MISSED OPPORTUNITY

¶On Sunday, Rodney Rocha e-mailed a Johnson Space Center Engineering Directorate manager to ask if a Mission Action Request was in progress for Columbiaʼs crew to visually inspect the left wing for damage. Rocha never received an answer.

146

¶RCC Panel 12

¶This photo from the aft flight deck window of an Orbiter shows that RCC panels 1 – 11 are not visible from inside the Orbiter. Since Columbia did not have a manipulator arm for STS-107, it would have been necessary for an astronaut to take a spacewalk to visibly inspect the inboard leading edge of the wing.

¶Flight Day Five, Monday, January 20, 2003

¶On Monday morning, the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday, the Debris Assessment Team held an informal meeting before its first formal meeting, which was scheduled for Tuesday afternoon. The team expanded to include NASA and Boeing transport analysts expert in the movement of debris in airflows, tile and RCC experts from Boeing and NASA, aerothermal and thermal engineers from NASA, United Space Alliance, and Boeing, and a safety representative from the NASA contractor Science Applications International Corporation.

¶Engineers emerged from that informal meeting with a goal of obtaining images from ground-based assets. Uncertainty as to precisely where the debris had struck Columbia generated concerns about the possibility of a breach in the left main landing gear door seal. They conducted further analysis using angle and thickness variables and thermal data obtained by personnel at Boeingʼs Huntington Beach facility for STS-87 and STS-50, the two missions that had incurred Thermal Protection System damage. (See Section 6.1.)

¶Debris Assessment Team Co-Chair Pam Madera distributed an e-mail summarizing the dayʼs events and outlined the agenda for Tuesdayʼs first formal Debris Assessment Team meeting. Included on the agenda was the desire to obtain on-orbit images of Columbiaʼs left wing.

¶According to an 11:39 a.m. entry in the Mission Evaluation Room Managerʼs log:

¶"…the debris ʻblobʼ is estimated at 20" +/-10" in some direction, using the Orbiter hatch as a basis. It appears to be similar size as that seen in STS-112. There will be more comparison work done, and more info and details in tomorrowʼs report."

¶This entry illustrates, in NASA language, an initial attempt by managers to classify this bipod ramp foam strike as close to being within the experience base and therefore, being almost an "in-family" event, not necessarily a safety concern. While the size and source of STS-107 debris was somewhat similar to what STS-112 had experienced, the impact sites (the wing versus the Solid Rocket Booster) differed – a distinction not examined by mission managers.

¶Flight Day Six, Tuesday, January 21, 2003

At 7:00 a.m., the Debris Assessment Team briefed Don McCormack, the chief Mission Evaluation Room manager, that the foamʼs source and size was similar to what struck STS-112, and that an analysis of measured versus predicted tile damage from STS-87 was being scrutinized by Boeing. An hour later, McCormack related this information to the Mission Management Team at its first post-holiday meeting. Although Space Shuttle Program requirements state that the Mission Management Team will convene daily during a mission, the STS-107 Mission Management Team met only on January 17, 21, 24, 27, and 31. The transcript below is the first record of an official discussion of the debris impact at a Mission Management Team meeting. Before even referring to the debris strike, the Mission Management Team focused on end-of- mission "downweight" (the Orbiter was 150 pounds over the limit), a leaking water separator, a jammed Hasselblad camera, payload and experiment status, and a communications downlink problem. McCormack then stated that engineers planned to determine what could be done if Columbia had sustained damage. STS-107 Mission Management Team Chair Linda Ham suggested the team learn what rationale had been used to fly after External Tank foam losses on STS-87 and STS-112.

¶Transcript Excerpts from the January 21, Mission Management Team Meeting

¶Ham: "Alright, I know you guys are looking at the debris."

McCormack: "Yeah, as everybody knows, we took a hit on the, somewhere on the left wing leading edge and the photo TV guys have completed I think, pretty much their work although Iʼm sure they are reviewing their stuff and theyʼve given us an approximate size for the debris and approximate area for where it came from and approximately where it hit, so we are talking about doing some sort of parametric type of analysis and also weʼre talking about what you can do in the event we have some damage there."

Ham: "That comment, I was thinking that the flight rationale at the FRR from tank and orbiter from STS-112 was.… Iʼm not sure that the area is exactly the same where the foam came from but the carrier properties and density of the foam wouldnʼt do any damage. So we ought to pull that along with the 87 data where we had some damage, pull this data from 112 or whatever flight it was and make sure that…you know I hope that we had good flight rationale then."

McCormack: "Yeah, and weʼll look at that, you mentioned 87, you know we saw some fairly significant damage in the area between RCC panels 8 and 9 and the main landing gear door on the bottom on STS-87 we did some analysis prior to STS-89 so uh…"

Ham: "And Iʼm really I donʼt think there is much we can do so itʼs not really a factor during the flight because there is not much we can do about it. But what Iʼm really interested in is making sure our flight rationale to go was good, and maybe this is foam from a different area and Iʼm not sure and it may not be co-related, but you can try to see what we have."

¶McCormack: "Okay."

After the meeting, the rationale for continuing to fly after the STS-112 foam loss was sent to Ham for review. She then exchanged e-mails with her boss, Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore:

¶-----Original Message----- From: DITTEMORE, RONALD D. (JSC-MA) (NASA) Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 9:14 AM To: HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-MA2) (NASA) Subject: RE: ET Briefing - STS-112 Foam Loss

¶You remember the briefing! Jerry did it and had to go out and say that the hazard report had not changed and that the risk had not changed...But it is worth looking at again.

¶-----Original Message----- From: HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-MA2) (NASA)

¶[continued on next page] Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 11:14 AM To: DITTEMORE, RONALD D. R(JSC-MA) e p o r t (NASA)

Volume I August 2003 — 147

¶Subject: FW: ET Briefing - STS-112 Foam Loss

148

From: DITTEMORE, RONALD D. (JSC-MA) (NASA) Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 9:14 AM COLUMBIA To: HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-MA2) (NASA)C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D Subject: RE: ET Briefing - STS-112 Foam Loss

¶You remember the briefing! Jerry did it and had to go out and say that the hazard report had not [continued from and

changed previous page]risk had not changed...But it is worth looking at again. that the

-----Original Message----- From: HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-MA2) (NASA) Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 11:14 AM To: DITTEMORE, RONALD D. (JSC-MA) (NASA) Subject: FW: ET Briefing - STS-112 Foam Loss

You probably can't open the attachment. But, the ET rationale for flight for the STS-112 loss of foam was lousy. Rationale states we haven't changed anything, we haven't experienced any 'safety of flight' damage in 112 flights, risk of loss of bi-pod ramp TPS is same as previous flghts...So ET is safe to fly with no added risk

¶Rationale was lousy then and still is....

-----Original Message----- From: MCCORMACK, DONALD L. (DON) (JSC-MV6) (NASA) Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 9:45 AM To: HAM, LINDA J. (JSC-MA2) (NASA) Subject: FW: ET Briefing - STS-112 Foam Loss Importance: High

¶FYI - it kinda says that it will probably be all right

[ORR=Operational Readiness Review, VAB=Vehicle Assembly Building, IFA=In-Flight Anomaly, TPS=Thermal Protection System, ET=External Tank]

¶Hamʼs focus on examining the rationale for continuing to fly after the foam problems with STS-87 and STS-112 indicates that her attention had already shifted from the threat the foam posed to STS-107 to the downstream implications of the foam strike. Ham was due to serve, along with Wayne Hale, as the launch integration manager for the next mission, STS-114. If the Shuttle Programʼs rationale to fly with foam loss was found to be flawed, STS-114, due to be launched in about a month, would have to be delayed per NASA rules that require serious problems to be resolved before the next flight. An STS-114 delay could in turn delay completion of the International Space Stationʼs Node 2, which was a high-priority goal for NASA managers. (See Section 6.2 for a detailed description of schedule pressures.)

¶During this same Mission Management Team meeting, the Space Shuttle Integration Officeʼs Lambert Austin reported that engineers were reviewing long-range tracking film and that the foam debris that appeared to hit the left wing leading edge may have come from the bipod area of the External Tank. Austin said that the Engineering Directorate would continue to run analyses and compare this foam loss to that of STS-112. Austin also said that after STS-107 landed, engineers were anxious to see the crew-filmed footage of External Tank separation that might show the bipod ramp and therefore could be checked for missing foam.