Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

¶297. On 18 March 2003, the House of Commons was asked:

to recognise that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and its continuing non‑compliance with Security Council resolutions, posed a threat to international peace and security; and

to support the use of all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, on the basis that the United Kingdom must uphold the authority of the United Nations as set out in resolution 1441 and many resolutions preceding it.

¶298. In his statement, Mr Blair addressed both the threat to international peace and security presented by Iraq's defiance of the UN and its failure to comply with its disarmament obligations as set out in resolution 1441 (2002). Iraq was "the test of whether we treat the threat seriously".

¶299. Mr Blair rehearsed the Government's position on Iraq's past pursuit and use of weapons of mass destruction; its failures to comply with the obligations imposed by the UN Security Council between 1991 and 1998; Iraq's repeated declarations which proved to be false; and the "large quantities of weapons of mass destruction" which were "unaccounted for". He described UNSCOM's final report (in January 1999) as "a withering indictment of Saddam's lies, deception and obstruction".

¶300. Mr Blair cited the UNMOVIC "clusters" document issued on 7 March as "a remarkable document", detailing "all the unanswered questions about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction", listing "29 different areas in which the inspectors have been unable to obtain information".

¶301. He stated that, based on Iraq's false declaration, its failure to co‑operate, the unanswered questions in the UNMOVIC "clusters" document, and the unaccounted for material, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach of its obligations. If Saddam Hussein continued to fail to co‑operate, force should be used.

¶302. Addressing the wider message from the issue of Iraq, Mr Blair asked:

"... what ... would any tyrannical regime possessing weapons of mass destruction think when viewing the history of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam over ... 12 years? That our capacity to pass firm resolutions has only been matched by our feebleness in implementing them."

¶303. Mr Blair acknowledged that Iraq was "not the only country with weapons of mass destruction", but declared: "back away from this confrontation now, and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating in their effects".

¶304. Mr Blair added:

"The real problem is that ... people dispute Iraq is a threat, dispute the link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and dispute in other words, the whole basis of our assertion that the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life."

¶305. Mr Blair also described a "threat of chaos and disorder" arising from "tyrannical regimes with weapons of mass destruction and extreme terrorist groups" prepared to use them.

¶306. Mr Blair set out his concerns about:

proliferators of nuclear equipment or expertise;

"dictatorships with highly repressive regimes" who were "desperately trying to acquire" chemical, biological or, "particularly, nuclear weapons capability" – some of those were "a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon", and that activity was increasing, not diminishing; and

the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction, including a "radiological bomb".

¶307. Those two threats had very different motives and different origins. He accepted "fully" that the association between the two was:

"... loose – but it is hardening. The possibility of the two coming together – of terrorist groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction or even of a so called dirty radiological bomb – is now in my judgement, a real and present danger to Britain and its national security."

¶308. Later in his speech, Mr Blair stated that the threat which Saddam Hussein's arsenal posed:

"... to British citizens at home and abroad cannot simply be contained. Whether in the hands of his regime or in the hands of the terrorists to whom he would give his weapons, they pose a clear danger to British citizens ..."

¶309. This fusion of long‑standing concerns about proliferation with the post‑9/11 concerns about mass‑casualty terrorism was at the heart of the Government's case for taking action at this time against Iraq.

¶310. The UK assessment of Iraq's capabilities set out in Section 4 of the Report shows:

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems, particularly ballistic missiles, was regarded as a major threat. But Iran, North Korea and Libya were of greater concern than Iraq in terms of the risk of nuclear and missile proliferation.

JIC Assessments, reflected in the September 2002 dossier, had consistently taken the view that, if sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years following the end of sanctions to produce enough fissile material for a weapon. On 7 March, the IAEA had reported to the Security Council that there was no indication that Iraq had resumed its nuclear activities.

The September dossier stated that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within one to two years if it obtained fissile material and other essential components from a foreign supplier. There was no evidence that Iraq had tried to acquire fissile material and other components or – were it able to do so – that it had the technical capabilities to turn these materials into a usable weapon. • JIC Assessments had identified the possible stocks of chemical and biological weapons which would largely have been for short‑range, battlefield use by the Iraqi armed forces. The JIC had also judged in the September dossier that Iraq was producing chemical and biological agents and that there were development programmes for longer‑range missiles capable of delivering them. • Iraq's proscribed Al Samoud 2 missiles were being destroyed.

¶311. The UK Government did have significant concerns about the potential risks of all types of weapons of mass destruction being obtained by Islamist extremists (in particular Al Qaida) who would be prepared to use such weapons.

¶312. Saddam Hussein's regime had the potential to proliferate material and know‑how, to terrorist groups, but it was not judged likely to do so.

¶313. On 28 November 2001, the JIC assessed that:

Saddam Hussein had "refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq".

Evidence of contact between Iraq and Usama Bin Laden (UBL) was "fragmentary and uncorroborated"; including that Iraq had been in contact with Al Qaida for exploratory discussions on toxic materials in late 1988.

"With common enemies ... there was clearly scope for collaboration."

There was "no evidence that these contacts led to practical co‑operation; we judge it unlikely ... There is no evidence UBL's organisation has ever had a presence in Iraq."

Practical co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was "unlikely because of mutual mistrust".

There was "no credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD‑related technology and expertise to terrorist groups".¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁵ JIC Assessment, 28 November 2001, 'Iraq after September 11 – The Terrorist Threat'.

¶314. On 29 January 2003, the JIC assessed that, despite the presence of terrorists in Iraq "with links to Al Qaida", there was "no intelligence of current co‑operation between Iraq and Al Qaida".¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁶ JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003, 'Iraq: The Emerging view from Baghdad'.

¶315. On 10 February 2003, the JIC judged that Al Qaida would "not carry out attacks under Iraqi direction".¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁷ JIC Assessment, 10 February 2003, 'International Terrorism: War with Iraq'

¶316. Sir Richard Dearlove told the Inquiry:

"... I don't think the Prime Minister ever accepted the link between Iraq and terrorism. I think it would be fair to say that the Prime Minister was very worried about the possible conjunction of terrorism and WMD, but not specifically in relation to Iraq ... [I] think, one could say this is one of his primary national security concerns given the nature of Al Qaida."¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ Private hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 39‑40.

¶317. The JIC assessed that Iraq was likely to mount a terrorist attack only in response to military action and if the existence of the regime was threatened.

¶318. The JIC Assessment of 10 October 2002 stated that Saddam Hussein's "overriding objective" was to "avoid a US attack that would threaten his regime".¹⁴⁹¹⁴⁹ JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002, 'International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq'. The JIC judged that, in the event of US‑led military action against Iraq, Saddam would:

"... aim to use terrorism or the threat of it. Fearing the US response, he is likely to weigh the costs and benefits carefully in deciding the timing and circumstances in which terrorism is used. But intelligence on Iraq's capabilities and intentions in this field is limited."

¶319. The JIC also judged that:

Saddam's "capability to conduct effective terrorist attacks" was "very limited".

Iraq's "terrorism capability" was "inadequate to carry out chemical or biological attacks beyond individual assassination attempts using poisons".

¶320. The JIC Assessment of 29 January 2003 sustained its earlier judgements on Iraq's ability and intent to conduct terrorist operations.¹⁵⁰¹⁵⁰ JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003, 'Iraq: The Emerging view from Baghdad'.

¶321. Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Co‑ordinator in the Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service judged that the "threat from terrorism from Saddam's own intelligence apparatus in the event of an intervention in Iraq ... was judged to be limited and containable".¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ Public hearing, 20 January 2010, page 37.

¶322. Baroness Manningham‑Buller, the Director General of the Security Service from 2002 to 2007, confirmed that position, stating that the Security Service felt there was "a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from Iraq within the UK and to British interests".¹⁵²¹⁵² Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.

¶323. Baroness Manningham‑Buller added that subsequent events showed the judgement that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything much in the UK, had "turned out to be the right judgement".¹⁵³¹⁵³ Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.

¶324. While it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.

¶325. The UK Government assessed that Iraq had failed to comply with a series of UN resolutions. Instead of disarming as these resolutions had demanded, Iraq was assessed to have concealed materials from past inspections and to have taken the opportunity of the absence of inspections to revive its WMD programmes.

¶326. In Section 4, the Inquiry has identified the importance of the ingrained belief of the Government and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein's regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear capability, and was pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and concealment.

¶327. This construct remained influential despite the lack of significant finds by inspectors in the period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after the Occupation of Iraq.

¶328. Challenging Saddam Hussein's "claim" that he had no weapons of mass destruction, Mr Blair said in his speech on 18 March:

"... we are asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction and non‑compliance ... he [Saddam Hussein] voluntarily decided to do what he had consistently refused to do under coercion."

"We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years – contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence – Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd."

"... Iraq continues to deny that it has any weapons of mass destruction, although no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes it."

"What is perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games in the same old way. Yes, there are minor concessions, but there has been no fundamental change of heart or mind."¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁴ House of Commons, Official Report, 18 March 2003, columns 760‑764.

¶329. At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or the policy community.

¶330. Intelligence and assessments were used to prepare material to be used to support Government statements in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging the limitations of the intelligence.

¶331. Mr Blair's statement to the House of Commons on 18 March was the culmination of a series of public statements and interviews setting out the urgent need for the international community to act to bring about Iraq's disarmament in accordance with those resolutions, dating back to February 2002, before his meeting with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April.

¶332. As Mr Cook's resignation statement on 17 March made clear, it was possible for a Minister to draw different conclusions from the same information.

¶333. Mr Cook set out his doubts about Saddam Hussein's ability to deliver a strategic attack and the degree to which Iraq posed a "clear and present danger" to the UK. The points Mr Cook made included:

"... neither the international community nor the British public is persuaded that there is an urgent and compelling reason for this military action in Iraq."

"Over the past decade that strategy [of containment] had destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf War, dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and halted Saddam's medium and long range missile programmes."

"Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term – namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target. It probably ... has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for twenty years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors?"¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁵ House of Commons, Official Report, 17 March 2003, columns 726‑728.

¶334. On 12 October 2004, announcing the withdrawal of two lines of intelligence reporting which had contributed to the pre‑conflict judgements on mobile biological production facilities and the regime's intentions, Mr Straw stated that he did:

"... not accept, even with hindsight, that we were wrong to act as we did in the circumstances that we faced at the time. Even after reading all the evidence detailed by the Iraq Survey Group, it is still hard to believe that any regime could behave in so self‑destructive a manner as to pretend that it had forbidden weaponry, when in fact it had not."¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁶ House of Commons, Official Report, 12 October 2004, columns 151‑152.

¶335. Iraq had acted suspiciously over many years, which led to the inferences drawn by the Government and the intelligence community that it had been seeking to protect concealed WMD assets. When Iraq denied that it had retained any WMD capabilities, the UK Government accused it of lying.

¶336. This led the Government to emphasise the ability of Iraq successfully to deceive the inspectors, and cast doubt on the investigative capacity of the inspectors. The role of the inspectors, however, as was often pointed out, was not to seek out assets that had been hidden, but rather to validate Iraqi claims.

¶337. By March 2003, however:

The Al Samoud 2 missiles which exceeded the range permitted by the UN, were being destroyed.

The IAEA had concluded that there was no Iraqi nuclear programme of any significance.

The inspectors believed that they were making progress and expected to achieve more co‑operation from Iraq.

The inspectors were preparing to step up their activities with U2 flights and interviews outside Iraq.

¶338. When the UK sought a further Security Council resolution in March 2003, the majority of the Council's members were not persuaded that the inspections process, and the diplomatic efforts surrounding it, had reached the end of the road. They did not agree that the time had come to terminate inspections and resort to force. The UK went to war without the explicit authorisation which it had sought from the Security Council.

¶339. At the time of the Parliamentary vote of 18 March, diplomatic options had not been exhausted. The point had not been reached where military action was the last resort.