5.3 An Agency Trying to Do Too Much With Too Little

¶A strong indicator of the priority the national political leadership assigns to a federally funded activity is its budget. By that criterion, NASAʼs space activities have not been high on the list of national priorities over the past three decades (see Figure 5.3-1). After a peak during the Apollo program, when NASAʼs budget was almost four percent of the federal budget, NASAʼs budget since the early 1970s has hovered at one percent of federal spending or less.

¶4.0

¶3.5

¶3.0

¶Percent of Federal Budget

¶2.5

¶2.0

¶1.5

¶1.0

¶0.5

¶0.0

1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 — 2001

¶Figure 5.3-1. NASA budget as a percentage of the Federal budget. (Source: NASA History Office)

¶Particularly in recent years, as the national leadership has confronted the challenging task of allocating scarce public resources across many competing demands, NASA has had difficulty obtaining a budget allocation adequate to its continuing ambitions. In 1990, the White House chartered a blue-ribbon committee chaired by aerospace executive Norman Augustine to conduct a sweeping review of NASA and its programs in response to Shuttle problems and the flawed mirror on the Hubble Space Telescope.16 The review found that NASAʼs budget was inadequate for all the programs the agency was executing, saying that "NASA is currently over committed in terms of program obligations relative to resources available–in short, it is trying to do too much, and allowing too little margin for the unexpected."17 "A reinvigorated space program," the Augustine committee went on to say, "will require real growth in the NASA budget of approximately 10 percent per year (through the year 2000) reaching a peak spending level of about $30 billion per year (in constant 1990 dollars) by about the year 2000." Translated into the actual dollars of Fiscal Year 2000, that recommendation would have meant a NASA budget of over $40 billion; the actual NASA budget for that year was $13.6 billion.18

¶During the past decade, neither the White House nor Congress has been interested in "a reinvigorated space program." Instead, the goal has been a program that would continue to produce valuable scientific and symbolic payoffs for the nation without a need for increased budgets. Recent budget al- locations reflect this continuing policy reality. Between 1993 and 2002, the governmentʼs discretionary spending grew in purchasing power by more than 25 percent, defense spending by 15 percent, and non-defense spending by 40 percent (see Figure 5.3-2). NASAʼs budget, in comparison, showed little change, going from $14.31 billion in Fiscal Year 1993 to a low of $13.6 billion in Fiscal Year 2000, and increasing to $14.87 billion in Fiscal Year 2002. This represented a loss of 13 percent in purchasing power over the decade (see Figure 5.3-3).19

103

¶1.50

¶Change from Base Year 1993

¶1.40

1.30 Non-Defense

1.20 Total Discretionary 1.10 Defense

1.00 NASA 0.90 FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000

¶Figure 5.3-2. Changes in Federal spending from 1993 through 2002. (Source: NASA Office of Legislative Affairs)

Real Dollars Constant Dollars Fiscal Year (in millions) (in FY 2002 millions) 1965 5,250

¶1975 3,229

¶1985 7,573

¶1993 14,310

1994 14,570 1995 13,854

¶1996 13,884

¶1997 13,709

¶1998 13,648

¶1999 13,653

¶2000 13,601

¶2001 14,230

¶2002 14,868

¶2003 15,335

¶(requested)

¶15,255

¶Figure 5.3-3. NASA Budget. (Source: NASA and Office of Management and Budget)

The lack of top-level interest in the space program led a 2002 review of the U.S. aerospace sector to observe that "a sense of lethargy has affected the space industry and community. Instead of the excitement and exuberance that dominated our early ventures into space, we at times seem almost apologetic about our continued investments in the space program."20

WHAT THE EXPERTS HAVE SAID

¶Warnings of a Shuttle Accident

"Shuttle reliability is uncertain, but has been estimated to range between 97 and 99 percent. If the Shuttle reliability

is 98 percent, there would be a 50-50 chance of losing an Orbiter within 34 flights … The probability of maintaining at least three Orbiters in the Shuttle fleet declines to less

¶than 50 percent after flight 113."21

¶-The Office of Technology Assessment, 1989

¶"And although it is a subject that meets with reluctance

to open discussion, and has therefore too often been relegated to silence, the statistical evidence indicates

¶FY 2001 FY 2002

that we are likely to lose another Space Shuttle in the next several years … probably before the planned Space Station is completely established on orbit. This would seem to be the weak link of the civil space program – unpleasant to recognize, involving all the uncertainties of statistics, and difficult to resolve." -The Augustine Committee, 1990

¶lions) Shuttle as Developmental Vehicle 24,696

"Shuttle is also a complex system that has yet to demonstrate an ability to adhere to a fixed schedule"

¶10,079

¶-The Augustine Committee, 1990 11,643

¶NASA Human Space Flight Culture 17,060

"NASA has not been sufficiently responsive to valid criticism and the need for change."22

¶16,965 -The Augustine Committee, 1990 15,790

¶15,489

¶Faced with this budget situation, NASA had the choice of 14,994

either eliminating major programs or achieving greater efficiencies while maintaining its existing agenda. Agency lead-

¶14,641 ers chose to attempt the latter. They continued to develop the space station, continued robotic planetary and scientific

¶14,443 missions, and continued Shuttle-based missions for both scientific and symbolic purposes. In 1994 they took on the re14,202 sponsibility for developing an advanced technology launch vehicle in partnership with the private sector. They tried to

¶14,559 do this by becoming more efficient. "Faster, better, cheaper" became the NASA slogan of the 1990s.23 14,868

¶The flat budget at NASA particularly affected the hu-

¶NA

man space flight enterprise. During the decade before the Columbia accident, NASA rebalanced the share of its bud-

¶NA

get allocated to human space flight from 48 percent of agency funding in Fiscal Year 1991 to 38 percent in Fiscal Year 1999, with the remainder going mainly to other science and technology efforts. On NASAʼs fixed budget, that meant

104

¶tion of Boris Yeltsin and halting the proliferation of nuclear

EARMARKS

¶Pressure on NASAʼs budget has come not only from the

¶White House, but also from the Congress. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency for the Congress to add "earmarks" – congressional additions to the NASA budget request that reflect targeted Membersʼ interests. These earmarks come out of already-appropriated funds, reducing the amounts available for the original tasks. For example, as

¶Congress considered NASAʼs Fiscal Year 2002 appropriation, the NASA Administrator told the House Appropriations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the NASA budget that the agency was "extremely concerned regarding the magnitude and number of congressional earmarks" in the

¶House and Senate versions of the NASA appropriations bill.24

¶He noted "the total number of House and Senate earmarks … is approximately 140 separate items, an increase of nearly

¶50 percent over FY 2001." These earmarks reflected "an increasing fraction of items that circumvent the peer review process, or involve construction or other objectives that have no relation to NASA mission objectives." The potential

¶Fiscal Year 2002 earmarks represented "a net total of $540 million in reductions to ongoing NASA programs to fund this extremely large number of earmarks."25 the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station were competing for decreasing resources. In addition, at least $650 million of NASAʼs human space flight budget was used to purchase Russian hardware and services related to U.S.-Russian space cooperation. This initiative was largely driven by the Clinton Administrationʼs foreign policy and national security objectives of supporting the administra-

Presidentʼs Congressional Fiscal Year Request to Appropriation Congress

¶1993 4,128.0 4,078.0

¶1994 4,196.1 3,778.7

¶1995 3,324.0 3,155.1

¶1996 3,231.8 3,178.8

¶1997 3,150.9 3,150.9

¶1998 2,977.8 2,927.8

¶1999 3,059.0 3,028.0

¶2000 2,986.2 3,011.2

¶2001 3,165.7 3,125.7

¶2002 3,283.8 3,278.8

¶2003 3,208.0 3,252.8

¶Figure 5.3-4. Space Shuttle Program Budget (in millions of dollars). (Source: NASA Office of Space Flight) * NASAʼs operating plan is the means for adjusting congressional appropriations among various activities during the fiscal year as changing circumstances dictate. These changes must be approved by NASAʼs appropriation subcommittees before they can be put into effect. **This reduction primarily reflects the congressional cancellation of the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program

¶weapons and the means to deliver them. Space Shuttle Program Budget Patterns

¶For the past 30 years, the Space Shuttle Program has been NASAʼs single most expensive activity, and of all NASAʼs efforts, that program has been hardest hit by the budget constraints of the past decade. Given the high priority assigned after 1993 to completing the costly International Space Station, NASA managers have had little choice but to attempt to reduce the costs of operating the Space Shuttle. This left little funding for Shuttle improvements. The squeeze on the Shuttle budget was even more severe after the Office of Management and Budget in 1994 insisted that any cost overruns in the International Space Station budget be made up from within the budget allocation for human space flight, rather than from the agencyʼs budget as a whole. The Shuttle was the only other large program within that budget category.

¶Figures 5.3-4 and 5.3-5 show the trajectory of the Shuttle budget over the past decade. In Fiscal Year 1993, the out- going Bush administration requested $4.128 billion for the Space Shuttle Program; five years later, the Clinton Administration request was for $2.977 billion, a 27 percent reduction. By Fiscal Year 2003, the budget request had increased to $3.208 billion, still a 22 percent reduction from a decade earlier. With inflation taken into account, over the past decade, there has been a reduction of approximately 40 percent in the purchasing power of the programʼs budget, compared to a reduction of 13 percent in the NASA budget overall.

¶NASA

¶Change Change

¶Operating Plan*

¶–50.0 4,052.9 –25.1

¶–417.4** 3,772.3 –6.4

¶–168.9 3,155.1 0.0

¶–53.0 3,143.8 –35.0

¶0.0 2,960.9 –190.0

¶–50.0 2,912.8 –15.0

¶–31.0 2,998.3 –29.7

¶+25.0 2,984.4 –26.8

¶–40.0 3,118.8 –6.9

¶–5.0 3,270.0 –8.9

¶+44.8

105

¶Constant FY 2002 Dollars in Millions

Flight Rate — 7

¶91 92 Y93 Y94 Y95 Y96 Y97 Y98 Y99 Y00 Y01 Y02 Y03 Y04 Y05 Y06 Y07 Y08

FY FY F F F

¶Figure 5.3-5. NASA budget as a percentage of the Federal budget from 1991 to 2008. (Source: NASA Office of Space Flight)

¶This budget squeeze also came at a time when the Space Shuttle Program exhibited a trait common to most aging systems: increased costs due to greater maintenance requirements, a declining second- and third-tier contractor support base, and deteriorating infrastructure. Maintaining the Shuttle was becoming more expensive at a time when Shuttle budgets were decreasing or being held constant. Only in the last few years have those budgets begun a gradual increase.

¶As Figure 5.3-5 indicates, most of the steep reductions in the Shuttle budget date back to the first half of the 1990s. In the second half of the decade, the White House Office of Management and Budget and NASA Headquarters held the Shuttle budget relatively level by deferring substantial funding for Shuttle upgrades and infrastructure improvements, while keeping pressure on NASA to limit increases in operating costs.