Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume I

9.3 LONG-TERM: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE U.S. IN SPACE

9.3 LONG-TERM: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE U.S. IN SPACE

The Board in its investigation has focused on the physical and organizational causes of the Columbia accident and the recommended actions required for future safe Shuttle operation. In the course of that investigation, however, two realities affecting those recommendations have become evident to the Board. One is the lack, over the past three decades, of any national mandate providing NASA a compelling mission requiring human presence in space. President John Kennedyʼs 1961 charge to send Americans to the moon and return them safely to Earth "before this decade is out" linked NASAʼs efforts to core Cold War national interests. Since the 1970s, NASA has not been charged with carrying out a similar high priority mission that would justify the expendi- ture of resources on a scale equivalent to those allocated for Project Apollo. The result is the agency has found it necessary to gain the support of diverse constituencies. NASA has had to participate in the give and take of the normal political process in order to obtain the resources needed to carry out its programs. NASA has usually failed to receive budgetary support consistent with its ambitions. The result, as noted throughout Part Two of the report, is an organization straining to do too much with too little.

A second reality, following from the lack of a clearly defined long-term space mission, is the lack of sustained government commitment over the past decade to improving U.S. access to space by developing a second-generation space transportation system. Without a compelling reason to do so, successive Administrations and Congresses have not been willing to commit the billions of dollars required to develop such a vehicle. In addition, the space community has proposed to the government the development of vehicles such as the National Aerospace Plane and X-33, which required "leapfrog" advances in technology; those advances have proven to be unachievable. As Apollo 11 Astronaut Buzz Aldrin, one of the members of the recent Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, commented in the Commissionʼs November 2002 report, "Attempts at developing breakthrough space transportation systems have proved illusory."1 The Board believes that the country should plan for future space transportation capabilities without making them dependent on technological breakthroughs.

Lack of a National Vision for Space

In 1969 President Richard Nixon rejected NASAʼs sweeping vision for a post-Apollo effort that involved full development of low-Earth orbit, permanent outposts on the moon, and initial journeys to Mars. Since that rejection, these objectives have reappeared as central elements in many proposals setting forth a long-term vision for the U.S. Space program. In 1986 the National Commission on Space proposed "a pioneering mission for 21st-century America: To lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit, from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars."2 In 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the first lunar landing, President George H.W. Bush proposed a Space Exploration Initiative, calling for "a sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system."3 Space advocates have been consistent in their call for sending humans beyond low-Earth orbit as the appropriate objective of U.S. space activities. Review committees as diverse as the 1990 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, chaired by Norman Augustine, and the 2001 International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force have suggested that the primary justification for a space station is to conduct the research required to plan missions to Mars and/or other distant destinations. However, human travel to destinations beyond Earth orbit has not been adopted as a national objective.

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The report of the Augustine Committee commented, "It seems that most Americans do support a viable space program for the nation – but no two individuals seem able to agree upon what that space program should be."4 The Board observes that none of the competing long-term visions for space have found support from the nationʼs leadership, or indeed among the general public. The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than 30 years without a guiding vision, and none seems imminent. In the past, this absence of a strategic vision in itself has reflected a policy decision, since there have been many opportunities for national leaders to agree on ambitious goals for space, and none have done so.

The Board does observe that there is one area of agreement among almost all parties interested in the future of U.S. activities in space: The United States needs improved access for humans to low-Earth orbit as a foundation for whatever directions the nationʼs space program takes in the future. In the Boardʼs view, a full national debate on how best to achieve such improved access should take place in parallel with the steps the Board has recommended for returning the Space Shuttle to flight and for keeping it operating safely in coming years. Recommending the content of this debate goes well beyond the Boardʼs mandate, but we believe that the White House, Congress, and NASA should honor the memory of Columbiaʼs crew by reflecting on the nationʼs future in space and the role of new space transportation capabilities in enabling whatever space goals the nation chooses to pursue.

All members of the Board agree that Americaʼs future space efforts must include human presence in Earth orbit, and eventually beyond, as outlined in the current NASA vision. Recognizing the absence of an agreed national mandate cited above, the current NASA strategic plan stresses an approach of investing in "transformational technologies"

that will enable the development of capabilities to serve as "stepping stones" for whatever path the nation may decide it wants to pursue in space. While the Board has not reviewed this plan in depth, this approach seems prudent. Absent any long-term statement of what the country wants to accomplish in space, it is difficult to state with any specificity the requirements that should guide major public investments in new capabilities. The Board does believe that NASA and the nation should give more attention to developing a new "concept of operations" for future activities – defining the range of activities the country intends to carry out in space – that could provide more specificity than currently exists. Such a concept does not necessarily require full agreement on a future vision, but it should help identify the capabilities required and prevent the debate from focusing solely on the design of the next vehicle.

Developing a New Space Transportation System

When the Space Shuttle development was approved in 1972, there was a corresponding decision not to fund technologies for space transportation other than those related to the Shuttle. This decision guided policy for more than 20 years, until the National Space Transportation Policy of 1994 assigned NASA the role of developing a next-generation, advanced-technology, single-stage-to-orbit replacement for the Space Shuttle. That decision was flawed for several reasons. Because the United States had not funded a broad portfolio of space transportation technologies for the preceding three decades, there was a limited technology base on which to base the choice of this second-generation system. The technologies chosen for development in 1996, which were embodied in the X-33 demonstrator, proved not yet mature enough for use. Attracted by the notion of a growing private sector market for space transportation, the Clinton Administration hoped this new system could be developed with minimal public investment – the hope was that the private sector would help pay for the development of a Shuttle replacement.

In recent years there has been increasing investment in space transportation technologies, particularly through NASAʼs Space Launch Initiative effort, begun in 2000. This investment has not yet created a technology base for a second-generation reusable system for carrying people to orbit. Accordingly, in 2002 NASA decided to reorient the Space Launch Initiative to longer-term objectives, and to introduce the concept of an Orbital Space Plane as an interim complement to the Space Shuttle for space station crew-carrying responsibilities. The Integrated Space Transportation Plan also called for using the Space Shuttle for an extended period into the future. The Board has evaluated neither NASAʼs Integrated Space Transportation Plan nor the detailed requirements of an Orbital Space Plane.

Even so, based on its in-depth examination of the Space Shuttle Program, the Board has reached an inescapable conclusion: Because of the risks inherent in the original design of the Space Shuttle, because that design was based in many aspects on now-obsolete technologies, and because the Shuttle is now an aging system but still developmental in character, it is in the nationʼs interest to replace the Shuttle as soon as possible as the primary means for transporting humans to and from Earth orbit. At least in the mid-term, that replacement will be some form of what NASA now characterizes as an Orbital Space Plane. The design of the system should give overriding priority to crew safety, rather than trade safety against other performance criteria, such as low cost and reusability, or against advanced space operation capabilities other than crew transfer.

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This conclusion implies that whatever design NASA chooses should become the primary means for taking people to and from the International Space Station, not just a complement to the Space Shuttle. And it follows from the same conclusion that there is urgency in choosing that design, after serious review of a "concept of operations" for human space flight, and bringing it into operation as soon as possible. This is likely to require a significant commitment of resources over the next several years. The nation must not shy from making that commitment. The International Space Station is likely to be the major destination for human space travel for the next decade or longer. The Space Shuttle would continue to be used when its unique capabilities are required, both with respect to space station missions such as experiment delivery and retrieval or other logistical missions, and with respect to the few planned missions not traveling to the space station. When cargo can be carried to the space station or other destinations by an expendable launch vehicle, it should be.

However, the Orbital Space Plane is seen by NASA as an interim system for transporting humans to orbit. NASA plans to make continuing investments in "next generation launch technology," with the hope that those investments will enable a decision by the end of this decade on what that next generation launch vehicle should be. This is a worthy goal, and should be pursued. The Board notes that this approach can only be successful: if it is sustained over the decade; if by the time a decision to develop a new vehicle is made there is a clearer idea of how the new space transportation system fits into the nationʼs overall plans for space; and if the U.S. government is willing at the time a development decision is made to commit the substantial resources required to implement it. One of the major problems with the way the Space Shuttle Program was carried out was an a priori fixed ceiling on development costs. That approach should not be repeated.

It is the view of the Board that the previous attempts to develop a replacement vehicle for the aging Shuttle represent a failure of national leadership. The cause of the failure was continuing to expect major technological advances in that vehicle. With the amount of risk inherent in the Space Shuttle, the first step should be to reach an agreement that the overriding mission of the replacement system is to move humans safely and reliably into and out of Earth orbit. To demand more would be to fall into the same trap as all previous, unsuccessful, efforts. That being said, it seems to the Board that past and future investments in space launch technologies should certainly provide by 2010 or thereabouts the basis for developing a system, significantly improved over one designed 40 years earlier, for carrying humans to orbit and enabling their work in space. Continued U.S. leadership

Final Conclusions

The Boardʼs perspective assumes, of course, that the United States wants to retain a continuing capability to send people into space, whether to Earth orbit or beyond. The Boardʼs work over the past seven months has been motivated by the desire to honor the STS-107 crew by understanding the cause of the accident in which they died, and to help the United States and indeed all spacefaring countries to minimize the risks of future loss of lives in the exploration of space. The United States should continue with a Human Space Flight Program consistent with the resolve voiced by President George W. Bush on February 1, 2003: "Mankind is led into the darkness beyond our world by the inspiration of discovery and the longing to understand. Our journey into space will go on."

Two proposals – a capsule (above) and a winged vehicle - for the Orbital Space Plane, courtesy of The Boeing Company.

in space is an important national objective. That leadership depends on a willingness to pay the costs of achieving it.

The citations that contain a reference to "CAIB document" with CAB or CTF followed by seven to eleven digits, such as CAB001-0010, refer to a document in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board database maintained by the Department of Justice and archived at the National Archives.

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Other Significant Observations

Although the Board now understands the combination of technical and organizational factors that contributed to the Columbia accident, the investigation did not immediately zero in on the causes identified in previous chapters. Instead, the Board explored a number of avenues and topics that, in the end, were not directly related to the cause of this accident. Nonetheless, these forays revealed technical, safety, and cultural issues that could impact the Space Shuttle Program, and, more broadly, the future of human space flight. The significant issues listed in this chapter are potentially serious matters that should be addresed by NASA because they fall into the category of "weak signals" that could be indications of future problems.