A.2 BOARD CHARTER AND ORGANIZATION

¶During meetings that first week, Chairman Gehman and the Board proposed that its charter be rewritten. The original charter, derived from Appendix D of NASAʼs Contingency Action Plan, had a number of internal inconsistencies and provisions that the Board believed would impede the execution of its duties. Additionally, the Board was not satisfied that its initial charter adequately ensured independence from NASA. The Board resolved to:

Have its own administrative and technical staff so that it could independently conduct testing and analysis and establish facts and conclusions
Secure an adequate and independent budget to be overseen by the Board Chairman
Establish and maintain records independent from NASA records
Empower the Board Chairman to appoint new Board Members
Provide the public with detailed updates on the progress of its investigation through frequent public hearings, press briefings, and by immediately releasing all significant information, with the exception of details relating to the death of the crew members and privileged witness statements taken under the condition of confidentiality
Simultaneously release its report to Congress, the White House, NASA, the public, and the astronautsʼ families
Allow Board members to voice any disagreements with Board conclusions in minority reports

¶With the full cooperation of Administrator OʼKeefe, the Boardʼs charter was rewritten to incorporate these principles. The new charter, which underwent three drafts, was signed and ratified by OʼKeefe on February 18, 2003. In re-chartering the Board, OʼKeefe waived the requirements specified in the Contingency Action Plan that the Board use standard NASA mishap investigation procedures and instead authorized the Board to pursue "whatever avenue you deem appropriate" to conduct the investigation.2

¶Additional Board Members

¶To manage its burgeoning investigative responsibilities, the Board added additional members, each of whom brought to the Board a needed area of expertise. On February 6, the Board appointed Roger E. Tetrault, retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of McDermott International. On February 15, the Board appointed Sheila E. Widnall, Ph.D., Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former Secretary of the Air Force. On March 5, the Board appointed Douglas D. Osheroff, Ph.D., Nobel Laureate in Physics and Chair of the Stanford Physics Department; Sally

Ride, Ph.D., Professor of Space Science at the University

¶of California at San Diego and the nationʼs first woman in space; and John M. Logsdon, Ph.D., Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University. This brought the total number of Board members to 13, coinci- dentally the same number as the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident.

¶Board Organization

¶In the first week, the Board divided into four groups, each of which addressed separate areas of the investigation. Group I, consisting of General Barry, General Deal, and Admiral Turcotte, examined NASA management and treatment of materials, including Shuttle maintenance safety and mission assurance. Group II, consisting of General Hess, Mr. Wallace, and later Dr. Ride, scrutinized NASA training, operations, and the in-flight performance of ground crews and the Shuttle crew. Group III, consisting of Dr. Hallock, Mr. Hubbard, and later Mr. Tetrault, Dr. Widnall, and Dr. Osheroff, focused on engineering and technical analysis of the accident and resulting debris. Group IV, consisting of Dr. Logsdon, Dr. Ride, and Mr. Hubbard, examined how NASA history, budget, and institutional culture affected the operation of the Space Shuttle Program. Each group, with the approval of the Chairman, hired investigators and support staff and collaborated extensively with one another.

¶The Board also organized an internal staff of technical experts called the Independent Assessment Team. Under the leadership of James Mosquera, a senior nuclear engineer with the U. S. Navy, the Independent Assessment Team advised the Board when and where NASA analysis should be independently verified and, when needed, conducted fully independent tests on the Boardʼs behalf.