The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq

¶340. Mr Blair had been advised that an invasion of Iraq was expected to increase the threat to the UK and UK interests from Al Qaida and its affiliates.

¶341. Asked about the risk that attacking Iraq with cruise missiles would "act as a recruiting sergeant for a young generation throughout the Islamic and Arab world", Mr Blair responded that:

"... what was shocking about 11 September was not just the slaughter of innocent people but the knowledge that, had the terrorists been able, there would have been not 3,000 innocent dead, but 30,000 or 300,000 ... America did not attack the Al Qaida terrorist group ... [it] attacked America. They did not need to be

recruited ... Unless we take action against them, they will grow. That is why we should act."157

¶342. The JIC judged in October 2002 that "the greatest terrorist threat in the event of military action against Iraq will come from Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists"; and they would be "pursuing their own agenda".158

¶343. The JIC Assessment of 10 February 2003 repeated previous warnings that:

Al Qaida and associated networks would remain the greatest terrorist threat to the UK and its activity would increase at the onset of any military action against Iraq.

In the event of imminent regime collapse, Iraqi chemical and biological material could be transferred to terrorists, including Al Qaida.159

¶344. Addressing the prospects for the future, the JIC Assessment concluded:

"... Al Qaida and associated groups will continue to represent by far the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat will be heightened by military action against Iraq. The broader threat from Islamist terrorists will also increase in the event of war, reflecting intensified anti‑US/anti‑Western sentiment in the Muslim world, including among Muslim communities in the West. And there is a risk that the transfer of CB [chemical and biological] material or expertise, during or in the aftermath of conflict, will enhance Al Qaida's capabilities."

¶345. In response to a call for Muslims everywhere to take up arms in defence of Iraq issued by Usama Bin Laden on 11 February, and a further call on 16 February for "compulsory jihad" by Muslims against the West, the JIC Assessment on 19 February predicted that the upward trend in the reports of threats to the UK was likely to continue.160

¶346. The JIC continued to warn in March that the threat from Al Qaida would increase at the onset of military action against Iraq.161

¶347. The JIC also warned that:

Al Qaida activity in northern Iraq continued.

Al Qaida might have established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be activated during a US occupation.

¶348. The warning about the risk of chemical and biological weapons becoming available to extremist groups as a result of military action in Iraq was reiterated on 19 March.162

¶349. Addressing the JIC Assessment of 10 February 2003, Mr Blair told the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) later that year that:

"One of the most difficult aspects of this is that there was obviously a danger that in attacking Iraq you ended up provoking the very thing you were trying to avoid. On the other hand I think you had to ask the question, 'Could you really, as a result of that fear, leave the possibility that in time developed into a nexus between terrorism and WMD in an event?' This is where you've just got to make your judgement about this. But this is my judgement and it remains my judgement and I suppose time will tell whether it's true or it's not true."163

¶350. In its response to the ISC Report, the Government drew:

"... attention to the difficult judgement that had to be made and the factors on both sides of the argument to be taken into account."164

¶351. Baroness Manningham‑Buller told the Inquiry:

"By 2003/2004 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the UK ... our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word ... a few among a generation ... [who] saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam."165

¶352. Asked about the proposition that it was right to remove Saddam Hussein's regime to forestall a fusion of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism at some point in the future, and if it had eliminated a threat of terrorism from his regime, Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:

"It eliminated the threat of terrorism from his direct regime; it didn't eliminate the threat of terrorism using unconventional methods ... So using weapons of mass destruction as a terrorist weapon is still a potential threat.

"After all Usama Bin Laden said it was the duty of members of his organisation or those in sympathy with it to acquire and use these weapons. It is interesting that ... such efforts as we have seen to get access to these sort of materials have been low‑grade and not very professional, but it must be a cause of concern to my former colleagues that at some stage terrorist groups will resort to these methods.

In that respect, I don't think toppling Saddam Hussein is germane to the long‑term ambitions of some terrorist groups to use them."166

¶353. Asked specifically about the theory that at some point in the future Saddam Hussein would probably have brought together international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in a threat to Western interests, Baroness Manningham‑Buller responded:

"It is a hypothetical theory. It certainly wasn't of concern in either the short‑term or the medium‑term to my colleagues and myself."167

¶354. Asked if "a war in Iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source to the United Kingdom", Baroness Manningham‑Buller stated that that was the view communicated by the JIC Assessments.168

¶355. Baroness Manningham‑Buller subsequently added that if Ministers had read the JIC Assessments they could "have had no doubt" about that risk.169 She said that by the time of the July 2005 attacks in London:

"... an increasing number of British‑born individuals ... were attracted to the ideology of Usama Bin Laden and saw the West's activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as threatening their fellow religionists and the Muslim world."

¶356. Asked whether the judgement that the effect of the invasion of Iraq had increased the terrorist threat to the UK was based on hard evidence or a broader assessment, Baroness Manningham‑Buller replied:

"I think we can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I think the answer to your ... question: yes."170

¶357. In its request for a statement, the Inquiry asked Mr Blair if he had read the JIC Assessment of 10 February 2002, and what weight he had given to it when he decided to take military action.171

¶358. In his statement Mr Blair wrote:

"I was aware of the JIC Assessment of 10 February that the Al Qaida threat to the UK would increase. But I took the view then and take the same view now that to have backed down because of the threat of terrorism would be completely wrong.

In any event, following 9/11 and Afghanistan we were a terrorist target and, as recent events in Europe and the US show, irrespective of Iraq, there are ample justifications such terrorists will use as excuses for terrorism."172