Roger Guillemette, "Vandenberg: Space Shuttle Launch and Landing

¶Site, Part 1," Spaceflight, October 1994, pp. 354-357, and Roger

¶Guillemette, "Vandenberg: Space Shuttle Launch and Landing Site, Part

¶2," Spaceflight, November 1994, pp. 378-381; Dennis R. Jenkins, Space

Shuttle: The History of the National Space Transportation System – The First 100 Missions (Cape Canaveral, FL, Specialty Press, 2001), pp. 467- 476.

Vice Presidentʼs Space Policy Advisory Board, A Post Cold War Assessment of U.S. Space Policy, December 1992, p. 6.

¶Quoted in John M. Logsdon, "Return to Flight: Richard H. Truly and the

Recovery from the Challenger Accident," in Pamela E. Mack, editor, From Engineering to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners, NASA SP-4219 (Washington: Government

¶Printing Office, 1998), p. 363.⁹⁹ R. J. Gomex et al, "STS-107 Foam Transport Final Report," NSNS- 60506, August 2003. 84 Report Volume I August 2003

¶Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 10, 1986, p. 30.¹⁰¹⁰ The civil aviation study indicates that the risk to groundlings is significantly 25 Julie Kramer, et al., "Minutes from CAIB / Engineering Meeting to higher in the vicinity of an airport. The average annual risk of fatality Discuss CAIB Action / Request for Information B1-000193," April 24, within 0.2 miles of a busy (top 100) airport is about 1 in a million. 2003. CAIB document CTF042-00930095.

There are proposals for using other U.S. systems, in development but not yet ready for flight, to provide an alternate U.S. means of station access. These "Alternate Access to Space" proposals have not been evaluated

¶by the Board.

Testimony of William F. Readdy to the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, U.S. Senate, September 6, 2001.

Bush administration space policy is discussed in Dan Quayle, Standing Firm: A Vice-Presidential Memoir (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 185-190.

Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, December 1990. The quotes are from p. 2 of the reportʼs

¶executive summary. 18

Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program. Measured in terms of total national spending, the reportʼs

recommendations would have returned NASA spending to 0.38 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product – a level of investment not seen since 1969.

For Fiscal Years 1965-2002 in Real and Constant Dollars, see NASA, "Space Activities of the U.S. Government – in Millions of Real Year

¶Dollars," and "Space Activities of the U.S. Government – Adjusted for

¶Inflation," in Aeronautics and Space Report of the President – Fiscal Year

¶2002 Activity, forthcoming. For Fiscal Years 2003-2004 in Real Dollars, see Office of Management and Budget, "Outlays By Agency: 19622008," in Historical Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year

¶2004, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), pp. 70-75.

Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, Final Report, November 18, 2002, p. 3-1.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "Shuttle Fleet Attrition if Orbiter Recovery Reliability is 98 Percent," August 1989, p. 6. From:

Round Trip to Orbit: Human Space Flight Alternatives: Special Report, OTS-ISC-419.

Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program.

Howard E. McCurdy, Faster, Better, Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

Letter from Daniel Goldin to Representative James T. Walsh, October 4, 2001. CAIB document CAB065-01630169.

¶Ibid. 26

Remaking of NASA (Washington: Price Waterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, March 2001), pp. 12; 27-29.¹¹¹¹ Thompson, "The Risk of Groundling Fatalities;" Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14 CFR Part 415, 415, and 417, "Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch: Proposed Rule," Federal Register Vol. 67, No. 146, July 30, 2002, p. 49495. 224 Report Volume I August 2003 W. Henry Lambright, Transforming Government: Dan Goldin and the

32 — 57

For two recent works that apply the "Iron Triangle" concept to other policy areas, see Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy, 5th Edition, (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/ Cole Publishing Company, 1991); and Paul C. Light, Forging Legislation: The Politics of Veterans Reform, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

Information obtained from Anna Henderson, NASA Office of Space Flight, to e-mail to John Logsdon, June 13, 2003.

National Academy of Public Administration, A Review of the Space Shuttle Costs, Reduction Goals, and Procedures, December 1994, pp. 3-5. CAIB document CAB026-0313.

¶Presentation to NASA Advisory Council by Stephen Oswald, Acting

Director, Space Shuttle Requirements, "Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) Acquisition Status," April 23, 1996. CAIB document CTF064- 1369.

Bryan D. OʼConnor, Status Briefing to NASA Administrator, "Space Shuttle Functional Workforce Review," February 14, 1995. CAIB document CAB015-0400.

¶Ralph Vartabedian, "Ex-NASA Chief Hits Flight Safety," Houston

¶Chronicle, March 7, 1996.

¶Kathy Sawyer, "NASA Space Shuttle Director Resigns," Washington

¶Post, February 3, 1996, p. A3. See also "Take this Job and Shuttle

¶It: Why NASAʼs Space Shuttle Chief Quit," Final Frontier, July/August

1996, pp. 16-17; "NASA Alters Its Management, Philosophy," Space News, February 12-18, 1996, p. 3.

Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team, February 1995.

¶Ibid, pp. 3-18. 41

¶NASA News Release 95-27, "Shuttle Management Team Issues Final

¶Report," March 15, 1995. 42

¶Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, "Review of the Space Shuttle

¶Management Independent Review Program," May 1995. CAIB document

¶CAB015-04120413.

¶Jose Garcia to President William Jefferson Clinton, August 25, 1995.

See, for instance: "Determinations and Findings for the Space Shuttle Program," United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Space, of the Committee on Science, 104 Cong.,¹¹ program. NASA actually spent $9.9 billion in real year dollars to George Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, take the Shuttle through design, development and initial testing. This NASA, "Honorary Fellowship Acceptance," address delivered to the sum, when converted to fixed year 1971 dollars using the aerospace British Interplanetary Society, University College, London, England, price deflator, equals $5.9 billion, or a 15 percent cost overrun on August 10, 1968, contained in John M. Logsdon, Ray A. Williamson, the original estimate for phase one. Compared to other complex Roger D. Launius, Russell J. Acker, Stephen J. Garber, and Jonathan L. development programs, this was not a large cost overrun." See Howard Friedman, editors, Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the McCurdy, "The Cost of Space Flight," Space Policy 10 (4) p. 280. For History of the U.S. Civil Space Program Volume IV: Accessing Space, a program budget summary, see Jenkins, Space Shuttle, p. 256. NASA SP-4407 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 11 202-205. STS stands for Space Transportation System. Although in the years just Report on the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, November 2002, p. 3-3. NASA Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations, January 2003, p. D-2.Show full note Sess., November 30, 1995.

See remarks by Daniel S. Goldin, Opening Remarks at the September 30, 1996, ceremony commemorating the signing of the Space Flight Operations Contract, Houston, Texas. (Videotape recording.)

¶Congressional Budget Office, "NASAʼs Space Flight Operations Contract and Other Technologically Complex Government Activities Conducted by

¶Contractors," July 29, 2003.

Russell Turner, testimony at public hearing before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, June 12, 2003.

¶See Section 204 of Public Law 105-303, October 28, 1999. 49

¶Joe Rothenberg to Dan Goldin, August 17, 2001, CAIB document

¶CAB015-1134; "Space Shuttle Privatization," CAIB document CAB015-

1135; "Space Shuttle Privatization: Options and Issues," Rev: 8/14/01, CAIB document CAB015-1147.

¶Ron Dittemore, "Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle Program,"

The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Fact Sheet--National Space Transportation Policy," August 5, 1994, pp. 1-2, reprinted in Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, pp. 626- 631.

¶Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team, pp. 3-18. 59

¶"Statement of William F. Readdy, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office

of Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science, House of Representatives," October 21, 1999. CAIB document CAB026- 0146.

Letter from Daniel Goldin to Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, July 6, 1999.

¶NASA, Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, "Report to the

Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, October-December 1999," March 7, 2000. CAIB document CTF017-0169.

¶Ibid.

¶Dr. Richard Beck, Director, Resources Analysis Division, NASA, "Agency

¶Budget Overview, FY 2003 Budget," February 6, 2002, p. 20. CAIB document CAB070-0001.

Space Flight Advisory Committee, NASA Office of Space Flight, Meeting Report, May 1-2, 2001, p. 7. CAIB document CTF017-0034.

Senators Bill Nelson, Bob Graham, Mary Landrieu, John Breaux, and Orrin Hatch to Senator Barbara Mikulski, September 18, 2001.

Space Flight Advisory Committee, NASA Office of Space Flight, Meeting Report, May 1-2, 2001, p. 7. CAIB document CTF017-0034.

Task Force on Space Shuttle Competitive Sourcing, Alternate Trajectories: Options for Competitive Sourcing of the Space Shuttle Program,

¶Executive Summary, The RAND Corporation, 2002. CAIB document

¶CAB003-1614.

¶NNBE Benchmarking Team, NASA Office of Safety & Mission Assurance and NAVSEA 92Q Submarine Safety & Quality Assurance Division,

"NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE)," Interim Report, December 20, 2002. CAIB document CAB030-0392. The teamʼs final report was issued in July 2003.

¶NASA FY 2004 Congressional Budget, "Theme: Space Shuttle." [Excerpt

from NASA FY 2004 budget briefing book also known as the "IBPD Narrative"]. CAIB document CAB065-04190440.

¶NASA, "Theme: Space Shuttle." CAIB document CAB065-04190440.

¶Testimony of Sean OʼKeefe, Deputy Director, Office of Management and

¶Budget, to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, "Part

¶1, National Aeronautics and Space Administration," Hearings Before a

Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st Sess., May 2001, p. 32.

"Report by the International Space Station (ISS) Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force to the NASA Advisory Council,"

¶November 1, 2001, pp. 1-5. CAIB document CTF044-6016.

Testimony of Tom Young, Chairman, ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force, to the Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives, "The Space Station Task Force Report," Hearing Before

the Committee on Science, United States House of Representatives, 107th September 2001. CAIB document CTF005-0283. Congress, 1st Sess., November, 2001, p. 23.

121

¶The dwindling post-Cold War Shuttle budget that launched NASA leadership on a crusade for efficiency in the decade before Columbiaʼs final flight powerfully shaped the environment in which Shuttle managers worked. The increased organizational complexity, transitioning authority structures, and ambiguous working relationships that defined the restructured Space Shuttle Program in the 1990s created turbulence that repeatedly influenced decisions made before and during STS-107.

¶This chapter connects Chapter 5ʼs analysis of NASAʼs broader policy environment to a focused scrutiny of Space Shuttle Program decisions that led to the STS-107 accident. Section 6.1 illustrates how foam debris losses that violated design requirements came to be defined by NASA management as an acceptable aspect of Shuttle missions, one that posed merely a maintenance "turnaround" problem rather than a safety-of-flight concern. Section 6.2 shows how, at a pivotal juncture just months before the Columbia accident, the management goal of completing Node 2 of the International Space Station on time encouraged Shuttle managers to continue flying, even after a significant bipod-foam debris strike on STS-112. Section 6.3 notes the decisions made during STS-107 in response to the bipod foam strike, and reveals how engineersʼ concerns about risk and safety were competing with – and were defeated by – managementʼs belief that foam could not hurt the Orbiter, as well as the need to keep on schedule. In relating a rescue and repair scenario that might have enabled the crewʼs safe return, Section 6.4 grapples with yet another latent assumption held by Shuttle managers during and after STS-107: that even if the foam strike had been discovered, nothing could have been done.