(NASA); MADDEN, CHRISTOPHER B. (CHRIS) (JSC-ES3) (NASA)

¶Subject: RE: STS-107 Debris Analysis Team Plans

¶This reminded me that at the STS-113 FRR the ET Project reported on foam loss from the Bipod Ramp during STS-112. The foam (estimated 4X5X12 inches) impacted the ET Attach Ring and dented an SRB electronics box cover.

¶Their charts stated "ET TPS foam loss over the life of the Shuttle program has never been a 'Safety of Flight' issue". They were severely wire brushed over this and Brian O'Conner (Associate Administrator for Safety) asked for a hazard assessment for loss of foam.

¶[continued on next page] The suspected cause for foam loss is trapped air pockets which expand due to altitude and aerother-

mal heating. Report Volume I August 2003 — 149

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This reminded me that at the STS-113 FRR the ET Project reported on foam loss from the Bipod Ramp during STS-112. The foam (estimated 4X5X12 inches) impacted the ET Attach Ring and dented an SRB electronics box cover.A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D

¶Their charts stated "ET TPS foam loss over the life of the Shuttle program has never been a 'Safety of [continued from

Flight' previous issue". Theypage] were severely wire brushed over this and Brian O'Conner (Associate Administrator for Safety) asked for a hazard assessment for loss of foam.

The suspected cause for foam loss is trapped air pockets which expand due to altitude and aerothermal heating.

¶[FRR=Flight Readiness Review, ET=External Tank, SRB=Solid Rocket Booster, TPS=Thermal Protection System]

¶Shackʼs message informed Rocha that during the STS-113 Flight Readiness Review, foam loss was not considered to be a safety-of-flight issue. The "wirebrushing" that the External Tank Project received for stating that foam loss has "never been a ʻSafety of Flightʼ issue" refers to the wording used to justify continuing to fly. Officials at the Flight Readiness Review insisted on classifying the foam loss as an "accepted risk" rather than "not a safety-of-flight problem" to indicate that although the Shuttle would continue to fly, the threat posed by foam is not zero but rather a known and acceptable risk.

¶It is here that the decision to fly before resolving the foam problem at the STS-113 Flight Readiness Review influences decisions made during STS-107. Having at hand a previously accepted rationale – reached just one mission ago – that foam strikes are not a safety-of-flight issue provides a strong incentive for Mission managers and working engineers to use that same judgment for STS-107. If managers and engineers were to argue that foam strikes are a safety-of-flight issue, they would contradict an established consensus that was a product of the Shuttle Programʼs most rigorous review – a review in which many of them were active participants.

¶An entry in a Mission Evaluation Room console log included a 10:30 a.m. report that compared the STS-107 foam loss to previous foam losses and subsequent tile damage, which reinforced management acceptance about foam strikes by indicating that the foam strike appeared to be more of an "in-family" event.

¶"…STS-107 debris measured at 22" long +/- 10". On STS-112 the debris spray pattern was a lot smaller than that of STS-107. On STS-50 debris that was determined to be the

¶Bipod ramp which measured 26" x 10" caused damage to the left wing…to 1 tile and 20% of the adjacent tile. Same event occurred on STS-7 (no data available)."

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

¶The foam strike to STS-107 was mentioned by a speaker at an unrelated meeting of NASA Headquarters and National Imagery and Mapping Agency personnel, who then discussed a possible NASA request for Department of Defense imagery support. However, no action was taken.

IMAGERY REQUEST

¶Responding to concerns from his employees who were participating in the Debris Assessment Team, United Space Alliance manager Bob White called Lambert Austin on Flight Day Six to ask what it would take to get imagery of Columbia on orbit. They discussed the analytical debris damage work plan, as well as the belief of some integration team members that such imaging might be beneficial.

¶Austin subsequently telephoned the Department of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office representative to ask about actions necessary to get imagery of Columbia on orbit. Austin emphasized that this was merely information gathering, not a request for action. This call indicates that Austin was unfamiliar with NASA/National Imagery and Mapping Agency imagery request procedures.

¶An e-mail that Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Lee sent to Don McCormack the following day shows that the Defense Department had begun to implement Austinʼs request.

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¶From: LEE, TIMOTHY F., LTCOL. (JSC-MT) (USAF) Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 9:01 AM To: MCCORMACK, DONALD L. (DON) (JSC-MV6) (NASA) Subject: NASA request for DOD

¶Don,

¶FYI: Lambert Austin called me yesterday requesting DOD photo support for STS-107. Specifically, he is asking us if we have a ground or satellite asset that can take a high resolution photo of the shuttle while on-orbit--to see if there is any FOD damage on the wing. We are working his request.

¶Tim

¶[DOD=Department of Defense, FOD=Foreign Object Debris]

At the same time, managers Ralph Roe, Lambert Austin, and Linda Ham referred to conversations with Calvin Schomburg, whom they referred to as a Thermal Protection System "expert." They indicated that Schomburg had advised that any tile damage should be considered a turnaround maintenance concern and not a safety-of-flight issue, and that imagery of Columbiaʼs left wing was not necessary. There was no discussion of potential RCC damage.

¶First Debris Assessment Team Meeting

On Flight Day Six, the Debris Assessment Team held its first formal meeting to finalize Orbiter damage estimates and their potential consequences. Some participants joined the proceedings via conference call.

IMAGERY REQUEST

After two hours of discussing the Crater results and the need to learn precisely where the debris had hit Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team assigned its NASA Co-Chair, Rodney Rocha, to pursue a request for imagery of the vehicle on-orbit. Each team member supported the idea to seek imagery from an outside source. Rather than working the request up the usual mission chain of command through the Mission Evaluation Room to the Mission Management Team to the Flight Dynamics Officer, the Debris Assessment Team agreed, largely due to a lack of participation by Mission Management Team and Mission Evaluation Room managers, that Rocha would pursue the request through his division, the Engineering Directorate at Johnson Space Center. Rocha sent the following e-mail to Paul Shack shortly after the meeting adjourned.

¶-----Original Message----- From: ROCHA, ALAN R. (RODNEY) (JSC-ES2) (NASA) Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 4:41 PM To: SHACK, PAUL E. (JSC-EA42) (NASA); HAMILTON, DAVID A. (DAVE) (JSC-EA) (NASA); MILLER, GLENN J. (JSC-

¶EA) (NASA) Cc: SERIALE-GRUSH, JOYCE M. (JSC-EA) (NASA); ROGERS, JOSEPH E. (JOE) (JSC-ES2) (NASA); GALBREATH,

GREGORY F. (GREG) (JSC-ES2) (NASA)

¶Subject: STS-107 Wing Debris Impact, Request for Outside Photo-Imaging Help

¶Paul and Dave, The meeting participants (Boeing, USA, NASA ES2 and ES3, KSC) all agreed we will always have big uncertainties in any transport/trajectory analyses and applicability/extrapolation of the old Arc-Jet test data until we get definitive, better, clearer photos of the wing and body underside. Without better images it will be very difficult to even bound the problem and initialize thermal, trajectory, and structural analyses. Their answers may have a wide spread ranging from acceptable to not-acceptable to horrible, and no way to reduce uncertainty. Thus, giving MOD options for entry will be very difficult.

¶[continued on next page]

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Paul and Dave, The meeting participants (Boeing, USA, NASA ES2 and ES3, KSC) all agreed we will always have big uncertainties in any transport/trajectory analyses ACCIDENT IN and VESTIGA applicability/extrapolation of the old Arc-Jet

TION BOARD

test data until we get definitive, better, clearer photos of the wing and body underside. Without better images it will be very difficult to even bound the problem and initialize thermal, trajectory, and structural analyses. Their answers may have a wide spread ranging from acceptable to not-acceptable to

¶[continued from and

horrible, previous page] no way to reduce uncertainty. Thus, giving MOD options for entry will be very difficult.

Can we petition (beg) for outside agency assistance? We are asking for Frank Benz with Ralph Roe or Ron Dittemore to ask for such. Some of the old timers here remember we got such help in the early 1980's when we had missing tile concerns.

Despite some nay-sayers, there are some options for the team to talk about: On-orbit thermal condi- tioning for the major structure (but is in contradiction with tire pressure temp. cold limits), limiting high cross-range de-orbit entries, constraining right or left had turns during the Heading Alignment Circle (only if there is struc. damage to the RCC panels to the extent it affects flight control.

Rodney Rocha Structural Engineering Division (ES-SED) • ES Div. Chief Engineer (Space Shuttle DCE) • Chair, Space Shuttle Loads & Dynamics Panel

¶Mail Code ES2

[USA=United Space Alliance, NASA ES2, ES3=separate divisions of the Johnson Space Center Engineering Directorate, KSC=Kennedy Space Center, MOD=Missions Operations Directorate, or Mission Control]

¶Routing the request through the Engineering department led in part to it being viewed by Shuttle Program managers as a non-critical engineering desire rather than a critical operational need.

¶Flight Day Seven, Wednesday, January 22, 2003

¶Conversations and log entries on Flight Day Seven document how three requests for images (Bob Page to Wayne Hale, Bob White to Lambert Austin, and Rodney Rocha to Paul Shack) were ultimately dismissed by the Mission Management Team, and how the order to halt those requests was then interpreted by the Debris Assessment Team as a direct and final denial of their request for imagery.

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

¶On the morning of Flight Day Seven, Wayne Hale responded to the earlier Flight Day Two request from Bob Page and a call from Lambert Austin on Flight Day Five, during which Austin mentioned that "some analysts" from the Debris Assessment Team were interested in getting imagery. Hale called a Department of Defense representative at Kennedy Space Center (who was not the designated Department of Defense official for coordinating imagery requests) and asked that the military start the planning process for imaging Columbia on orbit.

¶Within an hour, the Defense Department representative at NASA contacted U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) at Coloradoʼs Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station and asked what it would take to get imagery of Columbia on orbit. (This call was similar to Austinʼs call to the Department of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office in that the caller characterized it as "information gathering" rather than a request for action.) A representative from the USSTRATCOM Plans Office initiated actions to identify ground-based and other imaging assets that could execute the request.

¶Haleʼs earlier call to the Defense Department representative at Kennedy Space Center was placed without authorization from Mission Management Team Chair Linda Ham. Also, the call was made to a Department of Defense Representative who was not the designated liaison for handling such requests. In order to initiate the imagery request through official channels, Hale also called Phil Engelauf at the Mission Operations Directorate, told him he had started Defense Department action, and asked if Engelauf could have the Flight Dynamics Officer at Johnson Space Center make an official request to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. Engelauf started to comply with Haleʼs request.

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¶After the Department of Defense representatives were called, Lambert Austin telephoned Linda Ham to inform her about the imagery requests that he and Hale had initiated. Austin also told Wayne Hale that he had asked Lieutenant Colonel Lee at the Department of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office about what actions were necessary to get on-orbit imagery.

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 5 AND

¶Mike Card, a NASA Headquarters manager from the Safety and Mission Assurance Office, called Mark Erminger at the Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance for Shuttle Safety Program and Bryan OʼConnor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, to discuss a potential Department of Defense imaging request. Erminger said that he was told this was an "in-family" event. OʼConnor stated he would defer to Shuttle management in handling such a request. Despite two safety officials being contacted, one of whom was NASAʼs highest-ranking safety official, safety personnel took no actions to obtain imagery.

¶The following is an 8:09 a.m. entry in the Mission Evaluation Room Console log.

¶"We received a visit from Mission Manager/Vanessa Ellerbe and FD Office/Phil Engelauf regarding two items: (1) the MMTʼs action item to the MER to determine the impacts to the vehicleʼs 150 lbs of additional weight…and (2) Mr. Engelauf wants to know who is requesting the Air Force to look at the vehicle." [FD=Flight Director, MMT=Mission Management Team,

¶MER=Mission Evaluation Room]