft field joint, -4 norrla joint, STS-1lA forward fiald joint. STS-111) nozzle joint, and STS-1U nozzle joint. Thia program plan vill reault in defining the aolution to thia O-ring char.

2.0 OBJECTIVE

¶h a program objactivaa A K ~to ayateutically isolate tha p r o b l a and to aliminata damage to Slpl aaala.