2.1 Mission Objectives and Their Rationales

¶Throughout the 1990s, NASA flew a number of dedicated science missions, usually aboard Columbia because it was equipped for extended-duration missions and was not being used for Shuttle-Mir docking missions or the assembly of the International Space Station. On many of these missions, Columbia carried pressurized Spacelab or SPACEHAB modules that extended the habitable experiment space available and were intended as facilities for life sciences and microgravity research.

¶In June 1997, the Flight Assignment Working Group at Johnson Space Center in Houston designated STS-107, tentatively scheduled for launch in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2000, a "research module" flight. In July 1997, several committees of the National Academy of Scienceʼs Space Studies Board sent a letter to NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin recommending that NASA dedicate several future Shuttle missions to microgravity and life sciences. The purpose would be to train scientists to take full advantage of the International Space Stationʼs research capabilities once it became operational, and to reduce the gap between the last planned Shuttle science

¶mission and the start of science research aboard the Space Station.¹¹ The primary source document for this process is NSTS 08117, Requirements and Procedures for Certification and Flight Readiness. CAIB document CTF017-03960413. In March 1998, Goldin announced that STS-107, tentatively scheduled for launch in May 2000, would be a multi-disciplinary science mission modeled after STS-90, the Neurolab mission scheduled later in 1998.²² Statement of Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, before the Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, March 31, 1998. CAIB document CAB048-04000418. In October 1998, the Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Conference Report expressed Congressʼ concern about the lack of Shuttle-based science missions in Fiscal Year 1999, and added $15 million to NASAʼs budget for STS-107. The following year the Conference Report reserved $40 million for a second science mission. NASA cancelled the second science mission in October 2002 and used the money for STS-107.

¶In addition to a variety of U.S. experiments assigned to STS-107, a joint U.S./Israeli space experiment – the Mediterranean-Israeli Dust Experiment, or MEIDEX – was added to STS-107 to be accompanied by an Israeli astronaut as part of an international cooperative effort aboard the Shuttle similar to those NASA had begun in the early 1980s. Triana, a deployable Earth-observing satellite, was also added to the mission to save NASA from having to buy a commercial launch to place the satellite in orbit. Political disagreements between Congress and the White House delayed Triana, and the satellite was replaced by the Fast Reaction Experiments Enabling Science, Technology, Applications, and Research (FREESTAR) payload, which was mounted behind the SPACEHAB Research Double Module.³³ Roberta L. Gross, Inspector General, NASA, to Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator, NASA, "Assessment of the Triana Mission, G-99-013, Final Report," September 10, 1999. See in particular footnote 3, concerning Triana and the requirements of the Commercial Space Act, and Appendix C, "Accounting for Shuttle Costs." CAIB document CAB048-02680269.

¶Figure 2.1-1. Columbia, at the launch pad on January 15, 2003.

¶Schedule Slippage

¶STS-107 was finally scheduled for launch on January 11, 2001. After 13 delays over two years, due mainly to other missions taking priority, Columbia was launched on January 16, 2003 (see Figure 2.1-1). Delays may take several forms. When any delay is mentioned, most people think of a Space Shuttle sitting on the launch pad waiting for launch. But most delays actually occur long before the Shuttle is configured for a mission. This was the case for STS-107 – of the 13 delays, only a few occurred after the Orbiter was configured for flight; most happened earlier in the planning process. Three specific events caused delays for STS-107:

Removal of Triana: This Earth-observing satellite was replaced with the FREESTAR payload.
Orbiter Maintenance Down Period: Columbiaʼs depot-level maintenance took six months longer than originally planned, primarily to correct problems encountered with Kapton wiring (see Chapter 4). This resulted in the STS-109 Hubble Space Telescope service mission be-

COLUMBIA

¶Columbia was named after a Boston-based sloop commanded by Captain Robert Gray, who noted while sailing to the Pacific Northwest a flow of muddy water fanning from the shore, and decided to explore what he deemed the "Great

¶River of the West." On May 11, 1792, Gray and his crew maneuvered the Columbia past the treacherous sand bar and named the river after his ship. After a week or so of trading with the local tribes, Gray left without investigating where the river led. Instead, Gray led the Columbia and its crew on the first U.S. circumnavigation of the globe, carrying otter skins to Canton, China, before returning to Boston in 1793.

¶In addition to Columbia (OV-102), which first flew in 1981,

¶Challenger (OV-099) first flew in 1983, Discovery (OV-103) in 1984, and Atlantis (OV-104) in 1985. Endeavour (OV-105), which replaced Challenger, first flew in 1992. At the time of the launch of STS-107, Columbia was unique since it was the last remaining Orbiter to have an internal airlock on the mid-deck. (All the Orbiters originally had internal airlocks, but all excepting Columbia were modified to provide an external docking mechanism for flights to Mir and the International Space Station.) Because the airlock was not located in the payload bay, Columbia could carry longer payloads such as the Chandra space telescope, which used the full length of the payload bay. The internal airlock made the mid-deck more cramped than those of other Orbiters, but this was less of a problem when one of the laboratory modules was installed in the payload bay to provide additional habitable volume.

¶Columbia had been manufactured to an early structural standard that resulted in the airframe being heavier than the later Orbiters. Coupled with a more-forward center of gravity because of the internal airlock, Columbia could not carry as much payload weight into orbit as the other Orbiters. This made Columbia less desirable for missions to the International Space Station, although planning was nevertheless underway to modify Columbia for an International Space

¶Station flight sometime after STS-107.

¶ing launched before STS-107 because it was considered more urgent.

Flowliner cracks: About one month before the planned July 19, 2002 launch date for STS-107, concerns about cracks in the Space Shuttle Main Engine propellant system flowliners caused a four-month grounding of the Orbiter fleet. (The flowliner, which is in the main propellant feed lines, mitigates turbulence across the flexible bellows to smooth the flow of propellant into the main engine low-pressure turbopump. It also protects the bellows from flow-induced vibration.) First discovered on Atlantis, the cracks were eventually discovered on each Orbiter; they were fixed by weld- ing and polishing. The grounding delayed the exchange of the Expedition 5 International Space Station crew with the Expedition 6 crew, which was scheduled for STS-113. To maintain the International Space Station assembly sequence while minimizing the delay in returning the Expedition 5 crew, both STS-112 and STS-113 were launched before STS-107.

¶The Crew

¶The STS-107 crew selection process followed standard procedures. The Space Shuttle Program provided the Astronaut

¶Office with mission requirements calling for a crew of seven. There were no special requirements for a rendezvous, extravehicular activity (spacewalking), or use of the remote manipulator arm. The Chief of the Astronaut Office announced the crew in July 2000. To maximize the amount of science research that could be performed, the crew formed two teams, Red and Blue, to support around-the-clock operations.

¶Crew Training

¶The Columbia Accident Investigation Board thoroughly reviewed all pre-mission training (see Figure 2.1-2) for the STS-107 crew, Houston Mission Controllers, and the Ken-

¶Figure 2.1-2. Ilan Ramon (left), Laurel Clark, and Michael Anderson during a training exercise at the Johnson Space Center.

¶Left to right: David Brown, Rick Husband, Laurel Clark, Kalpana Chawla, Michael Anderson, William McCool, Ilan Ramon.

¶Rick Husband, Commander. Husband, 45, was a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force, a test pilot, and a veteran of STS-96. He received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Texas Tech University and a M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from California State University, Fresno. He was a member of the Red Team, working on experiments including the European Research In Space and Terrestrial Osteoporosis and the Shuttle Ozone Limb Sounding Experiment.

¶William C. McCool, Pilot. McCool, 41, was a Commander in the U.S. Navy and a test pilot. He received a B.S. in Applied Science from the U.S. Naval Academy, a M.S. in Computer Science from the University of Maryland, and a M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. A member of the Blue Team, McCool worked on experiments including the Advanced Respiratory Monitoring System, Biopack, and Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment.

¶Michael P. Anderson, Payload Commander and Mission Specialist. Anderson, 43, was a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force, a former instructor pilot and tactical officer, and a veteran of STS-89. He received a B.S. in Physics/Astronomy from the University of Washington, and a M.S. in

T HE CREW

¶Physics from Creighton University. A member of the Blue Team, Anderson worked with experiments including the Advanced Respiratory Monitoring System, Water Mist Fire Suppression, and Structures of Flame Balls at Low Lewis-number.

¶David M. Brown, Mission Specialist. Brown, 46, was a Captain in the U.S. Navy, a naval aviator, and a naval flight surgeon. He received a B.S. in Biology from the College of William and Mary and a M.D. from Eastern Virginia Medical School. A member

¶of the Blue Team, Brown worked on the Laminar Soot Processes,

¶Structures of Flame Balls at Low Lewis-number, and Water Mist

¶Fire Suppression experiments.

¶Kalpana Chawla, Flight Engineer and Mission Specialist. Chawla,

¶41, was an aerospace engineer, a FAA Certified Flight Instructor, and a veteran of STS-87. She received a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from Punjab Engineering College, India, a M.S. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Texas, Arlington, and a

¶Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Colorado,

¶Boulder. A member of the Red Team, Chawla worked with experiments on Astroculture, Advanced Protein Crystal Facility, Mechanics of Granular Materials, and the Zeolite Crystal Growth Furnace.

¶Laurel Clark, Mission Specialist. Clark, 41, was a Commander (Captain-Select) in the U.S. Navy and a naval flight surgeon. She received both a B.S. in Zoology and a M.D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. A member of the Red Team, Clark worked on experiments including the Closed Equilibrated Biological Aquatic System, Sleep-Wake Actigraphy and Light Exposure During

¶Spaceflight, and the Vapor Compres-

¶W sion Distillation Flight Experiment.

Ilan Ramon, Payload Specialist. Ramon, 48, was a Colonel in the Israeli Air Force, a fighter pilot, and Israelʼs first astronaut. Ramon received a B.S. in Electronics and Computer Engineering from the University of Tel Aviv, Israel. As a member of the Red Team, Ramon was the primary crew member responsible for the Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment (MEIDEX). He also worked on the Water Mist Fire Suppression and the Microbial Physiology Flight Experiments Team experiments, among others.

¶nedy Space Center Launch Control Team. Mission training for the STS-107 crew comprised 4,811 hours, with an additional 3,500 hours of payload-specific training. The Ascent/ Entry Flight Control Team began training with the STS-107 crew on October 22, 2002, and participated in 16 integrated ascent or entry simulations. The Orbiter Flight Control team began training with the crew on April 23, 2002, participating in six joint integrated simulations with the crew and payload customers. Seventy-seven Flight Control Room operators were assigned to four shifts for the STS-107 mission. All had prior certifications and had worked missions in the past.

¶The STS-107 Launch Readiness Review was held on December 18, 2002, at the Kennedy Space Center. Neither NASA nor United Space Alliance noted any training issues for launch controllers. The Mission Operations Directorate noted no crew or flight controller training issues during the January 9, 2003, STS-107 Flight Readiness Review. According to documentation, all personnel were trained and certified, or would be trained and certified before the flight. Appendix D.1 contains a detailed STS-107 Training Report.

¶Orbiter Preparation

¶Board investigators reviewed Columbiaʼs maintenance, or "flow" records, including the recovery from STS-109 and preparation for STS-107, and relevant areas in NASAʼs Problem Reporting and Corrective Action database, which contained 16,500 Work Authorization Documents consisting of 600,000 pages and 3.9 million steps. This database maintains critical information on all maintenance and modification work done on the Orbiters (as required by the Orbiter Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document). It also maintains Corrective Action Reports that document problems discovered and resolved, the Lost/Found item database, and the Launch Readiness Review and Flight Readiness Review documentation (see Chapter 7).

¶The Board placed emphasis on maintenance done in areas of particular concern to the investigation. Specifically, records for the left main landing gear and door assembly and left wing leading edge were analyzed for any potential contributing factors, but nothing relevant to the cause of the accident was discovered. A review of Thermal Protection System tile maintenance records revealed some "non-con- formances" and repairs made after Columbiaʼs last flight, but these were eventually dismissed as not relevant to the investigation. Additionally, the Launch Readiness Review and Flight Readiness Review records relating to those systems and the Lost/Found item records were reviewed, and no relevance was found. During the Launch Readiness Review and Flight Readiness Review processes, NASA teams analyzed 18 lost items and deemed them inconsequential. (Although this incident was not considered significant by the Board, a further discussion of foreign object debris may be found in Chapter 4.)

¶Payload Preparation

¶The payload bay configuration for STS-107 included the SPACEHAB access tunnel, SPACEHAB Research Double Module (RDM), the FREESTAR payload, the Orbital Ac-

¶Figure 2.1-3. The SPACEHAB Research Double Module as seen from the aft flight deck windows of Columbia during STS-107. A thin slice of Earthʼs horizon is visible behind the vertical stabilizer.

¶celeration Research Experiment, and an Extended Duration Orbiter pallet to accommodate the long flight time needed to conduct all the experiments. Additional experiments were stowed in the Orbiter mid-deck and on the SPACE- HAB roof (see Figures 2.1-3 and 2.1-4). The total liftoff payload weight for STS-107 was 24,536 pounds. Details on STS-107 payload preparations and on-orbit operations are in Appendix D.2.

¶Payload readiness reviews for STS-107 began in May 2002, with no significant abnormalities reported throughout the processing. The final Payload Safety Review Panel meeting prior to the mission was held on January 8, 2003, at the Kennedy Space Center, where the Integrated Safety Assessments conducted for the SPACEHAB and FREESTAR payloads were presented for final approval. All payload physical stresses on the Orbiter were reported within acceptable limits. The Extended Duration Orbiter pallet was loaded into the aft section of the payload bay in High Bay 3 of the Orbiter Processing Facility on April 25, 2002. The SPACEHAB