10.12 LEADERSHIP/MANAGERIAL TRAINING

¶Managers at many levels in NASA, from GS-14 to Associate Administrator, have taken their positions without following a recommended standard of training and education to prepare them for roles of increased responsibility. While NASA has a number of in-house academic training and career development opportunities, the timing and strategy for management and leadership development differs across organizations. Unlike other sectors of the Federal Government and the military, NASA does not have a standard agency-wide career planning process to prepare its junior and mid-level managers for advanced roles. These programs range from academic fellowships to civil service education programs to billets in military-sponsored programs, and will allow NASA to build a strong corps of potential leaders for future progression.

¶Observation:

¶10.12-1 NASA should implement an agency-wide strat-

egy for leadership and management training that provides a more consistent and integrated approach to career development. This strategy should identify the management and leadership skills, abilities, and experiences required for each level of advancement. NASA should continue to expand its leadership development partnerships with the Department of Defense and other external organizations.

present state—and replace all deficient material in the Attachment Rings.

¶The citations that contain a reference to "CAIB document" with CAB or

¶CTF followed by seven to eleven digits, such as CAB001-0010, refer to a document in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board database maintained by the Department of Justice and archived at the National Archives.

"And stunningly, in as much as this was tragic and horrific through a loss of seven very important lives, it is amazing that there were no other collateral damage happened as a result of it. No one else was injured. All of the claims have been very, very minor in dealing with these issues."

NASA Administrator Sean OʼKeefe, testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, May 14, 2003.

An intensive search of over a million acres in Texas and Louisiana recovered 83,900 pieces of Columbia debris weighing a total of 84,900 pounds. (Over 700,000 acres were searched on foot, and 1.6 million

acres were searched with aircraft.) The latitude and longitude was recorded for more than 75,000 of these pieces. The majority of the recovered items were no larger than 0.5 square feet. More than 40,000 items could not be positively identified but were classified as unknown tile, metal, composite, plastic, fabric, etc. Details about the debris reconstruction and recovery effort are provided in Appendix E.5, S.

Altemis, J. Cowart, W. Woodworth, "STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report," NSTS-60501, June 30, 2003. CAIB document CTF076- 20302182.

The precise probability is uncertain due to many factors, such as the amount of debris that burned up during re-entry, and the fraction of the population that was outdoors when the Columbia accident occurred.

"Userʼs Guide for Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT), Version 5.0, Volume I-Methodology, Input Description, and Results," JSC-28742, July 1999; W. Alior, "What Can We Learn From Recovered

¶Debris," Aerospace Corp, briefing presented to CAIB, on March 13,

"Reentry Survivability Analysis of Delta IV Launch Vehicle Upper Stage," JSC-29775, June 2002.

Analysis of the recovered debris indicates that relatively few pieces posed a threat to people indoors. See Appendix D.16.

Detailed information about individual fragments, including weight in most cases, was not available for the study. Therefore, some engineering discretion was needed to develop models of individual weights,

¶dimensions, aerodynamic characteristics, and conditions of impact. This lack of information increases uncertainty in the accuracy of the final results. The study should be revisited after the fragment data has been fully characterized.

¶K.M. Thompson, R.F. Rabouw, and R.M. Cooke, "The Risk of Groundling

¶Fatalities from Unintentional Airplane Crashes," Risk Analysis, Vol. 21,

¶No. 6, 2001.

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 CFR Part 415 Launch License, Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 76, April 21, 1999; Range Commanders Council Standard 321-02, "Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges," published by the Secretariat of the RCC U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range, NM 88002-5110, June 2002; "Mitigation of Orbital

Debris," Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission, FCC 02-80, Federal Register Vol. 67, No. 86, Friday, May 3, 2002.

Air Force launch safety standards define a Hazardous Launch Area, a controlled surface area and airspace, where individual risk of serious injury from a launch vehicle malfunction during the early phase of flight exceeds one in a million. Only personnel essential to the launch

operation are permitted in this area. "Eastern and Western Range Requirements 127-1," March 1995, pp. 1-12 and Fig. 1-6.

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 CFR Part 431, Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle, Section 35 paragraphs (a) and (b), Federal Register Vol. 65, No. 182, September 19, 2000, p. 56660.

"Reentry Survivability Analysis of Delta IV Launch Vehicle Upper Stage," JSC-29775, June 2002.

Tobin, "Range Safety Risk Assessments For Kennedy Space Center,"

October 2002. CAIB document CTF059-22802288; "Space Shuttle Program Requirements Document," NSTS-07700, Vol. I, change no. 76, Section 5-1. CAIB document CAB024-04120475.

Here, ascent refers to (1) the Orbiter from liftoff to Main Engine Cut Off (MECO), (2) the Solid Rocket Boosters from liftoff to splashdown, and (3) the External Tank from liftoff to splashdown.

Pete Cadden, "Shuttle Launch Area Debris Risk," October 2002. CAIB document CTF059-22682279.

¶See Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: The History of the National Space

¶Transportation System – The First 100 Missions (Cape Canaveral,

¶FL, Specialty Press, 2001), pp. 205-212 for a complete description

of the Approach and Landing Tests and other testing conducted with Enterprise.

Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986).

The pre-declared time period or number of missions over which the system is expected to operate without major redesign or redefinition.

¶"A crew escape system shall be provided on Earth to Orbit vehicles for safe crew extraction and recovery from in-flight failures across the flight envelope from pre-launch to landing. The escape system shall have a probability of successful crew return of 0.99."

¶Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Report for 2002,

¶(Washington: Government Printing Office, March 2002). CAIB document

¶CTF014-25882645.⁹⁹ R. J. Gomex et al, "STS-107 Foam Transport Final Report," NSNS- 60506, August 2003. 84 Report Volume I August 2003 Charlie Abner, "KSC Processing Review Team Final Summary," June 16,

Ibid. 2003. CAIB document CTF063-11801276.

225

¶Recommendations

¶It is the Boardʼs opinion that good leadership can direct a culture to adapt to new realities. NASAʼs culture must change, and the Board intends the following recommendations to be steps toward effecting this change.

¶Recommendations have been put forth in many of the chapters. In this chapter, the recommendations are grouped by subject area with the Return-to-Flight [RTF] tasks listed first within the subject area. Each Recommendation retains its number so the reader can refer to the related section for additional details. These recommendations are not listed in priority order.