RISC
¶4.108 RISC Management Limited (RISC) was a private security company that had grown out of an earlier business named ISC Global. I heard evidence from Keith Hunter, who was CEO of RISC in the period 2005–6.98 He explained that ISC had been set up in
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¶2000 by Stephen Curtis and Nigel Brown. Mr Curtis was a lawyer with a large network of high net worth clients, whom he introduced to ISC. Mr Curtis' clients included the so called oligarchs Mr Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky. Mr Curtis was killed in a helicopter crash in 2004. As I understood the evidence, the business of ISC was thereafter split between Mr Brown, who went to work in Israel, and Mr Hunter, who set up RISC in London.99
¶4.109 Mr Hunter's evidence was that he first met Mr Litvinenko in 2001 or 2002, when introduced to him by Mr Berezovsky. He recalled that Mr Berezovsky thought that Mr Litvinenko might be useful to his business. He remembered meeting Mr Litvinenko on subsequent occasions, such as at other meetings with Mr Berezovsky. He appears to have formed a fairly low opinion of Mr Litvinenko's value as a possible source of intelligence – his view was that Mr Litvinenko's sources were likely to be historic and also that the views he offered might contain a political slant.100
¶4.110 There was evidence from others that Mr Litvinenko did undertake some work for RISC in 2005 and 2006. Mr Hunter said that he had not been directly involved in such work, and that it would have been handled by Mr Knuckey, RISC's managing director, and by Garym Evans and Daniel Quirke, the investigators who were, successively, the people at RISC with whom Mr Litvinenko dealt on a day to day basis.
¶4.111 Written evidence of Mr Knuckey was read to the Inquiry. He recalled first meeting Mr Litvinenko in the summer of 2004, when he conducted an investigation into the firebombing attack against the houses of Mr Litvinenko and Mr Zakayev (see above at paragraph 4.26). He added, "I believe he was known by the CEO Keith Hunter before then."101 Marina Litvinenko 4/53-54 Knuckey 7/36 INQ006389
¶4.112 Later in the same statement, Mr Knuckey stated that, "during 2005 our company decided to use [Mr Litvinenko] as a source".102 Cole 17/119-122; Schofield 17/122-124 Knuckey 7/45 Shadrin 14/137-218 He said that he asked a member of his staff, Mr Evans, to manage Mr Litvinenko, and that when Mr Evans left RISC in February 2006, he "passed the management of Litvinenko to Dan Quirke",103 Marina Litvinenko 4/54 lines 22-23 Knuckey 7/45-46 Gorokov 13/142-155 another member of staff at RISC.
¶4.113 Mr Evans gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, and his evidence was broadly consistent with that of Mr Knuckey. He recalled being introduced to Mr Litvinenko by either Mr Hunter or Mr Knuckey, or both, in about the middle of 2005.104 Although he was told that he would be working with Mr Litvinenko, and the two met at the RISC offices in London about seven or eight times over the next few months, it does not appear that Mr Litvinenko was actually engaged to conduct any enquiries for RISC during the time that Mr Evans was managing him. Mr Evans said that when the two met they spent time discussing Russian politics. Mr Evans thought that Mr Litvinenko was keeping himself occupied, and also trying to build a relationship with RISC.105 There must have been some substance to the relationship between RISC and Mr Litvinenko, because Mr Evans remembered giving Mr Litvinenko two mobile phones and SIM cards at the latter's request – Mr Evans assumed they were to help him keep in touch with his "network of contacts."106 Marina Litvinenko 4/55-56; Baxter 17/125-127 Evans 7/26 INQ021208 Mr Knuckey's evidence was that RISC had gone further and
76¶The Litvinenko Inquiry paid Mr Litvinenko £1,000 in cash to mark the start of their relationship. He said that Mr Evans would have made the payment, but, whilst Mr Evans did have a "vague recollection" of paying Mr Litvinenko a much smaller amount for expenses, he had no memory of this.107 The other notable feature of Mr Evans' evidence was that he remembered meeting Mr Lugovoy, with Mr Litvinenko, at the RISC offices in London at some stage in the last quarter of 2005.108
¶4.114 Mr Quirke also gave oral evidence to the Inquiry. He said that he was introduced to Mr Litvinenko in February or March 2006, shortly before Mr Evans left the company, and took over as Mr Litvinenko's handler from that time.109 His understanding was that Mr Litvinenko was:
¶"… trying to establish a business, he was working hard, I think he was short of money. I think monies that he'd previously got from – as like a retainer from
¶Mr Berezovsky had ceased and that left a hole in his finances."110 Virchis 18/13 Quirke 11/68 Shadrin 14/170-171
¶4.115 Mr Quirke said that he met Mr Litvinenko five or six times after the handover meeting. The last of those meetings was on 17 October 2006, a meeting to which I shall return in due course.
¶4.116 The evidence I heard was that Mr Litvinenko was formally tasked with his first piece of investigative work for RISC at around the time of the handover from Mr Evans to Mr Quirke. Mr Knuckey asserted in his statement that he gave Mr Litvinenko this piece of work at some point in the first quarter of 2006.111 Mr Quirke's evidence was broadly consistent – he thought that the tasking had commenced shortly before he took over from Mr Evans.112 The case on which Mr Litvinenko was tasked was a long-running case in which RISC acted for Stolichnaya vodka. Mr Quirke explained that RISC were undertaking investigations on behalf of Stolichnaya into what he described as a scheme sponsored by the Russian government to put the company out of business by, as he put it, "flood[ing] the market with knockoff versions of the brand." The task that Mr Litvinenko was given, apparently by Mr Knuckey, was to make enquiries into the Russian agriculture minister, named Mr Gordeyev.113
¶4.117 Mr Litvinenko did not conduct this investigation alone. Rather, he enlisted the assistance of Mr Lugovoy. The evidence of both Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke was that Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy attended a meeting at RISC's offices in London in about April or May 2006 when they presented the fruits of their investigation. Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke were not impressed. Mr Quirke explained that the information, "was not up to the standard we expected … [it] appeared to have been culled from Russian internet sites." Mr Lugovoy demanded US$10,000 for the information – Mr Quirke said that Mr Knuckey agreed to make a payment of US$7,500 to an account operated by Mr Lugovoy in Cyprus, in part because, "We wanted to cultivate and build this relationship."114 Virchis 18/20; 18/26-31 Quirke 11/82; Knuckey 7/46-49; Hunter 11/45-46 Mascall 11/126
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¶4.118 As we shall see, this would not be the last occasion on which Mr Lugovoy would provide Mr Litvinenko with substandard material when purportedly assisting him in making enquiries into Russian targets.
¶4.119 Mr Quirke's evidence was that he had one further formal meeting with Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy. That meeting took place on 17 October 2006.115 Also present on that occasion was Mr Kovtun. I shall return to that meeting in due course.
¶Erinys/Titon 4.120 The other two London private security companies with which Mr Litvinenko became involved in the last year of his life were linked to each other. The two companies shared a director and also a suite of offices in Mayfair – offices that were to play an important part in the events that led to Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶4.121 Mr John Holmes, who gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, was a director of a large multinational security company named Erinys International. He operated its UK subsidiary, Erinys UK. He was assisted in doing so by Mr Tim Reilly, who was employed by Erinys UK as a consultant. The major business of both Erinys companies was the provision of physical security services to the oil industry.116
¶4.122 Mr Holmes was also a co-director of an investigative due diligence business called Titon International Limited. The other director, who managed the day to day work of the company, was called Mr Dean Attew.
¶4.123 Both companies were based in offices at 25 Grosvenor Street, Mayfair.
¶4.124 Mr Attew's evidence was that he first met Mr Litvinenko in 2004; thereafter the two men became close personal friends and, latterly, business associates.117 Mr Attew stated that he saw Mr Litvinenko from time to time after they first met, and they became friends, but that they did not start to work together until about six months before Mr Litvinenko died – that is, about May 2006. It is clear that during those six months the two men became even closer – Mr Attew said that Mr Litvinenko would often pop into the Mayfair offices for a short chat – something that he sometimes did several times a week.118
¶4.125 Mr Attew described how another investigator for whom he sometimes worked needed some enquiries conducted on Russian targets, and that he asked Mr Litvinenko to undertake the work. He said that he probably requested the first of these reports from Mr Litvinenko in August 2006. Mr Attew's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko produced a total of four due diligence reports.119 It was apparent from the evidence of Mr Attew and others that, as with the work that he did for Mr Quirke relating to Mr Gordeyev, Mr Litvinenko obtained assistance from others in preparing these reports. For the first draft of one of the reports, Mr Litvinenko sought assistance from Mr Lugovoy. For the second draft of that report, and for all the others, Mr Litvinenko was assisted by Yuri Shvets.120
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¶4.126 Mr Shvets was a former member of the Committee for State Security (KGB) who emigrated to the United States (US) in 1993. From there, he wrote and published a book that was highly critical of what he described as the Russian "system", which, he told me, he regarded as "more dangerous to the country than any external enemy". He received threats following the publication of the book and he subsequently claimed and was granted asylum in the US.121 As I have described at paragraph 4.51 above, Mr Litvinenko and Mr Shvets had met and become friends in 2002 when they were both involved in the project relating to the so called 'Kuchma tapes'.
¶4.127 Mr Shvets told me that he had a telephone conversation with Mr Litvinenko in about July 2006. Mr Shvets was already producing due diligence reports and he suggested to Mr Litvinenko that he should try and find customers for the reports in London. He said that he would pay Mr Litvinenko 20% of the fee for each report.122
¶4.128 One of the reports that Mr Attew commissioned Mr Litvinenko to provide is of particular interest to this Inquiry. That was the report of which Mr Lugovoy prepared the first draft and Mr Shvets the second. The target of that report was a senior Russian politician named Victor Ivanov. Mr Attew explained that Mr Litvinenko had introduced him to Mr Lugovoy prior to the report being commissioned, and he had disliked him.
¶4.129 The view of Mr Attew and others was that the reports prepared by Mr Shvets were of very high quality. Mr Litvinenko appears to have been paid thousands of pounds for each report,123 although the evidence was that the larger part of that money was sent by Mr Litvinenko to Mr Shvets.
¶4.130 Mr Reilly, who was employed by Mr Holmes as a consultant to Erinys UK, was a specialist in oil and gas and a Russian speaker. His evidence was that Mr Attew introduced him to Mr Litvinenko at some point during the early summer of 2006 in the offices that the two companies shared. They spoke together in Russian and subsequently Mr Litvinenko would often drop by his office so that they could talk in Russian. Mr Reilly thought that he was one of the few people whom Mr Litvinenko knew who could speak Russian but was not a member of the Russian community in London. He estimated that he saw Mr Litvinenko between 20 and 30 times in 2006, between the early summer and November when Mr Litvinenko was taken ill.124
¶4.131 Mr Reilly's role at Erinys UK at the time was to attempt to secure contracts for the Erinys companies in the Russian oil and gas fields, and in particular was attempting to cultivate contacts that he had made in the security department at Gazprom. According to Mr Reilly, Mr Litvinenko told him that he had a Russian friend who might be able to help, and that he should meet him. He put it in this way:
¶"[Mr Litvinenko] mentioned he had a friend from his time in Russia who was also ex-KGB who had contacts in the security world and indeed had a security company himself amongst other businesses that he had, and that it would be useful perhaps to meet this guy who may be able to introduce me to Russian oil and gas industry in terms of its security departments."125 Michenina 18/89-93 Reilly 10/61-62 Mascall 11/132-136
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¶4.132 Mr Lugovoy duly came to the Mayfair offices with Mr Litvinenko to meet Mr Reilly. Mr Reilly said that the first of these meetings took place in June or July 2006.126 The next meeting, at which Mr Lugovoy was accompanied by Mr Kovtun, took place on 16 October 2006; that is a meeting to which I shall return.
¶4.133 Mr Reilly's evidence was that, although the question of money was never discussed between him and Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy, it was understood that they would be paid if, and only if, Erinys won a contract.127
¶Might this work have been linked to Mr Litvinenko's death? 4.134 As I suggested at the beginning of this Part, Mr Litvinenko's apparent keenness to develop his work with private security companies in the period 2005-6 may well be explained by a desire, and/or a need, to establish sources of income that were independent of Mr Berezovsky. I heard evidence that Mr Litvinenko was exploring other similar ventures – for example, he asked for Mr Reilly's advice about a project to import ethanol from the Ukraine,128 and also discussed a possible deal involving copper trading with Mr Attew.129
¶4.135 Mr Litvinenko's life, then, was starting to move in a new direction. He was meeting and doing business with people outside the close circle around Mr Berezovsky. He was investigating people, often influential people, in Russia, and seeking to sell the fruits of those investigations to their business partners and rivals.
¶4.136 The question that I must address is whether, in taking these steps, Mr Litvinenko was placing himself at risk. In particular, I must consider whether the new work that Mr Litvinenko was undertaking was in any way connected with his death.
¶4.137 The first point to make is that I heard clear evidence that those who commissioned due diligence type work from Mr Litvinenko took careful steps to preserve his anonymity as the source of information that they then relayed to their clients. Mr Quirke stated that the names of sources were kept confidential even within the office, and that Mr Litvinenko's name would not have been written on any report or mentioned orally to any of their clients.130 Mr Evans131 and Mr Hunter132 gave evidence to similar effect, and the same basic principle was implicit in Mr Attew's evidence.
¶4.138 It follows that, at least as regards most of the reports that Mr Litvinenko was involved in preparing, there is no particular reason to think that his role in providing what may have been damaging information ever became known to anyone affected by it. One exception to this is the Ivanov report that I have referred to above. There is reason to think that this report might have found its way back to Mr Ivanov and others in the Kremlin, together with the fact that Mr Litvinenko had been responsible for preparing it. I will return to this particular report in the next Part (see below, Part 5, chapter 4).
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¶4.139 Moving on, the question that I posed at paragraph 4.106 above was whether Mr Litvinenko's need to establish a network of sources to assist him in this investigative work may have led him to associate with people who wished him harm.
¶4.140 The summary of the evidence relating to Mr Litvinenko's private security work that I have set out above contains references to Mr Litvinenko seeking to involve Mr Lugovoy in a number of different projects. Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy were old acquaintances; but the evidence is clear that it was this work that led to them becoming closer in the period 2005.
¶Andrey Lugovoy 4.141 Mr Lugovoy is a central figure in the issues to which this Inquiry give rise. Although he did not give oral evidence, I heard a good deal of oral evidence about him. I also admitted into evidence a number of the accounts that he has given about the events in question. It will be convenient to say a little by way of introduction about him at this point.
¶4.142 I heard that Mr Lugovoy was born in Baku in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1966, which made him four years younger than Mr Litvinenko.133 Not unlike Mr Litvinenko, Mr Lugovoy was born into a family that was proud of its military history and its record of service to Russia. At a press conference in May 2007, Mr Lugovoy said this about his family:
¶"I was born into a family of a military person. My grandad fought in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904. He was awarded a St George's Cross, one of the highest military honours of the Russian empire. My other grandad took part in the storming of Berlin. My father served in the army for 39 years. My brother is a steersman on an atomic submarine and I am a professional military man by training. I was brought up in the tradition of a real Russian officer. I am proud that for the last few years in my opinion Russia started to gain its place in the world as a stage of geopolitical importance, which has always influenced politics and I hope will influence politics. It was so before the October revolution, and after it. There was a small period of time when nobody took Russia into account for ten years. Now, gentlemen, you will have to take Russia into account."134 Berezovsky 25/19 lines 20-21 INQ001886 (page 21) INQ001788 (page 21)
¶4.143 In the passage that I have quoted Mr Lugovoy said that he was a military man by training, and I heard some further evidence on that subject. I heard that he attended military college, and then joined the Ninth Directorate of the KGB, which was responsible for providing protection for senior state officials. Like Mr Litvinenko, on the break-up of the KGB Mr Lugovoy continued to undertake the same work, albeit for a differently named organisation. In Mr Lugovoy's case, he was a member of the Federal Protection Service (FPS), which was the successor organisation to the Ninth Directorate.135 It appears that Mr Lugovoy was never a member of the FSB.136
¶4.144 I heard that in 1996 Mr Lugovoy resigned from the FPS to become Head of Security at ORT, the television station that was run at that time by Mr Berezovsky and his business partner Mr Patarkatsishvili. Mr Lugovoy remained in that job until 2001, when he was required to leave the company. It will be recalled that that was at about
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¶the time when Mr Berezovsky left Russia and gave up control of ORT, having fallen out with President Putin. I heard that Mr Lugovoy's explanation for his departure from ORT at this time was that he was required to leave the company because he was perceived to be one of Mr Berezovsky's associates.137
¶4.145 Unlike Mr Berezovsky, Mr Lugovoy did not leave Russia. Rather, he developed various successful business interests, including a security company named Ninth Wave.138
¶4.146 I also heard evidence about an event in Mr Lugovoy's life that took place shortly after his departure from ORT, and which is of considerable potential significance to the issues that arise in this Inquiry. The evidence I heard was that Mr Lugovoy was arrested and convicted in 2001 of attempting to assist another of Mr Berezovsky's associates, named Mr Glushkov, to escape from prison. The evidence was that he was released in 2002, after 15 months' imprisonment.139
¶4.147 As we shall see, questions have been asked about this chapter of Mr Lugovoy's story. The underlying theme of these questions has been the possibility that Mr Lugovoy was, or became, an FSB agent tasked to act against Mr Berezovsky and his associates. It has been suggested that Mr Lugovoy's conviction and imprisonment were fabricated in order to add to his credibility with Mr Berezovsky. Mr Glushkov, for example, stated that Mr Lugovoy had never been seen in the Lefortovo prison during the time that he was supposedly detained there.140 Another suggestion has been that Mr Lugovoy may have been recruited by the FSB whilst in prison. One focus of speculation in this regard has been Mr Lugovoy's successful business career following his release from prison, in particular in the security business, which was closely monitored by the FSB. I heard evidence that Andrei Vasiliev, the editor of the Russian newspaper Kommersant, had put the matter in this way:
¶"There is a saying 'there is no such thing as a former KGB man'… I find Lugovoy's story a little strange. He was in prison, had a criminal record and suddenly he is okay, is allowed to do business, still having contact with Berezovsky. It raises questions."141 Nathwani 18/103 Mascall 8/47-48 Mascall 12/10-12
¶4.148 As I have described, both Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy were associates of Mr Berezovsky in Moscow during the late 1990s, and both gave an account of having met occasionally at that time.142 They also gave consistent accounts of not having had any contact with each other for some years following Mr Litvinenko's departure from Moscow, and of then meeting again in London in 2004 or 2005. However, their accounts differ in what may be significant respects as to the timing and circumstances of their first meeting in London.
¶4.149 As to the timing of their first meeting in London, Mr Litvinenko said twice during the course of his interviews with DI Hyatt that the meeting had taken place in 2004. He also said that Mr Lugovoy had been in London at the time to watch either CSKA Moscow or Spartak play Chelsea.143 Mr Lugovoy's account (in the witness statement that he gave in the Terluk litigation) was that the meeting had taken place in October
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¶2005, but he also said that the meeting had coincided with his trip to London to watch CSKA Moscow play Chelsea.144 There is evidence before the Inquiry that CSKA Moscow played Chelsea in London on 20 October 2004; there were no matches between the two teams in 2005 – nor were there any matches between Chelsea and Spartak in either year.145 It therefore appears very likely that Mr Litvinenko's account was accurate and that the two men first met in London in October 2004.
¶4.150 There is also a divergence between the accounts of the two men as to how the meeting was arranged. Mr Litvinenko told DI Hyatt that Mr Lugovoy contacted him and suggested that they meet. Mr Lugovoy, on the other hand, stated in the witness statement to which I have referred above that Mr Litvinenko had contacted him and asked to meet. Since this was the occasion on which the relationship between the two men was renewed, the question of who initiated the process is of some importance. I will return to this question in Part 9 below.
¶4.151 Following that meeting Mr Litvinenko drew Mr Lugovoy into his business activities, often describing him as his 'Moscow contact'. On the evidence that I have heard, the first occasion on which Mr Litvinenko took Mr Lugovoy to a business meeting in London was the meeting with Mr Evans in late 2005. That was followed by the meeting with Mr Quirke and Mr Knuckey in April/May 2006, then the meetings with Mr Attew and Mr Reilly, and the further meeting with Mr Quirke, later in the year. Marina Litvinenko gave evidence that she recalled meeting Mr Lugovoy at Mr Berezovsky's 60th birthday party, held at Blenheim Palace in January 2006. She also recalled that Mr Lugovoy and his wife had visited Mr Litvinenko at their home in north London during July 2006, whilst she and Anatoly were away on holiday.146
¶4.152 As I have explained above, neither Mr Knuckey and Mr Quirke, nor Mr Attew, were at all impressed by the due diligence reports compiled by Mr Lugovoy. Mr Attew also stated that he took a strong personal dislike to Mr Lugovoy when he met him with Mr Litvinenko at Heathrow Airport in June 2006. Mr Attew's evidence was that, on meeting Mr Lugovoy, he disliked and distrusted him. He added:
¶"I have met many different people from many different countries, and you on occasions meet people that worry you, concern you, scare you, and in this instance, there was something I would describe as cold, scarily cold about Lugovoy. It wasn't that I felt frightened; it wasn't that I felt in harm's way in any way. I just didn't like the characteristics of the individual or the profile that was sitting in front of me."147 Nathwani 18/113 Attew 13/85-86 INQ001788 (page 22)
¶Mr Attew also stated that he returned to the Erinys/Titon offices after meeting Mr Lugovoy and recounted his experience to Mr Holmes and Mr Reilly. He also advised his colleagues that they should not allow Mr Lugovoy into the offices and, more importantly, that they should not do any business with him.148 As I have explained, Mr Reilly ignored both pieces of advice.
¶4.153 But it is striking that Mr Litvinenko appears to have had a very different opinion of Mr Lugovoy to that of Mr Attew. Mr Attew told me that Mr Litvinenko described Mr Lugovoy to him as "a good friend."149 Nathwani 18/123-124 Attew 13/45 Glushkov 17/6-21 Mr Quirke's evidence was that Mr Litvinenko described Mr Lugovoy to him as "someone… that he trusted and who was in Russia
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¶and could help us",150 and Mr Reilly's impression of Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy's relationship was that they were, "fairly frank and open with each other, very comfortable in each other's presence".151 Nathwani 18/124 Reilly 10/65 Felshtinsky 23/160-161
¶4.154 Mr Shvets also told me that Mr Litvinenko trusted Mr Lugovoy. He recalled that he and Mr Litvinenko discussed whether Mr Lugovoy could be trusted after Mr Litvinenko told him that he had given a copy of the Ivanov report that Mr Shvets had drafted to Mr Lugovoy. The conversation, as Mr Shvets recounted it, is a telling one:
¶"Then it was dangerous, because I didn't know who that guy was, this Russian guy was, and basically it was dangerous for – it could be dangerous for my network.
¶And this is why I said: Sasha, do you understand what you are doing, because it may be dangerous for us both. And this is when I started asking questions, do you really know this guy, and he told me what he could tell me about him. Basically he told me that he had known him for more years than he knew me. He said that don't worry, I trust this guy entirely, because – and basically he told me his four criteria. First, this Russian guy, Sasha said, he had worked with the KGB, as we did, all right, so we are from the same league. Then he said that, like I, that's
¶Sasha, and this guy, we worked with the Russian security agencies. Okay. Third criteria, he said that this guy, like Sasha, worked for Boris Berezovsky. And the fourth criteria was that this guy, he had served time in jail for his association with
¶Boris Berezovsky, like Sasha did. So for Sasha, these two last criteria, they were essential for him to trust this guy entirely. Sasha said, like, you know, this guy, he is like me, he has served time in jail for Boris Berezovsky, I trust him entirely. I said:
¶okay, it's your choice, you did it, but let's see what happens next."152 Henry 18/139-140 Shvets 24/74-75 Glushkov 17/11-12
¶4.155 Whether Mr Litvinenko was right to trust Mr Lugovoy, and whether Mr Lugovoy was connected to what did "happen next" to Mr Litvinenko, are issues that lie at the heart of this Inquiry.
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85¶Part:5 Marina Litvinenko 3/15 lines 14-16 Service 28/71 lines 1-4 INQ019194 Marina Litvinenko 4/8-9 Alexander Litvinenko's final months Chapter 1: Introduction 5.1 The summer and early autumn of 2006 saw a number of developments in the themes that I have set out above, developments that I will consider before turning in the next Part to the events that immediately preceded Mr Litvinenko's death.
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¶Chapter 2: The 2006 Russian laws 5.2 Two laws passed through the Russian legislative process in the first part of 2006, to which I shall refer as 'the 2006 laws'. At the time, some perceived the 2006 laws as a means by which President Putin might take action against the dissident community outside Russia, including in the UK. It is necessary to consider whether such fears may have been justified, and whether their enactment is a factor of any significance in the death of Mr Litvinenko.
¶5.3 I heard oral evidence on these matters from a number of witnesses. Following the conclusion of the hearings, I instructed Drew Holiner, an expert in Russian law, to prepare a report on the meaning and effect of the 2006 laws. He produced a report dated 4 August 2015, which I have adduced into evidence.1
¶The 2006 laws 5.4 The first of the 2006 laws was Federal Law no.35-FZ of 2006 – On Counteraction of Terrorism (hereafter 'the Terrorism Law').2 It was adopted by the State Duma on 26 February 2006, endorsed by the Federation Council on 1 March 2006 and signed into law by President Putin on 6 March 2006. The Terrorism Law runs to some 17 pages and reads as a code providing for anti-terrorism measures to be taken by Russian forces. One of the striking features of the Terrorism Law is that it makes provision for Russian forces to take action against terrorism beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.
¶5.5 The Terrorism Law contemplates anti-terrorism action being taken both by Russia's armed forces, and also by the "federal security service" – i.e. the FSB. I shall return below to address questions as to the roles that each was intended to play under the legislation, and the limits on their statutory functions.
¶5.6 The second of the 2006 laws was not, like the first, a piece of freestanding legislation but was an amendment to the Federal Law of 25 July 2002 On Counteracting Extremist Activity. The bill containing the amendment was approved by the State Duma on 8 July 2006 and by the Federation Council on 14 July 2006. It received Presidential approval on 27 July 2006. I shall refer to this amendment as 'the Extremism Law'.
¶5.7 The Extremism Law contained an expansive list of activity that was to constitute extremism for the purposes of the statute. The list is set out in full in Appendix C to Mr Holiner's report3 (an abbreviated version of the list is included in Professor Service's first report). The list includes:
¶"(a) the activity of public and religious associations or other organisations, or the editorial board of a medium of mass communication, or physical persons as to the planning, organising, preparation and implementation of acts directed at:
Violent change to the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;
¶Undermining of the security of the Russian Federation;
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¶Creation of illegal armed formations;
¶Conduct of terrorist activity or the public justification of terrorism;
Excitation of racist, national or religious strife (roznya) as well as social strife accompanied by force or calls for the use of force;
¶Insulting (unizhenie) national dignity;
Realisation of mass disorders, hooligan actions and acts of vandalism with motives of ideological, political, racial, national or religious hostility or hatred, as well as that motivated by hatred or enmity toward some social group;
Propaganda of the exceptionalism, superiority or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude towards religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation;
Obstruction of the legal activity of organs of state power and election commissions, as well as the lawful activities of the officials of such organs and commissions;
Public slander of anyone filling a state post of the Russian Federation or a state office of a constituent region of the Russian Federation during the exercise of his official duties or in connection with their exercise, accompanied by an accusation that the person has committed acts identified in this article, on the condition that such slander has been established in court proceedings;
¶…
Production and (or) dissemination of printed, audio, audio-visual and other materials for public use that contain even one of the above-mentioned features;
¶(b) …
¶(c) Public appeals to engage in such activity, as well as public calls and addresses encouraging engagement in such activity and supporting or justifyng the commission of acts identified in this article;
¶(d) Financing such activities or any co-operation in planning, organisation, preparation and implementation of such actions, including by means of providing funds, immovable property, educational, printing material and technical support, telephone, fax or other means of communication, informational services or other material and technical means."
¶5.8 Professor Service commented on this provision in trenchant terms. He said:
¶"The amendment is a mere listing of categories rather than a careful legislative definition. The language is extravagantly vague, and more than one category allows for unfettered repressive activity by the authorities. The item on the slandering of holders of public office is remarkable for the room it gives to treat any strident critique of the President or other leading officials as extremism. The wording is so expansive as to enable the authorities, if such were to be their desire, to act
88¶The Litvinenko Inquiry against every kind of unfair criticism – or indeed any criticism that they deem to be unfair."4 Marina Litvinenko 3/24-25; INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 7); there are some small points of difference between this evidence and Mr Litvinenko's own account, given without an interpreter at the first session of his November 2006 police interviews – INQ002076 (page 3) HMG000353 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 67) Mascall 22/135
¶The perceived threat 5.9 There is no doubt that Mr Litvinenko and the circle around him perceived the 2006 laws as representing a threat to their safety. On 11 July 2006 (three days after the second law had been passed by the Duma), The Times published a letter written by Vladimir Bukovsky and Oleg Gordievsky. It was short and to the point. It read as follows:
¶"Sir, As the seven leaders of the world's most industrially developed democracies are packing their suitcases in order to go to St Petersburg for the G8 meeting, their would-be host, Former KGB Lieutenant–Colonel Vladimir Putin, has rushed through the state Duma two new pieces of legislation.
¶First, a new law enabling him to use his secret services as 'death squads' to eliminate 'extremists' anywhere abroad (including in this country).
¶Second, an amendment to existing law on fighting 'extremism', providing a much broader definition of that 'crime' which, among other things, will include now any
¶'libellous' statements about his Administration.
¶Thus, the stage is set for any critic of Putin's regime here, especially those campaigning against Russian genocide in Chechnya, to have an appointment with a poison-tipped umbrella. According to the statement by the Russian Defence
¶Minister Sergei Ivanov, the black list of potential targets is already compiled.
¶In keeping with the best traditions of the Soviet-era foreign policy, which always strived to make the world an unwitting accomplice of their crimes, this masterpiece is delivered precisely to coincide with the G8 meeting, which will serve to provide a semblance of approval, or at least of acceptance, by the world of this new development in the 'common fight with terrorism'.
¶Needless to say, this is an extremely dangerous development. Unless the Western leaders are prepared to share responsibility for murders, like the one committed in Qatar by Russian agents, they must cancel their meeting, or, at the very least, should protest loudly against such abuse of the G8 chairmanship."5 Marina Litvinenko 3/15 lines 14-16 Service 28/71 lines 1-4 INQ019194 Marina Litvinenko 4/8-9
¶5.10 In an interview conducted by the Metropolitan Police Service in March 2007, Boris Berezovsky explained the extent of the concerns that Mr Litvinenko himself had had regarding the new legislation. He said:
¶"And of course he was always worried of the security especially after, in July 2006,
¶Putin signed a law which allowed Russian special services without any investigation or court hearing, to kill people who Russian authorities considered to be enemies of then Russian state. Sasha mentioned loads of times that this legislation of course was designed in the first place to get rid of us – him, Zakayev and myself. Moreover, he said that most probably they would try to poison us. Today this sounds amazing but unfortunately this proved to be true, true prediction."6 Marina Litvinenko 3/27-29; 4/80 INQ017734 (page 10, paragraph 34); Marina Litvinenko 3/137 lines 4-11 Berezovsky 25/26 lines 9-20 Reilly 10/61
89¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months
¶5.11 Marina Litvinenko's evidence was to a similar effect – she said that Mr Litvinenko "viewed these laws as a personal threat".7 INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 8) INQ016642 (page 7) INQ017734 (page 23 paragraph 80) Mascall 8/2-4
¶Did the 2006 laws represent a real threat? 5.12 This is an issue that is best addressed in two stages.
¶5.13 First, it is necessary to consider whether the terms of the legislative provisions themselves bear out the type of concerns expressed above. That is an exercise that requires me to determine the meaning and effect of the 2006 laws. Although Professor Service addressed the point, it is not strictly within his expertise. Mr Holiner, on the other hand, is an expert on Russian law and I will refer principally to his evidence in addressing this first question.
¶5.14 The second stage is to assess whether the laws could have operated at a more general level in increasing the threat to Mr Litvinenko and those around him. That is an area within Professor Service's expertise, and I found his evidence of assistance in this regard.
¶The strict meaning of the 2006 laws 5.15 The question here is whether the text of the 2006 laws themselves bears out the concerns held and expressed by Mr Bukovsky, Mr Gordievsky and Mr Litvinenko, and which would appear to have been shared by others.
¶5.16 As I have said, both Professor Service and Mr Holiner addressed these matters. I also received helpful representations on this point made in March 2013 to the Solicitor to the Inquiry (then the Solicitor to the Inquest) by Mr Batmanov, the then Head of the Consular Department of the Russian Embassy in London.8
¶5.17 I agree with the observation made by Professor Service in his report that there is "some confusion" as to the meaning and content of the two pieces of legislation, "even in some of the well-informed secondary literature".9
¶5.18 I would make the following points regarding the content and strict meaning of the two laws:
¶a. It appears to me that the effect of the Extremism Law was to create a very wide definition of the term 'extremism'. Moreover, the new definition included conduct of which Mr Litvinenko and those around him could be accused – most obviously,
¶"Public slander of anyone filling a state post of the Russian Federation." I note the statutory requirement under that limb of the statutory definition that "such slander has been established in court proceedings"
¶b. It follows that steps might well have been taken against Mr Litvinenko under the On Countering Extremist Activity law as amended, had he been in Russia in
- However, he was of course outside the jurisdiction by that time, and the anti-extremist law contained no provisions for extra-territorial enforcement c. The Terrorism Law, by contrast, did contain such provisions
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry d. Mr Holiner confirmed the distinction at paragraph 25 of his report:10
"In sum, the Counterterrorism Law permits the Federal Security Service, upon obtaining authority from the President of the Russian Federation, to engage in counterterrorist activities abroad aimed at eliminating terrorist threats, including through the use of lethal force…The Counter-Extremism Law confers no similar authority to act in respect of persons defined as extremists."
¶e. Professor Service made a similar point at paragraph 68 of his report – the 2006 anti-
extremism amendment, he said, "contained no permission for the assassination of 'extremists' who were not terrorists"11 INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 4) INQ017680 [video] INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 68) Mr Kovtun states that he is one year older than Mr Lugovoy in his 2 June 2015 witness statement INQ021208 (page 6). There is evidence that Mr Lugovoy was born in 1966. INQ016809 INQ006067
¶f. The only legal route to extra-territorial action against Mr Litvinenko was therefore
under the Terrorism Law. However, action could only have been taken against Mr Litvinenko under this law had he been involved in, or no doubt suspected of involvement in, some form of terrorist activity. Article 3 of the Terrorism Law contains definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts that are broadly conventional, and certainly not as expansive as the definition of 'extremism' in the second of the 2006 laws. Mr Batmanov's letter (above) states that, "Alexander Litvinenko did not make part of a terrorist organization and was not accused by Russian law enforcement bodies of having committed a terrorist crime." That accords with my understanding of the evidence
¶5.19 On the basis of the evidence currently before me, and in light of the considerations set out above, I am therefore not persuaded that any action could have been taken by the FSB against Mr Litvinenko in 2006 under the terms of either of the 2006 laws.
¶5.20 For completeness, I should add that the letter from Mr Batmanov made a further suggestion, to the effect that the Terrorism Law only established a legal basis for Russia's armed forces to take international action against terrorism, and that it did not create any similar legal basis for international action by the FSB. Mr Holiner disputed this analysis. His view was that the Terrorism Law did indeed authorise international action of this sort by the FSB, and that this was also clear from the relevant terms of the Federal Security Service Law.
¶5.21 I find Mr Holiner's reasoning on this point compelling, but in the end it is unnecessary for me to reach a conclusion on it. There is a simple factual reason why the terms of the 2006 laws did not permit any Russian forces to take action against Mr Litvinenko in the UK, namely that he had not been involved in terrorist activities.
¶Wider considerations 5.22 But as I have already indicated, that is not the end of the matter. Professor Service, rightly in my view, identified a further consideration. Even if the strict terms of the 2006 laws could not be brought to bear against Mr Litvinenko, can it be said that they had a subtler, less formal effect of encouraging, or emboldening, or even licensing the FSB to take action against Mr Litvinenko and others like him?
¶5.23 Professor Service helpfully put the 2006 laws into their historical context. He referred in particular to the public outrage in Russia following the killing of five Russian diplomats by a Chechen supporting terrorist group in Iraq, and also to FSB claims in July 2006
91¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months that it had been responsible for the explosion in Ingushetia that had killed Shamil Basayev, a leading Chechen terrorist.
¶5.24 Against this backdrop, Professor Service expressed the view that the 2006 amendment to the anti-extremist law had an influence going beyond the scope of its black letter provisions. In his report he put the matter in this way:
¶"The amendment did, however, have a political consequence of importance by broadening the spectrum of targets to be pursued by the security agencies.
¶Not only out-and-out terrorists were mentioned but 'extremists' in general, and extremism itself was described only in relation to imprecisely delineated categories of activity. The door was left open to brand a large swathe of opponents of Putin and his administration as extremists who needed to be eliminated. And terrorism and extremism were frequently mentioned in the same breath by Putin and his ministers. There was little attempt to make an official distinction between the two phenomena that the legislation was directed against. To that extent, there was an implicit licensing package for FSB operations abroad as well as in Russia."12 Berezovsky 25/3-30 Marina Litvinenko 4/31-32; 4/41; 4/112-114 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 69) INQ021208 (page 6) Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ020031
¶5.25 Professor Service expanded on this reasoning in giving oral evidence. When asked whether it was his view that the 2006 laws had more of a political than a legal effect, he stated:
¶"Yes, I think that's a fair summary. In legal terms, only one of them related to legal encouragement for taking physical action abroad, but generally taking the two together, the political effect was to engender an environment within the FSB and within public opinion that there was little difference between acting against extremism and acting against terrorism… legally speaking, there is a distinction, but it's hard to avoid the conclusion that the authorities wanted to fudge that distinction and just create a new feeling for the FSB to feel free to act without constraint."13 Berezovsky v Abramovich [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm), paragraphs 97-112 Marina Litvinenko 4/113; INQ016447 Service 28/47 lines 4-14 Hohne 32/50-54; Marina Wall 32/56 INQ017779 (page 30) Dombey 23/5-56
¶He continued:
¶"We don't have definite documentation about exactly why President Putin introduced these two legal changes in 2006, but we do know that they were introduced to the maximum of publicity, so that it is inconceivable that they were not thought to be important elements in reinforcing support in public opinion for what the authorities wanted to do."14 Berezovsky 25/6-7 Felshtinsky 23/128-131 Service 28/48 lines 3-9 Hohne 32/51 INQ015781 part 1, INQ015781 part 2; INQ015777 part 1, INQ015777 part 2; INQ015778; INQ015779; INQ015780 [videos] Dombey 23/13-39
¶And further:
¶"We simply don't know the extent to which those two amendments affected the operational activity of the FSB. It seems a strong possibility that those amendments opened a channel for the FSB that wasn't as wide beforehand."15 Marina Litvinenko 3/35-36 INQ019146 (page 24 paragraph 75) Service 28/51 lines 2-6 Marina Wall 32/55 INQ017779 Dombey 23/22
92¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 3: Continued opposition to President
¶Putin 5.26 The evidence shows that Mr Litvinenko's political campaigning work, and in particular his vocal criticism of President Putin, continued until his final illness. There does not appear to have been any let up – either through concern at what the new Russian laws might herald, or because of his increasing security work. Mr Goldfarb did observe, however, that the balance of Mr Litvinenko's campaigning work in the later years was more towards writing, for example on the Chechenpress website, than on the public appearances that had been a feature of his first few years in the UK.16
¶5.27 It was, in fact, in July 2006 that Mr Litvinenko published an article on the Chechenpress website that Professor Service referred to as the "climax" of Mr Litvinenko's attacks on President Putin.17 The article, which is in evidence before me, accused President Putin of paedophilia.18 It read as follows:
¶"A few days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin walked from the Big Kremlin
¶Palace to his Residence. At one of the Kremlin squares, the president stopped to chat with the tourists. Among them was a boy aged 4 or 5.
¶'What is your name?' Putin asked.
¶'Nikita,' the boy replied.
¶Putin knee[le]d, lifted the boy's T-shirt and kissed his stomach.
¶The world public is shocked. Nobody can understand why the Russian president did such a strange thing as kissing the stomach of an unfamiliar small boy.
¶The explanation may be found if we look carefully at the so-called 'blank spots' in
¶Putin's biography.
¶After graduating from the Andropov Institute, which prepares officers for the KGB intelligence service, Putin was not accepted into the foreign intelligence. Instead, he was sent to a junior position in KGB Leningrad Directorate. This was a very unusual twist for a career of an Andropov Institute's graduate with fluent German.
¶Why did that happen with Putin?
¶Because, shortly before his graduation, his bosses learned that Putin was a pedophile [sic]. So say some people who knew Putin as a student at the Institute.
¶The Institute officials feared to report this to their own superiors, which would cause an unpleasant investigation. They decided it was easier just to avoid sending Putin abroad under some pretext. Such a solution is not unusual for the secret services.
¶Many years later, when Putin became the FSB director and was preparing for the presidency, he began to seek and destroy any compromising materials collected against him by the secret services over earlier years. It was not difficult, provided he himself was the FSB director. Among other things, Putin found videotapes in
93¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months the FSB Internal Security directorate, which showed him making sex with some underage boys.
¶Interestingly, the video was recorded in the same conspiratorial flat in Polyanka
¶Street in Moscow where Russian Prosecutor-General Yuri Skuratov was secretly video-taped with two prostitutes. Later, in the famous scandal, Putin (on Roman
¶Abramovich's instructions) blackmailed Skuratov with these tapes and tried to persuade the Prosecutor-General to resign. In that conversation, Putin mentioned to Skuratov that he himself was also secretly video-taped making sex at the same bed. (But of course, he did not tell it was pedophilia [sic] rather than normal sex.)
¶Later, Skuratov wrote about this in his book Variant Drakona (pp.153-154)."
¶5.28 It hardly needs saying that the allegations made by Mr Litvinenko against President Putin in this article were of the most serious nature. Could they have had any connection with his death?
¶5.29 Nor were these the last public allegations that Mr Litvinenko made against President Putin. Only a matter of days before he fell ill, Mr Litvinenko publicly accused President Putin of responsibility for the murder of Anna Politkovskaya (see paragraphs 5.67 – 5.77 below). And, as I have already described, in the statement that he signed on his deathbed, he accused the Russian President of responsibility for another murder – his own.
94¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 4: Did Alexander Litvinenko fall out with
and/or attempt to blackmail Boris Berezovsky?
¶5.30 Item 17 of the Inquiry's List of Issues refers to the "possible involvement of Boris Berezovsky in Alexander Litvinenko's death".
¶5.31 This issue arises from allegations that have been made principally, but not solely, by Andrey Lugovoy. Put very shortly, the allegation is that Mr Litvinenko fell out with Mr Berezovsky about money in the months before he died, that he then tried to blackmail Mr Berezovsky, and that as a result Mr Berezovsky ordered his killing.
¶5.32 This allegation was advanced by Mr Lugovoy at the press conference that he held in Moscow on 31 May 2007. He told the press that he had three explanations for Mr Litvinenko's death. The first two were that Mr Litvinenko had been killed by UK agencies or by the Russian mafia. His third explanation, which he said seemed to him to be "the most plausible", was as follows:
¶"I am talking about Berezovsky who is known as an outstanding master of political intrigue. Litvinenko told me, that Berezovsky in fact sacked him by decreasing his salary threefold. Lately both Sasha and Berezovsky thought that the Office of the Russian Federation Procurator General and the British will come to an understanding and Berezovsky will be extradited to Russia.
¶In this connection I would like to tell you what Sasha had told Dmitry Kovtun not long before his death, when we met together in October of last year. During our dinner at one of the Chinatown restaurants in London, Litvinenko, enlarging on the subject of ways to make money, touched upon the resumed negotiations between
¶Russia and the UK regarding Berezovsky's extradition. Lamenting the fact that
¶Berezovsky did not appreciate the services rendered to him by Litvinenko, who allegedly saved his life more than once, Litvinenko told Kovtun, that he had the most important materials of a compromising nature, regarding the illegal activity of Berezovsky on the UK territory. If any part of the documents pertaining to the circumstances of his obtaining the refugee status were to be made public, then he (Berezovsky) would have huge problems. Litvinenko hinted to Dima, that especially now, when Russia raised an issue with the UK of extraditing Berezovsky, it would be very opportune to let Berezovsky know that such materials exist, and to put a value of several million dollars on them. Still being financially dependent on Berezovsky – Berezovsky was paying his son's tuition fees and the family's accommodation in London – Litvinenko asked Kovtun to find a reliable person, whom he would introduce to Berezovsky, which person would be able to familiarise
¶Berezovsky with the materials, compromising him. Litvinenko was absolutely sure of the success of this enterprise, referring to the explosive nature and authenticity of the compromising materials that he possessed. Since the conversation took place when I left the table, Litvinenko asked Kovtun to keep that conversation between them, fearing that I, as a person who could contact Berezovsky at any point, would expose Litvinenko's idea to him.
¶Not willing to participate in all that even indirectly, not taking Litvinenko seriously,
¶Kovtun and I decided it prudent to forget this conversation as soon as possible.
¶However recalling now the details of my meetings with Litvinenko, his conviction
95¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months
that the compromising materials he possessed could have fundamentally changed his (Litvinenko's) reduced financial circumstances, I can suppose that he did not abandon the idea of blackmailing Berezovsky which could have led to such lamentable consequences for him."19 INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 12) BER000167 INQ001886 (pages 5-6) Mascall 8/77 Tristam Burgess 21/172-213 Death of Dissident, pp.337-338
¶5.33 There is evidence that Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko had dinner together in a restaurant in Chinatown on 17 October 2006, and it would appear to have been that evening to which Mr Lugovoy was referring in his speech at the press conference.
¶5.34 About four years later, in a statement dated March 2011, Mr Lugovoy gave a slightly different account of this episode. He said this:20
"We, that is Mr Litvinenko, Mr Kovtun and I, had a meeting at 18.00 with RISC on 17 October 2007 [this is clearly a typo for 2006]. After the meeting at RISC, when we were walking back to the hotel, Mr Litvinenko was walking next to Mr Kovtun some distance ahead of me. I was speaking on my mobile phone. Whilst we were walking I could not hear what Mr Litvinenko was saying to Mr Kovtun. However, later that day Mr Kovtun told me that Mr Litvinenko resumed his complaint that Mr Berezovsky was not treating him fairly and that he simply could not survive on the money that Mr Berezovsky was paying to him. He said that he knew information regarding Mr Berezovsky that was worth a great deal of money. He said that he needed to find someone substantial and trustworthy who could sell this information without the source of the information coming back to himself.
I do not know why Mr Litvinenko said this to Mr Kovtun. One possibility may be that Mr Litvinenko thought that Mr Kovtun would tell me the content of this conversation and that perhaps I would tell Mr Berezovsky or Mr Patarkatsishvili (who would tell Mr Berezovsky) with the end result being that Mr Berezovsky would recognise the value/threat of the information held by Mr Litvinenko and therefore reward him accordingly (and return his monthly salary to its previous level of £5,000 and perhaps even increase it)."
¶5.35 I will have to make findings as to whether Mr Litvinenko did have a conversation along these lines with Mr Kovtun on 17 October 2006 – either over dinner in Chinatown or as they walked away from the meeting at RISC. More importantly, I will have to make a finding as to whether Mr Berezovsky had any involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death. Those are matters that I will address in due course.
¶5.36 The accounts that Mr Lugovoy has given raise a straightforward factual issue upon which, at least to an extent, his broader allegations of blackmail and complicity in murder all rest. That factual issue concerns Mr Litvinenko's reaction to the reduction in the payments that Mr Berezovsky was making to him that, as we have already seen, took place in early or mid 2006. What was Mr Litvinenko's reaction to the reduction in payments? Did the two men argue? Was Mr Litvinenko upset, and if so was he sufficiently upset to contemplate blackmailing his old friend?
¶5.37 I heard oral evidence from a number of those who were close to one or other of the two men, and who were well placed to report on the state of relations between them. Their evidence can be summarised as follows.
96¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶5.38 Marina Litvinenko said that she had seen the reduction in Mr Berezovsky's payments in 2006 as an opportunity for their family to reduce its dependence on him. She said that Mr Litvinenko had been "a little bit sad, emotional," but her view was that Mr Litvinenko was upset at the thought that Mr Berezovsky did not need him anymore, rather than financial issues. She was very clear that the underlying friendship between her husband and Mr Berezovsky had not been broken.21 She agreed with the proposition that Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky were close friends until Mr Litvinenko's death and added, "I knew these two people have been very special to each other."22 Sixsmith The Litvinenko File (pages 78-79); Cowell The Terminal Spy (pages 103-104) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Marina Litvinenko 4/110-111 Marina Wall 32/75 Mascall 22/127 A1 2/131-140 When asked whether she knew anything about Mr Litvinenko blackmailing Mr Berezovsky in October 2006, she said:
¶"I don't believe it because I have no evidence during this time Sasha did like to blackmail Boris Berezovsky because particularly in October 2006, I didn't feel
¶Sasha struggling about money and had any emotional problem at all."23 Marina Litvinenko 3/31-35; INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 13) Bukovsky 26/86-90; 26/109-110 Marina Litvinenko 4/11 lines 11-15 Marina Wall 32/66-67 Horwell 33/16-17 INQ016403 (page 30)
¶5.39 Mr Goldfarb's evidence on this issue was broadly consistent with that of Marina Litvinenko. On the first occasion that he gave evidence, he said that he had not been aware of any rift between the two men. While Mr Litvinenko had been "a little grouchy" about the reduction in payments, he would not have described him as upset. He added that he would have expected Mr Litvinenko to have told him, "if he was really upset and thought it was unfair", but that he had never done so.24
¶5.40 When Mr Goldfarb returned to give evidence, he said that he did not even suspect that Mr Berezovsky might have been responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death. Regarding the relationship between the two men, he said:
¶"There was, and it cannot be denied, some sort of a cooling off between them for a short period before Sasha was killed which was related to the reduction of his support, but… the support was reduced only marginally because Boris continued to pay for schooling and for the… house. And Sasha was naturally upset when his amount – the amount of money was reduced, but of course he expected that he would… be getting more money elsewhere, and he did not, so he was a little bit – financial strait, but it never, ever, would even occur to him to kind of confront
¶Boris about that or accuse him of something, not to mention blackmail, no. So it's totally inconceivable."25 INQ017734 (page 5 paragraph 15) Goldfarb 27/109-110 Goldfarb 26/2-8 Elenora Wall 32/79-80 INQ018946; INQ017548 (pages 8-9); Goldfarb 26/125-127
¶5.41 Mr Reilly's evidence on this issue was rather different. He recalled that there had been "a big row" between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky in the late summer of 2006, which had resulted in them not speaking to each other for a time. However, he said that the row was not about money, but about Mr Berezovsky's failure to follow some advice that Mr Litvinenko had given him (and about which Mr Litvinenko had subsequently been proved correct). He also said that the two men had been reconciled by October 2006 (that being the time at which Mr Lugovoy claimed that Mr Litvinenko was planning to blackmail Mr Berezovsky).26
¶5.42 Given the allegation of blackmail, it is also noteworthy that Mr Reilly immediately went on to describe Mr Litvinenko in the following terms:
97¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months
¶"I don't think naturally as a man he was particularly acquisitive at all, really. I think sufficiency was… the way he was. He… was never expressing views about buying
¶Ferraris or Rolex watches or anything like that but I would imagine, though, that that… may have been affected simply by the Western world…. He was beginning to understand, unfortunately, the importance of money in a Western economy, but he was not avaricious and he was not spending money will-nilly."27 Marina Litvinenko 3/44 lines 19-20 Felshtinsky 23/136-137 Reilly 10/27-28 INQ006201 INQ014620; INQ014621
¶5.43 Like Mr Reilly, MrAttew understood that Mr Litvinenko had fallen out with Mr Berezovsky and then made up with him again in the period September to October 2006.28
¶5.44 Mr Tabunov, an acquaintance whom Mr Litvinenko met occasionally in central London, had a slightly different understanding of the position. He remembered Mr Litvinenko telling him that he had had enough of Mr Berezovsky and no longer wanted anything to do with him. His memory was that Mr Litvinenko had said that he no longer wanted or needed any payments from Mr Berezovsky, he did not want to be dependent on him, and was frustrated because there were always too many people around Mr Berezovsky to talk in private. In contrast to the evidence given by Mr Attew and Mr Reilly, Mr Tabunov did not remember Mr Litvinenko mentioning a reconciliation; but the two met relatively rarely, and Mr Tabunov indicated that Mr Berezovsky was not in any event a regular topic of conversation.29
¶5.45 Mr Shvets' evidence was that Mr Litvinenko had called him in June or July 2006 and told him that he had been "fired" by Mr Berezovsky, "because of some intrigues." Mr Shvets recalled Mr Litvinenko saying that he had had a stand up row with Mr Berezovsky, although he added that Litvinenko was an "emotional person" who would "explode immediately and start yelling at anybody… but then cool down five minutes later," and that he had been laughing when he recounted the episode to Mr Shvets. Although Mr Shvets said that Mr Litvinenko was not in the habit of bearing grudges for very long, he did not remember Mr Litvinenko ever telling him about any subsequent meetings or communications with Mr Berezovsky. He added, though, that he could not imagine Mr Litvinenko ever threatening Mr Berezovsky. He said, "They were so closely connected for many years that I can't imagine Sasha threatening Boris Berezovsky with anything."30 BLK000253 (page 3) Goldfarb 5/122 Shvets 24/56-58 INQ006201 (page 15) INQ022423; INQ022433
¶5.46 Mr Bukovsky's memory was that Mr Litvinenko argued over politics and also practical matters, in particular Mr Berezovsky's failure to accept Mr Litvinenko's advice on security matters. But he said that there had been no personal quarrel between the two men, and that the friendship between them had remained intact throughout.31
¶5.47 I also heard evidence on this point from two of Mr Berezovsky's employees – Mr Voronkov, his office manager, and Mr Cotlick, Mr Berezovsky's personal assistant.
¶5.48 Mr Cotlick had been aware from discussions with Mr Litvinenko that his regular payments had been cut, but said that this was not the type of matter that he would expect Mr Berezovsky to tell him about. As to Mr Litvinenko's reaction, he said: "I can't say that he was pleased with the fact that his salary was reduced, but nobody would probably. At the same time I have never heard from him a bad word about Mr Berezovsky." He said that neither Mr Berezovsky nor Mr Litvinenko had ever said
98¶The Litvinenko Inquiry anything to him about blackmail, nor was he aware of any other evidence to support the allegation against Mr Litvinenko. In his mind, the matter amounted to no more than press speculation.32
¶5.49 Mr Voronkov was unaware of any dispute between Mr Berezovsky and Mr Litvinenko, although he said that he would not have expected Mr Berezovsky to discuss such matters with him. What he was able to say was that he did not notice any change in the way that the two men behaved towards one another during this period.33
¶5.50 In summary, I heard evidence on this issue from a wide range of those who were close to Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky during the second half of 2006. It seems clear that the level of the regular payments to Mr Litvinenko was reduced, and there is good evidence that he was unhappy about this. There is also good evidence that there was some sort of row between the two men during this period, but much less evidence that the row was about the reduction in payments. Some of those who thought there had been a row also thought there had been a reconciliation. There was strong evidence that whatever row may have taken place, it had not affected the underlying friendship between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky. None of the witnesses offered any support to the allegation that Mr Litvinenko either had been blackmailing Mr Berezovsky, or had been planning to do so.
¶5.51 I would add that both Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky left substantial quantities of written evidence in the form of various witness statements and transcripts of interviews. None of this material supports the suggestion that there had been a serious rift between the two men in the months before Mr Litvinenko's death, or indeed at any time. For example, in a statement given to the Metropolitan Police Service after Mr Litvinenko's death, Mr Berezovsky stated that the two men had "continue[d] to have good relations" after Mr Litvinenko had stopped working for him.34 And there is nothing in the transcripts of Mr Litvinenko's interviews with Detective Inspector Hyatt to suggest that there had been a serious rift between him and Mr Berezovsky.
¶5.52 This brings me to the evidence of Julia Svetlichnaya.
¶5.53 The essential facts about Dr Svetlichnaya's contact with Mr Litvinenko are, I think, uncontroversial. The evidence that Dr Svetlichnaya gave in this regard may be summarised as follows:
¶a. In 2006, Dr Svetlichnaya was a research student at the Centre for the Study of
¶Democracy at Westminster University b. One of the subjects of Dr Svetlichnaya's research was the issue of Chechen identity. She wished in that connection to interview Akhmed Zakayev c. In order to arrange such an interview, Dr Svetlichnaya contacted Mr Berezovsky, whose phone number she had been given by a journalist. Mr Berezovsky said that he could not introduce her to Mr Zakayev, but he gave her contact details for
¶Mr Litvinenko – who, he said, might introduce her to Mr Zakayev. Dr Svetlichnaya formed the impression that the intention was that Mr Litvinenko would vet her in order for a decision to be taken as to whether she should be allowed to interview
¶Mr Zakayev
99¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months d. Dr Svetlichnaya made contact with Mr Litvinenko in late March or early April 2006.
¶They subsequently met six or seven times between the end of April and the end of May. The meetings took place in various locations, including itsu in Piccadilly,
¶Hyde Park, Mr Litvinenko's house and the Park Lane Hilton Hotel. Mr Zakayev was present at the last meeting35
¶5.54 There is one particular element of Dr Svetlichnaya's evidence that is of potential relevance to the issue of blackmail. Dr Svetlichnya was taken through this part of her evidence with some care when she gave oral testimony at the Inquiry. What she told me, in summary, was that during the course of her meetings with Mr Litvinenko, he said that he had plans to take action against a group of wealthy Russians. The intention that he expressed appeared to be to obtain secret files relating to these individuals and then to blackmail them. Dr Svetlichnaya told me that this was a recurring theme of their conversations.36 She said that the expression used by Mr Litvinenko was that he would "force them to share", meaning their money – she also said that he mentioned blackmail, and that he also talked of selling sensitive information.37 She said Mr Litvinenko talked of his intention to demand payment of US$10,000 from each individual. Dr Svetlichnaya was asked what Mr Litvinenko had said about his intended targets and she replied, "I can just quote him: bastards, bastards from the Kremlin, bastards like Abramovich. That kind of person."38 Marina Litvinenko 3/69 lines 22-23 Goldfarb 5/79-80 Svetlichnaya 25/103-104 Mascall 9/4-37 Dombey 23/54
¶5.55 I emphasise at this stage that I have taken into account only the evidence that Dr Svetlichnaya gave to me orally. Although there are a number of newspaper articles in evidence that purport to give her account of her meetings with Mr Litvinenko, I have disregarded them as it became clear when she gave evidence before me that those articles misrepresent her account in significant respects.
¶5.56 The view that I have taken is that Dr Svetlichnaya's evidence does not assist me in reaching my conclusions about Mr Litvinenko's death. I have taken that view for the following reasons.
¶5.57 First, the principal allegation that has been raised – by Mr Lugovoy – is that Mr Litvinenko may have been blackmailing Mr Berezovsky. Dr Svetlichnaya did not say that Mr Litvinenko mentioned Mr Berezovsky as one of the intended targets of his "force to share" plans, and moreover the description of his intended targets that he did give to Dr Svetlichnaya – "bastards from the Kremlin" – would not appear to have included Mr Berezovsky.
¶5.58 Second, although on Dr Svetlichnaya's account Mr Litvinenko was clearly describing some sort of blackmail plans, those plans would appear still to have been at an early stage only weeks before he became ill. Dr Svetlichnaya did not suggest that Mr Litvinenko told her that he had actually implemented any of these plans, or that he had even started to implement them.
100¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 5: The Ivanov report 5.59 I observed at paragraphs 4.137 and 4.138 above that there was no particular reason to think that Mr Litvinenko's role in providing sensitive and damaging information in due diligence reports ever became known either to those who received the reports or to those who were affected by them. That was because it was standard practice in the security industry to preserve the anonymity of sources such as Mr Litvinenko. It followed that – again, in general terms – there was no reason to think that the due diligence reports that Mr Litvinenko provided for the security companies in 2006 played any part in his death.
¶5.60 On the evidence that I have heard, however, there was one of Mr Litvinenko's reports to which this reasoning did not, or at least did not necessarily, apply.
¶5.61 The report in question was one of the reports that Mr Litvinenko and Mr Shvets prepared for Mr Attew. The subject of the report was a Russian politician and close ally of Mr Putin named Viktor Ivanov.
¶5.62 The basic facts relating to this report appear, from the evidence before me, to be as follows:
¶a. The Ivanov report was one of a series of reports commissioned from Mr Litvinenko by Mr Attew in about August or September 2006. Mr Attew was unable to remember whether or not the report was the first that he had commissioned from
¶Mr Litvinenko39 b. Mr Litvinenko initially gave Mr Attew a report on Mr Ivanov that was only a third of a page long. Mr Attew considered the report to be far below the standard he expected, and told Mr Litvinenko so. Mr Litvinenko told Mr Attew that the report had been drafted for him by Mr Lugovoy 40 c. Mr Litvinenko then asked Mr Shvets to draft a report on Mr Ivanov. In response,
¶Mr Shvets drafted an eight-page report. Some of the content of the report was information that Mr Shvets had been told by Mr Litvinenko41 d. Mr Shvets completed the report and emailed it to Mr Litvinenko on 19 September
¶200642 e. A copy of the report is in evidence before me.43 The report contains detailed and serious criticism both of Mr Ivanov and (as Mr Shvets observed) of Mr Putin.44
¶Mr Attew described the report as "extremely damaging".45 BLK000253 (page 10) HMG000308 Attew 13/37 Mascall 9/27-28 INQ019146 (page 15 paragraph 46) In summary:
101(i) The report details Mr Ivanov's early career in the Committee for State Security (KGB). It notes that he served in Afghanistan and in the human resources department, and asserts that these postings indicate that he was considered to be an underachiever and a "failure"
¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months
(ii) The report asserts that, whilst posted in St Petersburg (then Leningrad), Mr Ivanov set up businesses and deceived his KGB superiors that they were for operational purposes, whereas he was in fact running them as private ventures
(iii) The report alleges that, during his time in St Petersburg, Mr Ivanov developed close links with the Tambovskaya criminal group and its leader Vladimir Kumarin. It asserts that, as a result of this "murky business association", Mr Ivanov acquired an interest in the St Petersburg seaport, which, it claimed, he still held at the date of the report
(iv) The report asserts that Mr Ivanov was a protégé of Mr Putin, and that the careers of the two men were very closely connected. It asserts that Mr Putin was complicit in Mr Ivanov's dealings with "gangsters" in St Petersburg, and also that Mr Putin himself was involved in assisting a Colombian drugs cartel in a money laundering scheme
¶e. On about 21 September, Mr Litvinenko told Mr Shvets that he had passed the report to the client, whom we know was Mr Attew 46 f. Mr Attew was very pleased with the second version of the report. He told me that he regarded it as being of "exceptional" quality, and he passed it to his clients47 g. A few days later – Mr Shvets thought it was probably between 21 September and
30 September – Mr Litvinenko told Mr Shvets that a 'Russian source' of his had also produced a report on Mr Ivanov which the client had said was "trash". He added that he had passed a copy of Mr Shvets' report to the Russian source to show him how he should write his reports in future48
¶h. Although Mr Litvinenko did not tell Mr Shvets, either at the time or at any time
before his death, that this 'Russian source' was Mr Lugovoy,49 there is very strong evidence to that effect. Mr Litvinenko did tell Mr Shvets that the Russian source had worked for Mr Berezovsky and had been imprisoned – that fits with Mr Lugovoy. He also, as I have said above, told Mr Shvets that this other source had prepared a report on Mr Ivanov that Mr Attew had rejected – that also fits with Mr Lugovoy, and Mr Attew stated in terms that he only received two Ivanov reports50 – there is, in other words, no other candidate to whom Mr Litvinenko might have been referring. Finally, Mr Litvinenko told Mr Shvets that he had met the Russian source shortly before being taken ill.51 Marina Litvinenko also gave evidence that she believed that Mr Litvinenko had shown the Shvets Ivanov report to Mr Lugovoy52
¶i. Mr Attew's evidence was that the Shvets due diligence report on Mr Ivanov caused the collapse of the deal that his clients had been considering. He assumed that, as
102¶The Litvinenko Inquiry a result, Mr Ivanov would have suffered significant financial losses.53 Mr Shvets gave evidence to a similar effect54
¶5.63 The possibility that the Ivanov report may have found its way to the Kremlin via Mr Lugovoy, and that this may have been linked to Mr Litvinenko's death, was first aired in public by Mr Shvets in an interview broadcast by BBC Radio 4 in December 2006. A transcript of the interview is in evidence before me.55 In the course of that interview, Mr Shvets described Mr Litvinenko giving the Ivanov report to Mr Lugovoy as having "triggered the entire assassination of Sasha."
¶5.64 A similar theory was subsequently proposed in an article in the Novaya Gazeta dated 24 May 2007. That article suggested that the Ivanov report had come to the attention of the authorities in Russia after it had been found in Mr Lugovoy's possession when he was stopped and searched at Sheremetyevo Airport on his return to Moscow from London.56
¶5.65 Is it possible that the Ivanov report triggered Mr Litvinenko's killing, or at least had some connection with it? One obvious difficulty with this theory is that, on Mr Shvets' evidence, Mr Lugovoy only received the report a few weeks before what appears to have been the first attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko. Mr Shvets was asked about this, but was not shaken from his "positive" belief that the Ivanov report triggered an operation to murder Mr Litvinenko. His reasoning, as he explained it to me, was that such an operation could have been mounted quickly since the Russian security agencies already had access to, and experience in the use of, polonium, as well as inside knowledge of Mr Berezovsky's office, and Mr Lugovoy had easy access to Mr Litvinenko. He believed it to be credible, therefore, that the planning for Mr Litvinenko's poisoning had not started until September (and presumably, on his reasoning, the end of September) 2006.57 He concluded:
¶"… look, before Sasha was poisoned, he had lived in London for several years, and over this period, he was consistent in making statements, critical statements, against Putin… some of this criticism was very insulting, very personal, and still
¶Sasha was alive. Nothing happened. He was alive and well. And suddenly he was poisoned. So it leads me to believe that we should be looking for something which happened shortly before he was poisoned. Something changed in his life-style shortly before he was poisoned, and what changes? It was the fact that he was fired by Boris Berezovsky, it was the fact that he got involved in other business activities, which leads to the report, et cetera."58 INQ017734 (page 12 paragraphs 40-41) Zakayev 26/144-146 Shvets 24/84-85 Krgo 9/54-60 Goldfarb 27/114-115; INQ019146 (page 19 paragraph 60)
¶5.66 In his oral closing submissions on behalf of Marina Litvinenko, Mr Emmerson QC described Mr Litvinenko's action in giving a copy of the Shvets Ivanov report to Mr Lugovoy as "a fatal mistake". Mr Emmerson suggested that a similar significance could be placed on the fact that Mr Lugovoy knew from his dealings at RISC that Mr Litvinenko had been tasked with investigating Mr Gordeyev, who was, in his words, "a high-ranking official in the Russian government". Mr Emmerson submitted that from the moment Mr Litvinenko gave Mr Lugovoy a copy of the Ivanov report:59
103¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months
¶"Lugovoy not only knew that Litvinenko had been tasked to produce a devastating report on Alexei Gordeyev, and that he had been tasked to produce a devastating report which implicated both Ivanov and Putin directly in organised crime, but he had a copy of the report in his hands. It can hardly be a coincidence… that two months later it was Lugovoy who was chosen to be the man to kill Mr Litvinenko. The direct and immediate link to Putin and the Kremlin is just too obvious to ignore."
104¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 6: The murder of Anna Politkovskaya
¶5.67 Anna Politkovskaya was a Russian journalist on the Novaya Gazeta newspaper. She was a critic of President Putin – Professor Service described her as, "a regular harrier of both Putin and Chechnya's brutal ruler Ramzan Kadyrov".60 Marina Litvinenko 4/102-105; HMG000122 Goldfarb 5/128-129 INQ019146 (page 23 paragraph 73) Reilly 10/80-119 Goldfarb 26/69; 27/114-116 I have already mentioned her on several occasions, for example in the reference to her investigations into the Moscow theatre siege (paragraph 4.38 above) and to her work on the War Crimes Commission established by Mr Zakayev (paragraph 4.56 above).
¶5.68 On the evidence that I have heard, Anna Politkovskaya and Mr Litvinenko were both campaigners who shared a cause and were also close friends.
¶5.69 It appears that Mr Litvinenko and Ms Politkovskaya first met in 2003 at court hearings in London relating to Mr Zakayev's extradition.61 Marina Litvinenko said that the two became friends, and that Ms Politkovskaya subsequently visited them "once or twice" in London.62 Mr Goldfarb, who was himself a friend of Ms Politkovskaya, thought that the two had been "very close"; he said that they had "a natural kinship as converts", Mr Litvinenko having been a KGB officer and Ms Politkovskaya's father having been a senior Russian diplomat.63
¶5.70 I should add in this connection that I am aware of suggestions that have been made that Ms Politkovskaya did not trust Mr Litvinenko because of his FSB past (see Putin's Labyrinth by Steve Levine, page 125). None of the witnesses who gave evidence before me mentioned this, but that does not of course mean that it is not true.
¶5.71 The relationship between the two was not purely social. I heard that they collaborated on investigative work, one example being their work together with regard to possible FSB involvement in the Moscow theatre siege.64
¶5.72 I also heard that Mr Litvinenko became very concerned for Ms Politkovskaya's safety. Marina Litvinenko told me that Mr Litvinenko had urged Ms Politkovskaya to take advantage of her American citizenship and to "go and write [her] articles in America"; but she had refused. Mr Litvinenko had also given her personal security advice, "how to feel safe if you went to your apartment, how to check if nobody is staying in a corner". In the end, Marina Litvinenko reflected, this advice had been insufficient, "unfortunately, he couldn't save her".65 INQ017734 (page 22 paragraph 76); Marina Litvinenko 4/101 (2003) NIQB 56 Marina Litvinenko 3/146 Reilly 10/108 Zakeyev 26/163-167
¶5.73 Anna Politkovskaya was murdered by gunmen outside her Moscow apartment on 7 October 2006.
¶5.74 All of those who gave evidence to me on this subject were agreed that Mr Litvinenko was deeply affected by Ms Politkovskaya's death. Marina Litvinenko recalled giving him the news, and said that, "he was just broken down because for him it was absolutely devastating news".66 Mr Quirke said that Mr Litvinenko had mentioned Ms Politkovskaya's death to him, and that he had been upset about it, as well as
105¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months being worried that "he could be next."67 Felshtinsky 23/143-144 Garnham 1/178-179 Quirke 11/64-66 INQ018987 (page 2) Scaramella 15/172-178 Mr Attew told me that Mr Litvinenko had been "outraged" at Ms Politkovskaya's death.68
¶5.75 Mr Litvinenko attended two events in London held in response to Ms Politkovskaya's murder. The first was a memorial meeting held at Westminster on the afternoon of 13 October 2006; I will return to that meeting shortly.
¶5.76 The second of these events was a meeting at the Front Line Club in London on the evening of 19 October 2006. Marina Litvinenko said that she had been aware of the meeting at the time, but that she had not accompanied Mr Litvinenko to it.69 Mr Zakayev told me that he had taken Mr Litvinenko to the meeting as his guest. He was one of the platform speakers. During the meeting, Mr Litvinenko made a short speech from the floor publicly accusing President Putin of being responsible for Anna Politkovskaya's murder. A video recording of that speech was made, which was played to the Inquiry.70 Mr Zakayev said that he "absolutely" agreed with what Mr Litvinenko had said, although he had not said so expressly in his own speech at the Front Line Club that evening because of the post that he then held as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the exiled Chechen government.
¶5.77 When Mr Zakayev was asked whether he thought that Mr Litvinenko's outspokenness about Ms Politkovskaya's death was linked in any way to his own death, Mr Zakayev replied; "We were on the same list, Anna Politkovskaya, Litvinenko and myself."71 Marina Litvinenko 3/97; Felshtinsky 23/145-146 INQ015669 Zakayev 26/160-161 Mascall 9/97-101 Slater 22/91-118
106¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 7: British citizenship 5.78 I have referred above (at paragraph 3.98) to the strong sense of attachment that Mr Litvinenko demonstrated to his adopted nation. I mentioned Marina Litvinenko's evidence about her husband flying the flag of St George during the 2006 World Cup.
¶5.79 Mrs Litvinenko explained in evidence that the family became eligible for naturalisation as British citizens in 2006, and that they had submitted their applications during the summer of that year. The applications were granted and all three then attended a citizenship ceremony at Haringey Civic Centre. The ceremony took place on 13 October 2006.72
¶5.80 Several witnesses referred to Mr Litvinenko's delight at being granted British citizenship. Mr Attew, for example, recalled that Mr Litvinenko had come to his office "elated at the fact that he was holding a British passport. He was British… he was extremely proud." He added that Mr Litvinenko ran next door to see Mr Reilly.73 Mr Reilly described what was clearly the same occasion:
¶"… he ran in one day when he was given his British passport, he just absolutely ran in, and threw it down on the desk and… wanted to go for a drink… He was delighted, he was over the moon, he was ecstatic, he was literally jumping up in my office, I was calming him down, I only had coffee to give him."74 Felshtinsky 23/146-150 Guzzanti 29/9-18; Scaramella 27/30-32 Reilly 10/21; Tabunov 13/128; Berezovsky 25/13-14 Reilly 10/90 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 79)
¶5.81 Mr Litvinenko himself expressed his feelings about his British citizenship towards the end of the last of his interviews with DI Hyatt. The relevant section of the transcript reads as follows:
¶"I wouldn't like you to think that this is some, some kind of pompous political statement, but since all this happened I would like you to know very clearly what my position regarding this matter is. As you understand last month I was granted
¶British Citizenship and I very much love this country, and its people, although unfortunately I haven't learnt the English language completely yet. I am proud to be able to say that I'm a British Citizen. Yes they did try to kill me and possibly I may die, but I will die, as a free person, and my son and wife are free people. And
¶Britain is a great country. When after we were given asylum here I took my son to the Tower and I showed him the British crown, and I told him, 'Sonny, you must defend this country in future until the last drop of your blood,' and he said, 'Yes
¶Dad'. I told him, 'Remember for the rest of your life this country saved us, and do everything whatever you might be able to do in order to defend this country.'"75 Felshtinsky 23/150-151 Guzzanti 29/18-20 INQ016652 (page 8) Reilly 10/105-106 INQ019146 (pages 25-26 paragraphs 79-80)
¶5.82 When Anatoly Litvinenko gave evidence before me, he frankly admitted that although he could remember visiting the Tower with his father, he did not recall what his father had said to him on that occasion. But he confirmed that the words that I have quoted above were entirely consistent with what he knew of his father's feelings. He said:
¶"… he would always go on about the integrity of this nation… the honesty and transparency with which judicial processes were carried out as well as the honesty
107¶Part 5 | Chapters 1 to 8 | Alexander Litvinenko's final months of the police and how deeply [this] contrasted with the regime under which he grew up and the system in which he served."76 Goldfarb 5/92-95; Marina Litvinenko 3/105-106 Scaramella 15/93-94 Anatoly Litvinenko 4/134 A1 20/27-31 Service 28/51-55; 28/100-102
¶5.83 By coincidence, the British citizenship ceremony that the Litvinenko family attended at Haringey Civic Centre took place on the same day as the memorial meeting for Anna Politkovskaya at Westminster. Marina Litvinenko told me that she had gone home after the citizenship ceremony, but Mr Litvinenko had gone to the memorial at Westminster, taking Anatoly with him. She explained that Mr Litvinenko had felt it to be very important that he should go and pay tribute to Ms Politkovskaya.77
¶5.84 Mr Bukovsky and Mr Felshtinsky were also at Westminster for the memorial that afternoon. The evidence that they gave me about what Mr Litvinenko said to them there illuminates at least one of the reasons why he was so pleased with his British citizenship: it made him feel safer.
¶5.85 Mr Felshtinsky recalled that Mr Litvinenko said to him, "I just received my citizenship, now they will not be able to touch me."78 Marina Litvinenko 3/108 Scaramella 27/57-58 Felshtinsky 23/169 Reilly 10/117-123 Emmerson 22/1-2
¶5.86 Mr Bukovsky's memory of that day was that Mr Litvinenko was, "very pleased with getting British citizenship". He also remembered that Mr Litvinenko had asked him, "it makes me more secure, doesn't it, it protects me?" Mr Bukovsky told me, "I had to smile and say: well, not much, not really."79 Marina Litvinenko 3/108-110 Guzzanti 29/22 Bukovsky 26/99 Reilly 10/145-146 Shvets 24/116-117
108¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 8: Alexander Litvinenko's state of mind in October 2006 5.87 I have already touched on some of the evidence that I received regarding Mr Litvinenko's state of mind in the weeks before he was taken ill. He was delighted, and excited, at having received his British citizenship. He was shocked and outraged at the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. At least in the view of some of those around him, her death had made him more anxious for his own safety,80 perhaps compounding fears that he already entertained regarding the 2006 laws. That said, as Mr Bukovsky observed, Mr Litvinenko had become used to living with risk, "he definitely was aware [of risk] all the time".81 Marina Litvinenko 3/111-112 Scaramella 15/94-95 Bukovsky 26/99 Reilly 10/119-121 Horwell 33/72
¶5.88 It has been suggested that Mr Litvinenko may have taken his own life. This raises a host of questions, which I will address when I come to reach my overall conclusions. One issue that is obviously raised, however, and on which I heard evidence, is whether Mr Litvinenko was suicidal in the days and weeks before 1 November 2006. The evidence I heard on this issue was entirely consistent. He was not.
¶5.89 Marina Litvinenko gave evidence that her husband was busy and active during this period. He was not depressed. In all the time that they had been together, she had not known him to be suicidal for a single day. She told me that she was absolutely sure that Mr Litvinenko had never thought of committing suicide.82
¶5.90 Mr Reilly said that the idea that Mr Litvinenko may have committed suicide was "utter nonsense". He explained this view in the following terms:
¶"Everything to live for, happy marriage, very fond of his son, British citizenship, he'd made the leap from [Russia]. Opportunities ahead of him. And although he'd had a row with Berezovsky, that seemed to have resolved itself. I think the state of Russia genuinely upset him, and the corruption and the rest of it… So he was still quite, I have to say bitter about that, but I would say quite the opposite of committing suicide; it was to stay alive long enough to nail some people, if he could, legitimately."83 Marina Litvinenko 3/114 INQ019473; Scaramella 27/60-73 Reilly 10/29-30 Mascall 9/101 INQ019146 (page 27 paragraph 85)
¶5.91 Mr Goldfarb, Mr Attew and Mr Tabunov expressed views to a similar effect.84
¶5.92 I will, as I have said, address the issue of possible suicide when I come to reach my final conclusions. But it can be said that none of Mr Litvinenko's friends and family who gave evidence provided any support at all for this theory. They were the ones who knew him, who were around him during the days and weeks before he fell ill, and none of them gave any credence to this idea.
109¶Part 6: The polonium trail – events in
¶October and November 2006 Chapter 1: Introduction 6.1 The police officers investigating Alexander Litvinenko's death painstakingly pieced together the last weeks of his life. In doing so, they employed standard techniques such as interviewing Mr Litvinenko's friends and associates, investigating the movements of persons of interest, interrogating telephone records and seizing and viewing closed circuit television (CCTV) footage. The material obtained in this way has all been made available to me, and a large amount of it has been put in evidence.
¶6.2 One task that the police undertook was to compile a schedule of all telephone calls made to and from individuals considered to be of relevance to this Inquiry during the period June to November 2006. I adduced this (lengthy) document into evidence, and will refer to it hereafter as 'the telephone schedule'.1
¶6.3 But in addition to such conventional sources of evidence, it became apparent that there was a highly unusual, in fact unprecedented, line of inquiry to be followed.
¶6.4 Forensic scientists were sent to conduct tests for alpha radiation at a series of locations across London and, subsequently, beyond. The results demonstrated widespread radioactive contamination at locations that had been linked to Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko in a period of a little over two weeks from mid October until the onset of Mr Litvinenko's fatal illness in early November.
¶6.5 In this Part of the Report, I propose to set out the narrative of events during that period. In doing so I shall refer not only to the extensive witness and documentary evidence that has been adduced, but also to the body of evidence arising from the testing for radioactive contamination – the evidence that has become popularly known as 'the polonium trail'.1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 In fact, there are two versions of the telephone schedule in evidence: the original schedule, INQ017809; and a subsequent slightly more detailed schedule covering only the dates 31 October 2006 to 3 November 2006, INQ020044
110¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 2: Introduction to the scientific evidence
¶6.6 I have referred above to the discovery of traces of polonium 210 in Mr Litvinenko's urine shortly before he died, and the subsequent tests that were carried out on his body after his death, which indicated that he had died as a result of ingesting polonium some weeks before his death.
¶6.7 This Part of the Report is concerned with a different series of tests – tests that were conducted not on Mr Litvinenko's body, but at a series of locations. Some were associated with Mr Litvinenko, others with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. Some of the most significant results were found at locations associated with all three.
¶6.8 The monitoring of the scenes for contamination was a highly complex task. As various sites were identified as having been contaminated in the days and weeks following Mr Litvinenko's death – hotel rooms, restaurants, aircraft, offices – the police were faced with competing requirements, on the one hand to clean up the sites in the interests of public safety, but, on the other hand, to obtain forensic evidence of the contamination for the purposes of their investigation. Detective Inspector (DI) Mascall said that the task that faced the police and the forensic scientists in this respect was unprecedented, certainly in the United Kingdom (UK). In the course of his evidence he explained the system of sequential testing that was adopted involving the police, scientists from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and scientists from the Health Protection Agency (HPA).2
¶6.9 Witness A1 was one of the principal scientific experts who gave evidence to the Inquiry. She is an expert in nuclear physics who spent 34 years working for the AWE in Aldermaston; she now works for another nuclear establishment in the UK. Of particular relevance to the Inquiry, A1 recently held the post of Manager of Nuclear Forensics at AWE. As will become apparent, A1 provided detailed and lengthy written evidence for the Inquiry (including the 'contamination schedule' to which I refer below), and also attended to give oral evidence on two occasions. I am most grateful for the assistance that A1 has provided to the Inquiry.3
¶6.10 A1 gave evidence as to the means by which the testing was undertaken. Tests in the field were conducted using alpha detectors. This equipment had the advantage of being portable and was capable of detecting the presence and, where present, the approximate strength of alpha radiation. Where significant findings were made, swabs were taken with filter papers, which were then sent to the laboratory to be analysed using more sophisticated spectrometry equipment.4
¶6.11 The first and most basic question was whether the alpha radiation found at the various scenes had indeed been caused by contamination with polonium 210, as opposed to any other radionuclide (for example, uranium 232, which has an alpha output indistinguishable from that of polonium 210). A1 stated that in the light of laboratory tests using both alpha and gamma spectrometry, she was absolutely confident in the conclusion that the alpha radiation discovered at the multiple scenes had been caused by polonium 210.5
¶2 Mascall 9/68-70 3 A fuller description of A1's CV is at 2/101-104 4 A1 2/114 5 A1 2/114-115
111¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.12 Beyond that finding, the principal questions that arose were, first, the level of each of the findings and, second, the inferences that could be drawn from the results.
¶6.13 In order to provide an evidential basis for assessing these questions, a schedule was compiled containing all the results of all the testing that had been conducted at the scenes that were relevant to the investigation. I admitted this document – which was referred to during the course of the hearings as "the contamination schedule" into evidence.6 It is an extremely long document, running to over 260 pages. In common with almost all the documents that I have admitted into evidence, the contamination schedule is available on the Inquiry website. The schedule contains very much more detail regarding the testing results than is included in this Report; those wishing to analyse this part of the evidence in more depth will find it an invaluable tool.
¶6.14 A1 gave oral evidence twice: on Day 2 and Day 20. On the second occasion she was asked to express an opinion as to inferences that could be drawn from each of the readings, in particular those in the higher range. Broadly speaking, A1 divided the readings into two categories.
¶6.15 A1 categorised a small number of the very highest readings as indicating a site of primary contamination, a term that she defined for these purposes as, "the contamination that has come from the main source of material". In practical terms, A1 agreed that the term referred to the first point of contamination – for example, where a solution containing polonium 210 had been directly applied to a surface.7
¶6.16 The other category, referred to during the hearings as secondary or transferred contamination, comprised sites where the contamination had been caused not as a result of exposure to the main source of material – i.e. polonium 210 – but rather as a result of the transfer of contamination, either directly or indirectly from a site of primary contamination. A1 explained that there was: "a range of ways in which the contamination from the original source can be transferred so that could potentially be on somebody's hand, by somebody's foot, et cetera".8 She also stated that:
¶"… the transfer of polonium from primary contamination areas to other areas is dependent upon the physical and chemical properties of polonium and the surface of the materials on which it is deposited. The amount of contamination transferred is dependent upon the amount of original activity present on each successive surface to which it is transferred."9 Marina Litvinenko 3/3-6 HMG000078 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 68) Cotlick 25/76-81
¶6.17 One important feature of the forensic testing in this case was that it was conducted some weeks after the dates on which the contamination appears to have taken place. As will be seen from the contamination schedule, most of the testing was undertaken during December 2006. On the assumption that the contamination occurred in late October and early November 2006, in each case there was a gap of several weeks between the date of contamination and the date of testing.
¶6.18 A1 explained that this delay caused the readings to be lower than they would have been at the time of contamination. First, in each case the level of alpha radiation being emitted will have decreased during the intervening period as a result of the rapid radioactive decay that is characteristic of polonium. Second, in some cases
¶6 INQ017934 7 A1 2/149-150 8 A1 2/150 9 A1 2/149
112¶The Litvinenko Inquiry environmental conditions such as the cleaning of surfaces or (in the case of sinks, drains, etc) the effect of running water will have further reduced the readings, a point to which I shall return.
¶6.19 Finally for the purpose of this introduction, it should be noted that different considerations flow from positive and negative findings of contamination.
¶6.20 In the instances where contamination was detected in relation to a place or an object, there is a positive finding that calls for explanation. The existence of that positive finding is not affected by the fact that, for the reasons discussed above, the original level of contamination is likely to have been higher than that found.
¶6.21 The position is somewhat different where a location was tested without any positive findings of contamination being made. As we shall see, there were a number of these 'negative findings' during the course of the investigation. They included buses on which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun travelled, and also other buses on which Mr Litvinenko had travelled.
¶6.22 One explanation for such findings is that the person of interest was not contaminated at the time that he travelled on the bus. This is the counterpart to the conclusion drawn in the case of positive findings of contamination, i.e. that the person of interest was contaminated at the relevant time.
¶6.23 In the case of negative findings, however, there are other possibilities. One is that the person of interest was contaminated at the time, but that he did not contaminate the bus, perhaps because the journey was too short, and/or he did not sit down or touch anything. Another possibility is that the person of interest was contaminated at the time of travel and did contaminate the bus, but the contamination was no longer present at the time of testing, as a result of decay and/or environmental factors such as cleaning.
¶6.24 I therefore consider that the negative findings must be approached with caution. Given the different possible explanations for these test results, and without any means of determining which is the accurate explanation in any particular case, these results must generally be treated as being neutral. There is one possible exception to this general approach, to which I shall return below.
113¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Chapter 3: Dmitri Kovtun
¶6.25 Before commencing on this stage of the narrative, it is necessary to introduce another of the key figures in the events surrounding Mr Litvinenko's death – Dmitri Kovtun.
¶6.26 Mr Kovtun is, with Mr Lugovoy, wanted by the British authorities on suspicion of the murder of Mr Litvinenko. In common with Mr Lugovoy, a warrant has been issued for his arrest. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to extradite both men to the UK.
¶6.27 Mr Kovtun did not initially show any interest in taking part in these proceedings (unlike Mr Lugovoy, who was for a time represented as an interested person in the inquest). The attempts made by the Inquiry to contact Mr Kovtun in Russia and to seek his participation were met with silence. However, at the very end of the Inquiry's open hearings, Mr Kovtun wrote to the Solicitor to the Inquiry and said that he wished to give evidence. In keeping with my desire for this Inquiry to be as full as possible, arrangements were made to enable Mr Kovtun to give evidence. Closing submissions were put back, further hearings were arranged and video link facilities in Moscow were established. One of the requirements that I set for Mr Kovtun giving evidence was that he provide the Inquiry with a detailed written witness statement. He complied with this requirement. In the end, however, Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence on the days that had been set aside for this purpose. The events leading to Mr Kovtun's decision not to give evidence were complicated, and I do not propose to go into them here. They are set out in observations that I made at the time.10
¶6.28 Although Mr Kovtun did not in the end give oral evidence and submit himself to questioning, there is a range of evidence available to me about his background and about his involvement in the events that led to Mr Litvinenko's death. Mr Kovtun has given his own account in a number of press interviews and also, as I have mentioned, in the statement that he provided to the Inquiry. And there are also other witnesses who have given evidence about Mr Kovtun.
¶6.29 Mr Kovtun was born in Moscow in 1965.11 I received evidence from a number of sources that Mr Kovtun's father, like Mr Lugovoy's, had been a senior officer in the Russian military, and that the two men had known each other as children as a result of this connection. For example, in his June 2015 witness statement, Mr Kovtun stated:
¶"I have known A.K. Lugovoy since 1978 or 1979. We lived in the same building where my family and his family were given flats at the same time. Our fathers were friends and worked together at the Army General HQ of the USSR Armed Forces.
¶We were pupils at different schools – I am actually 1 year older than Lugovoy – but we spent a great deal of time together as children, visited each other, exchanged books, etc."12 Berezovsky 25/3-30 Marina Litvinenko 4/31-32; 4/41; 4/112-114 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 69) INQ021208 (page 6) Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ020031
¶6.30 Mr Kovtun's statement goes on to assert that he attended the same military school as Mr Lugovoy for several years. He left in 1986 and joined the Russian army. He was posted first to Czechoslovakia and then to Parchim in what was then East Germany.
¶6.31 In 1991, while he was still posted in Parchim, Mr Kovtun married his first wife, who is now called Inna Hohne. Ms Hohne lives in Germany and did not respond to requests
114¶The Litvinenko Inquiry to give oral evidence to the Inquiry. I was able, however, to hear evidence about information that she provided to the German police in the course of their criminal investigations related to Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶6.32 Ms Hohne explained during those interviews that only a few months after she and Mr Kovtun had married, Mr Kovtun had discovered that his unit was being transferred to Chechnya. Ms Hohne did not wish to leave Germany and Mr Kovtun did not wish to leave her, or to go to fight in Chechnya. They therefore decided that Mr Kovtun would desert from the army and that they would go to West Germany and claim asylum. They implemented this plan in early 1992, secretly leaving the army base in Parchim and travelling together to Hamburg, where they claimed asylum.13
¶6.33 It would appear that life in Hamburg was not all that Mr Kovtun and Ms Hohne had hoped that it might be. Ms Hohne's evidence was that they were accommodated in a hostel for asylum seekers, and that shortly afterwards she and Mr Kovtun separated – she told the German investigators that, "the reason amongst others was his escalating drunkenness."14
¶6.34 Mr Kovtun stayed in Hamburg and in 1994 met Marina Wall, whom he married in 1996. I had available to me the transcripts of interviews that German investigators conducted following Mr Litvinenko's death with both Marina Wall and also with her mother, Dr Elenora Wall. As in the case of Ms Hohne, neither Ms Wall nor her mother responded to requests to appear before the Inquiry as a live witness (and, like Ms Hohne, I could not compel them to do so because they are out of the jurisdiction), but I did adduce in evidence the accounts that they had given when they were interviewed in Germany.
¶6.35 In the account that she gave to German investigators, Marina Wall described how Mr Kovtun lived with her in Hamburg from the time of their marriage in 1996 until he moved back to Moscow in 2003. She said that they had in fact separated in the previous year; 2002.15 The evidence was that Mr Kovtun did not have any stable employment during the entire ten years or so that he was in Hamburg. He lived off social benefits, with occasional work as a waiter, washing dishes and as a refuse collector.16 One of the restaurants where Mr Kovtun worked in Hamburg was called Il Porto. As I shall come to describe, Mr Kovtun was in contact with some of the men with whom he had worked at that restaurant in the days before he met Mr Litvinenko in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel.
¶6.36 As I have mentioned, Inna Hohne and Marina Wall were interviewed by German investigators in the aftermath of Mr Litvinenko's death. By the time of the interviews, media reports had already raised the possibility that Mr Kovtun, who was described in some of the reports as a businessman in the oil and gas industry, may have had a hand in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶6.37 The evidence that Mr Kovtun's two former wives gave to the German investigators about his character, and about his possible involvement in a murder, was remarkably consistent.
¶6.38 However, if the evidence of Inna Hohne and Marina Wall about Mr Kovtun's personality was remarkably similar, there was a striking dissonance between, on the one hand,
115¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 their joint evidence about him, and, on the other hand, the evidence – to which I shall come – suggesting that by the latter part of 2006 Mr Kovtun was both a successful businessman and a cold blooded killer. This was a tension that both women recognised.
¶6.39 The following passages are taken from Inna Hohne's evidence:
¶"Dmitry wanted to be a porno star. He never said anything about any brokerage deals or sales. I have now read his interview in Spiegel and have read that there was trade in gas and oil. I can only say that this has absolutely nothing to do with
¶Dmitry."17 Berezovsky 25/7 Goldfarb 26/122 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Mascall 8/75 INQ019031; INQ019054 Dombey 23/24-30; INQ020031 (page 2 paragraphs S9-S10)
¶"Dmitry is not particularly down to earth, more a man about town. He had all sorts of dreams and plans, none of which he realised, however."18 Marina Litvinenko 3/40 lines 24-25 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 79) BLK000134 Mascall 8/76 Bruce Burgess 21/1-171 Mascall 29/77-78
¶"He drank a lot, which was eventually the reason for our separation. ... I only lived together with him for a very short time. I do not know a great deal about him. I cannot imagine how Dmitry got involved in this affair. He is not really the type for this, not the sort of person who does big deals or is suited in any way to this. I know
¶Dmitry really as not a particularly reliable person. That is all I can say about this"19 INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 12) BER000167 INQ001886 (pages 5-6) Mascall 8/77 Tristam Burgess 21/172-213 Death of Dissident, pp.337-338
¶6.40 Marina Wall said the following:
¶"Every woman finds Dmitry charming. It is just he does not fancy working and he is not a family man. He is more of a man about town. That is why we were not suited..."20 Zakayev 26/137-138; 26/140-141 Berezovsky v RTR & Terluk [2010] EWHC 476 (QB); Terluk v Berezovsky [2011] EWCA Civ 1534 INQ001788 (pages 21-22 paragraphs 127-128) Marina Wall 32/58 Bull 21/213-256 INQ006067 (page 5 paragraph 31)
¶"I looked on the internet and found out Litvinenko is supposed to have been poisoned with thallium. I then read that Litvinenko had met two businessmen in a hotel. They are said to have been Lugovoy and Dmitry. My first thought was that I found this ridiculous and absurd. When I read that an agent was involved and then my husband, I could never imagine that. I mainly took care of our living expenses and dealt with all financial matters. He didn't even have an account."21 Marina Litvinenko 3/41-43 Knuckey 7/38-44; see also Mr Knuckey's report and timeline relating to this incident: INQ019304; INQ019301 Marina Litvinenko 3/125-129 Marina Wall 32/63 Marina Wall 32/66-67 INQ016403 (pages 29-32)
¶When asked whether Mr Kovtun was skilled technically, for example with regard to computers, Marina Wall stated:
¶"I had to do everything. I had to set up the letters on the computer. He was not able to do this. Dmitry was no handyman. He could not even bang a nail into the wall.
¶Finally, I would like to say that it is beyond my power of imagination that Dmitry is an agent or a member of the secret service. I really cannot believe that for the life of me."22 Sixsmith The Litvinenko File (pages 78-79); Cowell The Terminal Spy (pages 103-104) INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Marina Litvinenko 4/110-111 Marina Wall 32/75 Mascall 22/127 A1 2/131-140
¶6.41 Following the discovery of radioactive contamination in her flat, Marina Wall was also asked whether she could, "conceive that Dmitry brought any dangerous substances into your flat", and gave a very clear answer:
¶"I really cannot imagine that he would put my children in danger. I am more inclined to believe that he was already ill himself or didn't know that."23 Marina Litvinenko 3/31-35; INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 13) Bukovsky 26/86-90; 26/109-110 Marina Litvinenko 4/11 lines 11-15 Marina Wall 32/66-67 Horwell 33/16-17 INQ016403 (page 30)
116¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶If Mr Kovtun was handling or carrying polonium 210 at around this time, it does not of course follow that he knew precisely what the substance was, or about its qualities. It may be that he had not been told. A similar question arises with regard to Mr Lugovoy. I will return to this matter in due course.
¶6.42 The account given to German investigators by Marina Wall's mother, Elenora Wall, was to a similar effect. It appears that she remained close to Mr Kovtun after his return to Moscow in 2003. She said that still in 2006, Mr Kovtun was:
¶"... always very modest. He only had a few clothes. Money and he did not go together. That is how we know him... Dmitry is not the person who takes a step forward in order to carry out big deals."24 Zakayev 26/142 lines 9-11 Service 28/30-31; 28/69-70; Felshtinsky 23/175-177 Goldfarb 5/102-107 Elenora Wall 32/77 INQ016403 (page 31)
¶She added:
¶"Dmitry is not a brutal person who kills people. No member of the KGB would have put poison in Dmitry's hands. He is a very soft person. He isn't a businessman, he is a philosopher. I do not believe that he knew when he visited us that he was giving off radioactivity. He was just as he always was. He would not have come if he had known that."25 INQ017734 (page 5 paragraph 15) Goldfarb 27/109-110 Goldfarb 26/2-8 Elenora Wall 32/79-80 INQ018946; INQ017548 (pages 8-9); Goldfarb 26/125-127
¶6.43 Finally, Elenora Wall also said something about what Mr Kovtun told her when he had become ill following Mr Litvinenko's death. She said:
¶"He told me that he had probably got some of the poison which killed Litvinenko.
¶He said word for word, 'Those arseholes have probably poisoned us all'."26 INQ002076 (page 4) Felshtinsky 23/135-137; Goldfarb 5/113-114 Reilly 10/23-26 Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ014604; INQ014605; INQ014607; INQ014608; INQ014609; INQ014610; INQ014611; INQ014612; INQ014613; INQ014620; INQ014621; INQ014623; INQ014624
¶She added that he had not explained the identity of the "arseholes" to whom he had referred.
117¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Chapter 4: Visa applications 6.44 The first of the journeys to London with which this Part is concerned was that made by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun between 16 and 18 October 2006. This was to be Mr Kovtun's first trip to the UK, and he therefore needed to apply for a visa. As I have mentioned, Mr Lugovoy had made several visits to London in the preceding months and years. As it happened, his previous UK visa had expired earlier in 2006 and he applied for a further visa in May 2006.
¶6.45 Both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun made their applications in writing to the British Embassy in Moscow. The applications were considered by two different British entry clearance officers posted to the Embassy. I heard oral evidence from both.
¶Visa application by Mr Lugovoy 6.46 Mr Lugovoy's visa application form was dated 23 May 2006.27 Evidence about the form (which was completed in Russian) and the procedure by which the application was considered was given by Mr Nigel Moughton, who was at the time in question an entry clearance officer at the British Embassy in Moscow.28
¶6.47 Mr Moughton explained that Mr Lugovoy's application was for a tourist visa (section 5.3 of the form); the form further stated that Mr Lugovoy wished to travel to the UK on 31 May for eight days. Evidence of the booking at the hotel in London at which Mr Lugovoy intended to stay on this trip was attached to the form.
¶6.48 Mr Moughton gave evidence about the checks that would have been undertaken in relation to the application after it had arrived at the Embassy. He said that Mr Lugovoy's name would have been checked against a 'Warnings Index' to make sure, as he put it, "that the person is not of interest to a multitude of government agencies".29 This check was completed on this occasion, and the result recorded was that Mr Lugovoy had 'No Trace' on the Warnings Index.
¶6.49 Mr Moughton stated that the form was then subject to a number of further checks by local staff. It was at this stage that a query was raised by an entry clearance officer other than Mr Moughton in respect of Mr Lugovoy's application, namely that Mr Lugovoy had travelled on eight occasions under his previous six month visa. Mr Moughton explained that he had not been involved at this stage; his understanding was that the volume of Mr Lugovoy's previous travel was considered to be unusual and to require an explanation.
¶6.50 Mr Lugovoy was accordingly telephoned and asked why he had used his last visa eight times, and what he had been doing in the UK on those occasions. There is a manuscript note of the telephone conversation.30 Mr Lugovoy is recorded as saying that:
¶"he has travelled to the UK purely for holidays because he has friends there
¶(Aleksander Litvinenko) and he likes the UK. He travelled either alone or with his wife."
118¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.51 Mr Moughton's evidence was that this manuscript note would have been passed back to the entry clearance officer then considering the application. It would appear that the explanation did not entirely satisfy that official, since Mr Lugovoy was then asked to attend for interview.
¶6.52 The interview took place on 6 June 2006. Mr Moughton was one of those assigned to conduct interviews that day, and he interviewed Mr Lugovoy, with the assistance of an interpreter. The interview was short and there is a transcript amongst the papers attached to the application form. Mr Lugovoy confirmed the accuracy of the form. Mr Moughton asked him again what he had been doing on his eight visits to the UK in the previous six months and Mr Lugovoy's answer is recorded as "Travel holiday".
¶6.53 Mr Moughton saw no reason to refuse Mr Lugovoy's application and therefore granted him a further six month visa. It was this visa that Mr Lugovoy used on his visits to the UK in October and November 2006.
¶6.54 There are a few short points to be made about this episode.
¶6.55 First, Mr Lugovoy gave Mr Litvinenko's name as a contact in the UK and this was recorded on the papers. From this time if not from earlier, there was express evidence of a link between the two men.
¶6.56 Second, Mr Lugovoy was recorded as a 'No Trace' on the Warnings Index notwithstanding his previous employment in the Committee for State Security (KGB) and in the Federal Protection Service (FPS). Mr Moughton made it clear that, had he known of these matters, they might have influenced the questions that he asked at interview.31
¶6.57 These points might have been relevant to the issue of preventability – i.e. whether UK authorities might have done more to protect Mr Litvinenko's safety. However, that issue was expressly excluded from the Terms of Reference (see Appendix 2) as a consequence of my ruling of 17 May 2013 given in the course of the inquest proceedings to the effect that there was no material within the documents that I had then considered to suggest that at any material time Mr Litvinenko was or ought to have been assessed by the UK authorities as being at a real and immediate threat to his life.
¶Visa application by Mr Kovtun 6.58 Mr Kovtun's application for a UK visa was dated 2 October 2006.32
¶6.59 The official at the British Embassy in Moscow who considered Mr Kovtun's application was Mr Fitzgerald. I heard oral evidence from him,33 and have also admitted into evidence a statement that he gave to the Metropolitan Police Service.34
¶6.60 In contrast to the procedure that had been followed regarding Mr Lugovoy's visa application earlier in the year, Mr Fitzgerald saw no need to interview Mr Kovtun. His evidence was that he granted the visa on the day that the application form was received at the Embassy – 5 October 2006.
119¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.61 In further contrast to Mr Lugovoy's application, Mr Kovtun applied for a business visa. Mr Kovtun described himself in his application form as the general director of a Russian company named Global Project Ltd and asserted that he had a monthly income of 65,000 roubles. He named a British company called Continental Petroleum Ltd (CPL) as his contact in the UK, and attached to his form a letter from the Chairman of CPL, named Mr Balfour, which was addressed to the British Embassy in Moscow.35 In his letter Mr Balfour requested that Mr Kovtun be granted an entry visa. The letter confirmed that Global Project Ltd had been founded in 2003 and that Mr Kovtun had been general director of the company since 5 December 2003. It added that, "the company provides consulting services in development of Russian oil and gas markets."
¶6.62 The contents of Mr Kovtun's visa application form and the letter from Mr Balfour raise for the first time a number of related issues concerning Mr Kovtun. Was his supposed successful business career in Russia genuine? Did he work with CPL? Did he have genuine business reasons for travelling to London in October and early November 2006?
¶6.63 I heard evidence from a number of witnesses on these matters which I will detail in due course. It may, however, assist if at this stage I identify the issues in a little more detail and give some preliminary views in relation to them:
¶a. There is no evidence, other than that emanating from Mr Lugovoy and from
Mr Kovtun himself, that Mr Kovtun was a wealthy and successful businessman in 2006. As I have explained in some detail above, at paragraphs 6.35 – 6.40, the evidence of Inna Hohne and of Marina and Elenora Wall was strongly inconsistent with such a suggestion. Further, as we shall see, it is a striking feature of the evidence relating to his activities in October and November 2006 that Mr Kovtun did not appear to live the lifestyle of a rich businessman. He did not pay for drinks or meals in London, and the evidence is that he had to ask his ex-wife's boyfriend to pay for his flight from Hamburg to London because he did not have a credit card
¶b. There is, on the other hand, plenty of evidence to demonstrate the existence
of a business relationship between CPL and Mr Lugovoy. Witnesses such as Dr Shadrin and Mr Voronoff, to whom I shall return, attested to this
¶c. It was also apparent from the evidence of these and other witnesses that
Mr Lugovoy drew Mr Kovtun into his work with CPL. I shall return to the detail of this evidence in due course
¶d. Perhaps the most important issue in this regard is whether Mr Kovtun's business
dealings with CPL (or for that matter any other companies) provide a sufficient explanation for his two trips to London in October and November 2006. On this issue, as we shall see, there are discrepancies between the evidence of Mr Kovtun on the one hand and Dr Shadrin on the other
¶6.64 Another notable feature of Mr Kovtun's visa application was its timing in relation to other events. As Mr Horwell QC observed in his closing submissions,36 it is striking that the bookings for Mr Lugovoy's and Mr Kovtun's flights to London on 16 October and the bookings for their hotel rooms on that trip were made a few days after Mr Kovtun's
120¶The Litvinenko Inquiry visa was issued on 5 October.37 It would appear to be a reasonable inference from this sequence, as Mr Horwell suggested, that Mr Kovtun's presence on the trip was deemed essential, or at least very important. The question that I will need to address is why Mr Kovtun's presence on this trip was apparently considered to be so desirable. Was it, as his visa application form asserted, for business reasons? Or were there other reasons for Mr Kovtun accompanying Mr Lugovoy to London?
121¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Chapter 5: Events in London 16-18 October 6.65 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun flew from Moscow to London Gatwick on the morning of Monday 16 October 2006. They stayed for two nights, returning to Moscow on Wednesday 18 October. The two men attended business meetings with Mr Litvinenko during the day on both 16 and 17 October, and went out with him for dinner on the evening of 17 October. For Mr Lugovoy, this was the latest in a series of visits to London during which he met Mr Litvinenko. For Mr Kovtun, by contrast, this was his first trip to London and also the first time he had met Mr Litvinenko.
¶6.66 Monday 16 October 2006 was just over a week after Anna Politkovskaya had been murdered in Moscow, on Saturday 7 October. The day on which Mr Litvinenko had attended his citizenship ceremony, and then gone on to the memorial service for Ms Politkovskaya, had been at the end of the previous week – Friday 13 October.
¶Arrival in London 6.67 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun flew into Gatwick on the morning of 16 October aboard Transaero flight UN333. The flight arrived at 10.48am. The registration number of the aircraft that made the flight that morning was EI-DDK.
¶6.68 In contrast to all bar one of the other aircraft on which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun flew during this period, EI-DDK was never tested for radiation by the UK authorities. I heard detailed evidence as to the reasons for this. Put very shortly, a request was made by the Metropolitan Police Service to test the aircraft. The aircraft was not made available and the police believed that the request had been deliberately frustrated by the Russian authorities. At the same time, the Russian authorities announced that they had tested the plane and found it free of contamination, although considerable doubt was subsequently cast on those results.
¶6.69 These events took place in early December 2006, at the very start of the police investigation. They involved a number of different parties, both in the UK and in Russia. DI Mascall gave evidence about these matters.38 In summary:
¶a. The Metropolitan Police Service decided on 30 November 2006 that both the
plane on which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had flown to London on 16 October (EI-DDK) and the plane on which they had returned to Moscow on 18 October (EI-DNM) should be tested for contamination. Both aircraft were operated by the Russian airline Transaero
¶b. On 1 December 2006, an official at the British Embassy in Moscow named
Mr Knott notified both the Russian authorities and Transaero of the concern as to possible contamination of the aircraft, and of the advice that they should be tested before they next flew39
¶c. On the same day, Mr Knott was informed both by officials in the office of
122Mr Gennadiy Onishchenko, the then Russian Chief Public Health Officer, and by Mr Alexander Tarrenets, the Deputy Director of Security for Transaero, that
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
both planes had in fact already been tested and that no contamination had been found40
¶d. In fact, aircraft EI-DNM flew into Heathrow on that day,1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 December 2006, and
was tested for contamination by AWE scientists. They discovered secondary alpha radiation contamination in the area of the seats on which Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy had sat on the flight on 18 October41
¶e. These findings were, clearly, in complete contrast to the communications that
were being received on the same day both from the airline and from the Russian government to the effect that EI-DNM had been checked and was free of contamination
¶f. EI-DDK was in fact scheduled to fly to London on the next day,2 Marina Litvinenko 3/20-23 INQ019146 (page 14-15 paragraph 45) A translated copy of the law provided to the Solicitor to the Inquiry by the Russian Embassy in London is at INQ018962 December.
That flight, however, was cancelled. Transaero explained at the time that the cancellation was due to disruption to their scheduling caused by the testing of EI-DNM in London42
¶g. It appears that EI-DDK did not in fact return to the UK for some time after that, and that it was never tested by UK authorities43
¶Some seven years later, in 2013, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (ICRF) made a disclosure of documents to me in what were then the inquest proceedings into Mr Litvinenko's death. The documents purported to be records of the testing of both aircraft in Russia.44 DI Mascall stated in evidence that these documents had never been formally provided to the Metropolitan Police Service, and that he saw them for the first time in 2013.45 Although the effect of these documents is not entirely clear, they appear to indicate that the original Russian tests did reveal contamination on EI-DNM, but did not reveal any contamination on EI-DDK. If that is the effect of these documents, it is quite obviously inconsistent with what Mr Knott was told both by the Russian government and by Transaero in 2006.
¶6.70 In summary, there is an inconsistency between the assertion made by the Russian authorities on 1 December 2006 that both planes had been tested and found to be clean, and the documents received in 2013 suggesting that the results of the Russian testing of one of the planes had been positive. There is also a conflict between the initial assertion by the Russians that EI-DNM was not contaminated, and the outcome of the tests conducted on that aircraft by AWE. Moreover, the delay of seven years in the production of the Russian test results remains unexplained. In the circumstances, I do not consider that any weight can be placed on what the Russian authorities have said about the testing of either of these aircraft, in particular the assertion that EI-DDK was tested and found to be clean.
¶6.71 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were transported from their aircraft to the terminal building by an airport bus. The bus that carried them was subsequently identified and tested, with no trace of contamination being found. There was evidence that the bus was regularly cleaned.46 For the reasons that I have explained above, (in paragraphs
123¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.21 – 6.24), in general terms I do not regard 'negative' evidence on this type of vehicle to be of any significance one way or the other.
¶6.72 On their arrival in the terminal building that morning, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were stopped and questioned by a policeman named Detective Constable (DC) Scott, who gave oral evidence at the Inquiry.
¶6.73 DC Scott explained that he did not have any prior intelligence relating to either Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun. He stopped them simply because he thought they might be of interest.47 DC Scott's file contained a photograph of the two men taken when they were stopped, timed at 11.34am.48
¶6.74 DC Scott examined the two men's travel documentation and asked about the purpose of their trip to the UK. He said that Mr Kovtun did not appear to be able to speak English, but that Mr Lugovoy could and answered the questions on behalf of them both. The men said that they were travelling for business. They gave a name that DC Scott wrote down as Mr 'Shadray', but which must have been a reference to Dr Shadrin. They also gave a phone number which DC Scott called – it was the offices at 58 Grosvenor Street of Dr Shadrin's two companies, Continental Petroleum Limited and ECO3 Capital Limited. DC Scott was told by someone there that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were visiting ECO3 Capital.
¶6.75 It appeared from his evidence that DC Scott was uneasy about Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. He explained that the two men:
¶"were very evasive as to why they were coming to the UK… as I asked them questions, they weren't coming out with the answers that I wanted to hear or expected to hear. They were giving me very, very short answers, so there was no information in those answers."49 BER002661 Goldfarb 5/123 Shvets 24/100 Scott 9/43-44 Marina Litvinenko 3/141-142
¶6.76 Ultimately, however, once he had telephoned Dr Shadrin's offices and completed his standard checks, DC Scott considered that he had no power to hold the two men any longer and therefore let them proceed.
¶6.77 DC Scott estimated that the two men left him at about 11.50am.50 It seems likely that they in fact left him a few minutes earlier, since the telephone schedule records Mr Lugovoy making calls on his mobile phone to Dr Shadrin and then to Mr Litvinenko at 11.45am and 11.46am respectively.51
¶6.78 As we shall see, later on the same day Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun met Mr Litvinenko and together attended a meeting with Mr Reilly. It seems reasonable to assume that Mr Lugovoy's brief call to Mr Litvinenko at 11.46 that morning was about that meeting, particularly since the records show that Mr Litvinenko called Mr Reilly a few minutes later.52
¶6.79 The meeting with Mr Reilly was to take place at 3.00pm. Prior to that, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun travelled into London and booked in at their hotel, the Best Western in Shaftesbury Avenue.
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¶6.80 DI Mascall explained that, despite extensive enquiries, the police had been unable to establish the means by which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun travelled from Gatwick to central London on 16 October.53 It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the journey would have taken approximately an hour.
¶6.81 I heard evidence from Mr Krgo, who in 2006 was the House Manager of the Best Western Hotel in Shaftesbury Avenue. He said that he remembered "quite vividly" meeting Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on their arrival at the hotel on 16 October.54
¶6.82 Mr Krgo's evidence was that the two men arrived at the hotel at between 9.00 and 9.30 in the morning. He thought that these timings had come from timed images from the hotel's CCTV that he had viewed with the police.55 I think that Mr Krgo was mistaken on both counts. There is clear evidence, as set out above, that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's flight was still in the air at 9.30am, and that they were still at Gatwick at 11.30am. Moreover, DI Mascall confirmed that, although the police did review the hotel CCTV system with Mr Krgo during their enquiries, the review established that the images for 16 October had already been automatically deleted by that time, so no footage of that day was ever seized.56
¶6.83 Mr Krgo also gave evidence that, following their arrival at the hotel, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun completed registration slips and a credit card was pre-authorised to cover any incidental costs. The credit card slip showed that that process had taken place at 12.51pm.57 Although Mr Krgo thought that the credit card had been pre-authorised some time after their first arrival at the hotel, in light of the known timings set out above, I think it most likely that this process was in fact undertaken on their arrival, and therefore that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun arrived at the hotel shortly before 12.51pm.
¶6.84 Leaving timings to one side, Mr Krgo was confident as to the sequence of events following the arrival of the two men. When they first arrived, neither of their rooms was ready. They left their luggage in the storage room and left the hotel for an hour or so, apparently to go to a nearby café that Mr Krgo had recommended. When they returned one of their rooms was ready. That was number 107, which was Mr Lugovoy's room. The two men then took their luggage up to that room, and got changed. They came down again about half an hour later and left the hotel. Mr Krgo did not see them again that day and it therefore seems likely that at this point they went to the meeting with Mr Litvinenko and Mr Reilly.58
¶6.85 Before turning to that meeting, it is necessary to address a submission that Mr Emmerson QC made in the course of his closing submissions. The general submission related to Russian State responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death and the source of the polonium apparently used to poison him. Those are matters to which I shall turn in due course. However, in developing this submission Mr Emmerson made a factual point that is relevant to this stage of the narrative. Put shortly, he contended that, on the assumption that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had attempted to poison Mr Litvinenko with polonium during the 16 October meeting with Mr Reilly, they must have brought the polonium with them from Russia, since they had no opportunity to acquire it from any other source between the time that they arrived on that day at
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¶Gatwick and the time of the meeting that afternoon. I make it clear that that narrow factual proposition is one that I am not able to accept. The evidence of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's movements during this period is in fact fairly sketchy. As I have said, there is no evidence of how they travelled from Gatwick to central London, or where they may have gone or who they may have met on the way. There is no evidence as to whether they in fact went to Mr Krgo's café, or somewhere else entirely, after their first arrival at the hotel. And there is no detailed evidence of how they travelled from the hotel to Mr Reilly's offices.
¶6.86 There is of course no positive evidence that Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun acquired any polonium 210 in London that morning. But the difficulty is that there is in fact only limited evidence as to what they did, where they went and whom they met in the hours following their arrival. In those circumstances, I cannot exclude, as Mr Emmerson's submission invites me to do, the possibility that they obtained polonium 210 from some source in London between the time of their arrival at Gatwick and the meeting with Mr Reilly later that day.
¶Meeting with Tim Reilly 6.87 At some point during the afternoon of 16 October 2006, a meeting took place between Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun, Mr Litvinenko and Mr Reilly. The meeting was held at Mr Reilly's offices at 25 Grosvenor Street, London.
¶6.88 Mr Litvinenko travelled into central London by bus that day. The bus on which he travelled was subsequently identified and tested, with no contamination being found.59
¶6.89 I have said a little about Mr Reilly and his relationship with Mr Litvinenko at paragraphs 4.130 – 4.133 above. I also described how Mr Litvinenko introduced Mr Lugovoy to Mr Reilly as a contact who might be able to assist Erinys in securing business with Gazprom, and how the three men first met in June or July 2006.
¶6.90 Mr Reilly gave detailed evidence about the meeting on 16 October.60 The basic facts can be stated fairly shortly:
¶a. It seems likely that the meeting had been pre-arranged, either earlier that morning or, more probably, before that61 b. There was some uncertainty about the precise timing of the meeting. Mr Reilly said that it was a morning meeting,62 but that cannot be right. There is clear evidence that Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko went to the Piccadilly itsu after the meeting, and that they were there at about 4.20pm (see below).
¶Mr Reilly said that the meeting took less than an hour.63 It would seem, therefore, that the meeting started at about 3.00pm c. The meeting took place in the boardroom of Mr Reilly's offices
126¶The Litvinenko Inquiry d. The purpose of the meeting was for Mr Reilly to discuss with Mr Lugovoy Erinys'
¶proposed business with Gazprom64 e. Mr Kovtun played no part in the discussions. Mr Reilly described him as, "a guy who was just watching me"65 INQ017734 (page 22 paragraph 76); Marina Litvinenko 4/101 (2003) NIQB 56 Marina Litvinenko 3/146 Reilly 10/108 Zakeyev 26/163-167
¶6.91 There are two other factual details about this meeting that are of some importance.
¶6.92 The first relates to the seating arrangements around the boardroom table. Mr Reilly was very confident in his evidence as to where each of the four men had sat at the meeting. He explained that he had wanted to sit facing Mr Lugovoy since he regarded him as "the most critical person" at the meeting. He therefore sat facing Mr Lugovoy at one end of the table. He placed Mr Litvinenko between them at the head of the table and Mr Kovtun, whom he regarded as the least important person at the meeting, next to Mr Lugovoy.66 Mr Reilly provided the police with a marked plan of the room showing where each of the attendees sat.67 It is reproduced below. Mr Reilly explained in the section of his oral evidence to which I have already referred that he sat at position 'A', Mr Litvinenko at 'B', Mr Lugovoy at 'C' and Mr Kovtun at 'D'.
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¶Mr Reilly's plan of the Erinys boardroom68
128¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Police photograph of the Erinys boardroom69
¶6.93 The second point concerns the refreshments provided at the meeting. Mr Reilly's evidence was that he himself did not drink anything at the meeting, but that he provided each of the other three with either tea or coffee. He said that he also offered them a drink of water from the office water fountain, but they all refused.70
¶6.94 However, the most important evidence relating to this meeting is the evidence of polonium contamination of the boardroom that was discovered after Mr Litvinenko's death. Extensive contamination was discovered, in particular on two of the chairs and on a section of the green baize that covered the boardroom table. The contamination was described in evidence by DI Mascall,71 and is shown in diagrammatic form in a computer aided model of the room prepared by the Metropolitan Police Service,72 which is reproduced below.
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¶Contamination levels in the Erinys boardroom73
130¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.95 The room was first tested on 25 November 2006, more than a month after the meeting had taken place. Unsurprisingly, Mr Reilly's evidence was that the chairs in the room could have been moved during the intervening period.74 But the same was not true of the green baize cloth on the table. Mr Reilly said that John Holmes (who, as I have described above, ran both Erinys and Titon International) was always insistent that the baize should not be removed from the table.75 There was, therefore, no reason to think that the baize had been moved between mid October when the meeting took place and late November when the room was tested.
¶6.96 That is a highly significant consideration. As is apparent from the plan, the highest level of contamination found in the room was on a patch of the green baize at one end of the table (shown in purple in the plan). Comparison with Mr Reilly's plan shows that this area was located between the positions in which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko were sitting.
¶6.97 A1's evidence about the contamination in the Erinys boardroom was that the small 'purple' patch of contamination on the baize cloth represented primary contamination. In other words, as I have said, the reading was so high that it must have been caused by a primary source of polonium being exposed to the environment in that area. She said the scientific evidence provided strong support for this conclusion. Her view was that the rest of the contamination in the room was secondary contamination.76
¶6.98 Mr Reilly told me that the meeting on 16 October was probably the last time that he saw Mr Litvinenko. Although Mr Reilly thought that he might have met Mr Lugovoy and/or Mr Kovtun again before Mr Litvinenko's death (there is no other evidence of any such meetings),77 he was clear that Mr Litvinenko was not present at any such meetings.78
¶6.99 Mr Reilly referred in the course of his evidence to radiation testing that was undertaken at his house.79 The contamination schedule indicates that secondary contamination was found on some of Mr Reilly's clothing, and also on the steering wheel of his car.80 Mr Reilly also mentioned that he had a sudden illness on 26 October 2006, with symptoms of migraine and sickness.81 I am not in a position to make any findings as to whether this illness was caused in any way by the contamination that had been left in the Erinys boardroom.
¶6.100 There is one further matter that I should mention before leaving this subject. Both Mr Holmes and Mr Attew gave evidence that there had been a break in at the offices at 25 Grosvenor Street in mid June 2006.82 Considerable force was used to gain entrance to the offices, but nothing was taken. Both men thought, with hindsight, that the break in may have been linked to Mr Litvinenko's case. Mr Attew said, "In my business, that's a reconnaissance".
131¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 itsu 6.101 The evidence before me was that, following the meeting with Mr Reilly, Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko went together to the itsu restaurant on Piccadilly. Mr Lugovoy made a purchase on his credit card there that afternoon that was timed at 4.22pm.83 There was no direct evidence as to where they sat on that occasion, but secondary contamination was found at one of the tables. Importantly, the table at which the secondary contamination was found was not that at which (according to the evidence of Mr Scaramella) Mr Litvinenko sat with Mr Scaramella on 1 November 2006.84 Given the primary contamination at the Erinys boardroom, it is a reasonable inference that the secondary contamination found at itsu was left by Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and/or Mr Litvinenko at the time of their visit on 16 October.
¶The evening of 16 October 6.102 When they left itsu, the three men split up. Mr Litvinenko travelled back to his home in Muswell Hill. The bus on which he travelled was subsequently tested and found to be free of contamination.85 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun remained in central London.
¶6.103 When she gave oral evidence, Marina Litvinenko told me about her recollection of that evening.86 She said that it was a "normal, very peaceful evening". Marina Litvinenko had prepared spicy chicken soup for dinner. Mr Litvinenko liked hot food, and he ate the soup with some hot peppers. She said that he often added hot spices to his food. Some time after the meal, Mr Litvinenko suddenly began to feel ill. He vomited. She said that Mr Litvinenko continued to feel unwell for the next two days.
¶6.104 When interviewed by police in hospital, Mr Litvinenko had himself referred to an incident "two or three weeks" before he went into hospital when he had vomited. He said that at the time he had assumed it was food poisoning.87
¶6.105 In the witness statement that he provided to the Inquiry dated 2 June 2015, Mr Kovtun suggested that Mr Litvinenko's illness had in fact pre-dated 16 October. He stated that Mr Litvinenko had told him whilst they were at itsu on that day that: "he would not be eating with us because he had been poisoned the previous day and had spent the entire night vomiting so much that he had had to call a doctor."88 Hatjiosif 2/99-101 Scaramella 27/97-99; LUG000092 INQ021208 (page 3) It should be noted that Mr Kovtun said something similar to this in an interview that he gave to Der Spiegel in late 2006.89 On the other hand, Marina Litvinenko's evidence – which she emphasised in a further statement served in rebuttal of Mr Kovtun's statement90 – was that Mr Litvinenko had not been ill prior to 16 October. She said that she was certain that this episode of sickness had not taken place on Sunday 15 October, and she was equally certain that neither she nor anyone else had called a doctor on this occasion. There is certainly no other evidence (for example from General Practitioner (GP) records or the account of Mr Prikazchikov) that a doctor was called at this time.
132¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶These are matters that would obviously have been explored with Mr Kovtun had he given oral evidence.
¶6.106 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun spent the evening having dinner with Dr Shadrin at the Pescatori restaurant in Dover Street. Mr Lugovoy's credit card was used to pay the bill at the restaurant at 10.39pm that evening. The reservation book at the restaurant shows that the three men sat at table 17.91
¶6.107 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun then went on to a bar near the Best Western Hotel named Dar Marrakesh, where a bill was paid with the same credit card at 11.05pm. The bill was for £9.00, which appeared to reflect the purchase of a shisha pipe.
¶6.108 The Pescatori restaurant and Dar Marrakesh were both found to have secondary contamination. At the Pescatori, the table with the highest level of contamination was table 17.92 At Dar Marrakesh, one of the shisha pipes was found to be contaminated.93
¶6.109 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun spent the night at the Best Western Hotel. As I have already said, Mr Lugovoy had room 107. Mr Kovtun's room, which had not been available earlier, was room 308. As we shall see, this was in fact the only night that the two men spent at the Best Western Hotel.
¶6.110 Both rooms were subsequently tested and were found to contain extensive contamination.94 Room 107 was more heavily contaminated than room 308. A1 gave her opinion as to the interpretation of the readings taken in these two rooms.95 She said that the most significant result of this testing was the discovery of what she judged to be primary contamination in the u-bend of the sink in the bathroom of room 107. She explained that the scientists had opened the u-bend and found the contamination on detritus such as hair, etc. caught in the u-bend. The testing of the room had taken place on 22 December – more than two months after Mr Lugovoy had stayed in it. A1 said that the repeated use of the sink that would have taken place during that period explained the fact that relatively low readings were taken in the area of the sink itself – from where the polonium would have been washed away – in contrast to the sediment in the u-bend, where the polonium would have been caught. She added that even in the u-bend the initial levels of contamination may have been considerably higher. In a nutshell, A1's view was that the contamination in the u-bend was consistent with polonium being poured down the sink plughole.
¶6.111 There are three observations that I would make about these findings at this stage:
¶a. First, and perhaps obviously, the coincidence of primary contamination being found both on the boardroom table at the Erinys offices where Mr Lugovoy sat at a meeting on 16 October and also in the bathroom of the hotel room that he occupied that day is very striking b. Second, although there is no direct evidence as to precisely how the polonium came to be in the u-bend in room 107, the inference can be drawn that it was poured down the sink by Mr Lugovoy and/or Mr Kovtun either in the act of preparing a solution to be used in an attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko at the
¶Erinys meeting, or in disposing of the remainder of the solution later in the day. I
133¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 will assess the strength of that inference in due course, by reference to the totality of the evidence c. Third, it is to be noted in particular in this regard (i) that no similar primary contamination was found in any of the waste pipes of the bathroom in room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel, where Mr Lugovoy stayed on the nights of 25-27 October;
¶and (ii) that a similar deposit of primary contamination was found in the u-bend of the sink in room 382 of the Millennium Hotel, where Mr Kovtun stayed on
¶1 November 2006
¶Moving hotel 6.112 On the following day, Tuesday 17 October 2006, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun moved from the Best Western Hotel to the Parkes Hotel in Knightsbridge. They stayed at the Parkes Hotel on the night of 17 October before, as we shall see, flying back to Moscow on Wednesday 18 October. The rooms at the Best Western had been booked for both nights. Why they moved remains unclear. What the evidence does show is as follows:
¶a. As I have described above, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun arrived at and checked into the Best Western Hotel at about 12.51pm on 16 October. They were given access to one of their rooms – room 107 – an hour or so later before they left for the meeting with Mr Reilly at Erinys b. At 3.07pm on the same day – i.e. at about the time of the meeting at Erinys – rooms were booked by email for Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Parkes Hotel for the next night,17 Berezovsky 25/7 Goldfarb 26/122 INQ019146 (page 25 paragraph 77) Mascall 8/75 INQ019031; INQ019054 Dombey 23/24-30; INQ020031 (page 2 paragraphs S9-S10) October. DI Mascall's evidence was that these bookings, unlike the earlier bookings, were made by Mr Lugovoy's daughter, Tatiana Lugovoya96 c. Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun checked out of the Best Western Hotel at about
¶1.30pm on 17 October. They told the receptionist simply that they were leaving a day early. They did not ask for a refund97 d. The two men checked into the Parkes Hotel at about 2.00pm on the same day.
¶They were greeted by the Front of House Manager at the hotel, Giuliana Rondoni, from whom I heard evidence. Ms Rondoni recalled that they had told her that they had come from another hotel in Piccadilly that was overbooked98
¶6.113 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun stayed, respectively, in rooms 23 and 25 at the Parkes Hotel.99 Secondary contamination was found in both rooms.100
¶Meetings with Dr Shadrin 6.114 Later on 17 October, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had a meeting with Dr Shadrin in the CPL offices at 58 Grosvenor Street. As I have already mentioned, they had had dinner with him the night before. The Visitors' Book held at the entrance to the building101 indicates that the two men arrived at 3.00pm and left at 5.30pm on 17 October. The entries in the book also indicate that the two men had visited the building the day
134¶The Litvinenko Inquiry before, and Dr Shadrin's evidence was that they may have had a meeting there prior to going out to dinner at the Pescatori restaurant.
¶6.115 Dr Shadrin gave detailed oral evidence to the Inquiry about his relationship with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun and the various meetings that he had with them in London during this period.102 I also received oral evidence on this topic from several of Dr Shadrin's colleagues – Nikolay Gorokov,103 Dariya Davison104 and Vladimir Voronoff.105 The witness statement served by Mr Kovtun dated 2 June 2015106 addresses the business dealings that he and Mr Lugovoy had with these individuals.
¶6.116 As I have indicated above, there is a good deal of uncontroversial evidence regarding Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's dealings with CPL. In the course of his oral evidence, Dr Shadrin explained in great detail how in 2005 CPL had obtained oil and gas exploration licences over blocks of land in Western Siberia. The licences had been purchased by raising funding in the London market. He went on to describe how the exploitation of these licences was subsequently put at risk by the actions of a group in Russia whom he variously described as 'criminals' and 'raiders'.
¶6.117 In summary, Dr Shadrin's evidence was that this group, which was apparently led by a man named Mr Livshitz, attempted to cut CPL out of the exploration of the blocks of land by forging rival licences and bribing government officials. According to Dr Shadrin, CPL took two courses of action in response to this attack. The first (which was Dr Shadrin's preferred course) was to challenge the forged licences in the Russian courts. The second, which Dr Shadrin said was insisted upon by the investors and by the CPL Chairman Mr Balfour, was to investigate and to attempt to put pressure on Mr Livshitz and his group. This led to the introduction of Mr Voronoff to the company. He, in turn, suggested that Mr Lugovoy and his company Ninth Wave should be instructed to assist. Mr Lugovoy appointed Mr Kovtun as Project Manager. Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were tasked with preparing a report on the Livshitz group.
¶6.118 This general outline appears to me to be an uncontentious summary of the evidence of the various witnesses. What is of particular significance for present purposes is the stage that these matters had reached by the autumn of 2006.
¶6.119 Dr Shadrin's evidence was that the difficulties with the Livshitz group had been largely resolved by the summer of 2006.
¶6.120 CPL had been successful in the domestic legal challenges that it pursued in Russia, both before the Arbitrazh Court and then the Court of Appeal. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Ministry for Natural Resources had reissued CPL's licences. All this had taken place by June 2006.107
¶6.121 With regard to CPL's other line of attack, Dr Shadrin stated that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had prepared and submitted their report by the end of July 2006, prior to which he had held two or three meetings with them in Moscow. He described their report in the following terms:
135¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶"Basically, they prepared a report on the group who was trying to take over our assets illegally. They identified two people from – one from police department and another from the prosecution office who were providing protection to this group, and also they identified their high profile connections as well.
¶They submitted this report, and that was the only result of their work on the project."108 INQ006741 Evans 7/31 Shadrin 14/154-155
¶Dr Shadrin thought that Mr Lugovoy's bill for preparing the report had been paid by July 2006.109
¶6.122 This outline raises a question as to the subject matter of the meetings that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had with Dr Shadrin in the autumn of 2006. If the Livshitz affair had effectively been concluded, what were they discussing?
¶6.123 Dr Shadrin was asked about this when he gave evidence. Putting the matter shortly, his response was that by the autumn of 2006 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were pitching for new business. He recalled the letter of introduction being provided to support Mr Kovtun's visa application, and said that Mr Balfour had provided the letter to facilitate discussions with Mr Kovtun about his possible future involvement with CPL. As Dr Shadrin put it, as at 3 October 2006, which was the date of the letter, "it would be accurate to say that [Mr Kovtun was] pitching to provide consultant services… because at that time obviously their previous role… has been finalised and the new role, we haven't negotiated out." He further stressed that he did not regard his discussions with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at that time as a matter of any urgency.110
¶6.124 With regard to his meetings with Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy on 16 and 17 October 2006, Dr Shadrin recalled that they had discussed two possible future projects. One related to further investigation/surveillance of Mr Livshitz and his group and the other concerned the possibility that Mr Lugovoy's company might be awarded a contract to provide physical security at the sites in Siberia once drilling began, possibly as a joint venture with security firms in the UK. He said that Mr Lugovoy also sought his advice on raising finance for other unrelated business projects, including one relating to the bottling company with which he was involved. Dr Shadrin also stated that, given their possible future working relationship, he asked Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to provide copies of formal documents required under the Know Your Client protocols.111
¶6.125 The statement that Mr Kovtun provided to the Inquiry dated 2 June 2015112 gives a rather different account of his engagement with Dr Shadrin at this time. That statement gives the clear impression that the investigation into the Livshitz group was then still underway. More than that, the statement suggests that one of the purposes of his trip to London on 16 October 2006 was to discuss with Dr Shadrin a particular piece of information that Mr Kovtun claimed to have discovered, namely that members of the Livshitz group had been hacking the emails of an American company named Harvest and Hicks, in particular those of a senior manager named Mr Byron.
¶6.126 Dr Shadrin had by this stage already given oral evidence to the Inquiry and he addressed these points in a further written statement dated 24 June 2015.113 Put
136¶The Litvinenko Inquiry shortly, Dr Shadrin disputed Mr Kovtun's account. He said that there had been no need for Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to visit him in London at this time, since he had been a regular visitor to Moscow and they could have seen him there (as, indeed, they had done previously). Dr Shadrin also said in his further statement that he had, "no recollection of being provided with any reports pertaining to a US company called Harvest and Hicks or a person called Mr Byron".
¶6.127 The discrepancies between Mr Kovtun's account and that given by Dr Shadrin are certainly matters that would have been explored with Mr Kovtun had he given oral evidence to the Inquiry. Since he did not do so, I am unable to reach any detailed conclusions on these matters. But what can be said is that I have no reason to doubt the truthfulness of what Dr Shadrin has told the Inquiry. That, in turn, gives rise to the distinct possibility that Mr Kovtun has exaggerated, or perhaps entirely fabricated, the business justification for his travel to London on this occasion. I will return to this point in due course.
¶6.128 Before leaving this topic, I should add that secondary contamination was found at a number of places at CPL's offices in Grosvenor Street.114 As we shall see, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun paid a number of visits to these offices during the period in question, and it is not possible to state on which occasion or occasions this contamination might have occurred.
¶Meeting at RISC 6.129 The evidence was that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun attended one further business meeting on the afternoon of 17 October, on this occasion in company with Mr Litvinenko. The meeting was with Mr Quirke of RISC. It took place at RISC's offices at 1 Cavendish Place, in Mayfair. Mr Quirke had, of course, met Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy (although not Mr Kovtun) previously, and I have referred to the evidence about those meetings above at paragraphs 4.115 to 4.119.
¶6.130 Mr Quirke gave oral evidence about the meeting.115 He said that it had been arranged a fortnight or so in advance by Mr Litvinenko.116 He was a little uncertain as to the precise timing of the meeting, but thought that it was already underway by shortly before 6.00pm.117 It would therefore appear that the meeting took place after Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's meeting with Dr Shadrin.
¶6.131 Mr Litvinenko had travelled down to central London by bus earlier in the afternoon. The bus on which he travelled was subsequently identified and tested; no radiation was detected.118
¶6.132 Mr Quirke's evidence was that the meeting took less than an hour. Mr Lugovoy led the discussions. Mr Quirke said he had not met Mr Kovtun before and had not been expecting him to attend.119 He said that Mr Kovtun took no part in the meeting other than operating a minidisc containing information.120
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¶6.133 Discussion at the meeting centred on Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko's continuing investigations regarding the Stolichnaya case. Mr Lugovoy raised the possibility of pressurising one of the Russian companies that was acting against Stolichnaya's interests by forcing its value down, a process he described as "greenmail". Mr Quirke stated that this was not a course that was subsequently pursued.121
¶6.134 Towards the end of the meeting, Mr Kovtun gave the minidisc that he had been operating to Mr Quirke, who stated that he subsequently passed it to the police.122
¶6.135 The RISC offices were subsequently monitored for radiation and secondary contamination was discovered at various places, including chairs in the boardroom.123 The highest reading was registered on a CD. It seems likely that this was the minidisc that Mr Kovtun gave to Mr Quirke during the meeting that I have just described.
¶Events of the evening of 17 October 6.136 It appears that after the meeting with Mr Quirke, Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko returned together to the Parkes Hotel. A witness statement from Alexey Valuev was read in this regard.124 Mr Valuev was the son of a business associate of Mr Lugovoy. He explained that Mr Lugovoy had arranged to meet him at the hotel that evening so that Mr Lugovoy could give him some money from his father. He recalled Mr Lugovoy arriving back at the hotel with Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko.
¶6.137 Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko subsequently went out for the evening in London. As part of their enquiries, the police traced the establishments that they had visited. DI Mascall gave evidence that the three men had gone for dinner at a Chinese restaurant named the Golden Dragon in Gerrard Street. There was evidence that Mr Lugovoy paid the bill at the restaurant using his credit card at 9.49pm. Further similar credit card evidence showed that the men then moved on to a bar named Cafe Boheme in Old Compton Street.125
¶6.138 Mr Litvinenko himself gave a brief description of the events of this evening in the course of his interviews with the police whilst he was in hospital. He referred to going to a Chinese restaurant and then to a pub in Soho. He said that he had only drunk green tea and a glass of Coca-Cola at the restaurant. He said that the other two had been drinking sake and had offered him some, but he had refused as "I don't drink alcohol generally". It appears from Mr Litvinenko's account that he went with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to the Cafe Boheme, but on arrival he didn't like the place and decided to go home. He said that he travelled back to Muswell Hill on a 134 bus from Tottenham Court Road, arriving home at about 11.00pm.126 The bus on which Mr Litvinenko travelled that night was identified and tested; no radiation was detected.127
¶6.139 DI Mascall explained that further evidence from Mr Lugovoy's credit card showed that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had subsequently gone to a nightclub named Hey Jo, where Mr Lugovoy purchased more drinks. The receipts make it clear that Mr Lugovoy
138¶The Litvinenko Inquiry was in the club that evening.128 The evidence was that the two men had returned to the Parkes Hotel at about 3.00am.129 DI Mascall subsequently confirmed that he had found no evidence that Mr Litvinenko had ever been to Hey Jo nightclub.130
¶6.140 The Golden Dragon restaurant, Cafe Boheme and Hey Jo nightclub were all tested for alpha radiation. No contamination was found at the Golden Dragon or at Cafe Boheme. Secondary contamination was, however, found at Hey Jo nightclub.131
¶6.141 There is one further feature of the evidence about what took place that evening that I must address.
¶6.142 In the witness statement dated 2 June 2015 that Mr Kovtun provided to the Inquiry, he gave a description of an event that took place during the meal at the Golden Dragon on the evening of 17 October 2006. The account that he gave was as follows:
¶"In the restaurant Litvinenko talked about the scoundrel Y. Felshtinsky, relating how he had robbed him, unfairly dividing the fee for the book 'Blowing up Russia', and how it was easy to obtain political asylum in Great Britain through A. Goldfarb, whom he called a 'CIA agent'. Litvinenko also suggested identifying wealthy citizens in Russia with property in Spain and giving him their details. Using his connections within the Spanish police, he would create problems for them there, and we would then make contact with them and solve those problems for a significant material reward.
¶Somehow or other, the subsequent conversation turned to Chechens, and
¶Litvinenko started boasting about his friendship with Sakayev and his brothers, hinting at his indirect involvement in the events in Nalchik where over 70 Russian police officers were killed in an attack on the town by Islamic militants. I was fed up with listening to his harangue and gladly complied with Lugovoy's request to leave them. I went outside and walked about not far from the Chinese restaurant for about 30 minutes."
¶6.143 I draw attention to this section of Mr Kovtun's statement because it is seriously at odds with other accounts that both he and Mr Lugovoy have previously given.
¶6.144 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun gave a joint press conference in Moscow on 31 May 2007 – less than a year after Mr Litvinenko's death. During the course of the press conference, both of them gave accounts of conversations that they said had taken place on 16/17 October between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Kovtun about Boris Berezovsky.
¶6.145 Mr Kovtun said that Mr Litvinenko had talked to him on the evening of 16 October whilst they were waiting for a cab. He said that Mr Litvinenko had complained to him about Mr Berezovsky cutting his salary. He said that Mr Litvinenko claimed that it had been he and MI6 who had obtained asylum for Mr Berezovsky.132
¶6.146 Earlier in the same press conference, Mr Lugovoy had given an account of a conversation which he said had taken place between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Kovtun at
139¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 the Golden Dragon restaurant on the evening of 17 October. Mr Lugovoy said that the conversation had taken place while he was away from the table. He said as follows:133
"In this connection I would like to tell you what Sasha had told Dmitry Kovtun not long before his death, when we met together in October of last year. During our dinner at one of the Chinatown restaurants in London, Litvinenko, enlarging on the subject of ways to make money, touched upon the resumed negotiations between Russia and the UK regarding Berezovsky's extradition. Lamenting the fact that Berezovsky did not appreciate the services rendered to him by Litvinenko, who allegedly saved his life more than once, Litvinenko told Kovtun, that he had the most important materials of compromising nature, regarding the illegal activity of Berezovsky on the UK territory. If any part of the documents pertaining to the circumstances of his obtaining the refugee status were to be made public, then he (Berezovsky) would have huge problems. Litvinenko hinted to Dima, that especially now, when Russia raised an issue with the UK of extraditing Berezovsky, it would be very opportune to let Berezovsky know that such materials exist, and to put a value of several million dollars on them. Still being financially dependent on Berezovsky – Berezovsky was paying his son's tuition fees and the family's accommodation in London, Litvinenko – Litvinenko asked Kovtun to find a reliable person, whom he would introduce to Berezovsky, which person would be able to familiarise Berezovsky with the materials, compromising him. Litvinenko was absolutely sure of the success of this enterprise, referring to the explosive nature and authenticity of the compromising materials he possessed. Since the conversation took place when I left the table, Litvinenko asked Kovtun to keep that conversation between them, fearing that I, as a person who could contact Berezovsky at any point, would expose Litvinenko's idea to him."
¶6.147 Several years after the press conference, in 2011, Mr Lugovoy provided a lengthy witness statement in the course of the Terluk libel proceedings. One section of that statement was devoted to a detailed narrative account of the meetings that he and Mr Kovtun had had with Mr Litvinenko in October and November 2006. In that statement, Mr Lugovoy made no mention at all of anything that Mr Litvinenko said at the Golden Dragon restaurant – whether in terms of a private discussion between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Kovtun concerning Mr Berezovsky (as Mr Lugovoy had described at the press conference) or in terms of a discussion about Russians in Spain, as Mr Kovtun now asserts. Nor did he say anything about a discussion between Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko on 16 October while they were waiting for a cab. Rather, Mr Lugovoy gave an account of a conversation between Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko that had supposedly taken place earlier in the day on 17 October. Paragraph 127 of this statement read as follows:134
140"We, that is Mr Litvinenko, Mr Kovtun and I, had a meeting at 18.00 with RISC on 17 October 2007 [sic]. After the meeting at RISC, when we were walking back to the hotel, Mr Litvinenko was walking next to Mr Kovtun some distance ahead of me. I was speaking on my mobile phone. Whilst we were walking I could not hear what Mr Litvinenko was saying to Mr Kovtun. However, later that day Mr Kovtun told me that Mr Litvinenko resumed his complaint that Mr Berezovsky was not treating him fairly and that he simply could not survive on the money that Mr Berezovsky was paying to him. He said that he knew information regarding Mr Berezovsky that was worth a great deal of money. He said that he needed to find someone
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry substantial and trustworthy who could sell this information without the source of the information coming back to himself."
¶6.148 I have previously referred to these two accounts in chapter 4 of Part 5 above. I have set them out here again in order to demonstrate the very significant discrepancies that exist between the accounts that have been given by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun over the years, ending in the statement that Mr Kovtun provided to the Inquiry in June 2015. Clearly, had Mr Kovtun (or, for that matter, Mr Lugovoy) given oral evidence to the Inquiry, these discrepancies would have been addressed. Equally clearly, in the absence of any explanation from either of the men, I am not in a position to place any weight on these parts of their accounts. Arguably, the matter goes further than that. The differences between the accounts are so marked that I might be driven to conclude that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have been deliberately attempting to mislead those attempting to discover the truth about these events, including myself. I shall return to this matter in due course.
¶6.149 I add in passing that the freedom with which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have previously provided these detailed accounts, both to the press and in evidence in UK court proceedings, stands in stark contrast to what I was told was the legal prohibition on Mr Kovtun giving evidence about the same matters to this Inquiry.135
¶18 October: return to Moscow 6.150 I heard evidence from Ms Rondoni that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun checked out of the Parkes Hotel at about 10.00am the following morning, Wednesday 18 October 2006. Mr Lugovoy paid the bill for both rooms. They told her that they were going to Gatwick and she saw the porter call a taxi for them.136
¶6.151 Later that day, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun flew back to Moscow from Gatwick aboard Transaero flight UN444.137 The bus on which they travelled from the terminal to the aeroplane was tested and no radiation was detected.138 The aircraft used for the flight that day was registration number EI-DNM. As I have already described, that aircraft was tested by UK authorities and was found to contain secondary contamination in the area of the seats on which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun sat on 18 October.139
141¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Chapter 6: Events in London 25-28 October 6.152 A week after he and Mr Kovtun had flown back to Moscow, Mr Lugovoy returned to London. He arrived on an evening flight on Wednesday 25 October 2006. On this occasion, he was not accompanied by Mr Kovtun. In further contrast to the earlier trip, the evidence is that Mr Lugovoy's travel on this occasion was hastily arranged. Whereas the arrangements for the first trip (including, it appears, obtaining a visa for Mr Kovtun) had been several weeks in the planning, the evidence was that on this occasion Mr Lugovoy's flight and hotel bookings had been made only the day before he travelled, on Tuesday 24 October 2006.140
¶6.153 In the interim, Mr Litvinenko had made his speech at the Frontline Club about Anna Politkovskaya's death, publicly attributing the blame for her murder to President Putin. That event had taken place on the evening of Thursday 19 October.
¶6.154 DI Mascall gave evidence that Mr Lugovoy flew into Heathrow on the evening of 25 October on British Airways flight BA875. The flight landed at Heathrow at 10.54pm that evening. The aircraft that made the flight that day was G-BNWX.141 Secondary contamination was subsequently discovered on that aircraft – see further below at paragraphs 6.184 – 6.186.
¶6.155 Mr Lugovoy travelled into central London and booked into the Sheraton Hotel, where he was given room 848.142
¶6.156 In a witness statement that he provided in the Terluk litigation, Mr Lugovoy described this trip as, "another business trip where I was due to meet with some contacts in London as regards some proposed work".143
¶Meeting with Badri Patarkatsishvili 6.157 There is certainly evidence that Mr Lugovoy met with other business contacts at this time. One of those contacts was Badri Patarkatsishvili.
¶6.158 Mr Patarkatsishvili was a wealthy Georgian businessman who was a close friend and business partner of Boris Berezovsky. There is evidence that Mr Lugovoy travelled to see Mr Patarkatsishvili at his house in Surrey on 26 October 2006. Mr Patarkatsishvili provided witness statements to the police following Mr Litvinenko's death, but he himself died in 2008. Relevant sections of his statements were therefore read.
¶6.159 Mr Patarkatsishvili had told the police that he had known Mr Lugovoy since about 1993, when the latter had been head of security at ORT, the Russian television channel that Mr Patarkatsishvili and Mr Berezovsky had run together. More recently, Mr Lugovoy had organised Mr Patarkatsishvili's security in Georgia. Mr Patarkatsishvili told the police that Mr Lugovoy visited him in Georgia every two months. Mr Patarkatsishvili recalled a business meeting at his house in Surrey during October 2006. He said that, in addition to himself and Mr Lugovoy, the meeting had been attended by Vladimir Voronoff and also a man named Marti Pompadour. He said that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss outdoor advertising in Moscow.144 There is no reason to think that this was anything other than a genuine business meeting.
142¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.160 I heard oral evidence from Bruno Bonetti, the chauffeur who drove Mr Lugovoy to and from Mr Patarkatsishvili's house on 26 October 2006. Mr Bonetti described how he collected Mr Lugovoy from Park Lane at about 10.30 that morning. He drove him to Surrey, near Leatherhead. With some difficulty, they found Mr Patarkatsishvili's house. Mr Bonetti recalled that Mr Lugovoy sat in the rear near side seat of the car. He said that they did not talk much on the journey – Mr Lugovoy spent most of the time on the telephone, speaking a language that he had not understood. Mr Bonetti thought that they had arrived at Mr Patarkatsishvili's house at about noon. He waited all afternoon and drove Mr Lugovoy back to the hotel at 6.00pm, arriving at about 7.30pm. He said that on the return journey, as on the way out, Mr Lugovoy sat on the rear near side passenger seat.145
¶6.161 Mr Bonetti's car was subsequently tested for radiation and secondary contamination was discovered. The highest readings were taken on the rear near side passenger seat.146
¶Meeting with Boris Berezovsky 6.162 In his statement in the Terluk case to which I have referred above, Mr Lugovoy stated that whilst he was at Mr Patarkatsishvili's house, he received a call from Mr Berezovsky, who asked him to visit him in his London offices. Mr Lugovoy went on in his statement to describe going to see Mr Berezovsky and a discussion between the two of them about the provision of personal security in Moscow for a journalist named Elena Tregubova. He also referred in the statement to Mr Glushkov, one of Mr Berezovsky's close associates, coming into the room during the meeting and discussing wine.147
¶6.163 There is no doubt that this meeting did take place. Apart from Mr Lugovoy's evidence, I received evidence from a number of witnesses who described the meeting in similar terms. This evidence included a statement given to the police by Mr Berezovsky before his death,148 and also oral evidence from Mr Glushkov, who remembered Mr Lugovoy coming to Mr Berezovsky's offices and the discussion about wine.149
¶6.164 A witness statement given by Ms Tregubova was also read.150 She was a Russian journalist who was actively opposed to the Putin regime. In her statement she explained that she had been afraid for her safety following the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, and that she had asked Mr Berezovsky to assist with her personal security. She said that she was aware at the time that Mr Berezovsky was intending to speak with Mr Lugovoy about her security, and in fact she said that Mr Lugovoy had telephoned her following the meeting.
¶6.165 Whilst it is clear that the meeting took place, there is a conflict in the evidence as to precisely when it took place. As I have said, Mr Lugovoy said that it happened shortly after his visit to Mr Patarkatsishvili on 26 October 2006 (it is not clear from Mr Lugovoy's Terluk statement whether his account is that the meeting took place on 26 October following his return from Surrey, or on the following day). Other witnesses, including Mr Berezovsky, Mr Glushkov and Ms Tregubova, have stated that the meeting took
143¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 place the following week, during Mr Lugovoy's next (and final) trip to London – either on 31 October or 1 November.
¶6.166 It does not seem to me to be necessary to make a factual finding as to the date of this meeting. The difference between the dates that have been given for it is small. Moreover, the discrepancy in the dates does not bear on what, to my mind, are the two important points of substance that can be made about this meeting.
¶6.167 First, this episode demonstrates the high degree of trust that Boris Berezovsky placed in Mr Lugovoy right up until the time that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned. It is apparent from all the evidence that I have heard that Mr Berezovsky was very keen to protect his own safety and that of those around him. It is therefore significant that Mr Lugovoy was permitted entry to Mr Berezovsky's offices – and, indeed, to Mr Berezovsky's personal suite within those offices. Moreover, Mr Lugovoy was asked by Mr Berezovsky to assist in keeping safe one of his friends who feared that she might be at risk from violent pro-Putin elements in Moscow. In short, it seems clear that as late as the end of October 2006, Mr Berezovsky regarded Mr Lugovoy as a trusted associate – someone who was 'one of us' in his dispute with the Putin regime.
¶6.168 In the course of his oral evidence, Mr Felshtinsky told me his understanding of Mr Berezovsky's relationship with Mr Lugovoy. The following passage of Mr Felshtinsky's evidence is taken from an answer he gave explaining why he had not been at all surprised to find that Mr Berezovsky had invited Mr Lugovoy to his 60th birthday party, held in January 2006:151
¶"You see, Lugovoy according to legend… was put in prison for organising an escape for Glushkov, a former director of… Aeroflot and a former associate of
¶Boris Berezovsky. So after being released from prison, Lugovoy became, you know, a very close friend of Berezovsky, because he was a person who, because of Berezovsky, spent many months in prison, and Berezovsky actually felt uncomfortable because of this.
¶The question, of course, is whether Lugovoy was in prison indeed and I doubt that he was."
¶6.169 The second point relates to contamination. Mr Berezovsky provided the police with a plan showing where both he and Mr Lugovoy had sat, on facing sofas, at the meeting. That plan is in evidence before me, and is also reproduced below. It will be seen that Mr Berezovsky initialled the seat where he sat during his meeting with Mr Lugovoy. His evidence was that Mr Lugovoy sat on the sofa facing him. In the course of his oral evidence, Mr Glushkov was shown the plan and endorsed it.152 Subsequently the police made a plan of the room, which is also reproduced below. On the police plan, the sofa on which Mr Berezovsky sat at the meeting is 'sofa 2' and Mr Lugovoy's sofa is 'sofa 1'.
¶6.170 When Mr Berezovsky's offices were monitored for radiation, secondary contamination was found in a number of places. One such place was the photocopier that Mr Litvinenko used when he visited the offices after meeting Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Pine Bar on 1 November 2006. The highest readings, however, were taken from 'sofa 1', the sofa on which Mr Lugovoy had been sitting at his meeting with Mr Berezovsky.153
144¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Mr Berezovsky's plan of his office154
¶The police plan of Mr Berezovsky's office155
145¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Other meetings 6.171 The evidence now available to the Inquiry regarding Mr Lugovoy's actions for the remainder of this trip is limited. The account that Mr Lugovoy gave during his police interview in Moscow did provide further detail in this regard, but for reasons that I have outlined elsewhere (in Appendix 1, paragraphs 127 – 133) the record of that interview is no longer material that I am able to use in evidence.
¶6.172 The records from the Sheraton indicate that Mr Lugovoy had breakfast at the hotel on the morning of 27 October. Mr Lugovoy's credit card billing and related witness evidence show that he then spent the first part of that morning shopping in the West End.156
¶6.173 Moving on, the Visitors' Book at 58 Grosvenor Street, where CPL had its offices, has an entry showing Mr Lugovoy arriving there at 11.30 on the morning of 27 October 2006.157 It is to be noted in this regard that the telephone schedule records a number of calls made between Mr Lugovoy and Dr Shadrin the previous day, on 26 October.158 When he gave evidence before me, Dr Shadrin was unable to assist as to whether or not he had seen Mr Lugovoy at his offices on that day.159
¶6.174 It also appears that Mr Lugovoy met Mr Litvinenko during this trip to London. There is some evidence that the two met at the Sheraton Hotel on the evening of 26 October, after Mr Lugovoy's return from seeing Mr Patarkatsishvili. There is stronger evidence that they met again on the following day,27 Marina Litvinenko 3/44 lines 19-20 Felshtinsky 23/136-137 Reilly 10/27-28 INQ006201 INQ014620; INQ014621 October.
¶6.175 As to 26 October, it appears that Mr Litvinenko may well have met Mr Lugovoy in the bar of the Sheraton Hotel some time after 7.00pm. It would appear probable that Mr Lugovoy met someone there at that time, since the hotel records include a bar bill in his name timed at 7.50pm for three glasses of wine and two teas.160 Mr Litvinenko, as we have seen, did not drink alcohol.
¶6.176 Various other pieces of evidence indicate that Mr Litvinenko had been in touch with Mr Lugovoy during the day and that he was in the vicinity of the Sheraton Hotel from shortly before 7.00pm until 9.40pm that evening. The telephone schedule records several telephone calls made between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Lugovoy that day.161 Mr Litvinenko's Oyster Card records show that he travelled into central London in the early afternoon of 26 October, and that he did not return home until after 10.00pm that evening. Cell site evidence shows Mr Litvinenko in the vicinity of the Sheraton at 6.55pm.162 It therefore seems likely that it was he who drank tea with Mr Lugovoy that evening.
¶6.177 There was another bar bill on Mr Lugovoy's account for the next day,27 Marina Litvinenko 3/44 lines 19-20 Felshtinsky 23/136-137 Reilly 10/27-28 INQ006201 INQ014620; INQ014621 October 2006, timed at 5.21pm.163 On this occasion, a whisky and two teas were purchased. Cell site evidence again shows Mr Litvinenko to have been in the vicinity of the Sheraton at the time.164 Further, in the course of his interview with the police whilst in hospital,
146¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Mr Litvinenko referred to having purchased a new SIM card for Mr Lugovoy and giving it to him at what he described as their "penultimate meeting" – i.e. their last meeting before the Pine Bar.165 There is evidence that Mr Litvinenko purchased two SIM cards at about 5.00pm on 27 October 2006.166 All this evidence tends to indicate that, as with the previous day, it was Mr Litvinenko who drank tea with Mr Lugovoy on 27 October 2006. DI Mascall stated that the teapots used in the bar at the Sheraton – which was named the Palm Court – were of a silver metal design.167
¶Contamination at the Sheraton Hotel 6.178 As I mentioned above, Mr Lugovoy occupied room 848 at the Sheraton for the nights of 25,26 INQ002076 (page 4) Felshtinsky 23/135-137; Goldfarb 5/113-114 Reilly 10/23-26 Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ014604; INQ014605; INQ014607; INQ014608; INQ014609; INQ014610; INQ014611; INQ014612; INQ014613; INQ014620; INQ014621; INQ014623; INQ014624 and 27 October 2006.
¶6.179 DI Mascall gave evidence about the radioactive contamination found in the hotel.168 He said that the readings taken there were the highest found in the entire investigation. A1 gave her expert opinion as to the interpretation of these results.169
¶6.180 Secondary contamination was found throughout room 848. As with the Best Western Hotel, the bathroom was a focus of higher readings. In contrast to the Best Western, however, the readings taken in the bathroom sink and in the disposal pipe from the sink were not especially high. Rather, the highest readings in room 848 were found in the bathroom bin, in particular on one area of the base of the plastic inner casing of the bin. A1 was very confident that these readings were evidence of primary contamination.
¶6.181 The other notable feature of the pattern of contamination at the Sheraton Hotel was the contamination found in the hotel laundry. Two towels found in the laundry also gave such high radiation readings that A1 considered them to be consistent with primary contamination. DI Mascall explained that, although the towels were not found until January 2007, it had not been possible to ascertain whether or not they had in fact been laundered since October 2006.
¶6.182 Given the readings to which I have referred, it seems likely that the two contaminated towels in the laundry emanated from room 848. The findings of primary contamination found there indicate that polonium was handled in that room. In their closing submissions, Mr Horwell QC and Mr Emmerson QC suggested that the pattern of contamination was consistent with an accidental spillage, perhaps followed by an attempt to clean up and/or dispose of the solution.
¶Return to Moscow 6.183 Mr Lugovoy rose early on the morning of Saturday 28 October 2006. Hotel records at the Sheraton indicate that he checked out at 5.30am. He travelled to Heathrow and caught BA flight 872 to Moscow, which took off that morning at 9.10am.
¶6.184 The aircraft making the flight that morning was G-BNWX, the same plane on which he had flown to Heathrow from Moscow three days earlier.170
147¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.185 This aircraft was tested for contamination at Heathrow on 29 November 2006. It was discovered that in the month or so since the aircraft had flown on 25 and 28 October, it had undergone a refit, with about half the seats being removed and replaced, and the balance being moved around within the aircraft. The seats in which Mr Lugovoy had been sitting on those dates were, respectively, 6K and 4A. No contamination was found on the seats in those positions when the aircraft was tested on 29 November 2006, although secondary contamination was detected on seat 16K. Secondary contamination was also found on the overhead locker above seats 6J and 6K.171
¶6.186 The seats that had been removed from the aircraft at the time of the refit (which had taken place on 1 November 2006) had been taken to Blackwood in Wales. They were also tested for contamination.172 There were 118 seats in total, all of which had come from G-BNWX. Three of these seats were found to contain secondary contamination. Whilst they were marked 14A, 14B and 13A, it was unclear whether that was in fact where they had been positioned on the aircraft.
¶6.187 Mr Lugovoy was to return to London within a few days, on Tuesday 31 October 2006. This time he was accompanied by family and friends, on a trip to watch a football match that had been planned several weeks before.
¶6.188 As we shall see, however, one change to the travel arrangements was made at short notice. Mr Kovtun was not initially included in any of the travel bookings made in relation to the 31 October trip. However, on 27 October, a ticket was purchased for him to fly from London to Moscow on 3 November, on the same flight upon which all the other members of the party were already booked to return home.
¶6.189 The booking of this ticket appears to mark the moment at which a decision was taken to add Mr Kovtun to the party travelling to London the following week. If that is right, the decision was taken midway through Mr Lugovoy's stay at the Sheraton Hotel. I will return in due course to consider whether this change of plan could have had any connection with the contaminated bath towels and waste bin in room 848.
148¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 7: Events in Hamburg 28 October –
¶1 November 6.190 Before turning to the group trip to London that commenced on 31 October, I propose briefly to consider the evidence relating to Mr Kovtun's stay in Hamburg that immediately preceded it.
¶6.191 As DI Mascall explained in the course of his oral testimony to the Inquiry,173 the evidence relating to this part of the narrative consists largely of the fruits of an investigation conducted by the German authorities in the aftermath of Mr Litvinenko's death. That investigation was commenced in late 2006 after the Metropolitan Police Service alerted their German colleagues to the details that they had uncovered as to Mr Kovtun's visit to Hamburg. The German police subsequently shared the evidence that they had obtained with the British police.
¶6.192 One piece of the evidence that emerged from the German investigation is potentially of considerable significance. It concerns a conversation that one of the German witnesses, known to us as witness D3, says that he had with Mr Kovtun on the evening of 30 October 2006. As we shall see, the German and British investigating teams reached different conclusions as to the reliability of this evidence. The German police thought that D3 was lying. The British police thought that he might well be telling the truth. As DI Mascall stated, one explanation for this difference of views lay in the fact that the German police only had access to the relatively limited evidence that they themselves had obtained, whereas the British police could place D3's account in the context of all the other information that they had gathered in the course of their investigation.174
¶6.193 For the purposes of this Inquiry, the question of the weight to be placed on D3's evidence is of course a matter for me.
¶Outline of events 6.194 The core events of this episode emerged clearly from the evidence and are, I think, uncontroversial. They may be summarised as follows:
¶a. On the morning of Saturday 28 October – the same morning that Mr Lugovoy
was returning to Moscow from London – Mr Kovtun took an Aeroflot flight from Moscow to Hamburg175
¶b. Mr Kovtun was collected from Hamburg airport by his ex-wife Marina Wall, her
149partner Radoslaw Pietras and her children. He then returned with them to their flat and stayed there that night176
¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 c. The next day, Sunday 29 October, Mr Kovtun made an internet booking for an
early morning flight from Hamburg to London on Wednesday 1 November. He paid for the flight using Mr Pietras' credit card177
¶d. Later the same day (29 October) Mr Kovtun's ex-mother in law, Dr Elenora Wall, collected him and drove him to her house, where he stayed the night178 e. On Monday 30 October, Mr Kovtun and Marina Wall attended an appointment
at the Hamburg Aliens' Registration Office. The purpose of the appointment was to have Mr Kovtun's German residency permit inserted into his new (Russian) passport. Marina Wall had pre-arranged the appointment for Mr Kovtun; Mr Kovtun had asked her to make the appointment in a telephone conversation at the end of August 2006179
¶f. On the same day (30 October), Mr Kovtun telephoned his friend D3 and arranged
to meet him that evening at the Tarantella restaurant. Mr Kovtun and D3 spent the evening together and Mr Kovtun stayed that night at D3's flat180
¶g. On the following day, Tuesday 31 October, Mr Kovtun returned to Marina Wall's flat, where he spent the night181 h. Early on the morning of the following day (Wednesday 1 November), Mr Kovtun flew to London182
¶6.196 Secondary contamination was found in Marina Wall's flat, where Mr Kovtun had spent his first and last night in Hamburg, and also in the BMW car in which she had picked him up from the airport.183
¶6.197 Secondary contamination was also found in Elenora Wall's house.184 No contamination was found at the Aliens' Registration Office, although a slightly raised reading was taken under the passport photograph in Mr Kovtun's passport.185
¶6.198 Secondary contamination was also found on the bed in D3's flat, where Mr Kovtun had spent the night of Monday 30 October.186
150¶The Litvinenko Inquiry to London. The Germanwings aircraft was tested but no radiation was detected.187 The Aeroflot aircraft was never tested. DI Mascall stated that the German authorities had expected the aircraft to arrive from Russia on a certain date to be tested, but a different plane arrived in its place.188
¶The German witnesses 6.200 Before going further, there are two observations that I should make about the procedural position of the German witnesses.
¶6.201 First, it will be seen that a number of the German witnesses are referred to by way of pseudonyms – D3, D6, D7, etc. The reason for this is that I have made orders granting these individuals anonymity for the purposes of these proceedings. The details of these orders and the grounds for making them are discussed in more detail at paragraphs 79-81 of Appendix 1. For the avoidance of doubt, and as with all such orders, the names of these individuals are of course known to me and to my team.
¶6.202 Second, all bar one of the German witnesses did not give oral evidence to the Inquiry. Those who did not were D3, D7, Inna Hohne, Marina Wall and Elenora Wall. I had very much hoped that these witnesses would give oral evidence. They were contacted in advance and arrangements were made for evidence to be given using video link facilities in Hamburg. These facilities were used successfully for D6, who did give evidence. As DI Mascall explained, D7 did not give oral evidence because he was on holiday at the relevant time. As to the others, requests that they give oral evidence were sent to them and it is known that these requests were safely delivered. However, no responses to the requests were received. It is to be inferred that these individuals have declined to give oral evidence.189
¶6.203 In these circumstances, the evidence of these individuals was adduced by reading into the record sections of the transcripts of their interviews with the German investigators.
¶6.204 I should make it clear that, since these individuals are outside the jurisdiction, I have no power to compel them to give oral evidence. As to the weight that I should attach to the transcripts of their interviews, it is true that it has not been possible for their evidence to be tested or challenged. I have also not had the opportunity of observing their demeanour in answering questions. Those are considerations that must be borne in mind in considering their evidence. They apply in particular to D3, whose evidence is the most controversial of the group. Aside from these practical considerations, I do not consider that the accounts given by any of these witnesses are rendered less reliable simply as a result of their refusal (as I interpret it) to give oral evidence. That was a decision that they were entitled to take, and they may each have had good reasons for taking it.
¶D3's account 6.205 It seems to me to be clear from the evidence that the initial purpose of Mr Kovtun's trip to Hamburg was to attend the appointment at the Aliens' Registration Office that Marina Wall had booked for him several weeks before. It is also apparent, and unsurprising, that Mr Kovtun took the opportunity of his brief stay in Hamburg to catch
151¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 up with old friends and former family members. The secondary contamination that was discovered in the places Mr Kovtun visited, whilst important, is no more than consistent with the contamination discovered in London that is linked to Mr Kovtun's movements both before and after his time in Hamburg.
¶6.206 The single piece of evidence about Mr Kovtun's time in Hamburg that stands out from the rest is the account given by D3 of a brief conversation that he had with Mr Kovtun during the evening of Monday 30 October 2006.
¶6.207 D3 was interviewed by German investigators on five occasions – three times in December 2006, once in January 2007 and once (at the request of the British police) in September 2010. Transcripts were made of each interview and extensive sections of each of these transcripts were read into the record during DI Mascall's evidence on Day 30 of the Inquiry hearings.190
¶6.208 The core of the account that D3 gave in the course of the interviews was straightforward.
¶6.209 D3 said that he was an old friend of Mr Kovtun, having known him since 1996 when they both worked as waiters at the Il Porto restaurant in the harbour area of Hamburg. They had kept in touch after both of them had left Il Porto, occasionally meeting up to play chess and have a beer. D3 said that Mr Kovtun had telephoned him on Monday 30 October and asked if they could meet. He wasn't surprised by this – it was normal for Mr Kovtun to call out of the blue and suggest meeting up.
¶6.210 D3 said that they had indeed met up that evening. Initially, Mr Kovtun came to the Tarantella restaurant where D3 was having a meal with a friend, D5. Later, all three left the restaurant, intending to go to a casino. D5 went ahead, leaving D3 and Mr Kovtun walking alone. This was the point at which, on D3's account, the critical conversation took place.
¶6.211 When he was first interviewed by the German police on 9 December 2006, D3 made no mention of this conversation at all. He gave a brief narrative of the evening, in which he passed straight from leaving the restaurant, to a short stay in a games arcade on the Steindamm, to returning home.191
¶6.212 However, when D3 was interviewed for a second time, less than two weeks later on 21 December 2006, he gave a far more detailed account. I have set out the critical section of the interview transcript below:192
¶A: "We all three left the restaurant. We wanted to go to the casino on the
Steindamm. Witness D5 went ahead because he wanted to meet somebody. Afterwards he was going to come to the gambling casino, however. I do not know who he wanted to meet. It happened when Dmitri and I were now alone and he told me this tale.
¶Q: What did he say to you word for word?
¶A: Dmitri asked whether I knew Litvinenko or had heard of him. I answered
152no. Dmitri said word for word, 'Litvinenko was a traitor, there is blood on his hands.' He went on to say that Litvinenko does deals with Chechnya and then he asked me whether I knew a cook who was working in London. I told him
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
witness C2. Witness C2 was a cook at Il Porto and he told me that he wanted to go to England. I cannot say whether witness C2 is his first name or surname. Also, I do not know actually whether witness C2 ever went to England. I gave Dmitri the name without knowing exactly whether he was in fact in England. I cannot remember the exact words. Dmitri said that he had a very expensive poison and needed the cook to administer it to Litvinenko. I cannot remember whether Dmitri said he had the poison. I did not take seriously what Dmitri said. I thought it was just talk.
¶Q: Try once more to remember the exact words?
¶A: Kovtun said, 'I need this cook to put poison in Litvinenko's food or drink.' He
also said the poison is very expensive. As I have said already I did not take him seriously. I said to him he was crazy. The cook is married, I meant witness C2, it would be much easier to shoot Litvinenko, I said jokingly. Kovtun said after that, 'It is meant to set an example.' I answered that he should stop this nonsense. I asked him in addition why he told me of all people. I did not say anything more on this subject after that.
¶Q: Did he say anything else on the way to the casino?
¶A: He said he would soon have his own flat in Moscow. I replied that that would be nice and I could come and visit him there."
¶6.213 D3 added that he did not think that Mr Kovtun had been drunk at the time of this conversation. He said that Mr Kovtun had behaved normally for the rest of the evening. They had spent only a short time at the casino and had then both gone back to sleep at D3's flat. He said that Mr Kovtun had left early the next morning.
¶6.214 D3 was subsequently asked again about this conversation at an interview with the German investigators in January 2007,193 and again at the interview in September 2010.194 On both occasions, D3 gave the same basic account of this conversation. There were some variations in what he said, but none were significant.
¶6.215 D3 was also asked during both of these interviews why he had not given this account at the time of his first interview. He answered at some length.195 In summary, he said that he had been – and remained – afraid to be involved in what he described as "this huge affair". He said that initially he had hoped that the police "could solve this case alone". His fears appear to have included a concern for his physical safety – for example, he said that he was worried that "something may also happen to me" – but he was clear that Mr Kovtun had never threatened him, including in at least one telephone conversation that had taken place since Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶6.216 Mr Kovtun provided a response to D3's evidence in his statement dated 2 June 2015. He said:196
¶"I would add that during that meeting D-3 and his friend [D5] were smoking heroin;
¶I was shocked to see D-3 doing this because he had never done it before. [D5]
¶by contrast, is a heroin addict with a long record for using hard drugs. I was very pained by those circumstances. It is entirely possible that it was in fact the use of
153¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
heroin that would explain the preposterous and untruthful statements made by witness D-3 in relation to me. I should be grateful if you would verify the fact that the witness D-3 uses heroin."
¶6.217 Mr Kovtun did not identify precisely what he meant by D3's "preposterous and untruthful statements", and since he declined to give oral evidence to the Inquiry it was not possible to ask him to be more specific. I assume that he rejects the entirety of the alleged conversation that I have set out above.
¶6.218 Equally, the fact that D3 did not give oral evidence meant that I was unable to explore with him Mr Kovtun's allegations about his drug use, and what I take to be Mr Kovtun's contention that D3's account of his conversation with Mr Kovtun was either imagined or distorted as a result of having taken heroin that evening.
¶6.219 I will make my findings as to what I think really took place between Mr Kovtun and D3 in Hamburg that evening when I set out my conclusions at the end of this Report. Ultimately, this issue boils down to which of the two men has been truthful in the accounts that they have given. That does not mean, of course, that those accounts are all that I have to go on. The truthfulness of this part of Mr Kovtun's evidence is something that I can and must judge alongside the truthfulness of the rest of the evidence that he has given. In this case, that includes his evidence as to how and why he did in fact make contact with C2 after he arrived in London later that week. That is an issue to which I will turn in the next chapter of this Part.
¶Mr Kovtun obtains C2's phone number 6.220 In his 2 June 2015 witness statement, Mr Kovtun gave his account of how he obtained C2's telephone number. He said:197
"During my visit to Hamburg in the period between 28 October and 1 November I met my former employer, the owner of 'Il Porto' restaurant, [D4]. He gave me the telephone number of [D7] (manager of the 'Il Porto' restaurant in Hamburg), and [D7] passed on [C2]'s telephone number in Great Britain."
¶6.221 The other evidence available to me suggests that this account is broadly accurate, but that Mr Kovtun in fact obtained C2's number from D6, and not D7.
¶6.222 D6 gave oral evidence by video link from Hamburg.198 He said that he had formerly worked at Il Porto as a barman and a waiter and that he had known Mr Kovtun during his time there. He stated that Mr Kovtun had called him in 2006, explaining that he had got D6's phone number from their former boss, D4. Mr Kovtun had asked D6 whether he had a telephone number for C2 in England. D6 did not have C2's number. However, he said that he rang another former colleague from Il Porto days, D7, who did have C2's number. D6 explained that D7 had spoken to C2 and asked for his consent to pass his number to Mr Kovtun; C2 had agreed. D6 said that D7 then passed the number to him, and he had then texted C2's number to Mr Kovtun. D6 said that this had all taken place in a single day. He could not remember the date, but he thought that it was a day or two before a Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) cup match. He also said that it was the day when Mr Kovtun was travelling to the UK.
154¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.223 D7's evidence, which consisted of transcripts of interviews with German investigators, was read.199 The transcripts showed that, although he had initially denied it, D7 had ultimately given an account that was consistent with D6's story. D7 said:200
¶"I was at the workplace, under stress, and D6 called me and said Dmitri wanted to go to London and he wanted to have C2's telephone number. I said, I am sorry I cannot give him the telephone number if I do not know why he needs it.
¶Subsequently I [called] C2 briefly and asked him whether I could pass on his telephone number. C2 said I can pass on the telephone number to him and 10 minutes later D6 called me again, and I gave him C2's telephone number."
¶6.224 C2 gave evidence confirming D7's account.201
¶6.225 The telephone schedule shows a call from D7 to C2 at 7.14pm on the evening of Tuesday 31 October 2006.202 It would therefore appear that the exchanges between Mr Kovtun, D6, D7 and C2 took place on that day. This is broadly consistent with D6's memory, since 31 October was Mr Kovtun's last day in Hamburg before he flew to London very early the next morning, and was also two days before a Champions League football match between Arsenal and CSKA Moscow. It was also, of course, the day after Mr Kovtun's evening with D3.
155¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶Chapter 8: Events in London 31 October –
¶3 November 6.226 One fact about Mr Lugovoy that emerges with some clarity from the totality of the evidence is that he was a keen supporter of the CSKA Moscow football team. As I have mentioned above, when Mr Lugovoy met up with Mr Litvinenko for the first time in London in October 2004, he was in London to watch a match between Chelsea and CSKA (see above at paragraph 4.149). Mr Quirke gave evidence that during his meeting with Mr Lugovoy on 17 October 2006, Mr Lugovoy received a text alert about a goal that had been scored in a match that was taking place between CSKA and Arsenal.203
¶6.227 It is not, therefore, surprising that Mr Lugovoy should have come to London to watch CSKA play Arsenal at the Emirates Stadium on Wednesday 1 November 2006.
¶6.228 Nor did Mr Lugovoy come alone. The evidence shows that, on this occasion, he brought a group of people with him from Moscow. The core of the group was Mr Lugovoy's family – himself, his wife Svetlana, his two daughters Galina and Tatiana, who were 19 and 20 respectively, and his eight year old son Igor. Also in the group were Tatiana's boyfriend, Maxim Begak, and a business partner of Mr Lugovoy named Mr Sokolenko.
¶6.229 The group flew from Moscow to London on Tuesday 31 October 2006. Tatiana and Maxim caught an early morning flight from Moscow; the rest of the group caught an afternoon flight. Whilst in London the group (with the exception of Mr Begak) stayed at the Millennium Hotel in Grosvenor Square, Mayfair. They all flew home together on Friday 3 November.
¶6.230 The evidence was that this was a long planned trip. The flight bookings had been made on 12 October 2006.204 The hotel bookings had been made two days earlier, on 10 October 2006.205 DI Mascall referred to evidence that Mr Lugovoy had made arrangements to obtain tickets for the football match from Mr Shuppe, Mr Berezovsky's son in law, in September 2006.206
¶6.231 Putting these details into context, it will be seen that this family trip to watch a football match had been arranged some time before Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun made their first trip to see Mr Litvinenko on 16 October 2006. The question that I will have to consider is whether the later visit to London remained simply a recreational trip or whether, perhaps as a result of intervening events, it subsequently came to serve a different, additional, purpose.
¶Arrival of Andrey Lugovoy and his party 6.232 As I have said, the first of the Lugovoy party to arrive in London on Tuesday 31 October 2006 were Tatiana Lugovoya and her boyfriend Maxim Begak. They flew into Heathrow on BA flight 881, which landed that morning at 7.11am.207 The registration number of the aircraft that made the flight that day was G-EUUG. DI Mascall explained that
156¶The Litvinenko Inquiry that particular plane was never tested because it was not believed to be at risk of contamination.208
¶6.233 The rest of the party (that is, Andrey, Svetlana, Galina and Igor Lugovoy and Mr Sokolenko) flew from Moscow later in the day. They took BA flight 873, which landed at Heathrow at 6.35 in the evening. All five of them sat in seats in row 23 of the aircraft. The registration number of the aircraft was G-BNWB.209
¶6.234 G-BNWB was tested for contamination, and readings indicating secondary contamination were taken in the area of row 23. The highest readings were taken on seat 23D, which was the seat that had been occupied on this flight by Mr Lugovoy.
¶6.235 Later that evening Mr Lugovoy and his party checked into their rooms at the Millennium Hotel. The hotel records indicate that there was some confusion over the allocation of rooms, and this appears to have been caused at least in part by Tatiana Lugovoya arriving and checking in ahead of the main group. DI Mascall gave evidence about the detail of the process,210 but I do not propose to rehearse it here. The final position reached was that Andrey, Svetlana and Igor Lugovoy were allocated room 441, Tatiana and Galina Lugovoya were allocated room 101 and Mr Sokolenko was allocated room 382. Mr Begak had checked into a different hotel earlier in the day.211
¶6.236 The telephone schedule indicates that Mr Lugovoy made a telephone call to Mr Litvinenko lasting six minutes shortly after 9.00 that evening.212 There had been no previous telephone communication between them during the day. It is of some potential significance that the evidence shows Mr Lugovoy initiating contact with Mr Litvinenko, and not the other way around.
¶Arrival of Dmitri Kovtun 6.237 Dmitri Kovtun flew into London on a Germanwings flight early on the morning of Wednesday 1 November 2006.
¶6.238 I have already referred to Marina Wall's evidence that Mr Kovtun booked his onward flight to London on the internet on Sunday 29 October, the day after he had arrived in Hamburg. She also said that Mr Kovtun had used her boyfriend's credit card to pay for the ticket. Enquiries made by the German police confirmed Ms Wall's memory of events. They confirmed that the booking had been made on 29 October in the name of Radoslaw Michal.213
¶6.239 As I have also mentioned above, Mr Kovtun's return flight from London to Moscow had in fact been booked two days previously, on 27 October. Documentary evidence demonstrates that on that day a booking was made for Mr Kovtun to fly to Moscow on flight BA874 on 3 November, the flight on which the rest of Mr Lugovoy's party were already booked. The booking was made with the same travel agent as had previously booked the travel for Mr Lugovoy's party.214
157¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.240 Mr Kovtun's flight was scheduled to land at 7.25 that morning. There was no evidence of its actual arrival time, but it must have landed on time, or perhaps even slightly early, because Mr Kovtun can be seen on CCTV footage arriving at the Millennium Hotel shortly after 8.30am.215 The aircraft on which he had travelled was subsequently tested by the German authorities, but no contamination was found.216
¶6.241 Mr Kovtun did not have his own room at the Millennium Hotel. CCTV footage from within the hotel showed that for the two days and two nights that he was in London on this occasion, he shared room 382 with Mr Sokolenko.217
¶What was Mr Kovtun doing in London? 6.242 Before continuing with the narrative of events on 1 November, it is perhaps worth pausing to consider a question to which I have already alluded more than once. What was the purpose of Mr Kovtun's flight that morning? What was he doing in London?
¶6.243 The first point to address is whether Mr Kovtun's trip had been planned with any particular purpose at all. In his 2 June 2015 witness statement, Mr Kovtun denied this. He said, in summary, that he had only come to London "by chance", and that he only decided to make the trip after he had resolved his business at the Aliens' Registration Office with unexpected speed. The relevant section of the witness statement stated as follows:218
¶"I have declared repeatedly and publicly that I arrived in London by chance on
¶1 November because I was anticipating serious complications in Hamburg while arranging to have a 'residence permit' inserted into my new passport. That had to be done because the old passport expired on 11.04.06. For reasons which had nothing to do with me I did not receive the new passport until 17.08.2006, and I arrived in Germany on 28.10.2006. This meant that I had involuntarily infringed a whole series of provisions of the 'residence permit' law of Germany. Firstly, the periods laid down for crossing the border had been infringed. In connection with that I anticipated complications with having a 'residence permit' inserted into the new passport and was prepared for the fact that I might have to stay in Germany for 2-3 weeks and deal with residence and insurance matters, registration of the company, or employment. It was entirely possible that I would have to engage a lawyer. In any case I had not contemplated a trip to London until there was a happy turn of events for me when the employee of the foreign affairs department simply overlooked the abovementioned facts."
¶I have underlined what appear to me to be the most important parts of this passage.
¶6.244 As I have previously remarked in relation to other sections of Mr Kovtun's statement, the fact that Mr Kovtun decided not to give oral evidence to the Inquiry means that it was not possible to test him on difficulties and apparent inconsistencies in his account. However, even without the benefit of having heard Mr Kovtun's oral explanation, it seems tolerably clear that this section of his statement is false and was intended to mislead me. The suggestion made by Mr Kovtun is that he only decided to travel to London after his appointment at the Aliens' Registration Office on Monday 30 October – indeed, he states that he had not even "contemplated" making the trip
158¶The Litvinenko Inquiry until then. That is plainly inconsistent with the fact that a return ticket from London to
¶Moscow had been purchased for him on 27 October and that Mr Kovtun himself had purchased a ticket from Hamburg to London on Sunday 29 October – the day before his appointment at the Aliens' Registration Office. I simply do not accept that these arrangements would have been made unless a decision had already been taken that
¶Mr Kovtun would travel to London on 1 November.
¶6.245 If that is right, there must have been a reason for the decision that Mr Kovtun made to make a special trip to London. The statement also raises a further question – why is Mr Kovtun now attempting to confuse the issue?
¶6.246 There are some suggestions in Marina Wall's interview transcripts that Mr Kovtun was intending to go to London in order to watch the Arsenal v CSKA Moscow match. For example, she said at one point; "Dmitry wanted to go to London to a football match. He told me that he wanted to meet up with two friends in London and they then wanted to go to the football match."219 Jolly 32/60 It is clear, however, that this was not the reason for Mr Kovtun's trip to London. Apart from the fact that Mr Kovtun makes no mention of any plan for him to attend the match in his recent statement, there is evidence, to which we shall come, that there were not enough tickets for Mr Kovtun to go to the match, and it is clear on the evidence that he did not in fact go to the match.
¶6.247 In the Declaration that he made at the British Embassy in Moscow on 23 November 2006, Mr Kovtun gave a different explanation for his trip to London. At that time, he did not say that he had made the trip simply "by chance", or that he had come to watch the football match. Rather, he said:220
"The second time that I came to London was on 1 November 2006. I came from Hamburg, having agreed my visit with Continental Petroleum Ltd, with the aim of passing several documents to one of the members of the Board, Dr Shadrin. Mr Lugovoy was present at the talks, with Dr Shadrin as my main partner in the oil field development projects."
¶6.248 I will turn to Dr Shadrin's evidence about his contact with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun shortly. In summary, however, he contradicted the idea that there was any pressing business justification for Mr Kovtun's journey to London. He could not recall any important business being discussed when Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun came to his offices on 1 November – most of the time was spent talking about football. And in any event, he made regular visits to Moscow at that time and they could have seen him there if they wished. They did give him some documents, but these were standard 'Know Your Client' compliance documents. There was no need to deliver them by hand and certainly no need for Mr Kovtun to make a special trip to London to do so.
¶6.249 Mr Kovtun's 2 June 2015 witness statement does disclose one further possible motive for his trip to London, namely a desire to contact C2 and ask him if he would like to move to Moscow and become the chef at a new restaurant that Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy were planning to open. This is another matter to which I shall shortly come. Mr Kovtun has not of course said, either in his June 2015 statement or anywhere else, that a desire to speak to C2 was what prompted him to come to London. As we shall see, having arrived in London Mr Kovtun made very limited attempts to meet C2, and appears never to have put his proposal to him at all.
159¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.250 In conclusion, the question that I posed at the outset of this section remains unanswered. There must have been a reason for the decision, which the evidence shows to have been taken at short notice, for Mr Kovtun to fly to London and join Mr Lugovoy's party there. The different (and conflicting) explanations that Mr Kovtun has given over time are unconvincing. What was the reason?
¶Movements of Kovtun and Lugovoy – morning of 1 November 6.251 DI Mascall gave evidence about the movements and activities of Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and the rest of the group from the morning until the late afternoon of 1 November 2006. In outline:
¶a. There is CCTV evidence of the whole group (that is, the five members of the
Lugovoy family, Mr Sokolenko and Mr Kovtun) leaving the hotel together at about 10.08am221
¶b. Witness and documentary evidence demonstrates that at 10.26am Mr Lugovoy's
credit card was used to pay for tickets for a 'Big Bus' sightseeing tour of London, commencing at Marble Arch. Four adult and one child's tickets were purchased. It appears that Mrs Lugovoya with her three children and Mr Sokolenko went on the tour.222 As we shall see, they returned to the hotel later that afternoon
¶c. Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun appear to have walked on from Marble Arch together.
The telephone schedule indicates that at 10.42am Mr Lugovoy made a short telephone call to Mr Berezovsky's offices, which were nearby.223 It is possible that he popped in to Mr Berezovsky's offices at this stage to collect the tickets for the football match. Another possibility is that the meeting between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Berezovsky at which Ms Tregubova's security was discussed took place at about this time
¶d. The Visitors' Book at 58 Grosvenor Street, where CPL had its offices, records
that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun arrived there at some point in the late morning of 1 November 2006 (the entries for Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun are dated 31 October, but the sequence of the timings on the page suggest that these entries were in fact made on 1 November).224 There is other evidence, to which I shall return, that they were there that morning. DI Mascall stated that cell site evidence suggested (although he was careful not to put it higher than that) that the two men arrived at the CPL offices at about noon and stayed there for a number of hours225
¶e. The telephone schedule indicates that two potentially significant calls were made
160from Mr Lugovoy's mobile phone shortly after 11.30am.226 At 11.33am, a call lasting 1 minute and 14 seconds was made to C2. A few minutes later, at 11.41am, a call lasting nearly five minutes was made to Mr Litvinenko. As I have indicated above, DI Mascall stated that the cell site evidence tended to suggest that the calls were made before Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun arrived at the CPL offices
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry f. CCTV footage at the Millennium Hotel shows Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun arriving
back there at about 3.30pm.227 Similar footage shows Mr Litvinenko arriving at the hotel at about 4.00pm.228 There is evidence, to which I shall of course return, about a meeting that then took place in the Pine Bar of the hotel between Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko. CCTV footage shows Mr Sokolenko, Mrs Lugovoya and her children arriving back at the hotel at about 4.30pm,229 which was about the time that the meeting in the Pine Bar was breaking up
¶6.252 There is a degree of overlap between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's visit to the CPL offices and the two phone calls made shortly after 11.30am. I propose to address the two issues together.
¶6.253 It is quite clear that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did attend the CPL offices at some point on the morning of 1 November. I have already referred to the evidence of the Visitors' Book and the cell siting. The Visitors' Book does not record a time of arrival. Mrs Davison's evidence was that the two men arrived between 11.00am and noon,230 which is broadly consistent with DI Mascall's understanding of the cell site evidence.
¶6.254 I heard evidence from three individuals who were present at the CPL offices that day and who recalled meeting Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. They were Dr Shadrin himself,231 his assistant Mrs Davison232 and Mr Gorokov,233 a colleague of his. Mr Gorokov was confused over dates, but it is clear that the events he was describing took place on 1 November, since he remembered that it had been the day of the match between Arsenal and CSKA Moscow.
¶6.255 The strong impression that I gained from the evidence of these three witnesses was that there was little real business, and certainly no urgent or important business, done that day.
¶6.256 Mr Gorokov and Mrs Davison were both, as it happened, football fans who were due to go to the match that evening. They both recalled discussing the prospects for the match with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. Mr Gorokov recalled speaking to Mr Lugovoy for 15 or 20 minutes about football, including looking at his ticket and telling him that he had a good seat. He was asked directly whether they had discussed any business at all – he said, "No, this time it was not business; it was only saying this sporting matters."234 Gorokov 13/151-152
¶6.257 Dr Shadrin recalled that there had been a meeting on that day and that he had had some general discussions with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun about possible new projects, but his main memory appears to have been of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun discussing the football with Mrs Davison and Mr Gorokov. He said:
161"… frankly I don't remember that we actually discussed anything. Basically I was trying to explain Lugovoy the steps that he needs to undertake to develop the
¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 projects and the procedure that he has to adhere, but I don't know whether he actually listened to me very carefully."235 Shadrin 14/192
¶When asked whether he remembered Mr Kovtun being present, Dr Shadrin said:
¶"I don't remember, actually. Probably he was. But effectively they were talking more about football, and openly I just quitted the meeting, because I think that was probably early – it was midday/early afternoon, because obviously everyone was going to… attend the match."236 Shadrin 14/192
¶When asked whether he recalled the meeting being disturbed by Mr Lugovoy receiving a call from anyone else, Dr Shadrin replied:
¶"No. Actually, … I was trying to be focused on the matters that I would like… them to understand, and basically explain them the procedures that they need to comply with, but the major part of the conversation was just going into jokes and discussion about football."237 Shadrin 14/193
¶6.258 Dr Shadrin did recall that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun delivered some 'Know Your Client' documents, but his memory is that they did so the next day, when he was engaged in another meeting.238
¶6.259 I have addressed the evidence relating to the meeting with Dr Shadrin in some detail because it is relevant to the question of why Mr Kovtun travelled to London. As I have set out, one of the explanations that Mr Kovtun has given over time is that he needed to come to London to do business with Dr Shadrin.
¶6.260 I regard that assertion as being untenable in the light of the evidence of Dr Shadrin and his colleagues. There is nothing to suggest that anything was discussed or undertaken at the CPL offices that day that required Mr Kovtun's presence at all, far less his urgent travel from Hamburg. It is also important to recall in this context that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did not need to travel to London at all to meet Dr Shadrin. As he made clear in his oral evidence, and repeated in his statement dated 24 June 2015, "during 2006 I was a regular visitor to Russia and could quite easily have met them there".239
¶6.261 I turn now to the telephone call made on Mr Lugovoy's phone to C2 at 11.33 on the morning of 1 November.
¶6.262 It is common ground that this call was in fact made by Mr Kovtun – in his recent statement he said that he did so because his own phone was out of credit.240 It is also common ground that Mr Kovtun and C2 had a discussion about meeting up. Mr Kovtun said in his recent statement that this conversation in fact took place shortly after his first call when C2 rang him back. That assertion is not supported by the telephone schedule, but I do not regard this as a point of any great importance.
¶6.263 Beyond these facts, there are some important discrepancies in the evidence that I have received.
162¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.264 C2 himself gave oral evidence to the Inquiry.241 He said that he had worked for some years at Il Porto in the 1990s, initially as a kitchen porter and latterly as a chef de partie (in a statement prepared after he had given evidence, C2 clarified that in his last two years at Il Porto he worked as head chef when the other chef was absent).242 In 2000 he had left Germany, returning to his home country of Albania. He had subsequently travelled to the UK and settled in London. He said that he had known Mr Kovtun at Il Porto, but that they had not been friends. They had not shared a language, and had therefore been unable to talk to each other.
¶6.265 C2 recalled receiving a call from Mr Kovtun on 1 November 2006. He said that at that time he had not spoken to Mr Kovtun or had any other contact with him for six years. C2 said that when Mr Kovtun called he was in Stratford in east London. He was in a coffee shop helping with some menus. He said that the call had been brief. After Mr Kovtun had introduced himself, he had said (in English) that he was in London and had suggested meeting up. C2 had said that he was busy, but that he would call Mr Kovtun back and meet him when he had time. C2 said that that was the end of the call. He said that it took one minute.
¶6.266 C2 said that he had called Mr Kovtun back. He struggled to remember how long after Mr Kovtun's call this had been. He initially thought that it may have been two or three weeks later, but he accepted that it might have been (as the telephone schedule suggests) as soon as the next day. He said that when he did call he suggested to Mr Kovtun that they meet up. Mr Kovtun had said that he was busy but that he would see him later. C2 expected him to call back, but he never did.
¶6.267 Mr Kovtun's explanation for and account of this episode were strikingly different.
¶6.268 In his recent statement, Mr Kovtun stated that the reason he had obtained C2's phone number and then contacted him in London was that he wanted to ask him to come to Moscow and work as the chef in a restaurant that he and Mr Lugovoy were planning to open. He described C2 as his "friend", and said that he was a specialist in Mediterranean cuisine.243 As to his communications with C2 in London, he said as follows:244
¶"at 16.00-17.00 on 1 November 2006 I had a meeting planned with [C2] … who is my friend and former colleague in the restaurant business in Hamburg to whom
¶Lugovoy and I wished to offer a job in a restaurant in Moscow. However, in the presence of my acquaintance Aleksandr Shadrin, in a telephone conversation [C2]
¶suggested that I come to him for a meeting in a district of London far from the centre, the name of which I cannot remember. In answer to the question I put to
¶Shadrin as to how to get to the district named by [C2] and how long it would take to get there, he replied that at that time of day in London in would take 3-4 hours to get there because of traffic congestion. Since I did not want to spend such a long time reaching the meeting place after having flown in from Hamburg, I agreed with [C2] that we would postpone our meeting until the following day, at a more convenient time for both of us. [C2] agreed to ring on 2 November 2006 and discuss the possibility of meeting and the place at which to meet."
¶241 C2 24/14-39 242 C2 32/43-44
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¶6.269 Mr Kovtun went on to say that he had not called C2 on 2 November because he did not know when he would be free. He therefore decided that he would postpone meeting C2 until his next visit to London. He added that he and Mr Lugovoy had subsequently opened a restaurant in Moscow.
¶6.270 Mr Kovtun's account raises many questions. As with other similar instances, the fact that Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence has deprived the Inquiry of the opportunity to explore such questions with him. On this occasion, however, Mr Kovtun's account is so lacking in credibility, and has been so compromised by the evidence of other witnesses, that I have concluded that it must be rejected without having heard Mr Kovtun's response. I have taken this view for two broad reasons.
¶6.271 First, the reasons that Mr Kovtun has given for seeking to contact C2 have an intrinsic lack of credibility. It defies common sense to think that anyone planning to set up a restaurant in Moscow would seek to recruit as its chef an Albanian living in the UK, in particular one who did not speak Russian. And if, contrary to this, Mr Kovtun really did think that C2 was the only man for the job, why did he give up so easily, so that he never in fact put the proposal to him? Even if it was not possible to meet up in person in London, Mr Kovtun could have spoken to C2 by phone.
¶6.272 Second, key elements of Mr Kovtun's account have been refuted by C2 and by Dr Shadrin, whose evidence on these matters I accept. C2 was not Mr Kovtun's "friend". C2 said that they had never been friendly whilst they were working together – for the understandable reason that they did not speak a common language – and that by November 2006 they had not been in any form of contact for six years.245 C2 also denied that there had ever been any planned meeting between him and Mr Kovtun at 4.00-5.00pm on 1 November 2006.246 He further denied that when Mr Kovtun called him on 1 November he had suggested that Mr Kovtun come to meet him at a location that was three or four hours travel away from central London. He said that he did not suggest meeting Mr Kovtun at all, he simply told him that he was busy. And even if he had asked Mr Kovtun to come and meet him where he was that day – in Stratford – C2 said, and he was plainly correct in this, that Stratford is only a 45 minute journey from central London.247 Dr Shadrin also rejected his claimed involvement in this part of Mr Kovtun's conversation with C2. He said:248
¶"I have been asked if I can recall a telephone conversation that Mr Kovtun had whilst he was in company with Mr Lugovoy at the CPL offices on 1st November
- In particular I have been asked whether Mr Kovtun sought my advice about directions to a district of London and the time it might take him to travel to that location for another meeting including my mentioning that it would take him 3-4 hours to get there because of traffic congestion at that time of the day. I have no specific recollections with regard to this issue. I couldn't conceive that it would take that long to drive anywhere in London however I do know from personal experience that that could be the case in Moscow."
¶6.273 I therefore conclude that the elaborate explanation that Mr Kovtun has given for the call that he made to C2 at 11.33am on 1 November amounts to a tissue of lies. As I indicated above, this conclusion will be of importance when I come to determine whether D3's account of his conversation with Mr Kovtun in Hamburg should be 245 C2 24/24; 24/ 27; C2 32/45 246 C2 32/42 247 C2 32/43
164¶The Litvinenko Inquiry believed. Something else that will be of relevance to this issue is the action that Mr Lugovoy took only a few minutes after Mr Kovtun had spoken to C2 and discovered that he was too busy to meet that day: he telephoned Mr Litvinenko. I will return to that telephone call shortly.
¶Movements of Mr Litvinenko 6.274 DI Mascall gave evidence about Mr Litvinenko's movements on 1 November 2006.249 By drawing on what Mr Litvinenko had said to the police in interview and the statements given by those he had met, as well as CCTV and telephone evidence, it was possible to identify very precisely what he did and where he went that day prior to the meeting at the Pine Bar:
¶a. Mr Litvinenko spent the morning of 1 November at home. During the morning
he made arrangements by telephone for meetings later in the day. I will return to those calls in due course
¶b. Mr Litvinenko left home at about 12.30pm. He travelled into central London by
bus and tube, arriving at Oxford Circus shortly after 1.30pm. The bus on which he travelled was subsequently identified and tested for radiation. No radiation was detected250
¶c. From Oxford Circus, Mr Litvinenko walked to Mr Attew's office, where he had
a meeting with Mr Attew at about 2.00pm which lasted about half an hour. Mr Litvinenko did not eat or drink anything during the meeting251
¶d. On leaving Mr Attew's office, Mr Litvinenko walked towards Piccadilly, where he
was due to meet Mr Scaramella at 3.00pm. He stopped en route at the Russian Market near St James' Piccadilly and spoke for about 15 minutes with his friend Mr Tabunov252
¶e. Mr Litvinenko met Mr Scaramella at Piccadilly Circus at 3.00pm. They walked
together to the itsu restaurant on Piccadilly, where they stayed for about half an hour253
¶f. Mr Litvinenko left itsu at 3.40pm and walked north towards the Millennium Hotel.
¶He arrived at the Millennium Hotel just before 4.00pm254
¶Arrangements for meeting 6.275 There was an issue on the evidence as to how, and in particular on whose initiative, the meeting at the Pine Bar was arranged.
¶6.276 It has been a theme of the accounts given by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun over time that it was Mr Litvinenko who wanted to meet them on that day. Thus, for example, in the Declaration that he made at the British Embassy in Moscow on 23 November
165¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶2006, Mr Lugovoy stated, "On 1 November 2006, Mr Litvinenko called me and offered to meet".255 When he subsequently gave an account of that day to Bruce Burgess at the time of the polygraph test, Mr Lugovoy made the same point in slightly more colourful terms:
"On the day of the football match I received a call from Litvinenko who insistently asked me to meet him. I said I did not have time, let's meet say tomorrow. He said No, no, we must meet today."256 INQ017779 (page 6)
¶6.277 Mr Kovtun gave a very similar account in his statement of 2 June 2015:257
"I remember that on that day, with the sense of urgency typical of him, Litvinenko proactively telephoned Lugovoy 5-8 times on a mobile telephone saying that he was not far away from the hotel and asking if he could come to see us. Lugovoy's reply to him was that there would be hardly any time to talk because he was taking his family to a football match. In other words, it was up to Litvinenko whether he came or not. During the telephone conversations Lugovoy and I were in Shadrin's office."
¶6.278 Mr Litvinenko gave a very different account when he was interviewed by Detective Inspector (DI) Hyatt in his hospital bed.
¶6.279 Mr Litvinenko said that the two men had planned to meet on 2 November, but that on 1 November Mr Lugovoy, "called me in the morning and said he had already arrived and he would like to meet for a short time on the 1st". He said that they had then arranged to meet at about 5.00 that afternoon at the Millennium Hotel, but that later in the day they had spoken again and the meeting had been brought forward – on that occasion Mr Lugovoy had said, "come quicker, I am waiting for you".258
¶6.280 The telephone schedule has in fact made it possible to resolve the differences between these rival accounts.259 Put shortly, the schedule shows that the differences between the accounts fall to be resolved in favour of Mr Litvinenko's version of events. The following points emerge:
¶a. The very first call between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko following Mr Lugovoy's
arrival in London was made by Mr Lugovoy shortly after 9.00 on the evening of 31 October. The call lasted some six minutes
¶b. The next communication between the two was another call made by Mr Lugovoy
to Mr Litvinenko, this time at 11.41am the next morning. This was the call made a few minutes after Mr Kovtun's call to C2. It is consistent with Mr Litvinenko's recollection of Mr Lugovoy calling him on the morning of 1 November
¶c. The fact that the first two calls between the two men during this trip were made
166from Mr Lugovoy to Mr Litvinenko is strongly inconsistent with the accounts given by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry d. The next two relevant entries on the schedule show calls made by Mr Litvinenko
to Mr Lugovoy, one at 2.32pm and one at 2.55pm. These calls may well have been made whilst Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were at CPL that day, and to that extent they corroborate Mr Kovtun's account. That said, there were only two calls and they were both very short – the first lasted 8 seconds and the second 40 seconds. Moreover, there is good evidence that by that stage the meeting later in the day had already been arranged, at Mr Lugovoy's behest
¶e. A further call, lasting 39 seconds, was made by Mr Lugovoy to Mr Litvinenko
at 3.38pm. That time was a few minutes after Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had returned to the Millennium Hotel and a minute or so before Mr Litvinenko left itsu to walk up to the hotel. This would appear to corroborate Mr Litvinenko's memory that Mr Lugovoy rang him during the afternoon to bring the time of the meeting forward – the occasion when he told Mr Litvinenko, "come quicker, I am waiting for you". (See paragraph 6.279 above)
¶6.281 In summary, it is Mr Litvinenko's account that is consistent with the objective evidence of the telephone schedule. The meeting at the Pine Bar on the afternoon of 1 November was instigated by Mr Lugovoy, not Mr Litvinenko.
¶6.282 Two questions arise that are worthy of further consideration. First, why have Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun gone to such lengths to attempt to conceal what might be thought to be a very mundane piece of information, namely that the meeting was prompted by Mr Lugovoy and not Mr Litvinenko? And second, is there any significance in the fact that Mr Lugovoy made the call to Mr Litvinenko suggesting that they meet up that afternoon only a few minutes after Mr Kovtun had spoken to C2 and discovered that he was unavailable?
¶Scaramella/Limarev 6.283 I have already mentioned that, immediately before he went to the Millennium Hotel on the afternoon of 1 November, Mr Litvinenko met up with Mario Scaramella. They met by arrangement at Piccadilly Circus and then sat in itsu on Piccadilly for half an hour before Mr Litvinenko received the "come quicker" call from Mr Lugovoy. I heard oral evidence about the meeting and the events that had led to it from Mr Scaramella.260
¶6.284 Mr Scaramella's evidence was that he arranged to see Mr Litvinenko on 1 November because he wanted to pass on to him information that he had received about a possible threat to Mr Litvinenko's safety from individuals linked to the Russian security services. He had been provided with this information by Evgheniy Limarev, from whom I also heard evidence. I will consider the detail of the information that Mr Scaramella received from Mr Limarev and its possible veracity in Part 9 of this Report; but in a nutshell Mr Scaramella said that he had had a series of communications with Mr Limarev during October about what he understood to be an increasing threat to a group of individuals on a Russian 'hitlist'. The 'targets' included Anna Politkovskaya, Mr Scaramella himself, Mr Guzzanti, Mr Berezovsky, Mr Zakayev and Mr Litvinenko. Mr Scaramella said that Mr Limarev had spoken to him of the possibility that radioactive poisons might be used against these targets.261
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¶6.285 Mr Scaramella had contacted Mr Litvinenko by email in the previous week, on 25 October, saying that he would be in London the following week and that he hoped it would be possible to meet.262 The purpose of the planned trip was to attend the annual conference of the International Maritime Organization. As I understood his evidence, Mr Scaramella was in two minds whether to attend the conference, and his final decision to come to London owed as much to his wish to meet Mr Litvinenko as it did to his desire to attend the conference.263
¶6.286 The evidence was that Mr Scaramella flew to London on 31 October, arriving late in the evening. He stayed that night at the Thistle Hotel in Victoria.264 He telephoned Mr Litvinenko the next morning at 10.00265 and they arranged to meet at 3.00pm "as usual" – the code that the two men used for a meeting at Piccadilly Circus.266
¶6.287 Mr Scaramella had brought with him from Italy several documents to give to Mr Litvinenko – an excerpt from a book, an article that Mr Guzzanti had written and a recent email from Mr Limarev about the threat from the Russian security services. On his way to meet Mr Litvinenko on 1 November, Mr Scaramella visited an internet café in Chinatown and looked at his emails. Another 'security' email from Mr Limarev had arrived. He printed it off and added it to the documents for Mr Litvinenko.267
¶6.288 Mr Scaramella said that he met Mr Litvinenko at Piccadilly Circus according to plan. He said that he had already eaten, but that as Mr Litvinenko had not had lunch they walked together to itsu on Piccadilly.268 CCTV evidence showed them arriving at itsu at 3.10pm.269
¶6.289 When he was first interviewed Mr Scaramella had provided the police with a plan showing where he and Mr Litvinenko sat at itsu that day, and he confirmed the accuracy of the plan to me when he gave evidence. He said that they had sat facing each other across a table. The plan is reproduced below.
168¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Mr Scaramella's plan of where he and Mr Litvinenko sat at itsu270
¶Plan showing contamination found at itsu271
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¶6.290 Mr Scaramella said that he had shown Mr Litvinenko the emails from Mr Limarev, but that Mr Litvinenko had not taken the warnings in the emails seriously. According to Mr Scaramella, Mr Litvinenko's reaction had been; "it doesn't matter, if it's from Evgeni, it means not credible… it's shit if it's from Evgeni".272
¶6.291 Mr Scaramella said that he and Mr Litvinenko had parted when they left itsu. Mr Scaramella walked back to his conference. Mr Litvinenko, as we have seen, walked to the Millennium Hotel.
¶6.292 Following Mr Litvinenko's death, Mr Scaramella's room at the Thistle Hotel, the internet café that he had used and the table at itsu where he had sat with Mr Litvinenko were all tested and found to be free from contamination.273 I have referred at paragraph 6.101 to the contamination that was found in itsu on the table adjacent to that at which Mr Litvinenko and Mr Scaramella sat on 1 November – it seems likely that that table was contaminated on 16 October when Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko sat there after the Erinys meeting. The papers that Mr Scaramella had passed to Mr Litvinenko were also tested. They were found to bear low levels of secondary contamination, but nothing like the levels that would have been expected had the pages been in contact with a primary source of polonium.274
¶The Pine Bar 6.293 Mr Lugovoy and his party were, as I have already said, staying at the Millennium Hotel on Grosvenor Square. Next to the reception area on the ground floor of the Millennium Hotel is a bar called the Pine Bar. It was in the Pine Bar that Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Litvinenko met during the afternoon of 1 November 2006. The forensic and other evidence strongly indicates that it was during this meeting that Mr Litvinenko drank green tea poisoned with polonium.
¶6.294 The CCTV footage taken by various cameras sited in the reception area of the Millennium Hotel established the timings relating to the meeting in the Pine Bar that afternoon.
¶6.295 The footage showed Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun returning to the hotel at about 3.30pm.275 In the period of about half an hour before Mr Litvinenko arrived (during which Mr Lugovoy made his "come quicker" phone call), there is footage of both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun going separately into the men's lavatories just off the reception area.276 There is then footage of Mr Litvinenko arriving in the reception area and speaking on his mobile phone, which is consistent with entries on the telephone schedule showing him making two short calls to Mr Lugovoy at 3.59pm, presumably saying that he had arrived.277
¶6.296 At the end of the meeting, CCTV footage shows the arrival back in the hotel of Mr Lugovoy's family, and Mr Lugovoy himself walking in the reception area, at shortly after 4.30pm.278 There was no CCTV footage of Mr Litvinenko leaving the hotel, but footage from a camera in a nearby street showed him walking away from the hotel at
170¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶4.39pm.279 The CCTV camera covering the approach to the lavatories off the reception area was permanently recording and the footage does not show Mr Litvinenko entering this area at any time.280
¶6.297 Mr Litvinenko was therefore in the Millennium Hotel for a little over half an hour on 1 November 2006. That was when the meeting in the Pine Bar took place.
¶6.298 There is no CCTV footage of the meeting because there were no CCTV cameras in the Pine Bar in 2006. There is, though, other evidence. Mr Litvinenko told the police what happened during his interviews in hospital and both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have, as we shall see, given their own accounts. I also heard evidence from Mr Andrade, the head barman who served them that afternoon.281
¶6.299 Mr Andrade had a good memory of serving the three men that afternoon. He was assisted by the bar bill, which the police had obtained as part of their initial investigation.282 He was sure that he had served the men – he explained that the bill bore the name of a different member of staff because he had been using someone else's log on card that day.
¶6.300 Mr Andrade recalled that Mr Lugovoy had initially approached him and asked for a cigar, and that he and two others had subsequently sat at a table in the Pine Bar, where Mr Andrade had served them. The bill recorded that there were three guests in the group and that they had sat at table 1; Mr Andrade was confident that these details were correct. A number of drinks were listed on the bill, both alcoholic and non-alcoholic. Mr Andrade said that the men had made a number of different orders during the time that they were in the bar. He said that he would not necessarily have entered the details into the computer at the time the orders were made. In fact, the bill was timed at 4.33pm, so it would appear that the details were only entered at about the time the group were leaving the bar. He said that the bill would have been signed by Mr Lugovoy.
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¶Plan of the Pine Bar283
¶6.301 One of the items on the bill was "3 Tea". Mr Andrade recalled that this was in fact an order for green tea with lemon and honey. He said that the tea had been made in one large pot by his colleague behind the bar, and that he brought the pot and the cups to the table. It was not his practice, he said, to pour tea for customers. He said that the teapots in use in the Pine Bar at the time were made of white porcelain.
¶6.302 It was apparent from Mr Andrade's evidence that at the time in question he was busy serving a number of customers. Understandably, he paid only limited attention to the group at Mr Lugovoy's table. He said that the men were "very well behaved and well dressed". He did not overhear anything that the men said, and did not remember anything unusual about the way they acted. In particular, he did not notice anything
172¶The Litvinenko Inquiry unusual about the tea or the way that it had been drunk. He said, "it was as normal as any other table or any other time". He disassociated himself entirely from various sensational accounts that had been attributed to him in the press.
¶6.303 One oddity in the evidence is an entry in the telephone schedule indicating that Mr Lugovoy made a telephone call to Mr Voronoff at 4.00pm – i.e. just the time that Mr Litvinenko was arriving at the Pine Bar – that lasted for nearly six minutes.284 Neither Mr Litvinenko nor Mr Lugovoy referred to this call in their accounts of the meeting. It is unexplained.
¶6.304 Mr Litvinenko described the meeting in the Pine Bar on a number of occasions during the course of his interviews with DI Hyatt. The relevant sections of the transcripts of the interviews were read in the course of DI Mascall's evidence. In summary, Mr Litvinenko described arriving at the Millennium Hotel and Mr Lugovoy taking him to a table in the corner of the Pine Bar. His description of the position of the table is consistent with the position of table 1, where Mr Andrade said they had been sitting. Mr Litvinenko said that he had been sitting talking to Mr Lugovoy alone for some time before Mr Kovtun joined them. In an important passage of the interview transcript, which I have set out below, Mr Litvinenko described drinking some green tea that was already on the table. On Mr Litvinenko's account, this was before Mr Kovtun joined them. Mr Litvinenko's description of this part of the meeting was as follows:285
¶"There was nobody else there. He [Lugovoy] said that he was leaving for football match now so let's discuss things for 10-15 minutes and that's it. So. Next day we were due to go to Global Risk. Well… we discussed how we're going to go there and he said that he was looking for his interpreter… And what time we would go there, either at ten, or ten thirty. So… There were a few mugs on the table and there was also a tea pot, such a metal one, there was tea there. It was silver in colour, made of silver, not silver, the legs… expensive metal. It's a rich hotel.
¶Straight away a waiter came up to us… I could not see him because he came up from the back. He asked 'Are you going to have anything?' I think Andrei asked,
¶'Would you like anything?' I said, 'I don't want anything', (INAUDIBLE) and he said,
¶'Okay well we're going to leave now anyway so there is still some tea left here if you want you can have some.' And then the waiter went away or I think Andre asked for a clean cup, and he bought it [sic]. He left and when there was a cup I poured some tea out of the tea pot, although there was only little left on the bottom and it made just half a cup. Maybe about 50 grams. I swallowed a several times but it was green tea with no sugar and it was already cold by the way. I didn't like it for some reason, well almost cold tea with no sugar and I didn't drink it anymore.
¶Maybe in total I swallowed three or four times, I haven't even finished that cup."
¶6.305 Mr Litvinenko went on to describe Mr Kovtun (who he called 'Volodia') coming to sit at the table and the conversation about the next day's planned meeting with Mr Quirke. He said that they were talking for about 20 minutes. He mentioned a 'tall Russian' coming to the table, which is probably a reference to Mr Sokolenko arriving back in the hotel with Mrs Lugovoya and the children. In describing the end of the meeting, Mr Litvinenko said:286
¶"In the end [Lugovoy] looked at his watch, he said my wife is about to come. There in the hall Andrei's wife turned up, she was waving her hand and he said, that's
173¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 it, let's go. So, Volodia and I stayed, the two of us, and he stood up, approached his wife, Andrei, and then he brought his son,8 Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61 years old. He is such a boy, eight years old, wearing a jacket, he said, 'This is Uncle Sasha, shake his hand.' We shook hands, and he went (INAUDIBLE). So, then we came out."
¶6.306 Mr Litvinenko's account gives rise to a number of observations.
¶6.307 Mr Litvinenko was plainly mistaken about the colour of the teapot. It is clear from Mr Andrade's evidence that the tea was served in a white porcelain pot. There is nothing sinister about this. Given that Mr Litvinenko was undergoing lengthy interviews whilst seriously ill in hospital, it would have been surprising if he had not made a few mistakes. There is evidence that the teapots in the Palm Court at the Sheraton Hotel, where Mr Litvinenko had had tea with Mr Lugovoy the previous week, were silver.287 It seems likely that on this point of detail Mr Litvinenko confused his memory of the two occasions.
¶6.308 Of more significance, there are two points about the way that Mr Litvinenko described Mr Lugovoy acting that would appear to be inconsistent with the theory that Mr Lugovoy poisoned Mr Litvinenko with polonium at this meeting. Mr Tam QC referred to both these points in the course of his opening address.288
¶6.309 First, in Mr Litvinenko's narrative Mr Lugovoy was diffident in the extreme about whether or not Mr Litvinenko should drink the tea. One might have expected a poisoner to encourage his intended victim to take the concealed poison, but on Mr Litvinenko's account Mr Lugovoy was almost discouraging him from drinking the tea. There is no doubt that this is the account that Mr Litvinenko intended to give – after he had given the account that I have set out above, Detective Sergeant (DS) Hoar asked Mr Litvinenko "… how insistent was Andre that you have a drink, or was he indifferent, was he saying, 'Go on, go on have some', or didn't he care?". Mr Litvinenko's answer to this was:
¶"He said it like that, you know, 'If you would like something, order something for yourself, but we're going to be leaving soon. If, if you want some tea then there is some left here, you can have some of this."289 INQ016582 (pages 8-9)
¶6.310 Second, it is striking that, on Mr Litvinenko's account, Mr Lugovoy encouraged Mr Litvinenko to shake hands with his eight year old son at the end of the meeting. Is it conceivable, one asks rhetorically, that Mr Lugovoy would have done that had he known that Mr Litvinenko, as the forensic evidence indicates, had just drunk tea poisoned with highly radioactive polonium?
¶6.311 I will return to consider both these points in due course.
¶6.312 As I have mentioned, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have both given their own accounts of events in the Pine Bar on various occasions since November 2006.
¶6.313 In fact, one of Mr Lugovoy's earliest public comments about this meeting took the form of declining to say anything about it. When he gave his Declaration to the British Embassy in Moscow on 23 November 2006, Mr Lugovoy said of the Pine Bar meeting:290
174¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶"We met in the afternoon in the Millennium Mayfair Hotel. I do not feel it necessary to write about this meeting in detail, as the room where it took place was equipped with high quality video equipment, which doubtless recorded the meeting."
¶6.314 As DI Mascall observed, this was an odd thing for Mr Lugovoy to say.291 There were no security cameras in the Pine Bar. And Mr Lugovoy, who was a security expert having spent his career first in the Federal Protection Service and then running his own security company, could reasonably be expected to have known that.
¶6.315 DI Mascall referred in the course of his evidence to a number of substantive accounts that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have given over the years.292 Their accounts are broadly consistent with that of Mr Litvinenko. For example, neither of them has ever suggested that there was anyone else present at the meeting. On the twin questions of whether they offered Mr Litvinenko a drink and whether he in fact drank anything during the meeting, Mr Lugovoy's position has generally been that he is sure that they did not offer Mr Litvinenko a drink, but unsure whether he drank anything. Mr Kovtun's position has been less consistent. For example, in his interview with Der Spiegel in early December 2006 – that is, only a few weeks after the incident – Mr Kovtun is recorded as having stated:293
¶"I can't remember that clearly today. He came into the bar 10 minutes after us, we'd already had some alcohol, and I paid more attention to my cigar."
¶That account is in marked contrast to the account contained in the statement that he provided to the Inquiry dated 2 June 2015. In the 8½ years since speaking to Der Spiegel, he appears to have developed a much fuller memory of events. The relevant section of the new statement reads as follows:294
¶"Litvinenko came to the bar of the 'Millennium' hotel and 'flopped down' next to me on a seat at our table. Litvinenko was in a highly excited state; he was coughing.
¶'Having flopped down' at our table, Litvinenko grabbed the teapot on the table and, without waiting for an invitation, poured himself some tea. He gulped down two cups of hot tea one after the other. Litvinenko then had a coughing fit, wiped his mouth with a napkin and started to talk. In the course of the conversation he coughed and constantly wiped his mouth with a napkin."
¶6.316 The fact that Mr Kovtun has given such a dramatically different account so many years after the event raises further serious questions about his credibility.
¶Contamination in the Millennium Hotel 6.317 DI Mascall gave evidence about the results of tests for contamination that were conducted at the Millennium Hotel.295 Traces of alpha radiation were found in a large number of places throughout the hotel. As at other scenes, many of the positive readings were almost certainly the result of cross contamination – that is, radiation spreading from original points of contamination as a result of the use of cleaning equipment and items being moved from one place to another.
175¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.318 Several of the results, however, are worthy of particular attention.
¶6.319 Secondary contamination was found in room 441, the room shared by Mr Lugovoy and his wife and young son. Very much higher readings were, however, found in room 382, which was shared by Mr Kovtun and Mr Sokolenko. The highest readings were found in the bathroom and the highest of those readings was found in a sediment trap below the plughole in that bathroom. The expert evidence of A1 was that these readings were only consistent with primary contamination.296 It therefore appeared that polonium in one form or another had been poured down the plughole. The comparison with the contamination found in room 107 at the Best Western Hotel is striking.
¶6.320 Very high readings, which in A1's view were also consistent with primary contamination, were additionally found in two places in the Pine Bar.
¶6.321 In the bar itself, primary contamination was found on the table which Mr Andrade had described as table 1 (in fact, two tables pushed together) and also on one of the chairs at the next table. It is to be noted that there was a gap of several weeks after 1 November before the Pine Bar was sealed as a crime scene, and Mr Andrade's evidence was that the chairs in the bar, and also on occasions the tables, were sometimes moved around.297
¶296 A1 20/65-68
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¶Plan showing contamination found in the Pine Bar298
177¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006
¶6.322 The other place where primary contamination was found was on one of the Pine Bar's white teapots. The teapot had been given the exhibit number NJH/1. A1 gave evidence that every teapot in the hotel had been tested, and that NJH/1 had been the only one that bore evidence of contamination. The readings were extremely high. The highest readings were taken on the inside of the spout, where the polonium appeared to have bonded with tannin deposits. A1 stated that the levels and position of the contamination found on the inside of the teapot indicated that, "at some stage polonium… has been poured out of the spout". She was sure of this. She said, "I think that's the only conclusion you can come to." 299
¶The teapot300
¶299 A1 20/70-75
178¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶6.323 A1 also drew attention to the readings taken in the gentlemen's lavatories situated next to the reception area at the Millennium Hotel. It will be recalled that the evidence of the CCTV footage was that these lavatories had been used by both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun shortly before the Pine Bar meeting, but not by Mr Litvinenko at any point. Testing showed raised readings on one cubicle door, a sink and a hand drier. A1 expressed the view that the contamination was secondary rather than primary, albeit that, relatively speaking, the secondary contamination was at "very, very high levels". She said that the readings could "most certainly" be consistent with secondary transfer by hand from the source of the primary contamination found in the Pine Bar.301
¶Mr Litvinenko after the Pine Bar 6.324 After leaving the Millennium Hotel, Mr Litvinenko walked the short distance to Mr Berezovsky's offices in Down Street. In his hospital interview with the police, Mr Litvinenko said that he had rung Mr Berezovsky in advance and told him that he was coming – that would be consistent with a call from Mr Litvinenko to Mr Berezovsky that is shown on the telephone schedule timed at shortly before 4.00pm.302 It would seem that Mr Litvinenko wanted to show Mr Berezovsky some of the documents that Mr Scaramella had given him at itsu earlier that afternoon, which he thought were relevant to identifying the killers of Anna Politkovskaya.303
¶6.325 The witness statement that Mr Berezovsky gave to the police was largely consistent with Mr Litvinenko's account. Mr Berezovsky stated that Mr Litvinenko had called him saying that he had papers to show him about Anna Politkovskaya's death, and that he had seen him using the photocopier in the offices that afternoon. Mr Berezovsky added that Mr Litvinenko had given him some of the pages that he had copied to read, but that he had not had time to read them – he was in meetings ahead of a trip to South Africa, and he also wanted to get to the match at the Emirates Stadium that
¶301 A1 20/75-77
179¶Part 6 | Chapters 1 to 8 | The polonium trail – events in October and November 2006 evening.304 I also heard evidence from Vladimir Voronkov, who was Mr Berezovsky's office manager. He said that it was quite normal for Mr Litvinenko to pop into the building, and he recalled seeing him there, he said at about 4.00 on the afternoon of 1 November 2006.305
¶6.326 Mr Litvinenko was in telephone contact with Mr Zakayev at around this time. Mr Zakayev had driven into central London and Mr Litvinenko was arranging to get a lift home with him. Mr Zakayev gave oral evidence to the Inquiry. He said that Mr Litvinenko had telephoned him earlier in the day and that later he had picked him up by arrangement near Mr Berezovsky's offices. He, too, recalled that Mr Litvinenko had been talking about the papers he had received from Mr Scaramella and their possible connection to the Politkovskaya case. His evidence was that he had another friend, named Yaragi Abdul, who was already in the front passenger seat of the car. He said that when Mr Litvinenko got in he sat in the middle of the rear seats and that as they drove he leaned forward to talk to them, leaning on the back of the front seats. According to Mr Zakayev the drive back to north London was uneventful and he dropped Mr Litvinenko off in Osier Crescent.306
¶6.327 Mr Abdul also gave oral evidence, which was consistent with that of Mr Zakayev.307
¶6.328 1 November was the anniversary of Mr and Mrs Litvinenko's arrival in this country. I have described in Part 3 above the evidence that Mrs Litvinenko cooked a special meal that evening, that Mr Litvinenko subsequently fell ill, and of all that followed.
¶6.329 When Mr Zakayev's car was tested for radiation, secondary contamination was found predominantly on the rear passenger seat and on the backs of the two front seats.308
¶6.330 Mr Litvinenko's house in Osier Crescent was also tested. Unsurprisingly, given that Mr Litvinenko had on any view ingested polonium, secondary contamination was found throughout the property. There are two points about the findings that are of particular interest. First, there was no primary contamination found anywhere in the house. Second, in the main the secondary contamination readings were low. A1 agreed that these readings reflected, "pretty chronic low level contamination throughout the house, consistent with secondary transfer by multiple individuals over time."309 A1 20/83 There was a single exception to this pattern. Very high readings were taken from the sleeve of the blue denim jacket that Mr Litvinenko had been wearing on 1 November.310 A1 stated that, in simple terms, the readings indicated that the sleeve had been in an area of primary contamination. She said: "Most certainly the cuff of that sleeve had actually been in contact with quite a considerable level of contamination, and from its position, et cetera, it would be transferred contamination".311
¶Lugovoy and Kovtun after the Pine Bar 6.331 DI Mascall gave evidence about the movements of Mr Lugovoy and his party during the remainder of their stay in London. This can be dealt with fairly shortly.
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¶6.332 In the early evening of 1 November, the entire group went to eat at a steakhouse in Coventry Street. After the meal, Mr Kovtun returned to the hotel whilst the others went to watch the match at the Emirates Stadium. Following the match, the group returned to the Millennium Hotel. DI Mascall explained that the Coventry Street steakhouse was not tested for radiation: due to a mix-up, two other steakhouses were tested instead. The Emirates Stadium was, however, tested and secondary contamination was found in a block of seats that matched the evidence that had been obtained as to the tickets purchased for Mr Lugovoy's group.312
¶6.333 The telephone schedule shows a number of calls between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko on 2 November 2006. Several of the calls in the morning would appear to relate to Mr Litvinenko informing Mr Lugovoy of his illness and the meeting with Mr Quirke being cancelled. There was also a call in the afternoon and a further call in the evening.313
¶6.334 Mr Lugovoy and his entire party, including Mr Kovtun, flew back to Moscow on the following day, Friday 3 November. They flew from Heathrow on BA flight BA874, which took off shortly after midday. The aircraft making the flight that day was G-BZHA. When it was tested for radiation, low levels of secondary contamination were found in the seats in row 27 where Tatiana Lugovoya had sat with her boyfriend Maxim Begak. Considerably higher readings were associated with row 16, where Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and Mr Sokolenko had sat together. The highest reading was taken on seat 16F, which was Mr Kovtun's seat.314
181¶Part 7: The closed evidence 7.1 As I have explained elsewhere in this Report, in conducting this Inquiry I have received and considered both open and closed evidence. Indeed, the main purpose of converting the previous inquest proceedings into a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 was to enable me to receive such closed evidence, and to take it into account in making my findings.
¶7.2 The preceding Parts of this Report contain my assessment of open evidence. This Part is concerned with the closed evidence. In the Parts that follow I shall set out my findings and overall conclusions, which are based on both the open and the closed evidence.
¶7.3 Put very shortly, the closed evidence consists of evidence that is relevant to the Inquiry, but which has been assessed as being too sensitive to put into the public domain. The assessment that the material is sufficiently sensitive to warrant being treated as closed evidence in these proceedings has been made not by me, but by the Home Secretary. She has given effect to this decision by issuing a number of Restriction Notices, which is a procedure specified in section 19 of the Inquiries Act 2005. The Restriction Notices themselves, although not, of course, the sensitive documents appended to them, are public documents. They have been published on the Inquiry website and are also to be found at Appendix 7 to this Report.
¶7.4 There is a considerable quantity of closed documentary evidence in this case. I have also received a number of closed witness statements, some of which are lengthy.
¶7.5 In order to assist me in the task of assessing the closed material, I held closed hearings of the Inquiry over several days in May 2015. Attendance at those hearings was limited to myself, Counsel and Solicitor to the Inquiry and the legal team for the Home Secretary. The hearings took place in a government building in London. During those hearings, as in the open hearings, I heard oral evidence from witnesses and also received submissions from Counsel regarding documentary evidence. A number of witnesses were called and questioned during the closed hearings. Following the closed hearings, Counsel for the Home Secretary filed, at my request, written submissions addressing the findings that were open to me on a number of issues raised by the closed evidence.
¶7.6 I have admitted into evidence all the documents contained in the hearing bundles to which I have referred above. I also admitted into evidence the witness statements provided by the witnesses who were called to give evidence, which was a different procedure to that which I adopted during the open hearings.
¶7.7 The following materials will form part of the appendices to this Report, although the sensitivity of the material will of course mean that they cannot be published in the same way as the other appendices:
¶a. the closed documents (i.e. the contents of the closed hearing bundles)
¶b. the closed witness statements c. the transcripts of the closed hearings d. written submissions filed in the course of the closed hearings
182¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶7.8 The remaining sections of this Part of the Report will address a series of issues that arise on the closed evidence. I will set out my analysis of the critical closed evidence that relates to those issues, and my findings on them. I do not expect the rest of this Part to be published, since publication of my assessment of this evidence is prohibited by the Restriction Notices to which I have already referred.
¶7.9 For the same reason, it is not possible for me to list in a form that can be published the issues that I propose to address in this Part. What I can say is that I will consider all the issues arising from the closed evidence that I regard as significant in light of my Terms of Reference. Those issues will include the question of whether Alexander Litvinenko had any sort of relationship with British security and intelligence agencies, and if so the nature and extent of that relationship. The issues will also include the question of whether the Russian State was responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶7.10 Paragraph 1(ii) of the Terms of Reference requires me to "make such recommendations as may seem appropriate". I have made one such recommendation. The recommendation concerns the closed evidence that I have heard. Because it would not be possible to publish the recommendation without breaching the Restriction Notices, it appears in this Part of the Report.
183¶Part 8: Who killed Alexander Litvinenko? Chapter 1: Introduction 8.1 This is the first of two Parts of the Report in which I will record my factual findings. In this Part, I shall address the basic factual circumstances of Mr Litvinenko's death – when and where he died, the mechanism of his death, whether anyone else was involved and if so how and who. In the next Part (Part 9), I shall make my findings regarding any wider responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.2 The analysis in these two Parts will be informed by all the evidence that I have heard; that is, the open evidence that I have summarised at Parts 3-6 and the closed evidence that I have dealt with at Part 7.
184¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 2: Medical cause of death
¶8.3 I received detailed evidence regarding the decline in Mr Litvinenko's physical condition during the last weeks of his life, and also regarding the care and treatment that he received during that period first at Barnet General Hospital and then at University College Hospital. I have summarised that evidence earlier in this Report, (see Part 3, chapter 4).
¶8.4 Mr Litvinenko died at University College Hospital on the evening of 23 November 2006. He had suffered two cardiac arrests on 21 November, but had been successfully resuscitated. He had lost consciousness on 23 November and at 8.51pm that evening he suffered a third cardiac arrest from which the medical professionals were unable to resuscitate him. Mr Down, an intensive care consultant on duty at the hospital that evening, pronounced life extinct at 9.21pm. His view was that Mr Litvinenko had died from multiple organ failure including progressive heart failure.
¶8.5 Following Mr Litvinenko's death, his body and samples taken from it were examined by a number of different scientists with a view to finding out as much as possible about the way in which he died. I have detailed that evidence in Part 3, chapter 5 above.
¶8.6 The post mortem into Mr Litvinenko's death was jointly conducted by two pathologists, Dr Cary and Dr Swift. I heard evidence from both. The radioactivity present in Mr Litvinenko's body meant that special precautions had to be taken to protect the health of all those present. It also meant that the pathologists were unable to conduct all the tests that they might otherwise have undertaken. I have set all these matters out in Part 3.
¶8.7 Dr Cary, with whom Dr Swift agreed, expressed himself to be "entirely satisfied" that the cause of Mr Litvinenko's death was acute radiation syndrome.
¶8.8 The pathologists reached this conclusion taking into account a number of factors. These factors included not only their physical examination of Mr Litvinenko's body, but also their review of the detailed medical notes recording Mr Litvinenko's worsening clinical condition in the weeks before his death, as well as the results of tests performed by other scientists on samples taken from Mr Litvinenko's body. The pathologists also relied on the fact that they had found no evidence of any possible alternative causes (such as natural disease) of Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.9 Although the pathologists were not in any doubt that Mr Litvinenko's final heart attack had been the result of acute radiation syndrome, they were unable to reach a firm conclusion as to the precise mechanism by which this took place. They listed a number of possibilities in this regard, including sepsis, liver and/or kidney failure, and the primary effect of radiation on the heart itself.
¶8.10 I accept the evidence of Dr Cary and Dr Swift. I am sure that the cause of Mr Litvinenko's death was acute radiation syndrome.
¶8.11 I am fortified in reaching this conclusion by the evidence that I received from other scientists who have conducted tests on samples taken from Mr Litvinenko's body in the years since his death. The scientists from whom I heard in this regard were witness A1, Dr Harrison, Dr Gent and Dr Black.
185¶Part 8 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Who killed Alexander Litvinenko?
¶8.12 The evidence of the scientists, which I have summarised in Part 3 above, enables me to make several more detailed findings regarding the medical cause of Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.13 First, it is clear on the evidence that the acute radiation syndrome described by the pathologists was itself caused by the presence in Mr Litvinenko's body of very high levels of polonium 210. Tests conducted by Dr Harrison on tissue samples taken from Mr Litvinenko's body demonstrated that there had been a total intake of about 4.4GBq of polonium 210. Dr Harrison's evidence was that this quantity far exceeded survivability levels.
¶8.14 Dr Harrison, Dr Gent and Dr Black all subscribed to the opinion expressed at paragraph 25 of the joint experts' report that, "It can be stated with certainty that Mr Litvinenko died as a consequence of an intake of polonium-210."
¶8.15 Second, the scientists were also agreed that the polonium 210 entered Mr Litvinenko's body either entirely or almost entirely by ingestion. If Mr Litvinenko inhaled any of the polonium 210, this was a minor route of intake, accounting for less than 5% of the total intake. It seems that the polonium 210 was probably ingested in the form of a soluble compound.
¶8.16 Third, there is compelling evidence that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 on 1 November 2006. The scientific evidence was not definitive on this point, but I heard that the medical records of the early stages of Mr Litvinenko's illness, and in particular the rise in neutrophil levels noted on 3 November and 5 November, were consistent with the poisoning having taken place on 1 November. More importantly, there is other evidence relating to the location of the poisoning (see chapter 3 below) that provides very strong evidence that it took place on 1 November.
¶8.17 In summary, I make the following findings regarding the medical cause of Mr Litvinenko's death. I am sure of each of these matters.
¶a. Mr Litvinenko died at 9.21pm on 23 November 2006 in University College Hospital, having suffered a cardiac arrest from which medical professionals were unable to resuscitate him b. The cardiac arrest was the result of an acute radiation syndrome from which
¶Mr Litvinenko was suffering c. The acute radiation syndrome was caused by Mr Litvinenko ingesting approximately 4.4GBq of polonium 210 on 1 November 2006
¶8.18 To use everyday language, I conclude that Mr Litvinenko was fatally poisoned with polonium 210 on 1 November 2006.
186¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 3: Where did Alexander Litvinenko
ingest polonium 210 on 1 November 2006?
¶8.19 I am sure that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 whilst drinking tea in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel during the afternoon of 1 November 2006.
¶8.20 I have relied upon the following evidence in making this finding.
¶8.21 It is absolutely clear that Mr Litvinenko went to the Pine Bar on the afternoon of 1 November. Apart from his evidence to that effect, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have confirmed that they met him there then, and there is also Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage which supports this.
¶8.22 It is equally clear that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had ordered tea that afternoon, and that there was a teapot on the table when Mr Litvinenko arrived.1
¶8.23 Mr Litvinenko said that he drank some of this tea, and I accept that he did so.
¶8.24 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have given inconsistent accounts about what happened in the Pine Bar and on other matters (see paragraphs 8.82 – 8.91 below). But the theme of their accounts on this issue has been more that they did not offer or pour any tea for Mr Litvinenko, rather than that he did not drink any tea at all.2
¶8.25 The forensic evidence shows that the Pine Bar was heavily contaminated with polonium 210. The contamination was focused on the table where Mr Litvinenko sat with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on 1 November 2006. The highest readings, which were consistent with primary contamination, were taken on the table itself and on the inside of one of the teapots used in the Pine Bar. A1's evidence was that the readings on the inside of the teapot demonstrated that, "at some stage polonium… has been poured out of the spout". She said she was sure of this (see paragraph 6.322).
¶8.26 It is equally important to note that radiation tests were conducted at all the other places where Mr Litvinenko went that day. Although some secondary contamination was found at some of these locations (I shall return to these results in due course), the Pine Bar was the only location of those visited by Mr Litvinenko on 1 November where primary contamination was found. More than that, of course, it was found on the table in the Pine Bar where Mr Litvinenko had sat whilst drinking tea, and on the inside of one of the teapots used in the Pine Bar.
¶8.27 This evidence all points to the conclusion that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 whilst drinking tea in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel during the afternoon of 1 November 2006, and I make a finding to that effect.1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 Andrade 16/111-141; INQ015344 2 Mascall 16/161-170
187¶Part 8 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Who killed Alexander Litvinenko?
¶Chapter 4: Was there an earlier ingestion of polonium 210? 8.28 I have referred above to what the scientific tests conducted on Mr Litvinenko's body can tell us about the fatal dose of polonium 210 that he received on 1 November 2006.
¶8.29 There was a further dimension to this scientific evidence. Tests conducted on Mr Litvinenko's hair demonstrated that he had ingested polonium 210 on not one but two occasions. The fatal dose on 1 November 2006 was the second of the two occasions. The first dose was much smaller, and had been ingested by Mr Litvinenko several days earlier.
¶8.30 I have summarised the scientific evidence relating to the first dose of polonium 210 in Part 3 of this Report at paragraphs 3.182 – 3.184. It is to be noted that the first intake was estimated to be 100 times smaller than the second, fatal, dose.
¶8.31 I am sure that Mr Litvinenko did receive an earlier, smaller, dose of polonium 210 prior to the fatal dose on 1 November 2006. The scientific evidence in this regard is compelling.
¶8.32 This gives rise to further questions. When and where did Mr Litvinenko receive the earlier dose? Was it connected to the fatal dose?
¶8.33 The scientists were clear that they were unable to provide a precise answer to the 'when' question. They were reliant in this regard on estimating time periods by reference to Mr Litvinenko's hair growth. But they had no independent evidence as to how fast his hair grew, and the exercise was further complicated by the possibility that the rate of growth may have been affected by the first dose of polonium 210. The best that they could do, therefore, was to offer probable time brackets. The view of Dr Harrison and A1 was that the earlier intake had probably taken place between 18 October and 23 October 2006. Dr Black, who conducted his analysis on a different basis, estimated that the earlier intake had taken place between 14 and 18 October 2006.
¶8.34 This evidence, however, does not stand alone.
¶8.35 There is forensic evidence that primary contamination was found on the boardroom table at Erinys close to where Mr Litvinenko was sitting at a meeting on 16 October, a meeting also attended by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. The forensic evidence also shows primary contamination in the room at the Best Western Hotel in which the two men had prepared for the meeting, and in which Mr Lugovoy slept that night.
¶8.36 I also heard evidence about Mr Litvinenko's physical health on that day. Marina Litvinenko said that her husband had had a sudden and unusual episode of sickness on the night of 16 October. However, Mr Kovtun's evidence (which Marina Litvinenko disputed), was that Mr Litvinenko had told him on 16 October, shortly after the meeting at Erinys, that he had been unwell for the previous 24 hours, and that he had vomited the night before.
¶8.37 At this stage of the analysis, I will limit myself to making the following observations.
¶8.38 First, the forensic evidence is highly suggestive of a link between Mr Litvinenko's first intake of polonium 210 and the meeting at Erinys on 16 October 2006.
188¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶8.39 Second, although that date is at one end of the combined date ranges provided by the scientists, the dating exercise is an uncertain one for the reasons that I have explained above. It was not my understanding that a finding that the first intake took place on 16 October would be positively inconsistent with any of the scientific evidence.
¶8.40 Third, I am disinclined to place any weight in this regard on the evidence as to Mr Litvinenko's illness on the night of 16 October. I emphasise that this is not because I accept the evidence of Mr Kovtun (my findings on the credibility of his evidence are set out below), nor because I do not believe what Mrs Litvinenko has said. My reason for caution on this point lies in the scientific evidence. The view of Dr Harrison and others was that so called 'prodromal symptoms' i.e. diarrhoea and vomiting – were not typical symptoms of internal alpha radiation poisoning. They were cautious as to whether the similar symptoms that Mr Litvinenko had suffered after the (much larger) second dose of polonium 210 had been caused by it.3 Given this uncertainty, it is better, in my view, to leave the question of Mr Litvinenko's physical symptoms on or about 16 October entirely out of the account for these purposes.
¶8.41 In summary:
¶a. I am sure that Mr Litvinenko did receive a first, smaller, dose of polonium 210 some time before the fatal dose on 1 November 2006 b. The forensic evidence suggests that the earlier dose is likely to have been
received at the meeting at Erinys on 16 October 2006, and a finding to this effect would not be inconsistent with the scientific evidence
¶3 INQ016745 (page 9)
189¶Part 8 | Chapters 1 to 6 | Who killed Alexander Litvinenko?
¶Chapter 5: Did Alexander Litvinenko poison himself? 8.42 One of the possible explanations for Mr Litvinenko's death that has been aired in public in the time since 2006 is that he poisoned himself by accident, perhaps in the course of handling illicitly obtained polonium 210. Mr Lugovoy has referred to this possibility during press interviews, as have other commentators. Another theory, which was expressly raised at the early stages of the inquest proceedings by those then representing Mr Lugovoy, is that Mr Litvinenko deliberately poisoned himself with polonium 210 in order to commit suicide.
¶8.43 It is plainly important that I examine and make findings on each of these two suggestions.
¶Accident 8.44 DI Mascall gave evidence to the Inquiry about the public comments that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have made about Mr Litvinenko's death since 2006. One such comment was reported by the Voice of Russia in 2009. Mr Lugovoy is reported as having said:
¶"It cannot be excluded that [Mr Litvinenko's death] was simply an accident for
¶Litvinenko himself. In short, everything is possible since he had been linked to radioactive materials, and there could have been a leak and he had poisoned himself of an accident."4 Marina Litvinenko 3/24-25; INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 7); there are some small points of difference between this evidence and Mr Litvinenko's own account, given without an interpreter at the first session of his November 2006 police interviews – INQ002076 (page 3) HMG000353 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 67) Mascall 22/135
¶8.45 As I have said, other commentators have advanced a similar theory – i.e. that Mr Litvinenko had been involved in dealing with polonium 210, and that he might have poisoned himself with it accidentally.
¶8.46 There are five reasons why, in my view, this suggestion is wholly without merit.
¶8.47 First, there was no evidence from any of the witnesses who appeared before me that Mr Litvinenko had ever been involved in dealing with radioactive materials – either in the months before his death, or, for that matter, ever. Marina Litvinenko dismissed the possibility,5 and Mr Reilly said that he had no knowledge of any such dealings.6
¶8.48 Second, the pattern of the radioactive contamination found at Mr Litvinenko's house was inconsistent with this theory. It will be recalled that, although there was widespread contamination at the house, it was almost all low level secondary contamination, the single exception being the sleeve of the jacket that Mr Litvinenko wore on 1 November 2006. If Mr Litvinenko had been in the habit of dealing with leaky containers of polonium 210 in the weeks before his death, a different pattern of radiation would surely have been found. Had Mr Litvinenko been handling polonium 210 at his house, then one would have expected to find primary contamination there. Even if he had handled the substance away from his house, one would have expected that high readings would have been taken from more than one item of his clothing.
¶8.49 It is also of significance in this regard that the contamination readings taken at Boris Berezovsky's offices were all relatively low. The highest reading there was taken
190¶The Litvinenko Inquiry from a sofa on which Mr Lugovoy had sat. It has been suggested that Mr Berezovsky was involved with Mr Litvinenko's alleged dealings in polonium 210. The contamination evidence does not support that theory.
¶8.50 The third point relates to the route by which the polonium 210 entered Mr Litvinenko's body. As I have explained above, the scientists were agreed that most, if not all, of the polonium 210 was ingested by Mr Litvinenko, probably in the form of a soluble compound. In lay terms, Mr Litvinenko drank the polonium 210 dissolved in a liquid. Simply as a matter of common sense, it seems unlikely to me that Mr Litvinenko could have accidentally drunk a liquid containing polonium 210. Inhaling the substance by accident would have been more plausible, but this was ruled out as a route of entry for all but perhaps 5% of the fatal dose.
¶8.51 The fourth point concerns Mr Litvinenko's conduct during the three week period of his illness prior to his death. It is to be remembered that Mr Litvinenko's doctors were uncertain as to the cause of his painful and debilitating symptoms until only a few hours before his death. If Mr Litvinenko had poisoned himself accidentally whilst handling a leaky container of polonium 210, he would have had a good idea of the cause of his illness. Had that been the case, it is inconceivable, in my view, that Mr Litvinenko would not have said something about this either to the police or to one of his doctors, if only to improve the chances of his life being saved.
¶8.52 Finally, the 'leaky container' theory is of course at odds with the findings that I have already made as to the place and circumstances in which Mr Litvinenko received the fatal dose. As I have found, Mr Litvinenko was poisoned by drinking contaminated tea from a teapot in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel. The hypothetical 'leaky package' must remain just that. There is no evidence to support it, and, for the reasons that I have set out, the entire hypothesis is inconsistent with the facts that have been established from the evidence.
¶Suicide 8.53 I can deal with this point more shortly.
¶8.54 On the findings that I have already made, this theory must involve Mr Litvinenko deliberately contaminating the tea in the teapot at the Pine Bar with polonium 210, and then pouring and drinking it.
¶8.55 As I have said above, there is no evidence that Mr Litvinenko had access to polonium 210 prior to his death.
¶8.56 More importantly, there is no evidence at all that Mr Litvinenko was feeling at all suicidal at the time in question. I heard evidence from his wife and from a number of his close friends, none of whom thought it was remotely plausible that Mr Litvinenko might have taken his own life. I have summarised their evidence on this issue at Part 5, chapter 8. Mr Litvinenko was deeply committed to his wife and son. He was not at all depressed.
¶8.57 I would only add that Mr Litvinenko survived for three weeks after ingesting the fatal dose of polonium 210. If he really had poisoned himself in order to end his life, he would surely have said something to his wife, or the police, or one of his friends about what he had done.
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¶Conclusion 8.58 For the reasons set out above, I am sure that Mr Litvinenko did not die as a result of either accidentally or deliberately poisoning himself with polonium 210.
¶8.59 Further evidence against both of these theories may be found in the strong evidence, as I consider it to be, that supports a third explanation for Mr Litvinenko's death, namely that he was deliberately poisoned by others. It is to that issue that I shall now turn.
192¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 6: Who administered the poison?
¶Introduction 8.60 I have found that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 when he drank tea in the Pine Bar on 1 November 2006. I have also found that he did not put the polonium 210 into the teapot himself – either by accident, or as a deliberate means of committing suicide.
¶8.61 There is an obvious question that arises. If Mr Litvinenko did not put the polonium 210 into the teapot that afternoon, who did?
¶8.62 The Metropolitan Police officers who have investigated this case believe that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko on 1 November. I heard evidence that warrants for the arrests of both men have been issued.7 Mr Horwell, in his closing submissions made on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service, asserted that: "the evidence points resolutely to Lugovoy and Kovtun and no one else as having administered the poison which killed Litvinenko."8 Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61
¶8.63 I stress, and it is of the first importance, that I have analysed this issue, like all others in this Inquiry, in an entirely independent and dispassionate manner. Although I have had the great advantage of being able to consider the evidence gathered by the Metropolitan Police, their views as to where that evidence points have been accorded no special weight. I have approached the evidence with an open mind. I have considered it objectively. I have drawn my own conclusions as to what the evidence shows.
¶8.64 It will be helpful for me to summarise at this stage the findings that I have made.
¶8.65 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun placed the polonium 210 in the teapot at the Pine Bar on 1 November 2006.
¶8.66 I am sure that they did this with the intention of poisoning Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.67 I am sure that the two men had made an earlier attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko, also using polonium 210, at the Erinys meeting on 16 October 2006.
¶8.68 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun knew that they were using a deadly poison (as opposed to, for example, a 'truth drug' or a sleeping draught), and that they intended to kill Mr Litvinenko. I do not believe, however, that they knew precisely what the chemical they were handling was, or the nature of all of its properties.
¶Scientific evidence indicating Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.69 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have never disputed either (a) that they met Mr Litvinenko in the Pine Bar on the afternoon of 1 November 2006; or (b) that they ordered the tea which Mr Litvinenko says he drank when he met them there. There is, in any event, very clear independent evidence on both of these points (see Part 6, chapter 8).
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¶8.70 Given the findings that I have made above regarding the time and place at which, and the means by which, Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210, these matters are clearly sufficient to raise a question as to the possible involvement of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun in the poisoning. On their own, however, these facts do not establish anything more than that.
¶8.71 I have referred above to the forensic evidence of polonium 210 contamination found in the Pine Bar in the context of my finding that the Pine Bar was the location of Mr Litvinenko's fatal poisoning. Similarly, it is the forensic evidence of polonium 210 contamination found in other places associated with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun that I regard as the most important evidence of their responsibility for the poisoning. There are three points that I make in this regard.
¶8.72 First, the extensive testing for radiation throughout the Millennium Hotel only revealed one area of primary contamination apart from those found in the Pine Bar. That was in the plughole of the room occupied by Mr Kovtun and Mr Sokolenko.
¶8.73 Second, secondary contamination was found in Mr Lugovoy's bedroom and also (at particularly high levels) in the gentlemen's lavatories close to the Pine Bar. CCTV footage shows that both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun visited those lavatories prior to the meeting with Mr Litvinenko. The same footage demonstrates that Mr Litvinenko did not visit those lavatories during his time in the hotel.
¶8.74 Third, these findings form part of a wider pattern. Primary polonium 210 contamination was also found in the bathroom of room 107 of the Best Western Hotel, where Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun changed prior to their meeting at Erinys on 16 October 2006, and where Mr Lugovoy slept that night, and also in the bathroom of room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel, where Mr Lugovoy stayed between 25 and 27 October 2006. Secondary contamination was also discovered, as I have recounted in Part 6, in a large number of places associated with the two men during this period.
¶8.75 It will be recalled that A1 gave evidence to the effect that a finding of primary contamination was only consistent with the surface in question being exposed directly to a source of polonium 210. In practical terms, this means that polonium 210 must have been handled in each of the three hotel bedrooms to which I have referred above. This amounts to highly compelling evidence of a connection between Mr Lugovoy, Mr Kovtun and the (extremely rare) isotope with which Mr Litvinenko was poisoned, including such evidence found in the very hotel where the poisoning took place.
¶8.76 I consider that this evidence on its own would have been sufficient to satisfy me that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were responsible for Mr Litvinenko's poisoning, and in particular that one or other or both of them handled the polonium 210, which was used to kill Mr Litvinenko, in the bathroom of room 382 of the Millennium Hotel (i.e. Mr Kovtun's room).
¶8.77 But there is further evidence to consider, to which I shall next turn.
¶8.78 Before doing so, there is one further point to make about the pattern of primary contamination found in the hotel bedrooms. There is a striking similarity as to the location of the primary contamination found in room 382 of the Millennium Hotel and in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel. In both places, primary contamination was found inside the plughole in the bathroom. The natural inference is that polonium 210 had been poured down the sink. Since this appears to have happened in both rooms,
194¶The Litvinenko Inquiry it is logical to assume that it was part of a routine, and in all the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the routine was connected with the preparation and/or the disposal of polonium 210.
¶8.79 I have already expressed my view that room 382 of the Millennium Hotel was used to handle the polonium 210 that killed Mr Litvinenko. Given the similar findings in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel, it is a reasonable assumption that something similar occurred there. I have referred above to the scientific evidence which shows that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on an occasion prior to 1 November 2006, and to other evidence that tends to suggest that this occasion might have been the Erinys meeting on 16 October. Given, additionally, (a) my finding that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on 1 November by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun; and (b) the similarity between the findings of primary contamination at room 107 of the Best Western Hotel and room 382 of the Millennium Hotel, I make the further findings that Mr Litvinenko was also poisoned with polonium 210 by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun at the Erinys meeting on 16 October 2006, and that the polonium 210 used on that occasion was prepared and/or disposed of in the bathroom of room 107 of the Best Western Hotel.
¶8.80 For completeness, I note that the primary contamination found in the bathroom of room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel was found not in the sink, but in the bin. Primary contamination was also found on towels in the hotel laundry. It is perhaps significant in this regard that there is no other evidence of an attempt being made to poison Mr Litvinenko during this period (for example, no primary contamination was found in the Palm Court bar at the hotel, where Mr Litvinenko appears to have met Mr Lugovoy on two occasions during the latter's stay). There is insufficient evidence for me to make any findings about what happened at the Sheraton Hotel, but I observe that the primary contamination found there was consistent with Mr Lugovoy having spilled the polonium 210 in the course of handling it, and then mopping it up with the towels that were subsequently found in the laundry.
¶Other evidence indicating Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.81 I turn to consider the other evidential matters that I consider support my findings that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
¶Accounts given by Lugovoy and Kovtun 8.82 Neither Mr Lugovoy nor, in the end, Mr Kovtun, gave oral evidence to the Inquiry. However, both have made public statements concerning the case since 2006 and Mr Kovtun provided the Inquiry with a witness statement. I admitted this material in evidence, and have referred to it extensively.
¶8.83 I should make it clear that I do not regard the simple fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did not give evidence before me as evidence that in itself supports the proposition that they poisoned Mr Litvinenko. There was some debate about this matter, but in the end all core participants agreed that I should not draw any adverse inferences from the fact that neither man has given evidence before me (see Appendix 1, paragraph 123). I do not do so.
¶8.84 That said, as I have observed on a number of occasions during my review of the evidence, the fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun did not give oral evidence means that I am left without answers to questions that they would have been asked had they
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¶attended. Put another way, I do not have their explanations for inconsistencies or gaps in their accounts. This may lead to me making findings against them that I would not have made had they given their explanation. There is no avoiding that.
¶8.86 First, there are some striking anomalies in the accounts that both men have given of their meeting with Mr Litvinenko on 1 November. Both men have stated, in insistent terms, that it was Mr Litvinenko who made the first contact on that day, and asked to meet up. Mr Litvinenko, on the other hand, said that Mr Lugovoy had telephoned him and suggested the meeting. It is plain from the telephone schedule that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were wrong about this (see paragraphs 6.275 – 6.282).
¶8.87 Mr Lugovoy initially declined to give an account of the meeting at the Pine Bar because, he said, the room had been covered by, "high quality video equipment, which doubtless recorded the meeting". In fact, there was no such video equipment in the Pine Bar, and it is not credible that Mr Lugovoy, as a security professional, could have mistakenly thought that there was. One is left, therefore, with the conclusion that he was lying about this (see paragraph 6.315).
¶8.88 Mr Kovtun told a German newspaper in December 2006 (i.e. a few weeks after the meeting in the Pine Bar) that he did not have a clear memory of the meeting and that at the time he had paid more attention to his cigar. More than eight years later, the statement that he provided to the Inquiry contained a detailed account of the meeting, including an assertion that Mr Litvinenko "grabbed the teapot on the table and, without waiting for an invitation, poured himself some tea" and that he "gulped down two cups of hot tea one after the other … [and] then had a coughing fit" (see paragraphs 6.318 – 6.319). There is no reason at all to think that Mr Kovtun's memory had improved dramatically so many years after the event. The only logical conclusion is that he was lying on one or other (or both) of the two occasions.
¶8.89 Second, in the years since 2006 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have given markedly different accounts of a conversation that one or other of them is supposed to have had with Mr Litvinenko on 17 October 2006. I have set out the various accounts that they have given at paragraphs 6.144 – 6.149 above. A common theme of these accounts is the claim that Mr Litvinenko was trying to engage the two men in a blackmail scheme. However, the discrepancies between the accounts (for example, where the conversation took place, the target of the intended blackmail, and to whom Mr Litvinenko was speaking) are so great that they cannot be explained by confusion or loss of memory. In my view, they are only consistent with a deliberate attempt to mislead.
¶8.90 Third, the explanations that Mr Kovtun has given as to the purpose of his travel to London on 1 November are profoundly unsatisfactory. For the reasons that I have explained at paragraphs 6.245 – 6.250 above, this appears to be another example of Mr Kovtun providing misleading information about an important issue in the case.
¶8.91 The deficiencies in the accounts that have been provided by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, of which the matters set out above are only examples, lead to two conclusions. First, I do not regard the evidence that the two men have given about these events as
196¶The Litvinenko Inquiry credible, and I will not accept any part of their accounts in the absence of corroboration from a reliable source of evidence. Second, and more importantly, I make a positive finding that both men have deliberately attempted to mislead the recipients of the various accounts they have given regarding crucial issues in the case. I infer that they have done so in order to conceal their own actions. These findings support my overall conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶Timing of travel bookings 8.92 The three key events that took place in this case during October and early November 2006 were the three visits to London that I have described in Part 6 above – the first visit made by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, the second by Mr Lugovoy alone and the third by a larger group including both Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
¶8.93 As well as hearing evidence as to what took place during these visits, I also heard evidence about the travel arrangements that had been made (e.g. flight and hotel bookings) for each visit.
¶8.94 There are two points that emerged from this evidence that are worthy of mention.
¶8.95 First, it was striking that the timing of the first visit seemed to turn on Mr Kovtun's availability to travel. I have touched on this issue above, at paragraph 6.64.
¶8.96 Mr Lugovoy was the senior of the two men in terms of their business relationships. His visa had been renewed in the summer, and he was therefore able to travel to the United Kingdom (UK) whenever he wished. It is notable, therefore, that the bookings for the flights and hotel rooms, which were both made in the days after Mr Kovtun's UK visa was issued on 5 October 2006, appear to have been held up until it was known when Mr Kovtun would be able to make the trip. Although Mr Kovtun attended business meetings when the trip to London did take place, there was nothing in the evidence that I heard about those meetings to suggest that his attendance was in any way essential.
¶8.97 I have already made a finding that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko with polonium 210 at their meeting in the Erinys boardroom on 16 October 2006, during this first trip. The evidence about the timing of the bookings is at the very least consistent with this finding, and I consider that it adds some weight to it. The evidence suggests that the true purpose of the trip was not to attend a series of business meetings at which Mr Kovtun would be no more than a mute observer, but rather, as I have found, to attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko – an operation in which Mr Kovtun was intended to play, and did play, a key role.
¶8.98 The second point concerns the timing of the decision that Mr Kovtun should join the third trip to London. This is a point that is addressed at paragraphs 6.188 – 6.189 above. In the statement that he provided to the Inquiry, Mr Kovtun suggested that he had not even contemplated flying to London on 1 November to join Mr Lugovoy and the others until 30 October (see discussion at paragraph 6.244 above). That was not true – the booking for his return flight from London to Moscow had been made several days earlier on 27 October. I am satisfied that that was the time at which the decision was made that Mr Kovtun would go to London.
¶8.99 That date of 27 October was midway through the trip that Mr Lugovoy made to London alone, when he stayed in room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel. I am satisfied that
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¶Mr Lugovoy had a quantity of polonium 210 with him on this occasion. As I have said, the forensic evidence is of primary contamination both in the bin in the bathroom of room 848, and also on two towels in the hotel laundry, which I am satisfied must have come from room 848. One possible explanation for the pattern of contamination is that Mr Lugovoy spilled the polonium 210 and mopped it up with the towels, or perhaps simply poured it into the bin. There is no evidence that there was any attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko during this trip, despite the fact that Mr Lugovoy met him twice in the Palm Court bar of the Sheraton.
¶8.100 Although there is insufficient evidence for me to make any positive finding on the point, I regard it as possible that this pattern of events at the Sheraton explains why the decision was taken, on 27 October, that Mr Kovtun should travel to London on 1 November. It is at least possible that the decision was taken, in light of events at the Sheraton, that Mr Lugovoy would need Mr Kovtun's assistance on the next attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko, and that is why the return flight was booked for him on that day.
¶8.101 I do not suggest that this evidence relating to the timing of travel arrangements is at the centre of this case, but it adds to the picture. And it offers some support for the conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶Did Mr Kovtun tell D3 that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko? 8.102 I now turn to a part of the case that is, on any view, of considerable significance. I refer to the evidence concerning Mr Kovtun's conversation with D3 in Hamburg on the evening of 30 October 2006, and his subsequent attempts to contact C2.
¶8.103 I have set out the evidence relating to these issues at some length above – see in particular paragraphs 6.205 – 6.225 and 6.261 – 6.273.
¶8.104 There is no doubt that Mr Kovtun met D3 in Hamburg that evening. There is also no doubt that on the following day,31 BLK000253 (page 4); Marina Litvinenko 3/50-51 Goldfarb 5/122-123; 26/17-18; 26/26 Bukovsky 26/91-92 Moughton 8/115-116 INQ020031 (page 4 paragraphs S17-S18) October 2006, Mr Kovtun obtained C2's phone number by telephoning D6, who got the number from D7 after he had spoken to C2. There is, finally, no doubt that Mr Kovtun telephoned C2 the day after that, from London, using Mr Lugovoy's phone.
¶8.105 There are two, connected, issues in respect of which I must make findings. The first is whether D3 has told the truth about what Mr Kovtun said to him that evening. In particular, did Mr Kovtun tell D3 that he had "a very expensive poison" and that he needed a cook "to put poison in Litvinenko's food or drink"? Second, what was the reason for Mr Kovtun calling C2 in London on 1 November 2006?
¶8.106 I have come to the conclusion that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 that he was looking for a cook to assist in poisoning Mr Litvinenko, and that in telephoning C2 he was attempting – unsuccessfully, as it turned out – to put that plan into operation.
¶8.107 The primary basis on which I have reached this conclusion is the utterly unconvincing explanation that Mr Kovtun has given for making the call to C2 on 1 November. I have analysed that explanation, together with Mr Kovtun's account of his conversations with C2 and Dr Shadrin, in some detail at paragraphs 6.261 – 6.273 above. I do not propose to go back over what I have said there, save to repeat that, despite not having had the advantage of hearing Mr Kovtun give oral evidence, I am quite satisfied that the explanation that he has given for making contact with C2, together
198¶The Litvinenko Inquiry with his account of conversations with C2 and Dr Shadrin, is a total fabrication. The term that I used above, which I repeat, is that his story is a tissue of lies.
¶8.108 There must be a reason why Mr Kovtun has fabricated this elaborate story about wishing to employ C2 to work in a restaurant in Moscow, and being unable to see him because Dr Shadrin told him that Stratford was 3-4 hours drive from central London. That reason is not difficult to deduce. I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did wish to enlist C2 as an accomplice in the plans that he and Mr Lugovoy were making to poison Mr Litvinenko. I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 in the course of their conversation in Hamburg that this was why he wished to make contact with C2, and that D3 has told the truth about that conversation. And I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun has fabricated the story about wishing to employ C2 – as well as his evidence about D3's unreliability – in order to conceal that truth.
¶8.109 There are three other matters that fortify me in these conclusions.
¶8.110 First, there is the forensic evidence, to which I have referred above, that demonstrates that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were involved in a series of attempts to poison Mr Litvinenko. Mr Kovtun's boast that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko with "a very expensive poison" may have appeared outlandish to D3, but there is a wealth of independent evidence before me that shows that that is exactly what he was planning to do.
¶8.111 Second, my findings that, by the time Mr Kovtun spoke to D3 on 30 October, he and Mr Lugovoy had already made one, and perhaps two, unsuccessful attempts to kill Mr Litvinenko are also of some significance here. Their previous lack of success makes it more plausible that they wished to alter their methods and enlist some support.
¶8.112 Third, it is impossible to overlook the fact that only a few minutes after Mr Kovtun had phoned C2 on Mr Lugovoy's phone and discovered that he was too busy to meet that day,1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 November, a call was made from the same phone to Mr Litvinenko. The call to C2, which lasted one minute and 14 seconds, was timed at 11.33am. The call to Mr Litvinenko, which lasted nearly five minutes, was timed at 11.41am (see paragraph 6.251(e) above).
¶8.113 The apparent link between the call to C2 and the call to Mr Litvinenko is highly suggestive.
¶8.114 As I have recounted above, Mr Litvinenko told the police that Mr Lugovoy had telephoned him during the morning of 1 November and said that, "he would like to meet for a short time" later that day. Mr Litvinenko said that it was during this conversation that the meeting at the Pine Bar was arranged. I am satisfied that Mr Litvinenko's account is accurate, and that the call in question was the call recorded as having been made to Mr Litvinenko from Mr Lugovoy's phone at 11.41am. I regard Mr Lugovoy's claim that in fact Mr Litvinenko called him and asked to meet, which is inconsistent with the telephone evidence, as a deliberate attempt to mislead.
¶8.115 Further, I think it likely that Mr Lugovoy called Mr Litvinenko at 11.41am and suggested a meeting later that day in direct consequence of the discussion that Mr Kovtun had had with C2 a few minutes earlier. Once it had become apparent to Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun that they would not get any help from C2, at least not in the short term, they decided to make another attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko themselves. Their plan,
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¶which they subsequently put into effect, was to make this attempt in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel.
¶8.116 In summary on this point, I am satisfied that Mr Kovtun did tell D3 in the course of their discussions in Hamburg that he was planning to poison Mr Litvinenko, and that he telephoned C2 on the morning of 1 November in an attempt to enlist his support in carrying out this plan.
¶8.117 For the reasons that I have set out above, this finding is both consistent with and strongly corroborative of the other evidence that points to the conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶The duration of Lugovoy's operation against Mr Litvinenko 8.118 I have referred at paragraphs 4.148 – 4.150 above to the evidence about the first meeting in London between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko. As I have said, it appears that this meeting took place in October 2004. There was a divergence between the evidence of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Litvinenko as to which of them had made the first contact. In light of my general findings regarding Mr Lugovoy's credibility, as well as my finding as to his involvement in poisoning Mr Litvinenko, I am satisfied that, as Mr Litvinenko said, it was Mr Lugovoy who first contacted him in 2004, and not the other way around. I would add that I regard it as entirely possible that Mr Lugovoy was already at that stage involved in a plan to target Mr Litvinenko, perhaps with a view to killing him.
¶Lugovoy and Kovtun's conduct since November 2006 8.119 I have already made it clear that I do not regard the fact that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun have not given evidence to the Inquiry as something that amounts in itself to evidence of their responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.120 However, I did hear evidence on a number of other matters relating to Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun's conduct since November 2006 that I do regard as supportive of my finding that they poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.121 I have referred above (see paragraph 4.73) to the 2008 El Pais interview in which Mr Lugovoy said that he believed Mr Litvinenko to have been "a traitor" and also, a little later, referred to Oleg Gordievsky (whom he knew to have been a friend of Mr Litvinenko) saying that, "if someone has caused the Russian state serious damage, they should be exterminated". The fact that Mr Lugovoy said these things does not, of course, mean that he killed Mr Litvinenko. But the fact that he held these views is certainly consistent with him having done so. I regard the fact that Mr Lugovoy expressed these views as supportive of my overall finding that he did poison Mr Litvinenko.
¶8.122 Of rather more significance is an incident described to me in evidence by Michael Cotlick, who was Boris Berezovsky's personal assistant from 2005 until Mr Berezovsky's death in 2013.
¶8.123 Mr Cotlick told me about an incident that took place in Mr Berezovsky's London offices in July 2010.9 Mr Cotlick described how he had been called to Mr Berezovsky's
200¶The Litvinenko Inquiry personal office and went in to find Mr Berezovsky with two men. One of the men was Yuri Dubov, who worked with Mr Berezovsky. The other man was named Rafael
¶Filinov. He was Russian, and had recently arrived in London from Moscow. Mr Cotlick was shown a T-shirt that Mr Filinov had given to Mr Berezovsky. Mr Filinov explained that he had been given the T-shirt in Moscow by Mr Lugovoy and, at Mr Lugovoy's request, had delivered it as a gift to Mr Berezovsky. There was writing printed on the
¶T-shirt (which can be seen in the photographs of the T-shirt below). The writing was in extraordinary terms. The writing on the front of the T-shirt read "POLONIUM-210
¶CSKA LONDON, HAMBURG To Be Continued". The writing on the back of the T-shirt read, "CSKA Moscow Nuclear Death Is Knocking Your Door".10
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¶Police photographs of the T-shirt 11
202¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶8.124 Mr Cotlick said that he was aware that Mr Filinov had a personal relationship with Mr Lugovoy. He said that he had "no doubt whatsoever" that Mr Lugovoy had himself handed the T-shirt to Mr Filinov, in order for him to give it to Mr Berezovsky.
¶8.125 Taken on its own (and without, of course, the benefit of oral evidence from Mr Lugovoy), it would be difficult to know what to make of this T-shirt. On any view, it demonstrates that Mr Lugovoy approved of Mr Litvinenko's murder. It was also, clearly, a threat to Mr Berezovsky. Further than that, the T-shirt could be seen as an admission by Mr Lugovoy that he had poisoned Mr Litvinenko, made at a time when he was confident that he would never be extradited from Russia, and wished to taunt Mr Berezovsky with that fact. Alternatively, it could, perhaps, be seen as an extraordinarily tasteless joke.
¶8.126 However, the T-shirt does not stand alone. As I have indicated, I am satisfied on the basis of other evidence (most importantly, the forensic evidence) that Mr Lugovoy did indeed poison Mr Litvinenko. Set against that context, this T-shirt can only be seen as Mr Lugovoy's gleeful acknowledgement of his part in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶8.127 There is one last matter to address under this heading, and it relates to Mr Kovtun. I have referred above to the fact that, after Mr Litvinenko's death, Mr Kovtun had a conversation with his ex-wife's mother, Elenora Wall, about the radiation poisoning that he was suffering from. When interviewed by the German authorities, Dr Wall gave this account of the conversation:
"He told me that he had probably got some of the poison which killed Litvinenko. He said word for word, 'Those arseholes have probably poisoned us all'."12 Berezovsky 25/3-30 Marina Litvinenko 4/31-32; 4/41; 4/112-114 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 69) INQ021208 (page 6) Elenora Wall 32/81 INQ020031
¶8.128 It seems to me to be at least possible that this comment made by Mr Kovtun to his mother-in-law, no doubt in an unguarded moment, was a revealing one.
¶8.129 The implication of his words is that a group of people, the unidentified "arseholes" – had been responsible for poisoning both Mr Litvinenko and him – and possibly Mr Lugovoy as well. This would not be consistent with the case pursued by the Russian investigators, who accused Mr Litvinenko of having poisoned Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy. But it would be consistent with a scenario in which others had tasked Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy to kill Mr Litvinenko, and had given them a poison with which to do it, but had not told them what the poison was or what its properties were, with the consequence that the poisoners, through ignorance, ended up contaminating themselves.
¶8.130 If that is what Mr Kovtun meant, then it was certainly an unwise comment for him to have made. But, as we have seen, making unwise comments is something that Mr Kovtun appears to have done from time to time.
¶Evidence apparently inconsistent with Lugovoy and Kovtun's involvement 8.131 I did hear some evidence that at least appeared to be inconsistent with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun having been responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death. I must, of course, address that evidence.
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¶The polygraph test 8.132 In 2012, Mr Lugovoy underwent a polygraph or so-called 'lie detector' test in Moscow. The test was administered by a British man and his son – Bruce and Tristam Burgess – who are both qualified polygraph examiners. Mr Lugovoy was asked a series of questions about his alleged involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death, and he denied any such involvement. At the end of the test, Bruce Burgess, who took the lead role in conducting the test, announced the result to Mr Lugovoy in the following words,13 "I can tell you the result was conclusive, you were telling the truth, no deception indicated."
¶8.133 I received exhaustive evidence about this polygraph test. The test itself was filmed, and I adduced both the recording14 and a transcript in evidence.15 I also had available to me the various charts produced by the polygraph equipment during the test.16 I commissioned an expert in polygraphy, Professor Ray Bull, to prepare a report about this test, and adduced that report in evidence.17 I also heard oral evidence from Bruce Burgess,18 from Tristam Burgess,19 and from Professor Bull.20 All those materials are available on the Inquiry website.
¶8.134 I will make it clear at once that I regard the polygraph test conducted on Mr Lugovoy as having been seriously flawed. In consequence, I do not feel able to place any weight at all on the outcome of the test. My reasons are as follows.
¶8.135 By the end of his oral evidence I was left with general concerns about the levels of professionalism and objectivity demonstrated by Bruce Burgess (to whom I shall refer hereafter simply as 'Mr Burgess'), and therefore his suitability to conduct what was, after all, a scientific examination relating to an allegation of murder. Mr Burgess accepted that he has a conviction for perverting the course of justice. More particularly, he stated during the course of his evidence that he did not think it would be improper to conduct a polygraph test on a person who had been charged with a criminal offence and was awaiting trial, on the basis that by that point the criminal investigation would have been concluded. He also said that in those circumstances he would try to obtain an admission if the individual 'failed' the test. Mr Burgess' view was that none of this risked interfering with the criminal process. In the present case, Mr Burgess accepted that he flew to Moscow having been told that the subject of the proposed polygraph test was involved in a murder case, but without asking who the subject was or what precise stage the murder investigation had reached. He accepted that he should have made further enquiries.
¶8.136 As I have said, these matters and others similar to them left me with concerns about Mr Burgess' professionalism and judgement. These concerns would not have justified me in rejecting the test without more, but they did lead me to examine with care the way in which the test was conducted.
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¶8.137 On examination, it became clear that there were a number of problems with the way in which the test was conducted.
¶8.138 The type of test that Mr Burgess conducted on Mr Lugovoy is known as the Control Question Technique (CQT). Professor Bull told me that research suggested that the CQT has an 85% success rate in cases, such as this, where the result is that the subject is not deceptive. There were, however, some problems with the research techniques that had been used. Moreover, that figure assumed that the test was properly conducted and that the subject had not used countermeasures.
¶8.139 Put very shortly, the CQT operates by comparing the subject's response while answering two sets of questions – 'comparison questions', which are intended to provoke a dishonest response but which are not related to the conduct that is the subject of the test, and 'relevant questions', which do relate to the subject of the test – here, Mr Lugovoy's alleged involvement in poisoning Mr Litvinenko. As Professor Bull explained, the CQT depends for its success on the examiner choosing appropriate questions and asking them in the correct manner. There were difficulties here on both counts.
¶8.140 Mr Burgess repeatedly told Mr Lugovoy that the comparison questions were not really part of the test, that they were not a threat to him, and that he wasn't being tested on them. This was completely contrary to the principles underlying the CQT, as explained in scientific literature that I was shown. Professor Bull stated that this was, "inconsistent with… good practice in polygraph testing". Mr Burgess responded that downplaying the importance of the control questions would be likely to increase the chances of a negative result to the test, whereas Mr Lugovoy's result had been positive. I accept that there is a narrow logic to this proposition, but it does not answer the general concern. As Professor Bull stated, polygraph tests are multi-faceted. The outcome depends upon comparing a range of results across the piece. One cannot simply accept that one part of the process was faulty but assume that it had no wider damaging effect. The CQT process depends on the control questions being properly selected and asked. The deficiencies that were identified undermine the test as a whole.
¶8.141 There were, moreover, further difficulties relating to the relevant questions. One question was whether Mr Lugovoy, "had ever performed any manipulations with polonium". Mr Lugovoy had told Mr Burgess prior to the test that he had been contaminated by polonium, and that in that sense he had had "some dealings" with polonium. Professor Bull observed that, in those circumstances, it was not clear why Mr Lugovoy's answer 'No' to that question was accepted as a truthful answer. I agree. This question was poorly selected, and further undermined the test.
¶8.142 There was a further difficulty with the relevant questions. The CQT process depends on the subject of the test being put under pressure, and measuring the subject's nervous physical reaction to false denials. However, throughout the testing process, Mr Burgess sought to reassure Mr Lugovoy, telling him that he was not expecting him to give untruthful answers to the relevant questions. As well as demonstrating a lack of objectivity on Mr Burgess' part, this would have tended to reduce Mr Lugovoy's reaction to false answers he was giving. Professor Bull considered that this was a factor that could have undermined the test. I agree.
¶8.143 Professor Bull also made the more general point that the very fact that, by the time of the test, Mr Lugovoy had answered questions repeatedly, over a period of years, about
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¶his alleged involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death, may have made him an unsuitable subject for a test of this type and/or on this topic. He said that Mr Lugovoy's mind and body may have become 'habituated' to denying these allegations, so that the nervous reaction to false denials that the test measures would not have been produced even if he was lying.
¶8.144 Finally, Professor Bull gave detailed evidence regarding the risk of a polygraph test being undermined by the subject of the test using countermeasures. He said that it has been recognised that people can be trained to defeat polygraph tests. In my view, this risk alone is sufficient to render this particular test valueless. Mr Lugovoy accepted that he was familiar with polygraph tests through his security work. I also bear in mind in this context his previous lengthy service in the Committee for State Security (KGB). Moreover, in the course of the test Mr Lugovoy was seen to move, which is a possible sign of countermeasures. He was told to keep still (as he had been instructed at the outset), but continued to move.
¶8.145 In my judgement, there is a very serious risk that Mr Lugovoy had been trained to defeat this polygraph test, and that he used countermeasures to do so.
¶8.146 In summary, I have no doubt that I should place no weight at all on the outcome of this test – in part because of shortcomings in the way that the test was conducted, in part because of Mr Lugovoy's unsuitability as a subject of the test, and in part because of the risk that Mr Lugovoy took deliberate steps to defeat the test.
¶8.147 Mr Emmerson did suggest at one stage that I might rely on one part of the test which suggested that Mr Lugovoy had lied in response to one of the relevant questions. In the end, rightly, he did not pursue this suggestion. I have concluded that the whole process was flawed, and it would therefore be wrong for me to rely on any part of it.
¶Contamination of Lugovoy and Kovtun and their families 8.148 It is a striking feature of the Pine Bar narrative that, as Mr Litvinenko was leaving, Mr Lugovoy invited him to shake hands with his young son, who had just arrived back at the hotel. Mr Lugovoy has referred to this incident as evidence of his innocence – surely, he has said, he would not risk his own son being contaminated?
¶8.149 The point goes further. Mr Lugovoy's wife and son slept in a contaminated bedroom at the Millennium Hotel, and sat in contaminated seats on the aircraft. Similarly, Marina Wall's flat in Hamburg was contaminated, leading her to say, "I really can't imagine that he [i.e. Mr Kovtun] would put my children in danger."21 Marina Litvinenko 3/41-43 Knuckey 7/38-44; see also Mr Knuckey's report and timeline relating to this incident: INQ019304; INQ019301 Marina Litvinenko 3/125-129 Marina Wall 32/63 Marina Wall 32/66-67 INQ016403 (pages 29-32)
¶8.150 I am prepared to assume that neither Mr Lugovoy nor Mr Kovtun would have wished to harm their loved ones. But I do not consider that this assumption is inconsistent with my conclusion that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun poisoned Mr Litvinenko with polonium 210.
¶8.151 In an article in the Sunday Times, Mr Franchetti quoted a Russian source named Mr Kondaurov, who stated:22
206"Let's for the sake of argument, assume that I had been in charge of such an operation… and let's assume Lugovoy was involved. I would have told him as
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry little as possible. Agents are used all the time without knowing the full details of an operation."
¶8.152 I think that Mr Kondaurov's analysis was sound. I regard it as likely that, whilst Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun knew that they were poisoning Mr Litvinenko, they did not know the name or the properties of the poison that they had been given to use. I note in passing that Mr Kovtun did not refer to polonium 210 in his conversation with D3.
¶8.153 Had Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun known more about the substance they were handling, I am confident that they would have dealt with it more carefully. The fact that they did not know what they were handling explains why it was splashed around in hotel bathrooms and mopped up with hotel towels that were then left in the hotel. It explains why Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy allowed their families to be contaminated. And it also, perhaps, explains Mr Kovtun's comment to his mother-in-law after Mr Litvinenko's death that, "Those arseholes have probably poisoned us all."
¶8.154 I would, however, add one further point. I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were aware that the substance that they were administering to Mr Litvinenko was a deadly poison – as opposed, say, to a truth drug or a sleeping draught. As I have found, Mr Kovtun told D3 of a plan to poison Mr Litvinenko, and explained that he was being poisoned rather than shot in order to set an example. Those comments are only consistent with a plan to kill Mr Litvinenko.
¶Indifference in Alexander Litvinenko drinking tea 8.155 A further oddity about the events in the Pine Bar is that, on the account that Mr Litvinenko himself gave to the police, Mr Lugovoy was extremely indifferent as to whether or not Mr Litvinenko should drink tea from the poisoned teapot. Mr Litvinenko's account was that Mr Lugovoy told him, "there is still some tea left here if you want you can have some".
¶8.156 If Mr Lugovoy was intent on poisoning Mr Litvinenko, wouldn't he have been keener on him drinking the tea?
¶8.157 I think that there are two answers to this question.
¶8.158 The first point is that Mr Lugovoy's conduct was quite explicable. As Mr Horwell stated in his closing submissions:
¶"Any display by either Lugovoy or Kovtun of eagerness or urgency or desperation would have appeared suspicious and counterproductive. Anything other than diffidence would have appeared very suspicious to Litvinenko and may well have brought an end to the plot to kill him. This was, after all, not the drink of the gods that was on offer at the Millennium Hotel, but an unexceptional cup of lukewarm tea. Any encouragement or enthusiasm from Lugovoy that Litvinenko should drink it would have been out of place and could have betrayed his murderous intent.
¶Lugovoy could afford to be diffident for two reasons. First, Litvinenko was very keen to do business and associate with him. Litvinenko needed no encouragement to meet Lugovoy. There would have been many other opportunities to poison him.
¶Even during that third visit to London, Lugovoy and Kovtun were due to meet
¶Litvinenko the following day,2 Marina Litvinenko 3/20-23 INQ019146 (page 14-15 paragraph 45) A translated copy of the law provided to the Solicitor to the Inquiry by the Russian Embassy in London is at INQ018962 November, at RISC Management.
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There would have been many other opportunities in the immediate future, both in London and in Spain where Lugovoy and Litvinenko were due to meet just nine days after their meeting at the Millennium Hotel.
In other words, the meeting in the Pine Bar was not the one and only opportunity Lugovoy and Kovtun were going to have to murder Litvinenko.
Secondly, of course, as far as Lugovoy and Kovtun were concerned, there was no shortage of this poison, whatever it might have been. Lugovoy had access to the very same poison in London on each of his three visits. There is no reason to suggest that it would not have been available to him in the future."23 Marina Litvinenko 3/31-35; INQ017734 (page 4 paragraph 13) Bukovsky 26/86-90; 26/109-110 Marina Litvinenko 4/11 lines 11-15 Marina Wall 32/66-67 Horwell 33/16-17 INQ016403 (page 30)
¶8.159 I agree. That is enough to dispose of this point.
¶8.160 There is, however, a second observation that I would make. I have referred above to the embarrassment that Mr Litvinenko appears to have felt at being poisoned by someone that he trusted (see paragraphs 3.133 – 3.139). Mr Shvets described the emotion as "wounded professional pride". This appears to have been the explanation for Mr Litvinenko's delay in telling his friends about the meeting with Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun on 1 November, and the fact that he continued during that period, even to his friends, to blame Mr Scaramella for the poisoning. It seems to me to be at least possible that Mr Litvinenko carried this feeling of "wounded professional pride" into his interviews with the police, and that in the course of those interviews he exaggerated Mr Lugovoy's diffidence about the tea in order to mitigate what he would have seen as his own professional error in drinking it.
¶A set up? 8.161 It has been a frequent theme of Mr Lugovoy's press interviews over the years that he has been the victim of a set up. He has stated that MI6, or perhaps some other British agency, must have killed Mr Litvinenko and then spread a trail of polonium in order to incriminate him and Mr Kovtun.
¶8.162 I will deal with this point shortly.
¶8.163 It is worth reflecting on what this allegation entails. Leaving to one side the allegation that Mr Litvinenko was murdered by British officials, a set up of the kind alleged by Mr Lugovoy would have necessitated a series of public and private places in London and beyond being deliberately contaminated with radioactive material. It would have been a complex, expensive and extremely risky operation. Very large numbers of people would have been put at risk.
¶8.164 I will simply say that in all the oral evidence that I have heard during this process, in all the many thousands of pages of documents that I have seen, I have not come across anything that would even begin to substantiate the claims of a set up made by Mr Lugovoy. On the other hand, I have seen plentiful evidence that is wholly inconsistent with Mr Lugovoy's claims. That evidence, much of which I have attempted to summarise above, clearly establishes that, far from being set up, Mr Lugovoy did in fact, with Mr Kovtun, poison Mr Litvinenko.
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209¶Part 9: Who directed the killing? Chapter 1: Introduction 9.1 I have made the finding that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun.
¶9.2 However, this immediately raises a further question. There is no evidence at all that either Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun had any personal reason to kill Mr Litvinenko. Mr Lugovoy may have commented after Mr Litvinenko's death that he regarded Mr Litvinenko as a traitor, but I do not think for a moment that that feeling on its own would have been sufficient to motivate Mr Lugovoy to plan and conduct the protracted and costly operation against Mr Litvinenko that I have outlined above. Moreover, had Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun been acting on their own behalf, it seems highly unlikely that they would have had access to the polonium 210 that they used to poison Mr Litvinenko. All the evidence points in one direction, namely that, when they killed Mr Litvinenko, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were acting on behalf of someone else.
¶9.3 This Part will address the question of who directed Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to kill Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.4 The structure of this Part will be as follows.
¶9.5 In Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I will consider whether any of the individuals and organisations listed at paragraphs 17, 19,20 Zakayev 26/137-138; 26/140-141 Berezovsky v RTR & Terluk [2010] EWHC 476 (QB); Terluk v Berezovsky [2011] EWCA Civ 1534 INQ001788 (pages 21-22 paragraphs 127-128) Marina Wall 32/58 Bull 21/213-256 INQ006067 (page 5 paragraph 31) and 21 of the List of Issues (see Appendix 3) (i.e. Boris Berezovsky, United Kingdom (UK) intelligence agencies, organised crime groups, Mario Scaramella, Chechen groups and Alexander Talik) had any involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.6 In Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8, Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 I will analyse the evidence relating to various aspects of the issue at paragraph 18 of the List of Issues – the possible involvement of Russian State agencies in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.7 In Chapter 11 I will set out my conclusions on the issue of Russian State responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.8 In Chapter 12 I will address one further issue, namely whether Nikolai Patrushev (the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in 2006) and/or President Putin bear any responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.9 The factual content of these chapters will be drawn from the open evidence (I have analysed the closed evidence in Part 7). I stress, however, that, as with Part 8, the findings that I make below will be based on both the open and the closed evidence that I have heard.
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¶Chapter 2: Boris Berezovsky
¶9.10 There are two points to note about the suggestion that it was Mr Berezovsky who was ultimately responsible for ordering the killing of Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.11 The first point is that the motive that his accusers have always ascribed to Mr Berezovsky for wishing Mr Litvinenko dead is a fear of blackmail at the hands of his protégé. I have addressed the question of a rift between Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky, and the suggestion that Mr Litvinenko may have been blackmailing Mr Berezovsky, or planning to do so, in Part 5 above.
¶9.12 I am satisfied that Mr Litvinenko was not blackmailing Mr Berezovsky. Even if he did occasionally make comments suggesting taking some form of action against Mr Berezovsky (for example, the comments related by Dr Svetlichnaya and the conversation at the Golden Dragon related by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun), I am quite satisfied that these were never put into effect. It is clear from the evidence that I have heard that it was not unusual for Mr Litvinenko to propose courses of action in conversation with friends and associates that never subsequently came to anything. Mr Litvinenko and Mr Berezovsky remained friends until the end of Mr Litvinenko's life. There was no blackmail, and therefore no motive for Mr Berezovsky to have Mr Litvinenko killed.
¶9.13 The second point is that the allegation that Mr Berezovsky was responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death is one that has been actively canvassed by Mr Lugovoy himself. Mr Lugovoy has not suggested that he killed Mr Litvinenko on Mr Berezovsky's behalf. Rather, Mr Lugovoy's argument has always been that he was not involved at all and that it was Mr Berezovsky who was responsible, perhaps with others, for the killing.
¶9.14 But I have now made the finding that it was Mr Lugovoy, with Mr Kovtun, who killed Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.15 There is no evidence at all that Mr Lugovoy might have been acting on Mr Berezovsky's behalf, and that hypothesis is inconsistent with the actions of both men since Mr Litvinenko's death. It is unlikely that Mr Lugovoy would have blamed Mr Berezovsky if he had been acting on his behalf when he poisoned Mr Litvinenko. As to Mr Berezovsky, I heard evidence from Mr Cotlick, his former personal assistant, that following Mr Litvinenko's death he spoke to Mr Lugovoy on the telephone and encouraged him to come to London and stand trial. He told Mr Lugovoy that he "could rely on the English justice system, and if he was really innocent, this would be found out by the court." He even offered to pay Mr Lugovoy's legal expenses.1 This is all wholly inconsistent with the idea that in fact Mr Lugovoy killed Mr Litvinenko on Mr Berezovsky's behalf.
¶9.16 In summary, I am quite satisfied that Mr Berezovsky bore no responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.1 Marina Litvinenko 3/19-20; INQ017734 (page 2 paragraph 6) Goldfarb 26/123; Emmerson 1/147 INQ022399 Cotlick 25/64
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¶Chapter 3: UK intelligence agencies 9.17 The allegation that UK intelligence agencies were responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death is of a piece with the 'set up' issue that I have addressed in Part 8 above. Mr Lugovoy, for example, has advanced this allegation in the following terms:2
"I was framed. I suspect this was some British intelligence operation involving Litvinenko and possibly Berezovsky that went wrong. I was contaminated by Litvinenko or someone else, not the other way round. I think polonium was planted on us and left in places we visited, to frame us."
¶9.18 I repeat what I have said at paragraphs 8.161 – 8.164 above. I heard no evidence to support this allegation.
¶9.19 I am entirely satisfied that UK intelligence agencies, and for that matter UK government bodies more generally, played no part at all in Mr Litvinenko's death.2 Marina Litvinenko 3/20-23 INQ019146 (page 14-15 paragraph 45) A translated copy of the law provided to the Solicitor to the Inquiry by the Russian Embassy in London is at INQ018962 HMG000175 (pages 9-10)
212¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 4: Organised crime
¶9.20 As I have described above, the fight against organised crime had been one of Mr Litvinenko's preoccupations since the start of his career in the Committee for State Security (KGB). His investigations into the activity of Russian crime gangs, and in particular the Tambov/Malyshev group based in St Petersburg, also revealed to him the extent of the collusion (as he saw it) between organised crime and members, including senior members, of the FSB.
¶9.21 Mr Litvinenko sought to expose these links, in particular in his book The Gang from the Lubyanka, which contained detailed allegations of collusion between FSB officers and organised crime.
¶9.22 Further, Mr Litvinenko passed information to the Mitrokhin Commission alleging that Semion Mogilevich, apparently one of the leaders of Russian organised crime, was an FSB agent with a longstanding personal relationship with President Putin.
¶9.23 Finally, I have also heard evidence that towards the end of his life Mr Litvinenko was assisting the Spanish authorities with investigations that they were conducting against members of Russian organised crime groups, and that he thought it possible that he might give evidence against them in court.
¶9.24 It follows from this short summary that a theory that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun killed Mr Litvinenko on the orders of one or more members of Russian crime gangs would not be implausible.
¶9.25 That theory, however, is not supported by the evidence that is available to me. Detective Inspector (DI) Mascall stated that the police investigation has not uncovered any evidence linking Mr Mogilevich directly to the poisoning.3 More broadly, none of the evidence suggests that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were commissioned to kill Mr Litvinenko by members of crime gangs. More than that, I am satisfied for reasons that I shall describe below that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun in fact received their instructions from another source.3 Marina Litvinenko 3/23-24 HMG000358 (page 3) INQ022399 (pages 23-24) Mascall 29/83-85
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¶Chapter 5: Mario Scaramella, Chechen groups,
¶Alexander Talik 9.26 There were a number of reasons why it was thought at one stage that Mr Scaramella may have been involved in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.27 First, there were the simple factual points that the two men met on the day that Mr Litvinenko fell ill, and that the itsu restaurant where the meeting took place was found to be contaminated. I am satisfied that the timing of this meeting was a pure coincidence, and that there was nothing sinister about it. It was no coincidence that they went to the itsu restaurant on Piccadilly – I have heard that it was one of Mr Litvinenko's favourite places. However, as I have explained (see paragraph 6.292 above), the contamination that was found there was centred on a table different to that at which Mr Litvinenko and Mr Scaramella sat on 1 November 2006.
¶9.28 Second, initial tests indicated that Mr Scaramella was himself heavily contaminated with polonium 210. As Dr Harrison explained in evidence, however, the results of these tests were unreliable.4 Mr Scaramella was not in fact contaminated at all.
¶9.29 Third, in the early days of his illness Mr Litvinenko himself suggested that Mr Scaramella may have been the person who poisoned him. I do not believe, however, that Mr Litvinenko ever thought this to have been true. As I have explained above, his early suggestion that Mr Scaramella may have poisoned him was in part the result of a desire not to admit to friends that he had allowed Mr Lugovoy to get close to him, and, in part, one element in a deliberate scheme to try and lure Mr Lugovoy back to the UK.
¶9.30 Mr Scaramella clearly regarded Mr Litvinenko as a friend. He had no motive to kill him. Giving evidence to the Inquiry, DI Mascall stated that the police had no evidence to suggest that Mr Scaramella was involved in Mr Litvinenko's death.5
¶9.31 The limit of the allegations made against Mr Scaramella was that it was he who had poisoned Mr Litvinenko on 1 November 2006. For the reasons set out above, I am quite satisfied that Mr Scaramella had no responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death. I am, of course, fortified in this conclusion by the finding that I have already made that it was Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun who poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.32 The List of Issues was drawn up at an early stage of the inquest proceedings, and adopted with only a few changes for the purposes of the Inquiry. As the case developed, it became apparent that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that either Chechen groups or Mr Talik had been involved in Mr Litvinenko's death.4 Marina Litvinenko 3/24-25; INQ017734 (page 3 paragraph 7); there are some small points of difference between this evidence and Mr Litvinenko's own account, given without an interpreter at the first session of his November 2006 police interviews – INQ002076 (page 3) HMG000353 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 67) Mascall 22/135 Harrison 19/67-73 5 Mascall 29/79-82
214¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 6: Russian State responsibility – introduction 9.33 A great deal of the evidence that I have heard in the course of the Inquiry has touched on the possibility that one or more organisations of the Russian State may have ordered Mr Litvinenko's killing, or that they may otherwise have been involved or complicit in his death. That issue has been referred to, both during the course of the Inquiry and in this Report, as the issue, of Russian State responsibility.
¶9.34 In the following chapters I will address the following themes in the evidence relating to possible Russian State responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death:
¶9.35 In chapter 7 I will consider the evidence that Russia was the source of the polonium 210 that killed Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.36 In chapter 8 I will consider the motives that the Russian State may have had for wishing Mr Litvinenko dead, and evidence that I heard as to the history of other killings and deaths of opponents of President Putin.
¶9.37 In chapter 9 I will consider the evidence of links between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun and the Russian State.
¶9.38 In chapter 10 I will consider events that have taken place since Mr Litvinenko's death, and what inferences may be drawn from them.
¶9.39 In chapter 11 I will set out my conclusions on the question of whether any Russian State organisation was responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.40 In chapter 12, I will address the further question of whether Nikolai Patrushev (the head of the FSB in 2006) and/or President Putin bear any responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.41 One witness about whom I should say a little more at this stage is Professor Robert Service, who was until recently Professor of Russian History at Oxford University. I have already referred to his evidence on a number of occasions. Professor Service was instructed by the Inquiry to provide expert evidence on Russian history and politics. He produced two reports, both of which I adduced in evidence.6 He also gave oral evidence at the Inquiry hearings.7
¶9.42 For the avoidance of any doubt, Professor Service did not have access to any of the closed material and was not involved in the closed hearings. It follows from this that the material that is available to me and upon which I am able to base my findings is more extensive than the material upon which Professor Service based his views.
¶9.43 I say at once that I found Professor Service to be a most impressive and helpful witness. His mastery of the subject was apparent, but just as notable – and of great assistance to me – was the conspicuous care that he took in highlighting the issues where the limited nature of the source material available to him meant that he was unable to express a decided view one way or the other.6 Marina Litvinenko 3/27-29; 4/80 INQ017734 (page 10, paragraph 34); Marina Litvinenko 3/137 lines 4-11 Berezovsky 25/26 lines 9-20 Reilly 10/61 INQ019146; INQ020316; INQ020998 7 Service 28/1-104
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¶9.44 The paucity of the public information relating to the inner workings of President Putin's administration was, indeed, a theme of Professor Service's evidence. As he put the matter: "It cannot be emphasised too heavily that public access to information about Russian politics has undergone a severe constriction since Vladimir Putin's accession to Presidential power in 2000."8 Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61
¶9.45 As I have indicated, there were occasions in the course of his evidence where Professor Service stated that the lack of public information in respect of an issue meant that he was unable to express a view about it. He suggested, moreover, that there were reasons going beyond academic or judicial rigour why this Inquiry ought to be careful to restrict its conclusions to matters that were provable on the evidence before it. He said this:9
"But we have to be really cautious – and there's another aspect of this that exercises me, and that's that Russians want to see us fairly going through evidence in a scholarly environment or a judicial environment or an Inquiry like this in a fashion that they know doesn't happen in their own country. So we must not sink at all below our conventional standards. We absolutely mustn't, because some of what we do in relation to this Inquiry will get back to Moscow, and we must not give them the opportunity to say that we failed to respect our own standards because those are standards that are really worth keeping to."
¶I wholeheartedly endorse these sentiments, which accurately reflect my approach to the evidence.8 Goldfarb 26/28-35 Bukovsky 26/95-96 INQ018943 Horwell 33/61 INQ019146 (page 4 paragraph 9)9 Marina Litvinenko 3/3-6 HMG000078 INQ019146 (page 22 paragraph 68) Cotlick 25/76-81 Service 28/62
216¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 7: Russian State responsibility – the source of the polonium 210 9.46 It is self evident that the isotope polonium 210 is a very rare substance. I also heard evidence that the isotope is difficult to produce and dangerous to handle. Moreover, whilst polonium 210 is routinely manufactured and sold commercially, it is only publicly available in minute quantities that are embedded within sealed containers.
¶9.47 Since polonium 210 is such a rare and specialised commodity, the question arises as to whether evidence relating to the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko might assist in establishing responsibility for his death. Can the source of the polonium 210 be traced? If so, what inferences can be drawn?
¶9.48 I received valuable evidence on these issues from Professor Norman Dombey. Professor Dombey was Professor of Theoretical Physics at the University of Sussex from 1989 until his retirement in 2003, and since that time has been Emeritus Professor. He has extensive experience in the field of nuclear physics. He also has a level of practical knowledge, in part through his international contacts, about the production of polonium 210 in Russia. In August 2007 Professor Dombey wrote a review of Death of a Dissident in the London Review of Books.10 Following that, he was commissioned by Alex Goldfarb to prepare an expert report for the purposes of the claim brought by Marina Litvinenko before the European Court of Human Rights. That report was dated 12 November 2007.11 Professor Dombey thereafter provided a supplementary report for the purposes of this Inquiry,12 and also attended to give oral evidence.13
¶9.49 A certain amount of the evidence relating to the possible source of the polonium 210 was uncontroversial.
¶9.50 It is not in any doubt that polonium 210 is, and was, throughout the relevant period, manufactured in Russia for commercial purposes. Professor Dombey assisted me by providing detailed evidence about this industry.14 He explained that the programme of polonium 210 production in Russia uses facilities at two former closed cities, both of which were initially established in connection with the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It was his understanding that all Russian production of polonium 210 came from this programme.15
¶9.51 The process by which large scale production of polonium 210 is undertaken was described in evidence by both Professor Dombey and witness A1.
¶9.52 Put shortly, a target of bismuth 209, which is a stable isotope, is inserted into a reactor where it is bombarded with neutrons. During the bombardment, bismuth 209 atoms capture neutrons and thereby become bismuth 210 atoms. Bismuth 210 is an unstable isotope, which decays by emitting a beta particle, so that one of its neutrons changes into a proton. That converts the bismuth 210 atom into a polonium 210 atom. When the target is removed from the reactor, a process has to be undertaken to isolate
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¶or remove the polonium 210 that has been created in this way from the remaining bismuth target.
¶9.53 Professor Dombey explained that in the Russian production programme the first stage of this process – i.e. the irradiation of the bismuth target – takes place in a nuclear reactor at the Mayak facility (formerly known as Chelyabinsk), near Ozersk. The second stage of the manufacturing process, i.e. the recovery of polonium 210 from the irradiated bismuth, is undertaken at a special production plant at the Avangard facility in Sarov (formerly known as Arzamas-16).16 For convenience, I shall refer to this production programme as 'the Avangard programme'.
¶9.54 Professor Dombey stated that the Avangard programme manufactured 0.8 grams of polonium 210 every month, and that this entire amount was routinely exported to the USA.17
¶9.55 He further explained that on arrival in the USA, the polonium 210 was split and placed in tiny amounts into sealed sources that were then sold for use in devices such as anti-static guns.
¶9.56 The police made enquiries into the export of polonium from Russia to the USA, and DI Mascall gave evidence about the results of those enquiries.18 His evidence was consistent with the more detailed evidence given by Professor Dombey.
¶9.57 It follows from all of this (and again, I think that this is uncontroversial) that Russia, i.e. the Avangard programme, could unquestionably have been the source of the polonium 210 ingested by Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.58 However, during the course of the Inquiry, various lines of evidence and argument were raised which, potentially at least, took the matter further. The logic of these different theories was that the polonium 210 used to kill Mr Litvinenko either probably came, or even must have come, from Russia.
¶9.59 Taken at their highest, these lines of evidence, which are independent of each other, suggested that there might be a direct link between the polonium 210 ingested by Mr Litvinenko and Russia as its place of production. Evidence was called in relation to each of these theories, and I shall address them in turn below.
¶Forensic matching/fingerprinting of polonium 210 samples 9.60 In Death of a Dissident, the book that they published in 2007, Alex Goldfarb and Marina Litvinenko advanced what has been described as a 'fingerprint' theory, suggesting that every batch of commercially produced polonium 210 contains characteristic and detectable impurities, by which it can subsequently be traced and identified. What they said was as follows:19
¶"When Polonium-210 decays – its half-life is 138 days, meaning that half of any given amount decays in the first 138 days, followed by a fourth in the next 138 days, and so on – it turns into lead, a nonradioactive metal. As the amount of polonium decreases, the amount of lead increases. By measuring the proportion of
218¶The Litvinenko Inquiry lead in a sample of polonium, an investigator can figure out how old the sample is and establish the precise date it was produced. Moreover, the production process leaves characteristic isotope impurities in every batch. By comparing the lead content and the impurities present in two samples of polonium, an investigator should be able to say whether they came from the same batch, produced in the same laboratory on the same day.
¶Samples of Russian polonium have presumably been available to British law enforcement from American sources. The Polonium-210 found in Sasha's body has by now undoubtedly been checked against the Polonium-210 exported to the
¶United States. From the level of lead and the isotope composition, the investigators should have been able to unequivocally establish the batch and production date of the poison. ..."
¶9.61 A similar argument was advanced by Professor Dombey in a written Declaration that he signed in November 2007.20
¶9.62 It will be seen that this 'fingerprint' theory is founded on two premises.
¶9.63 The first premise is that all commercially produced polonium 210 contains detectable impurities that vary from reactor to reactor, so that these impurities amount to a unique signature that can be used to identify the reactor used to manufacture any particular sample of polonium 210.
¶9.64 The second premise is that analysis of the lead content of a sample of polonium 210 can be used to calculate the precise date on which it was manufactured.
¶9.65 A1 addressed both these issues in her report dated 26 June 2013,21 and also in her oral evidence.22
¶9.66 A1 rejected the first premise. She explained that a sample of commercially produced polonium 210 had been analysed at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and found to be entirely pure. There were no signature impurities. In her report, A1 described the process of irradiating bismuth 209 by which the commercial production of polonium 210 is undertaken. She then continued:23
¶"The final product is pure Polonium 210. The fact that Polonium 210 can be made free of detectable gamma emitting radionuclides was demonstrated at AWE by conducting a gamma spectrometric analysis of a sample of commercially available
¶Polonium 210. The single gamma active peak was observed at 803 keV attributable to Polonium 210. The other gamma peaks observed in the spectra were due to alpha and neutron activation of the packaging and detector system generated by the alpha particles interacting with the containment vessel, and the intrinsic background of the detector system. No gamma peaks were attributed to likely impurities in the Polonium 210.
¶As the only radionuclide detected in the commercial sample was Polonium 210 it is not possible to derive ratios that can be used as a distinguishing radionuclide fingerprint for different 'batches' of Polonium 210.
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No radionuclides other than Polonium 210 were identified by gamma counting of the exhibits supplied by MPS once peaks due to detector background system were removed. Thus the exhibits also had no fingerprint to distinguish the polonium 210."
¶9.67 It follows that the first premise for the 'fingerprint' theory that I have set out above is flawed and must be rejected.
¶9.68 Turning to the second premise, A1 accepted that the age (and, therefore, the manufacture date) of a sample of polonium 210 could in principle be calculated by reference to the lead content in the sample. She referred in this context to the equation that is used to make this calculation. However, A1 also added a number of important qualifications.
¶9.69 First, she explained that due to the form of the equation and the expected uncertainties of the measurements, it is only possible to use this method to determine the age of polonium 210 samples up to seven months old. Beyond that period, the changes in the amount of lead become too small for reliable calculations to be performed.
¶9.70 Second, A1 said that even for samples still within the first seven months of manufacture, this process cannot provide an exact date of manufacture. Rather, she explained, the process can only be relied upon to differentiate between samples manufactured at least 13 or 14 days apart. As A1 explained in her report, it followed that: "if two batches of Polonium 210 were purified on two consecutive days or even ten days apart this could not be differentiated by analysis of Lead 206".24
¶9.71 Turning from the limits of this process in theory to its limits in practice, A1 stated that most of the exhibits in the present case were not suitable for age dating in any event because they had been heated and/or cleaned after the date of contamination, which would have rendered the dating process unreliable.
¶9.72 In summary, the claims made about the 'fingerprint' theory in the passage from Death of a Dissident that I have quoted above are not supported by the expert scientific evidence that I have heard. The analysis conducted at AWE does not support the assertion that all commercially produced batches of polonium 210 have characteristic impurities, and although there is a process by which such samples can be aged by reference to their lead content, the process is far from precise and in any event the samples in this case had not been sufficiently well preserved to enable meaningful calculations to be made.
¶The Potemkin evidence 9.73 This issue arises from evidence given by Mr Goldfarb about information and documents that he received in unusual circumstances from a man calling himself Alexei Potemkin.
¶9.74 Mr Goldfarb provided lengthy written evidence about this issue and also answered some questions about it when he gave oral evidence.25 The tale that Mr Goldfarb related was a complicated one, and I will summarise it as briefly as I can.
¶9.75 Mr Goldfarb explained that he had first been contacted by Mr Potemkin in June 2010, by email. Thereafter they had exchanged several emails. In the first instance,
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¶Mr Potemkin had merely stated that he had information connected with the polonium in the Litvinenko case. In due course, he became more forthcoming. He said that he was a Major in the FSB who was living as an undercover agent of the Russian government in Austria. He also said that he could provide information as to how the polonium that had been used to poison Mr Litvinenko had been transported to the UK from Russia, and that he had in fact been part of the transportation chain.
¶9.76 Mr Goldfarb described what he did next. He continued to communicate with Mr Potemkin, as well as informing the police about the information that he had received. In August 2010 Mr Goldfarb met Mr Potemkin in Innsbruck. The two met on further occasions later that year.
¶9.77 Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that in 2004 he had been assigned by the FSB to travel to Austria and claim asylum as a deserter from the Russian army, and thereafter to live in Austria as a refugee, with a view to monitoring the large population of Chechen refugees present in that country. He said that he now wished to live in the UK, and that he was willing to provide the UK authorities with sensitive information and documents in order to facilitate this.
¶9.78 The story that Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb about his involvement in the Litvinenko case was brief. He said that in 2006 a courier from the FSB had delivered to him a sealed container with radioactive markings. He had believed that it contained polonium 210. He had been instructed to put the container in a locker at Innsbruck railway station and to hide the key in a prearranged place in the station. He said that he had done this.
¶9.79 Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that the courier who had given him the package was not an FSB officer, but a Chechen freelancer whom he knew only as Sultan. He believed that Sultan was involved in arms and drugs smuggling as well as working for the FSB. Mr Potemkin said that Sultan had also been involved in a previous shipment of radioactive material in 2004.
¶9.80 Mr Potemkin's account was that when he received the container in 2006, he put it in the locker at the railway station and never saw it again. He did not open the container, nor did he see any transit documents. He said that he believed the package contained polonium 210 on account of the markings that it bore; he said that he had previously dealt with shipments of polonium 210 in 2002 as a member of a Russian special forces unit.
¶9.81 Mr Goldfarb produced several documents that he said Mr Potemkin had given to him. For most of the documents, Mr Goldfarb provided both a copy of the Russian original and also an English translation. Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that these documents had been obtained in Moscow by a man named Sergei Ploshkin, who he said was his former superior officer in the FSB.
¶9.82 I do not propose to set out the detailed contents of these documents. I have adduced all the documents into evidence and they are available on the Inquiry website.26 In summary, the key documents appear to evidence a consignment of radioactive material, possibly polonium 210, being transferred in August 2006 from Balakovo Atomic Power Station in Russia to the FSB Research Institute in Moscow. There is
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¶a further document dated 17 September 2006,27 which records FSB orders relating to the delivery to Mr Potemkin of material described only as 'Chemistry', as well as documents and currency. On the document, the purpose of this delivery is stated to be: "for carrying out further activities related to investigation, possible neutralization and return to RF of certain members of Chechen ethnic criminal groups in position Austria". The document further states that; "further instructions related to the material "Chemistry" will be given to [Mr Potemkin] via existing channels of communication". Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb that he received his further orders to put the container in a locker at the railway station through "communication channels".
¶9.83 In his witness statement dated 20 May 2013,28 Mr Goldfarb stated that he had stayed in touch with Mr Potemkin since 2010 in order to facilitate meetings with the police and also with a journalist. He also referred to the fact that Mr Potemkin had recently been convicted in Austria for fraud; he reported the explanation that Mr Potemkin had given him for this conviction, namely that he had in effect been set up by the FSB.
¶9.84 In the same statement, Mr Goldfarb recorded his own views as to the reliability of the account that Mr Potemkin had given. He said this:
¶"While I felt obliged to report Potemkin's story to the police, I am of two minds about his credibility. On the one hand, his story is too sophisticated, elaborate and detailed to be a simpleminded hoax. On a more personal level, he left a positive impression, both on me and on two seasoned journalists that I brought to interview him. On the other hand, there are inconsistencies in his story, which he could never explain, and the documents that he provided, raised many questions. With the revelation of the Austrian fraud case, I became even more doubtful whether
¶Potemkin should be believed. I defer final judgment to the police."
¶9.85 In his oral evidence to me at the Inquiry hearings, Mr Goldfarb adopted very much the same line. He said that the story "may be true, it may be false". He added that he had reservations stemming both from inconsistencies in Mr Potemkin's account and from the fraud conviction.29
¶9.86 I have reached the clear view that I should not place any weight on the evidence emanating from Mr Potemkin. Put very briefly, the uncertainties both about the substance of his evidence and about his credibility are so great that the only proper course I can take is to disregard this material in its entirety. My more detailed reasons are as follows.
¶9.87 First, there are real doubts about Mr Potemkin's credibility. He is, on his own account, both a man who has spent years working as an undercover agent informing on those around him, and also a man who has more recently betrayed his own organisation. This is not a promising starting point, and the position has been compounded by Mr Potemkin's conviction on fraud charges. It does not follow from any of these matters, of course, that the story Mr Potemkin told Mr Goldfarb is untruthful. But, given this context, I am bound to approach Mr Potemkin's evidence with great caution. It does not assist in this respect that I have not heard him give evidence, and am not therefore in a position to form an independent view of his reliability.
222¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.88 Second, Mr Potemkin's account is on any view far fetched. Again, that does not of course mean that he is lying. But there are many further questions to which I would have needed an answer before being sufficiently confident to conclude that the extraordinary story that he has told is true. To give only a few examples, if the container was to be brought to Innsbruck by Sultan and left in a locker at the railway station, why did Mr Potemkin need to be involved at all? Why couldn't Sultan have left the container at the station? On a further point, how confident was Mr Potemkin that the package contained polonium 210? How did his earlier special forces experience assist him in identifying the contents of this package? Did the markings on the package specifically state that it contained polonium 210, and if not, how did Mr Potemkin know that it did not contain (for example) some other radioactive material? Finally, why did Mr Potemkin's (presumably secret) orders state that he was to receive this package in connection with: "carrying out further activities related to investigation, possible neutralization and return to RF of certain members of Chechen ethnic criminal groups" ? On the account that he has given, this would appear to be simply inaccurate.
¶9.89 Third and in any event, I observe that even if Mr Potemkin's account was to be accepted in its entirety, it would be of only limited assistance to this Inquiry. Put at its highest, the account amounts to evidence that in September 2006 the FSB was clandestinely moving a package of polonium 210 around Europe as far as Innsbruck. There is no evidence to connect the container that Mr Potemkin claims to have deposited in a locker at Innsbruck station with London, Mr Litvinenko – or, for example, with Mr Lugovoy or Mr Kovtun.
¶Professor Dombey's analysis 9.90 When he gave his oral evidence to the Inquiry, Professor Dombey appeared to advance an argument that was both simple and, if true, of great significance to this case.
¶9.91 In summary, this argument was (a) that the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have been made in Russia, since the Mayak/Avangard facilities were the only place in the world in which the quantity of polonium used on 1 November 2006 could have been made; and (b) that since the facilities at Mayak and Avangard were controlled by the Russian State, any diversion of the polonium 210 produced there must have been authorised by state officials. Unsurprisingly, some emphasis was placed on this evidence by Mr Emmerson in his closing statement.
¶9.92 There were a number of steps to Professor Dombey's reasoning, which I will address in turn. After the conclusion of the Inquiry hearings, A1 produced a further statement in which she gave her own opinion on several of these points, and Professor Dombey responded by way of a further statement.30 I am grateful both to A1 and to Professor Dombey for their assistance in this regard; the further written material that they have provided has been of considerable assistance in resolving this issue.
¶The amount of polonium 210 that was used 9.93 Professor Dombey estimated that at least 50 micrograms of polonium 210 was put into the teapot at the Millennium Hotel on the afternoon of 1 November 2006. His reasoning was that the 4.4GBq that Mr Litvinenko was considered to have ingested equated to 26.5 micrograms, and the higher figure of 50 micrograms was chosen
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¶as a conservative estimate to allow for the extra polonium 210 that had been in the teapot but which Mr Litvinenko had not ingested, i.e. the polonium 210 mixed with the unpoured tea in the pot and the undrunk tea in the cup.31
¶9.94 A1 agreed with Professor Dombey's calculation.32
¶9.95 I note at this stage that, given the findings I have already made both as to the fact that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned on 1 November by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, and as to the fact that they had been responsible for the other deposits of polonium 210 found, for example, at the Erinys offices, in room 107 of the Best Western Hotel and in room 848 of the Sheraton Hotel, the amount of polonium 210 that they must have had available to them over the period 16 October to 1 November 2006 was in fact considerably in excess of 50 micrograms.
¶Could the polonium 210 have been extracted from uranium or anti-static devices? 9.96 Professor Dombey next considered the process by which whoever poisoned Mr Litvinenko (on my findings, Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun) might have obtained the hypothetical quantity of 50 micrograms of polonium 210.
¶9.97 He discounted two sources from which, at least in theory, the polonium 210 might have come.
¶9.98 First, he stated that it would have been extremely impractical to extract that quantity of polonium 210 from uranium ore.33 A1 agreed with Professor Dombey on this point.34 This possibility can therefore be dismissed.
¶9.99 Professor Dombey next considered the possibility that a quantity of 50 micrograms of polonium 210 might have been amassed by breaking down commercially produced anti-static devices containing very small amounts of polonium 210. He calculated that it would have been necessary to extract the polonium 210 from about 450 such sources in order to make up this amount. In his written evidence, Professor Dombey expressed the view that any bulk purchase (or bulk theft) of that number of these devices would have been noticed.35 He also observed that the extraction of polonium 210 from these devices would have been extremely dangerous without specialist training and equipment. It was this factor that he emphasised in his oral evidence, stating that, "it certainly would be impossible for a thief or a gang to extract Polonium 210 from these samples".36 He therefore excluded this possibility on those two grounds.
¶9.100 A1 did not consider herself competent to express a view on whether the loss or theft of 450 or so devices would have been noticed, in particular since the total production of such devices could have been numbered in the millions per month. But she did provide some additional reasoning regarding this possible source of the polonium 210. She stated:37
224¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
"In my view, there is a different and entirely independent reason why it is extremely unlikely that the Po-210 used to poison Mr Litvinenko was obtained by extraction from such devices. When these devices are manufactured, the Po-210 is bonded to a substrate, as Prof Dombey describes. Whilst it is possible that Po-210 could be extracted there is also the possibility of cross-contamination from impurities. Such impurities would be detectable on analysis. However, the Po-210 used to poison Mr Litvinenko was of extremely high purity, and I think that this fact excludes the possibility that it was extracted from such devices."
¶9.101 Having excluded these two possible sources, Professor Dombey and A1 were agreed that the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have been obtained directly from a supply manufactured in a reactor through the process (that I have described above) of irradiating bismuth. Professor Dombey added that since the polonium 210 in question must have been soluble, it must have been transported, "in metallic form, or something similar".38
¶9.102 A1 and Professor Dombey took different views, however, regarding the type of reactor in which the polonium 210 at issue in this case must or could have been produced. It is to that question that I now turn.
¶Which reactor(s) could have been used to produce the polonium 210? 9.103 As I have indicated above, at the time that he gave oral evidence to the Inquiry, it appeared to be Professor Dombey's analysis that the only place where the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko could have been produced was at the Mayak and Avangard facilities in Russia.
¶9.104 The starting point for Professor Dombey's argument was his contention that, as a matter of fact, the Avangard programme was the only commercial producer of polonium 210 in the world. Beyond that, he argued that the Lyudmila reactor at Mayak was one of only a handful of reactors worldwide that were sufficiently powerful to irradiate the quantities of bismuth 209 needed to produce the 50 micrograms (or, more likely, more) of polonium 210 involved here.
¶9.105 Professor Dombey listed the other high power reactors – located in places such as the UK, Canada and India – and gave evidence that these reactors were not used to produce polonium 210. He supported this evidence with documentary evidence to a similar effect. Professor Dombey accepted that less powerful research reactors could be used to irradiate bismuth and thereby make polonium 210, but he said that these reactors were limited to making far smaller amounts of polonium 210 than the 50 microgram quantity in play here.
¶9.106 This led him to the conclusion that the polonium that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have been produced at the Avangard programme.
¶9.107 A1 took issue with this analysis. She accepted (more accurately, she said she had no reason to doubt) that the Avangard programme was the only commercial producer of polonium 210 in the world. She did not agree, however, that the reactors on Professor Dombey's list of high power reactors were the only reactors capable of producing a quantity of 50 micrograms of polonium 210. In fact, A1 contended that the characteristic of a reactor that was of most relevance to its use for the production of polonium 210
225¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
¶was not its thermal power, but rather its neutron flux39 (a point to which Professor Dombey had alluded in the course of his oral evidence).40
¶9.108 A1 expressed the view that very many research reactors had a sufficient level of neutron flux to produce 50 micrograms of polonium 210 by means of irradiating bismuth 209. Moreover, she said that the process involved was relatively straightforward. She stated that, because the bismuth target can be inserted into a reactor core in place of a fuel rod, "it would be easily possible to insert a bismuth target ... into very many reactors."41 INQ017734 (pages 7-8 paragraph 23) INQ014928 Shvets 24/65 Mascall 9/35-37 INQ022423 (page 7 paragraph 30)
¶9.109 Witness A1 summarised her opinion on this issue in these terms:42
¶"I therefore think that on a technical level, it would be entirely possible for the quantity of Po-210 under consideration to have been produced in many reactors.
¶All that would be required is an appropriate bismuth target, access to a suitable reactor for an appropriate period of time, and suitable facilities with appropriate radiological protection for the relatively simple chemical process of isolating the
¶Po-210 from the irradiated bismuth target. While it is of course possible that the
¶Po-210 was simply diverted from that which is routinely produced at Avangard, I do not agree with Prof Dombey that that must have been the source of this Po-210."
¶9.110 In the further statement that he provided in response to A1's statement, Professor Dombey clarified his position. He stated that, although he regarded it as "highly likely" that the polonium 210 that had been used to kill Mr Litvinenko had been prepared at the Avangard facility, he accepted that it was "possible to envisage circumstances" in which it could have been prepared elsewhere. It seems to me that this clarification of his position by Professor Dombey means that there is no material difference of opinion on this issue between him and A1. They share the view that the polonium 210 that killed Mr Litvinenko could have been produced at Avangard (and it is fair to say that Professor Dombey puts the matter considerably higher than that). Crucially, however, they also both accept that the polonium 210 could in principle have been made somewhere entirely different, including a research reactor outside Russia.
¶Conclusion 9.111 My conclusion, for the reasons that I have set out above, is that none of these theories or lines of evidence relating to the source of the polonium 210 that was used to kill Mr Litvinenko amount to a secure basis for me to conclude, without more evidence, that the polonium 210 in question either must have come, or even probably came, from Russia.
¶9.112 That does not mean that the fact that polonium 210 was used to poison Mr Litvinenko is of no significance to the question of responsibility for his death.
¶9.113 First, the use of polonium 210 is at the very least a strong indicator of state involvement. That is in part simply because ordinary criminals might have been expected to use a more straightforward, less sophisticated means of killing. It is also because, on the evidence, the polonium 210 used to kill Mr Litvinenko must have come from a reactor, and such reactors are, in general, under state control.
226¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.114 It is also true, as I have said, that the Avangard programme in Russia was a possible source of the polonium 210. That is significant, even though the matter cannot be put any more strongly than that.
¶9.115 Finally, I would add in passing that the open market cost of polonium 210 would not appear to be a factor of any great significance. At the outset of the inquiry hearings, Mr Emmerson asserted that:43
"... the quantity of polonium of this purity used in the assassination of Mr Litvinenko would have cost tens of millions of dollars if it was purchased... by end users on the commercial market."
¶Mr Emmerson went on to assert that the extremely high cost of polonium 210 was a factor that argued strongly in favour of state involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.116 However, the evidence that I received on this issue was to the effect that the commercial price of polonium 210 in 2006 was in fact very much lower than Mr Emmerson suggested. DI Mascall gave evidence that a consignment of polonium 210 containing many times the quantity that Mr Litvinenko ingested was sold in 2006 for US$20,000.44
¶9.117 Put shortly, I think that the issue of cost is a red herring. It does not assist in either tending to prove or to disprove state responsibility.
227¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
¶Chapter 8: Russian State responsibility – motive
and evidence of similar deaths and killings
¶Motive 9.118 In chapter 1 of Part 4 above, I have addressed at some length the question of whether elements within the Russian State might have had a motive for killing Mr Litvinenko. I have also referred, in paragraph 5.27 above, to the article that Mr Litvinenko published in July 2006 accusing President Putin of being a paedophile.
¶9.119 I consider that there were several reasons why organisations and individuals within the Russian State might have wished to target Mr Litvinenko, including to the point of killing him, by late 2006. These reasons overlapped and their effect was no doubt cumulative. By way of summary, I shall identify five core themes that emerge from my analysis in the earlier sections of the Report.
¶9.120 First, Mr Litvinenko was regarded as having betrayed the FSB as a result of the public disclosures that he made before he left Russia, in particular his claim that he had been ordered to kill Mr Berezovsky. This idea of betrayal was compounded by Mr Litvinenko's campaigning activity in the UK. The two books that he wrote accused the FSB of responsibility for the 1999 apartment bombings and of collusion in organised crime.
¶9.121 Second, according to Mr Lugovoy the FSB also received information that Mr Litvinenko was working for British intelligence, and that he had tried to recruit Mr Lugovoy to do so too.
¶9.122 Third, Mr Litvinenko was a prominent associate of both Boris Berezovsky and Akhmed Zakayev, both of whom were leading opponents of the Putin administration.
¶9.123 Fourth, the causes espoused by Mr Litvinenko – such as the FSB's alleged responsibility for the apartment bombings, the war in Chechnya, and alleged collusion between President Putin and other members of his administration and organised crime – were areas of particular sensitivity to the Putin administration.
¶9.124 Finally, there was undoubtedly a personal dimension to the antagonism between Mr Litvinenko on the one hand and President Putin on the other. The history between the two men dated back to their (only) meeting in 1998, at a time when Mr Putin was the newly appointed head of the FSB and Mr Berezovsky and Mr Litvinenko still hoped that he might implement a programme of reform. In the years that followed, Mr Litvinenko made repeated highly personal attacks on President Putin, culminating in the allegation of paedophilia in July 2006.
¶9.125 These themes overlap. Many of them are reflected in Professor Service's observation that President Putin, "almost certainly looked on what Litvinenko did after fleeing abroad as punishable treachery".45 I am satisfied that, in general terms, members of the Putin administration, including the President himself and the FSB, had motives for taking action against Mr Litvinenko, including killing him, in late 2006.
228¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.126 In his closing statement Mr Emmerson submitted that a causative link could be established between the damning due diligence report on Mr Ivanov that Mr Litvinenko had given to Mr Lugovoy, and his subsequent poisoning. He made a similar submission in relation to the investigation that, to Mr Lugovoy's knowledge, Mr Litvinenko was conducting in relation to Mr Gordeyev.
¶9.127 As I indicated in chapter 4 of Part 5 above, where I have set out the evidence relating to the Ivanov issue, there is a difficulty with the argument that Mr Lugovoy was tasked to kill Mr Litvinenko as a result of him taking the Ivanov report back to Moscow. The difficulty is in the timing. The evidence is that Mr Litvinenko gave the Ivanov report to Mr Lugovoy in late September 2006. That was only a matter of weeks before what I have found was the first attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko on 16 October 2006, and only a matter of days before arrangements were made for Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to make that first joint trip to London (starting with Mr Kovtun's visa application on 2 October). It was also some considerable time after Mr Lugovoy began to court Mr Litvinenko, a process that had started with Mr Lugovoy's call to Mr Litvinenko in late 2004 and that continued in earnest with their first meeting in London in late 2005.
¶9.128 In summary, it appears from the evidence that the operation conducted by Mr Lugovoy against Mr Litvinenko was already underway before the investigation into Mr Gordeyev began, or the Ivanov report was drafted. I do not therefore think that either of these matters was a fundamental cause of the decision to kill Mr Litvinenko. That said, and although the timing with regard to the Ivanov report is tight, it is possible that one or other (or both) of these considerations may have provided extra motivation and impetus to a plan that had already been conceived.
¶The evidence of similar deaths and killings 9.129 At the beginning of a section of his first report entitled Political killings, 1999-2005, Professor Service stated that, "there have been several killings of prominent critics of Putin and his administration".46 In the same paragraph Professor Service noted that: "the evidence suggesting official complicity in these crimes is of a circumstantial nature, and the authors who have specialised in ferreting out the evidence are themselves well-known as critics who agree with the charges that the murdered critics levelled at the Russian authorities." Professor Service concluded that a number of these commentators, including Mr Goldfarb and Mr Felshtinsky (who, of course, both gave evidence to me), were nonetheless reliable in their factual assertions. He then went on to list the details of a number of killings.
¶9.130 During the course of the Inquiry hearings, I heard evidence about the deaths of a considerable number of President Putin's opponents that took place in the years prior to Mr Litvinenko's death. In the case of some, there had obviously been a murder, and the only question was who had sponsored it. Other cases were more complicated in that there was a preliminary question as to whether the deceased had been murdered or died of natural causes, and a secondary question as to who was responsible for the murder if that was indeed what had taken place.
¶9.131 Anna Politkovskaya was undoubtedly murdered. She was shot dead in Moscow on 7 October 2006. As I have set out above in Part 5, chapter 6, she was a prominent journalist and campaigner against President Putin. She and Mr Litvinenko were friends and fellow campaigners for Chechen causes. Professor Service recorded that "most
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¶observers" believed Ms Politkovskaya's death to have been "a political assassination", with suspicion falling on either President Putin or President Kadyrov of Chechnya.47
¶9.132 Sergei Yushenkov was shot dead in a street in Moscow in April 2003. He was a member of the Russian Parliament who had been one of the co-founders of the oppositionist Liberal Russia party with Boris Berezovsky in 2002. He was also a prominent member of the commission that had been established to investigate the 1999 apartment bombings.48 Marina Litvinenko recalled that Mr Yushenkov had met Mr Litvinenko in London in 2002 or 2003.49
¶9.133 Another of the founders of the Liberal Russia party was Vladimir Golovlev. He was shot and killed in Moscow in 2002. Mr Goldfarb said that his death, "appear[ed] to have been a political assassination".50
¶9.134 Professor Service noted that, "extrajudicial killings outside the frontiers of the Russian Federation have sometimes been attributed to Russian security forces."51 INQ017734 (page 10 paragraph 33) Goldfarb 5/125; 26/21-22 Shvets 24/102 INQ017809 (page 58) INQ019146 (page 19 paragraph 61)
¶9.135 The best known example of political assassination conducted by Russia outside its borders during this period is the February 2004 killing of the Chechen Vice President Zelinkhan Yandarbiev. He was blown up as he left a mosque with his son. Professor Service stated that Mr Yandarbiev was "a strong critic of the Putin administration",52 who had been a leader of the Chechen insurgency until going abroad in 1999. He said that, prior to his death, Mr Yandarbiev had been conducting his anti-Moscow activities in Qatar, where he was free from the risk of extradition to Russia, and that he had been held responsible by the Russian authorities for the Moscow theatre siege in October 2002. As to Russia's responsibility for Mr Yandarbiev's death, Professor Service stated:53
¶"Three agents of Russian military intelligence were arrested in Doha and accused of planting the bomb that killed Yandarbiev. Igor Ivanov, Secretary of the Security
¶Council, was sent to put pressure on the Qatari administration. Two Qatari citizens were taken into custody at Moscow's Sheremetevo airport; they were said to be suspected of connections with the Chechen insurgents. Putin wished to secure the release of the Russian agents. He phoned the Emir himself about the matter.
¶One of the agents was allowed back to Russia. Two remained in custody until
¶December 2004, when they were flown to Moscow to serve out their sentences in Russian prisons. The Qatari detainees were liberated as part of the diplomatic bargain."
¶9.136 A few months after Mr Yandarbiev's death, in September 2004, there was an apparent attempt to poison Viktor Yuschenko, the anti-Moscow candidate in Presidential elections taking place in Ukraine. Professor Service recorded that Mr Yuschenko's poisoning was attributed to Russian security forces.54
¶9.137 Nor was this the only incident during this period of the suspected poisoning of opponents of President Putin by Russian agents.
230¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.138 In 2003, Russian politician Yuri Shchekochikhin died of apparent poisoning. Professor Service described Mr Shchekochikhin's career in the following terms:55
¶"Yuri Shchekochikhin was deputy editor of Novoya Gazeta and a campaigning columnist over many years. Elected as a Duma deputy in 1995, he was active in the struggle against corruption, against abuses in the armed forces and against the wars in Chechnya. He denounced the official story about the Moscow apartment bombings in September 1999. He frequently exposed malpractices by
¶FSB officers."
¶Mr Goldfarb said that Mr Shchekochikhin did not lose his hair as he died but that his symptoms had resembled those of Mr Yuschenko. He thought that Mr Shchekochikhin had been poisoned with dioxins, rather than with a radioactive substance. He added, "Everyone believed that he was poisoned... his family and his party, colleagues, always claimed that he was poisoned."56 INQ017734 (pages 10-11 paragraphs 36,39-40) Goldfarb 26/50 INQ015674 Mascall 9/96-97 Goldfarb 26/26
¶9.139 Ms Politkovskaya had nearly died from poisoning in 2004, two years before she was murdered, when travelling to Grozny. Professor Service commented; "The identity of the culprit was never discovered, but there was speculation that Kadyrov was exasperated by her exposures of the human rights abuses in his republic."57 Marina Litvinenko 3/87 lines 16-18 Marina Litvinenko 3/135-136 Shvets 24/82-84 Krgo 9/57 INQ019146 (page 23 paragraph 73)
¶9.140 In 2004, an Islamist guerrilla leader named Ibn Khattab was killed by a poisoned letter. Mr Goldfarb said that the FSB had claimed responsibility for this killing.58
¶9.141 In the same year, the Russian public figure Roman Tsepov died in mysterious circumstances. Professor Service stated that Mr Tsepov: "was reliably said to have liaised between politicians and organised crime in St Petersburg and to have been close to Putin during his career in the city".59 Mr Goldfarb described how it had been alleged that Mr Tsepov had died from radioactive poisoning, and that many of his symptoms – such as loss of hair and destruction of the immune system – had been similar to those suffered by Mr Litvinenko.60
¶9.142 In the course of his oral evidence to me, Professor Dombey repeated an observation that he had previously made in an article in the London Review of Books.61 He said that, on the hypothesis that Mr Litvinenko had been deliberately poisoned with polonium 210 in a killing sponsored by the Russian State, it was reasonable to assume that the poison would have been tested on others in advance. Professor Dombey identified two cases that might indicate such testing. One was the case of Mr Tsepov, to which I have already referred. The other was the case of a Chechen man named Lecha Islamov. In the article to which I have referred, Professor Dombey had this to say about the Islamov case:62
¶"In April 2004, it was reported that Lecha Islamov, a Chechen guerrilla commander serving a nine-year prison sentence, had died after being admitted to hospital in
¶Volgograd with a mysterious illness. 'Sources close to the convict,' ran a report in the Chechnya Weekly, '... suspect he may have been poisoned by Russia's
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¶security agencies ... Islamov's symptoms – including hair loss and massive blisters
¶– were said to be inexplicable to the doctors who have been trying to treat him.'
¶Islamov's relatives said that he'd told them his jailers had summoned him several days before his death for an 'informal conversation', during which he was given a snack and some tea. 'He began to feel ill within five minutes,' they said, 'as he was being taken back to his cell'."
¶9.143 Mr Zakayev gave a very similar account of Mr Islamov's death when he gave oral evidence to the Inquiry. He told me that Mr Islamov had been a prisoner in Lefortovo prison, the FSB prison in Moscow, and that Mr Islamov had been convinced that he had been poisoned by a cup of tea given to him by prison staff 12 days before he died.63
¶9.144 What do these cases show that may be of relevance to the circumstances of Mr Litvinenko's death?
¶9.145 A note of caution should be sounded at the outset. As Professor Service observed, the evidence of Russian State involvement in most of these deaths is circumstantial. And even to the extent that Russian State involvement in any of these deaths is established, it plainly does not follow from involvement in those deaths that the Russian State was complicit in Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.146 All that said, these cases appear to establish a pattern of events, which is of contextual importance to the circumstances of Mr Litvinenko's death. These cases suggest that in the years prior to Mr Litvinenko's death, the Russian State may have been involved in the assassination of Mr Putin's critics; they suggest that those who were seeking to uncover the truth about the 1999 apartment bombings may have been targeted, and that living overseas may not have provided complete protection. Lastly, these cases suggest that the Russian State may have sponsored attacks against its opponents using poisons, including radioactive poisons.
¶9.147 I should make it clear that I have deliberately focused for these purposes on events in the few years immediately preceding November 2006, since those events have the strongest temporal relationship with Mr Litvinenko's death. There have of course been other deaths since that of Mr Litvinenko, including the deaths in the UK of Mr Berezovsky and Mr Perepilichny and the shooting in Moscow of Boris Nemtsov, but for reasons of relevance and proportionality I did not hear detailed evidence about deaths and/or killings of Mr Putin's opponents that took place after 2006.
¶9.148 That said, there is one event that took place in the summer of 2007 that I regard as being of potential significance to the circumstances of Mr Litvinenko's death some months earlier.
¶9.149 I heard evidence from Mr Goldfarb64 and from Mr Zakayev65 that in June 2007 a Chechen named Movladi Atlangeriev came to the UK. Mr Goldfarb explained that Mr Atlangeriev had "a long association with the FSB" and that the Metropolitan Police Service possessed intelligence that he had come to the UK to assassinate Mr Berezovsky. He did indeed attempt to meet Mr Berezovsky, but was arrested and deported. It would appear that shortly after his return to Moscow, Mr Atlangeriev was kidnapped and killed, possibly by a rival Chechen faction. If the intelligence that the
232¶The Litvinenko Inquiry police are said to have received about Mr Atlangeriev was true, this event is evidence that at very much the time of Mr Litvinenko's death, the FSB was prepared to arrange the assassination of leading opponents of the Putin regime in London.
¶9.150 It is also convenient at this point to return briefly to the information that Mr Scaramella received from Mr Limarev in October 2006, about which he wished to warn Mr Litvinenko when they met at itsu on 1 November 2006. I have previously referred to this matter at paragraph 6.287 above.
¶9.151 Mr Scaramella stated that he received a series of warnings from Mr Limarev in late 2006. He believed that the information Mr Limarev passed to him came from sources in Russia, including serving intelligence officers. He said that at some stage prior to the murder of Ms Politkovskaya (which took place on 7 October 2006), Mr Limarev had told him about a list of "enemies" of Russia who were to be "eliminated". Mr Scaramella said that the list had included Mr Berezovsky, Ms Politkovskaya, Mr Litvinenko, himself, Mr Guzzanti, Mr Gordievsky, Mr Zakayev and "probably even Bukovsky".66 Mr Scaramella said that he had spoken to Mr Limarev either on the day of Ms Politkovskaya's death or the day after that. Mr Limarev had told him that the killing of the "targets" on the list had started. Mr Limarev had also warned him that other individuals on the list might be poisoned with radioactive thallium, rather than being shot.67
¶9.152 I have referred above to the emails that Mr Scaramella received from Mr Limarev shortly before his meeting with Mr Litvinenko on 1 November 2006, and which he printed off and showed to Mr Litvinenko when they were at the itsu restaurant on that day. The emails that Mr Scaramella received from Mr Limarev focused on a report of action being planned against Mr Scaramella and Mr Guzzanti by a group of Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) veterans known as Dignity and Honor. There was, though, some mention of a risk to Mr Litvinenko – the earlier of the two emails stated:68
¶"Meanwhile above mentioned Russian intelligence officers speak more and more about necessity to use force against PG [Guzzanti] and MS [Scaramella], considering their 'incessant anti-Russian activities' – as well as against Berezovsky and Litvinenko."
¶9.153 I have also observed that Mr Litvinenko did not place any weight on Mr Limarev's warnings when they were conveyed to him by Mr Scaramella. It is clear, however, that Mr Scaramella took what Mr Limarev had told him very seriously. He produced a message that he had written on a piece of paper either on 1 November 2006 or the day after, and kept on his person for the rest of the time that he was in London. He may already have had it with him when he met Mr Litvinenko at itsu. The message listed contact numbers and then stated, "Please contact also the police and security services because I am in danger for my work at the Italian Parliament (Senator Paolo Guzzanti). There are risks that I have been poisoned."69 Felshtinsky 23/145 INQ017684 Marina Litvinenko 4/38-42 INQ017922 (page 3) Scaramella 15/139-140
¶9.154 I am obviously not in a position to make any findings as to the precise source (or sources) of the information that Mr Limarev was receiving during this period, and which was then passed on first by Mr Limarev to Mr Scaramella and then by Mr Scaramella to others, including Mr Litvinenko. Nor am I able to make any firm findings as to
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¶whether there was a link between the information that Mr Limarev was receiving and any plans that were in fact being made at the time to murder Ms Politkovskaya and Mr Litvinenko – or indeed any others on the hit list.
¶9.155 What can be said, though, is that the warnings that Mr Limarev passed on to Mr Scaramella and, through him, to Mr Litvinenko, were entirely consistent with the points that can be drawn from the run of the cases that are described above. Leading opponents of President Putin, including those living outside Russia, were at risk of assassination. One of the risks they faced was that of being poisoned.
234¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶Chapter 9: Russian State responsibility – links
between Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun and the Russian State
¶9.156 I have referred at paragraphs 9.135 – 136 above to the Yandarbiev case. In that case, the fact that the three men arrested in Qatar for Mr Yandarbiev's murder were serving Russian intelligence officers provided a clear link between the murder and the Russian State.
¶9.157 The question that arises here is whether any similar link existed in 2006 between Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun (whom I have found to have killed Mr Litvinenko) on the one hand, and the Russian State on the other.
¶9.158 I can deal with this point fairly shortly.
¶9.159 There is clear evidence that Mr Lugovoy spent a number of years first in the Ninth Directorate of the KGB and then in the Federal Protection Service, and that Mr Kovtun was for a time an officer in the Russian army. It is equally clear, however, that by 2006 neither man was still formally employed by the Russian State – Mr Kovtun having deserted from the army in 1992 and Mr Lugovoy having left the Federal Protection Service in 1996.
¶9.160 That is not, however, a complete answer to the point. I referred in Part 4 above to the Russian saying that "there is no such thing as a former KGB man". I have also referred to speculation that Mr Lugovoy may have been an FSB agent tasked to act against Mr Berezovsky and his associates (see paragraph 4.147 above).
¶9.161 That speculation was principally founded on questions that had been raised about the genuineness of Mr Lugovoy's conviction and prison sentence in 2002. It will be recalled that Mr Lugovoy, who until shortly before his conviction had himself been an employee of Mr Berezovsky, was convicted of attempting to assist Mr Glushkov, one of Mr Berezovsky's associates, to escape from prison. Mr Lugovoy subsequently claimed to have served his 15 month sentence in Lefortovo prison in Moscow. However, Mr Glushkov, who was detained there throughout the relevant period, said that he had never seen Mr Lugovoy in the prison. Was Mr Lugovoy already an FSB agent by this time, and only given a prison sentence in order to improve his credentials with those he planned to target? Or was he perhaps recruited shortly after being sentenced, and then secretly released in return for promising his services?
¶9.162 It has also been suggested that Mr Lugovoy's thriving business career in the years before 2006 was suspicious, given his conviction and previous links with Mr Berezovsky, in particular since many of Mr Lugovoy's business interests were in the closely regulated field of security. This, of course, was the period during which Mr Lugovoy was establishing his businesses in Russia and travelling to London to forge business relationships there, including with Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.163 Was the true position that, far from being in disfavour with the Russian authorities during this period, they were in fact supporting him? Had Mr Lugovoy been tasked by the FSB to insinuate himself into a position of trust with Mr Berezovsky and Mr Litvinenko?
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¶Chapter 10: Russian State responsibility –
events since Alexander Litvinenko's death
¶9.164 It is apparent that Mr Litvinenko was not mourned long in Russia, at least not by the government. Leading politicians made speeches attacking Mr Litvinenko and even implying that he had deserved his fate (some of which I have referred to in chapter 2 of Part 4 above). It has been suggested that British and German police investigating Mr Litvinenko's death received less than full cooperation from their Russian counterparts. The Russian government refused a request made by the British government to extradite Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to face criminal charges. Mr Lugovoy has been lionised in Russia. He has become a member of the Duma, and indeed was awarded an honour by President Putin during the course of the Inquiry's hearings.
¶9.165 The question for present purposes is whether any of these matters amount to evidence that the Russian government was actually involved in Mr Litvinenko's murder.
¶Engagement with the criminal investigations Russian aircraft not made available for testing 9.166 I have referred during the course of the narrative in Part 6 above to two occasions on which British and German police investigators respectively were not able to inspect Russian passenger aircraft that were of interest to their enquiries.
¶9.167 One of those planes was that on which Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun had flown from Moscow to London on 16 October 2006 – Transaero EI-DDK (see above at paragraph 6.69). The other was the Aeroflot aircraft on which Mr Kovtun flew from Moscow to Hamburg on 28 October 2006 (see paragraph 6.199 above).
¶9.168 I do not think that it would be safe to draw any inferences about responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death from these two incidents. There is insufficient evidence to be clear as to exactly what happened. Moreover, the two aircraft were operated by two independent companies. Even on the assumption that the aircraft were deliberately replaced on the schedules to avoid them being tested, there is no evidence on which I can safely determine whether this was done at the instigation of the airlines to avoid delay and disruption, or at the instigation of the Russian government, perhaps for more sinister reasons.
¶Metropolitan Police Service visit to Moscow, December 2006 9.169 In December 2006, officers from the Metropolitan Police team investigating Mr Litvinenko's death made a formal visit to Moscow to interview witnesses. I heard evidence from two officers who went on the trip to Moscow – Mr Tarpey70 and Mr Slater.71
236¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.170 It was a theme of the evidence of both these men that the trip to Moscow had not run smoothly. They described a large number of incidents that occurred during their stay in Moscow that, to them at least, seemed to demonstrate obstructiveness on the part of their Russian colleagues. For example, the British investigators were told that only one British investigator (rather than two) could sit in on interviews, that lists of questions had to be provided in advance, and that they could not make their own separate recordings of interviews. There was even an occasion on which Russian officials who were driving to an interview location in the knowledge that British investigators were following in a car behind drove fast and erratically in an apparent attempt to lose the British team.
¶9.171 Further, particular difficulties were experienced in relation to the interviews of the two key witnesses, Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy. Interviews were cancelled at short notice and then hastily rearranged, and when they did take place were rushed with limited opportunity for the single British investigator present to ask questions. The British team were told that the two men were being treated for radiation sickness, but when they were interviewed they did not appear to be ill. Finally, when the interview tapes that had been handed to the British investigators in Moscow were examined back in London, it was discovered that there was no tape of Mr Lugovoy's interview. The Russian authorities had not provided any advance warning that there would be no tape of this interview.72
¶9.172 In his closing statement, Mr Horwell QC, who appeared on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service, made the following submissions about these events:73
¶"Why be obstructive if there was nothing to hide?"
"The lack of full cooperation in Moscow with the interviews of Lugovoy and Kovtun: stupid, petty obstructions placed in the way of the police officers who went to interview them. The failure of the Russians to supply the tape of Lugovoy's interview perhaps says it all. The motivation obvious. The Russians wanted control of those interviews, a control which was resurrected but a few days ago. Hardly a reaction indicative of an interest in truth and justice."
¶9.173 My observations on these events, and the inferences that may be drawn from them, are as follows.
¶9.174 First, it is quite apparent that the British investigators did not receive the level of cooperation in Moscow that they had hoped for, and that in consequence the enquiries that they conducted during their stay there were not as full as they might otherwise have been. It was clear to me that this was a matter that still rankles with those involved, even now, several years after the event.
¶9.175 Second, there is no direct evidence as to the explanation for the conduct of the Russian officials. I had hoped that one of the Russian investigators might have given evidence to the Inquiry, in which case an explanation could have been sought, but this has not transpired. I am well aware, however, that the procedures governing international cooperation between police forces are complex and quite capable of giving rise to misunderstandings. There are a number of possible explanations – good, bad and indifferent – for what the British police saw as the obstructiveness of the Russian officials. In the absence of any explanation from the Russian side, I do not think it
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¶is possible to draw any firm conclusions. It would certainly not be appropriate, in my view, to conclude that the Russian authorities were deliberately attempting to undermine the British investigation.
¶9.176 Third, even if I did make such a finding, it would still be another considerable step to find that the Russian authorities had acted in this way in order to conceal their own involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death. Standing alone, this evidence cannot justify this conclusion.
¶Refusal of extradition requests 9.177 Russia has refused requests made by the British authorities to extradite Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun to face criminal charges in the UK. No inferences can be drawn from this. Article 61(1) of the Russian constitution provides that, "A citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deported from Russia or extradited to another State."
¶9.178 Moreover, as Professor Service pointedly observed:74
¶The careers of Mr Kovtun and Mr Lugovoy since 2006 9.179 Professor Service had this to say about the careers in Russia of Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun in the years following Mr Litvinenko's death:75
¶"A wall of protection was built around Lugovoi and Kovtun. Although Kovtun did not exactly avoid public attention, he gave only a few interviews to the print and broadcast media. His partner Lugovoi by contrast has paraded himself at every opportunity. He was welcomed into the Liberal Democratic Party and became one of its successful candidates in the Duma elections of 2007; he appeared on TV chat shows and has recently been appointed an adviser to a television series about spies.
¶The careers of Lugovoi and Kovtun since 2006 seem to me unimaginable without high-level political approval. The fact that Lugovoi has joined Zhironovski's Liberal
¶Democratic Party, moreover, is not a sign of Lugovoi's alienation from the central state authorities. It is a party that since the early 1990s has acted as a pseudocritical part of the tolerated opposition to whoever is President at the time. Lugovoi is a prominent, officially-respected public figure."
¶9.180 Professor Service expanded on these points in the course of his oral evidence.76 He emphasised that Mr Lugovoy's membership of the Liberal Democratic Party did not mean that he was a political opponent of President Putin in any substantive sense. Professor Service also drew attention to the importance that President Putin placed on television as a source of public information and the control that he therefore sought to exercise over it. Professor Service observed that, in those circumstances, the fact
238¶The Litvinenko Inquiry that President Putin had allowed Mr Lugovoy, "a prominent public role on Russian TV"
¶was a telling indication that he "has had favour shown to him by the President".
¶9.181 In fact, during the course of the Inquiry's open hearings an event took place in Russia that provided unambiguous evidence of the esteem in which President Putin holds Mr Lugovoy. In March 2015, President Putin awarded a state honour to Mr Lugovoy. A Reuters report carrying the headline "Russia's Putin honours suspect in Litvinenko poisoning" stated as follows:77
"Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded a state honour to a man suspected by Britain of using radioactive polonium to poison Kremlin critic Alexander Litvinenko in London nearly a decade ago. The medal 'for services to the fatherland', second degree, was given to Andrei Lugovoy for his contribution to developing Russia's Parliament, according to a citation posted on the official state bulletin."
¶9.182 Mr Emmerson QC submitted that the fact that the award to Mr Lugovoy had been made:78
"... on Day 22 of this Inquiry, after a substantial amount of evidence has been called establishing Mr Lugovoy's involvement in the murder of Mr Litvinenko, is clearly both a provocation by President Putin and the clearest possible message that he identifies himself with Mr Lugovoy."
¶9.183 I have already expressed my conclusion that Mr Lugovoy, with Mr Kovtun, poisoned Mr Litvinenko. Whether President Putin knew about this at the time is a matter to which I shall come. However, I do accept that Mr Lugovoy's award, given in particular its timing and public nature, can only be interpreted as a deliberate sign of public support made to him by President Putin.
¶9.184 Where does this analysis lead? There is clear evidence, as I have said, that the Russian State in general, and President Putin in particular, has supported Mr Lugovoy in the years since 2006. There is less evidence relating to Mr Kovtun, but it would certainly appear to be the case that he has suffered no ill consequences as a result of the allegations made against him in this country in connection with Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.185 It can be inferred from these facts that the Russian State approves of Mr Litvinenko's killing, or at least that it wishes to signal approval for it.
¶9.186 It would be a further step, however, to conclude that the conduct of the Russian State towards Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun since Mr Litvinenko's death demonstrates that it was actually responsible in some way for his death. In my judgement, that would be a step too far. Taken on its own, this evidence does not support that conclusion.
239¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
¶Chapter 11: Conclusions regarding Russian
¶State responsibility 9.187 The open evidence that I have set out above establishes a strong circumstantial case that the Russian State was responsible for Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.188 I draw attention in particular to the following points.
¶9.189 I have found that Mr Litvinenko was killed by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun. They had no personal animus against Mr Litvinenko. I am sure that they killed him on behalf of others.
¶9.190 Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun are both Russian citizens, who were living in Russia in 2006. They were both former members of Russian armed forces. Mr Lugovoy had been a member of the KGB and latterly the Federal Protection Service. Mr Kovtun had been an officer in the Russian army.
¶9.191 The evidence of Mr Glushkov and others raises questions as to a possible relationship between Mr Lugovoy (who was clearly the leader of the two men) and the FSB in the years up to and including 2006.
¶9.192 The fact that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned with polonium 210 that had been manufactured in a nuclear reactor suggests that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were acting for a state body, rather than (say) a criminal organisation.
¶9.193 Although it cannot be said that the polonium 210 with which Mr Litvinenko was poisoned must have come from the Avangard facility in Russia, it certainly could have come from there.
¶9.194 There were powerful motives for organisations and individuals within the Russian State to take action against Mr Litvinenko, including killing him. Mr Litvinenko was, as a result of his actions both before and after leaving Russia, regarded as having betrayed the FSB. Moreover, according to Mr Lugovoy, the FSB had received information that Mr Litvinenko was working for British intelligence. Mr Litvinenko was an associate of leading opponents of the Putin regime, and he had repeatedly targeted President Putin himself with highly personal public criticism.
¶9.195 I note in this context that Mr Kovtun told D3 during their conversation in Hamburg that Mr Litvinenko was to be poisoned rather than shot because, "It is meant to set an example".
¶9.196 There is evidence suggesting that in the years prior to Mr Litvinenko's death the Russian State had been involved in the killing of a number of opponents of President Putin's administration, including those, like Mr Litvinenko, who had publicly blamed the FSB for the 1999 apartment bombings. The pattern was of killings both inside and outside Russia. There was evidence of poisons, including radioactive poisons, being used in some cases. Professor Dombey expressed the view that the FSB had tested radioactive poisons on humans, including in one case on a prisoner.
¶9.197 Although the strict terms of the 2006 laws did not permit the FSB to take action against extremists (as opposed to terrorists) outside the borders of Russia, the evidence of Professor Service was that the laws had a wider effect. He said that: "the authorities
240¶The Litvinenko Inquiry wanted to fudge that distinction [i.e. the distinction between extremists and terrorists] and just create a new feeling for the FSB to feel free to act without constraint."
¶9.198 Since 2006 President Putin has supported and protected Mr Lugovoy, notwithstanding the fact that Mr Lugovoy has been publicly accused of killing Mr Litvinenko. During the course of the Inquiry hearings, President Putin awarded Mr Lugovoy an honour for services to the fatherland. Whilst it does not follow that Mr Lugovoy must have been acting on behalf of the Russian State when he killed Mr Litvinenko, the way in which President Putin has treated Mr Lugovoy is certainly consistent with that hypothesis. Moreover, President Putin's conduct towards Mr Lugovoy suggests a level of approval for the killing of Mr Litvinenko.
¶9.199 In my judgement, these matters amount to strong circumstantial evidence of Russian State responsibility for the killing of Mr Litvinenko. Having additionally taken into account the closed evidence, my findings are as follows.
¶9.200 When Mr Lugovoy poisoned Mr Litvinenko (as I have found that he did), it is probable that he did so under the direction of the FSB. I would add that I regard that as a strong probability. I have found that Mr Kovtun also took part in the poisoning; I conclude therefore that he was also acting under FSB direction, possibly indirectly through Mr Lugovoy but probably to his knowledge.
241¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
¶Chapter 12: Russian State responsibility –
involvement of Nikolai Patrushev and President Vladimir Putin
¶9.201 My finding that Mr Litvinenko was killed at the direction of the FSB gives rise to one further issue. At what level of seniority was the plan to kill Mr Litvinenko authorised? Was Mr Patrushev, the then head of the FSB, aware of the operation? Was President Putin aware of the operation?
¶9.202 A number of the witnesses who gave evidence during the open sessions of the Inquiry expressed strong views as to President Putin's direct involvement in Mr Litvinenko's death. It is perhaps worth recalling that the first person to make this allegation was Mr Litvinenko himself, in the deathbed statement to which I have referred above.
¶9.203 Yuri Shvets was asked whether, on the assumption that Mr Litvinenko had been killed in an operation that had been authorised by a Russian State organisation, such an operation could have taken place without Mr Putin's knowledge. He answered as follows:79
"I strongly believe that it couldn't be done without Vladimir Putin's knowledge, because of one of the key traditions of the KGB. Any general, including Mr Ivanov or any other FSB general, before issuing an order to assassinate Sasha or anybody else in Russia or outside Russia, would think about covering his back just in case. This is a KGB rule number one, cover your back, and covering your back is to get approval from your superior, especially in Russia where they say about developing this structure, straight line structure of leadership, where the boss – there is just one single boss who makes all the important decisions. So I rule out basically the possibility that a decision to assassinate Sasha or anybody else outside of Russia would have been made without approval of the top authority of Russia, which is Vladimir Putin."
¶9.204 Mr Goldfarb's evidence touched on the same issue.80 He said that, if it was assumed (as I have now found) that Mr Litvinenko was poisoned by Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun, and (as I have also now found) that the operation was sponsored by a Russian State organisation, "then the question narrows down [to] who in the state structures could authorise that". Mr Goldfarb stated that he regarded it as an "inevitable conclusion" that, "this can be no one else than Mr Putin". He explained the reasoning that led him to this conclusion in some detail, which I will set out below:
"One is it was already mentioned by Yuri Shvets here that traditionally this sort of active measures from the Soviet times are authorised at the highest political level, that's number one.
242Number two is that polonium is produced in a civilian agency which is Russian atomic industry, ministry, Rosatom, and to transfer polonium to FSB would require an interagency authority, and the only authority that could authorise such transfer is the presidential administration. So it brings us to the level above the hierarchy of the FSB.
¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
Mr Patrushev, who was at that time the head of the FSB, could not single-handedly order Mr Kiriyenkio, who was the head of atomic energy, to give him polonium just like that. He … would have needed – that's probably a question to an expert, but that's my guess in any case.
¶So that's number two.
Number three is that nobody in the Russian hierarchy would initiate such an operation without covering his back, as Mr Shvets said … not only for general reasons, but for specific reasons that everybody knows in Russia, about a long history of relationship with Mr Putin, Mr Berezovsky and Mr Litvinenko. It's personal.
¶…
Nobody in his right mind, knowing how things run there, would authorise such an operation when one could be sure that Mr Putin would take a very close look at it after the fact. It's not just an unauthorised operation, but it would be an unauthorised operation specifically involving an issue which is very close personally to Mr Putin. … I once said somewhere that it's a crime of passion, not only the crime of politics, it's a crime of passion.
And finally, in one of the Wikileaks cable[s], the American official, by the name of Daniel Fried, said that knowing Mr Putin's attention to detail, we, meaning the US administration, doubt that this could have happened without Mr Putin's knowledge; and to confirm that, I refer to the statement which was aired on Russian TV three days ago, where there was a film on Russian TV featuring Putin, a long interview, about him telling how they annex Crimea, and Putin said to the presenter: 'the reason why it worked so smoothly was because I personally micromanaged the whole operation.'
The moment you delegate this to the structures, the structures screw up, essentially, that's what he said. So in important situations like this, only [I] can make sure that everything is done perfectly, and this is kind of in the same vein as Daniel Fried said, that knowing Putin's attention to detail, he must have micromanaged it."
¶9.205 In formal court proceedings, opinions such as those that were set out above from Mr Shvets and Mr Goldfarb would not be admissible as evidence because Mr Shvets and Mr Goldfarb are not independent expert witnesses. In this Inquiry, however, I am not bound by the strict procedural rules that apply in court proceedings, and I do not go so far as to reject these opinions as without value. That said, I must clearly approach what they have said with some care. Although both men are knowledgeable in the field of Russian history and politics, Mr Horwell was right to observe81 that neither could (nor, no doubt, would) claim to be impartial observers of the events surrounding Mr Litvinenko's death.
¶9.206 But importantly, the evidence of Mr Shvets and Mr Goldfarb does not stand alone. I also received evidence on these issues from Professor Service, who is an independent expert witness.
¶9.207 I should make clear that Professor Service was not instructed to address in his report the core issues relating to the attribution of responsibility for Mr Litvinenko's death. But parts of both his written evidence, and in particular his oral evidence, did touch on
243¶Part 9 | Chapters 1 to 12 | Who directed the killing?
¶the question of the likely involvement of Mr Patrushev and Mr Putin on the hypothesis that Mr Litvinenko was killed in an operation sponsored by the FSB.
¶9.208 Professor Service said during his oral evidence that if Mr Litvinenko had been killed by the FSB, it was "inconceivable" that Mr Patrushev would not have had knowledge (and I take him to mean advance knowledge) of the operation.82 This evidence was in line with the view that Professor Service had expressed in his report that, despite the lack of irrefutable evidence, he found it hard to believe that Mr Patrushev had not been, "somehow involved in some of the other killings under consideration in my report"83 Marina Litvinenko 3/114 INQ019473; Scaramella 27/60-73 Reilly 10/29-30 Mascall 9/101 INQ019146 (page 27 paragraph 85) – that is, the deaths of various of Mr Putin's opponents to which I have referred at paragraphs 9.129 – 9.155 above.
¶9.209 The question that logically follows is whether, if Mr Patrushev had advance knowledge of an FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko, he shared that information with Mr Putin. On this issue, Professor Service was far more cautious.
¶9.210 Professor Service was confident that President Putin reserved oversight of security policy to himself. He also drew attention to the close links between President Putin and Mr Patrushev, and to the latter's long service as head of the FSB between 1999 and 2008. "The conclusion must be", Professor Service stated: "that Putin generally endorsed what the agency got up to in the years through to 2006 and beyond and that Patrushev as its Director knew that he had his President's support in its operations."84 Marina Litvinenko 3/114-116 Marina Litvinenko written closing submissions, page 46 paragraph 142 Goldfarb 5/132; Attew 13/22; Tabunov 13/139-140 Mascall 9/109-111 INQ019146 (pages 26-27 paragraph 83)
¶9.211 Professor Service expressed the further view that he considered it to be very unlikely that President Putin restricted himself to providing a general sanction to Mr Patrushev's broad line of action – he thought it likely, rather, that Mr Putin exercised, at the very least, some oversight of Mr Patrushev's activities.
¶9.212 But that simply begs the question of what level of oversight Mr Putin exercised over the FSB. Professor Service readily accepted that he lacked the evidence to draw any firm conclusion on this issue. He described the shortfall in the evidence available to him regarding the working relationship between Mr Putin and Mr Patrushev in the following terms:85
¶"… there is no available evidence for how much initiative was left to Patrushev in the FSB. Did Patrushev secure Putin's permission for operations in advance?
¶Or did he merely need sanction for a general operational strategy? And did the relationship between Putin and Patrushev undergo change in the course of their collaboration? These questions constitute an important nexus of known unknowns about Presidential power since Yeltsin stepped down from office."
¶9.213 Professor Service did draw attention in his report to one possible reason why Mr Patrushev might have concealed an FSB operation to assassinate Mr Litvinenko from Mr Putin, namely that the operation was part of a deliberate campaign by Kremlin insiders to weaken Mr Putin's power. Professor Service referred to this theory that had been advanced by some commentators, but he did not endorse it himself.86 I observe that it would also seem unlikely, given the duration and closeness of Mr Patrushev's ties to Mr Putin, that he would have been a party to such a plot in the first place.
244¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶9.214 As I have indicated, Professor Service did not address the express question of whether, if Mr Patrushev did order an FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko, it is likely that he would have sought President Putin's approval for such an operation. However, drawing on the logic of his analysis relating to other matters,87 it appears to me that Professor Service's view on this issue is that Mr Patrushev probably would have told President Putin about such an operation, but that the evidence available to him in relation to this issue is so lacking that he regards the answer to be, at least at present, unprovable.
¶9.215 Taking full account of all the evidence and analysis available to me, I find that the FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr Patrushev and also by President Putin.
245¶Part 10: Summary of conclusions 10.1 Alexander Litvinenko was born in Voronezh, Russia on 4 December 1962. He was an officer in the Committee for State Security (KGB) and latterly the Federal Security Service (FSB). He was dismissed in 1998 after he made public allegations of illegal activity within the FSB.
¶10.2 Mr Litvinenko left Russia in 2000. He arrived in the UK with his wife and son on 1 November 2000. Mr Litvinenko was granted asylum in 2001 and became a British citizen in October 2006.
¶10.3 In 2006 Mr Litvinenko was living with his family at 140 Osier Crescent, Muswell Hill, London. He was a journalist and author. He also undertook investigatory work, including preparing due diligence reports on Russian individuals and companies.
¶10.4 On the evening of 1 November 2006, the sixth anniversary of his arrival in the UK, Mr Litvinenko fell ill. He was admitted to Barnet General Hospital on 3 November, and was subsequently transferred to University College Hospital in central London on 17 November. His condition declined. He became unconscious on 23 November. At 8.51pm Mr Litvinenko suffered a cardiac arrest. Resuscitation was commenced but terminated when it became clear that he would not regain spontaneous cardiac output. Mr Litvinenko was pronounced dead at 9.21pm on 23 November 2006.
¶10.5 Throughout the time that Mr Litvinenko was in hospital, the doctors had been unable successfully to diagnose his condition. In fact, the cause of his illness only became clear several hours before his death when tests on samples of his blood and urine sent to the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston confirmed the presence in his body of extremely high levels of the radioactive isotope polonium 210. Subsequent examination of Mr Litvinenko's body and detailed testing of samples taken from it confirmed that he had died as a result of being poisoned with polonium 210.
¶10.6 As to the medical cause of Mr Litvinenko's death, I am sure of the following matters:
¶a. Mr Litvinenko died at 9.21pm on 23 November 2006 in University College Hospital, having suffered a cardiac arrest from which medical professionals were unable to resuscitate him b. The cardiac arrest was the result of an acute radiation syndrome from which
¶Mr Litvinenko was suffering c. The acute radiation syndrome was caused by Mr Litvinenko ingesting approximately 4.4Gbq of polonium 210 on 1 November 2006
¶10.7 There is abundant evidence that Mr Litvinenko met Andrey Lugovoy and his associate Dmitri Kovtun for tea at the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel in Mayfair during the afternoon of 1 November 2006. The forensic evidence shows that the Pine Bar was heavily contaminated with polonium 210. The highest readings were taken from the table where Mr Litvinenko was sitting and from the inside of one of the teapots. No comparable levels of contamination were found in any of the other places that Mr Litvinenko visited that day.
¶10.8 I am sure that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 whilst drinking tea in the Pine Bar of the Millennium Hotel during the afternoon of 1 November 2006.
246¶The Litvinenko Inquiry
¶10.9 I have carefully considered the possibility that Mr Litvinenko ingested the fatal dose of polonium 210 as the result of an accident. I have also considered whether Mr Litvinenko might have taken the poison deliberately, in order to commit suicide.
¶10.10 I am sure that Mr Litvinenko did not ingest the polonium 210 either by accident or to commit suicide. I am sure, rather, that he was deliberately poisoned by others.
¶10.11 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun placed the polonium 210 in the teapot at the Pine Bar on 1 November 2006. I am also sure that they did this with the intention of poisoning Mr Litvinenko.
¶10.12 I am sure that the two men had made an earlier attempt to poison Mr Litvinenko, also using polonium 210, at the Erinys meeting on 16 October 2006.
¶10.13 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun knew that they were using a deadly poison (as opposed, for example, to a truth drug or a sleeping draught), and that they intended to kill Mr Litvinenko. I do not believe, however, that they knew precisely what the chemical that they were handling was, or the nature of all its properties.
¶10.14 I am sure that Mr Lugovoy and Mr Kovtun were acting on behalf of others when they poisoned Mr Litvinenko.
¶10.15 When Mr Lugovoy poisoned Mr Litvinenko, it is probable that he did so under the direction of the FSB. I would add that I regard that as a strong probability. I have found that Mr Kovtun also took part in the poisoning. I conclude therefore that he was also acting under FSB direction, possibly indirectly through Mr Lugovoy but probably to his knowledge.
¶10.16 The FSB operation to kill Mr Litvinenko was probably approved by Mr Patrushev and also by President Putin.
247¶Appendix 1: The history of the Inquiry and procedures adopted
¶The police investigation