The end of the UN route

¶214. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush at 6pm on 7 March he emphasised the importance of securing nine positive votes98 in the Security Council for Parliamentary approval for UK military action.99

¶215. Mr Blair argued that while the 17 March deadline in the draft resolution was not sufficient for Iraq to disarm fully, it was sufficient to make a judgement on whether Saddam Hussein had had a change of heart. If Iraq started to co‑operate, the inspectors could have as much time as they liked.

¶216. In a last attempt to move opinion and secure the support of nine members of the Security Council, Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose a short extension of the timetable beyond 17 March and to revive the idea of producing a "side statement" setting out a series of tests which would provide the basis for a judgement on Saddam Hussein's intentions.

¶217. The initiative was pursued through intensive diplomatic activity to lobby for support between London and the capitals of Security Council Member States.

¶218. Mr Blair told the Inquiry:

"It was worth having one last‑ditch chance to see if you could bring people back together on the same page ... [W]hat President Bush had to do was agree to table a fresh resolution. What the French had to agree was you couldn't have another resolution and another breach and no action. So my idea was define the circumstances of breach – that was the tests that we applied with Hans Blix – get the Americans to agree to the resolution, get the French to agree that you couldn't just go back to the same words of 1441 again, you had to take it a stage further."100

¶219. In a discussion on 9 March, Mr Blair told President Bush that he needed a second resolution to secure Parliamentary support for UK involvement in military action.101 He sought President Bush's support for setting out tests in a side statement, including that the vote in the Security Council might have to be delayed "by a couple of days".

¶220. President Bush was unwilling to countenance delay. He was reported to have told Mr Blair that, if the second resolution failed, he would find another way to involve the UK.

¶221. Mr Blair told President Bush the UK would be with the US in taking action if he (Mr Blair) possibly could be.

¶222. Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Dr Blix was prepared to work with the UK on identifying tests but had reminded him that UNMOVIC still lacked clear evidence that Iraq possessed any WMD.102

¶223. Mr Blair spoke twice to President Lagos on 10 March in an attempt to find a path that President Lagos and President Vicente Fox of Mexico could support.

¶224. In the second conversation, Mr Blair said that he thought it "would be possible to find different wording" on the ultimatum to Iraq. Timing "would be difficult, but he would try to get some flexibility" if the first two issues "fell into place".103

¶225. Mr Straw reported that Secretary Powell thought that there were seven solid votes, and uncertainty about Mexico, Chile and Pakistan.104 If there were fewer than nine, the second resolution should not be put to the vote.

¶226. Mr Straw replied that "he was increasingly coming to the view that we should not push the matter to a vote if we were going to be vetoed"; but that had not yet been agreed by Mr Blair.

¶227. By 10 March, President Bush's position was hardening and he was very reluctant to delay military action.

¶228. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush, they discussed the "seven solid votes" for the resolution.105

¶229. Mr Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's Director of Communications and Strategy, wrote that Mr Blair had done most of the talking.106 President Bush thought President Jacques Chirac of France was "trying to get us to the stage where we would not put [the resolution] to a vote because we would be so worried about losing".

¶230. Mr Blair had argued that if Chile and Mexico could be shifted, that would "change the weather". If France and Russia then vetoed the resolution but the "numbers were right on the UN", Mr Blair thought that he would "have a fighting chance of getting it through the Commons". Subsequently, Mr Blair suggested that a change in Chile and Mexico's position might be used to influence President Putin.

¶231. President Bush was "worried about rolling in more time" but Mr Blair had "held his ground", arguing that Chile and Mexico would "need to be able to point to something that they won last minute that explains why they finally supported us". President Bush "said 'Let me be frank. The second resolution is for the benefit of Great Britain. We would want it so we can go ahead together.'" President Bush's position was that the US and UK "must not retreat from 1441 and we cannot keep giving them more time"; it was "time to do this" and there should be "no more deals".

¶232. Sir David Manning sent the UK proposals for a revised deadline, and a side statement identifying six tests on which Saddam Hussein's intentions would be judged, to Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's National Security Advisor, and to President Lagos.107

¶233. Mr Blair wrote in his memoir that President Bush and his military were concerned about delay.108

"It [the proposal for tests/more time] was indeed a hard sell to George. His system was completely against it. His military were, not unreasonably, fearing that delay gave the enemy time – and time could mean a tougher struggle and more lives lost.

This was also troubling my military. We had all sorts of contingency plans in place ... There was both UK and US intelligence warning us of the risk.

¶"Nonetheless I thought it was worth a try ..."

¶234. Mr Blair also wrote:

"Chile and Mexico were prepared to go along, but only up to a point. Ricardo made it clear that if there was heavy opposition from France, it would be tough for them to participate in what would then be a token vote, incapable of being passed because of a veto – and what's more, a veto not by Russia, but by France.

"Unfortunately, the French position had, if anything, got harder not softer. They were starting to say they would not support military action in any circumstances, irrespective of what the inspectors found ..."

¶235. In a press conference on 10 March, Mr Annan reiterated the Security Council's determination to disarm Iraq, but said that every avenue for a peaceful resolution of the crisis had to be exhausted before force should be used.109

¶236. Mr Annan also warned that, if the Security Council failed to agree on a common position and action was taken without the authority of the Council, the legitimacy and support for any such action would be seriously impaired.

¶237. In an interview on 10 March, President Chirac stated that it was for the inspectors to advise whether they could complete their task.110 If they reported that they were not in a position to guarantee Iraq's disarmament, it would be:

"... for the Security Council alone to decide the right thing to do. But in that case ... regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn't today."

¶238. President Chirac stated that he did not consider that the draft resolution tabled by the US, UK and Spain would attract support from nine members of the Security Council. In that case, there would be no majority for action, "So there won't be a veto problem."

¶239. But if there were a majority "in favour of the new resolution", France would "vote 'no'".

¶240. In response to a question asking, "And, this evening, this is your position in principle?", President Chirac responded:

"My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote 'no' because she considers this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in order to achieve the goal we have set ourselves, that is to disarm Iraq."

¶241. By 11 March, it was clear that, in the time available before the US was going to take military action, it would be difficult to secure nine votes in the Security Council for a resolution determining that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.

¶242. Mr Straw wrote to Mr Blair on 11 March setting out his firm conclusion that:

"If we cannot gain nine votes and be sure of no veto, we should not push our second resolution to a vote. The political and diplomatic consequences for the UK would be significantly worse to have our ... resolution defeated ... than if we camp on 1441 ..."111

¶243. Mr Straw set out his reasoning in some detail, including that:

Although in earlier discussion he had "warmed to the idea" that it was worth pushing the issue to a vote "if we had nine votes and faced only a French veto", the more he "thought about this, the worse an idea it becomes".

A veto by France only was "in practice less likely than two or even three vetoes".

The "best, least risky way to gain a moral majority" was "by the 'Kosovo route' – essentially what I am recommending. The key to our moral legitimacy then was the matter never went to a vote – but everyone knew the reason for this was that Russia would have vetoed."

¶244. Mr Straw suggested that the UK should adopt a strategy based on the argument that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, and that the last three meetings of the Security Council met the requirement for Security Council consideration of reports of non‑compliance.

¶245. Mr Straw also identified the need for a "Plan B" for the UK not to participate in military action in the event that the Government failed to secure a majority in the Parliamentary Labour Party for military action.

¶246. Mr Straw concluded:

"We will obviously need to discuss all this, but I thought it best to put it in your mind as event[s] could move fast. And what I propose is a great deal better than the alternatives. When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the way, he wanted you alive not dead!"

¶247. There was no reference in the minute to President Chirac's remarks the previous evening.

¶248. When Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the position late on 11 March, it was clear that President Bush was determined not to postpone the start of military action.112 They discussed the impact of President Chirac's "veto threats". Mr Blair considered that President Chirac's remarks "gave some cover" for ending the UN route.

¶249. Reporting discussions in New York on 11 March on the draft resolution and details of a possible "side statement", Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the draft resolution tabled by the UK, US and Spain on 7 March had "no chance ... of adoption".113

¶250. In a telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed that the US and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that he knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that the French had prevented them from securing a resolution, so there would not be one.114

¶251. Mr Blair wanted to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process and the Parliamentary vote in which France or another member of the Security Council might table a resolution that attracted the support of a majority of the Council. That could have undermined the UK (and US) position on its legal basis for action.

¶252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided that the UK would continue to support the US.115

¶253. During Prime Minister's Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated:

"I hope that even now those countries that are saying they would use their veto no matter what the circumstances will reconsider and realise that by doing so they put at risk not just the disarmament of Saddam, but the unity of the United Nations."116

¶254. The FCO assessed on 12 March that the votes of the three African states were reasonably secure but Pakistan's vote was not so certain. It was hoped that the six tests plus a short extension of the 17 March deadline might deliver Mexico and Chile.117

¶255. The UK circulated its draft side statement setting out the six tests to a meeting of Security Council members in New York on the evening of 12 March.118

¶256. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told Council members that the UK "non‑paper" responded to an approach from the "undecided six"119 looking for a way forward, setting out six tasks to be achieved in a 10‑day timeline.120 Sir Jeremy reported that France, Germany and Russia all said that the draft resolution without operative paragraph 3 would still authorise force. The UK had not achieved "any kind of breakthrough" and there were "serious questions about the available time", which the US would "not help us to satisfy".

¶257. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a second resolution and, following the French decision to veto, the outcome remained open.121

¶258. Mr Straw described President Chirac's position as "irresponsible".

¶259. Mr Straw told Cabinet that there was "good progress" in gaining support in the Security Council.

¶260. Mr Blair concluded that the French position "looked to be based on a calculation of strategic benefit". It was "in contradiction of the Security Council's earlier view that military action would follow if Iraq did not fully and unconditionally co‑operate with the inspectors". The UK would "continue to show flexibility" in its efforts to achieve a second resolution and, "if France could be shown to be intransigent, the mood of the Security Council could change towards support for the British draft".

¶261. Mr Blair agreed the military plan later on 13 March.122

¶262. On 13 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the resolution on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48 hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in the House of Commons on 18 March.123

¶263. Mr Blair continued to press President Bush to publish the Road Map on the Middle East Peace Process because of its impact on domestic opinion in the UK as well as its strategic impact.

¶264. Reporting developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned that the UK tests had attracted no support, and that the US might be ready to call a halt to the UN process on 15 March.124 The main objections had included the "perceived authorisation of force in the draft resolution" and a desire to wait for UNMOVIC's own list of key tasks which would be issued early the following week.

¶265. President Chirac told Mr Blair on 14 March that France was "content to proceed 'in the logic of UNSCR 1441'; but it could not accept an ultimatum or any 'automaticity' of recourse to force".125 He proposed looking at a new resolution in line with resolution 1441, "provided that it excluded these options". President Chirac "suggested that the UNMOVIC work programme might provide a way forward. France was prepared to look at reducing the 120 day timeframe it envisaged."

¶266. In response to a question from President Chirac about whether it would be the inspectors or the Security Council who decided whether Saddam had co‑operated, Mr Blair "insisted that it must be the Security Council".

¶267. President Chirac agreed, "although the Security Council should make its judgement on the basis of the inspectors' report". He "wondered whether it would be worth" Mr Straw and Mr Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign Minister, "discussing the situation to see if we could find some flexibility"; or was it "too late"?

¶268. Mr Blair said, "every avenue must be explored".

¶269. In the subsequent conversation with President Bush about the French position and what to say when the resolution was pulled, Mr Blair proposed that they would need to show that France would not authorise the use of force in any circumstances.126

¶270. President Lagos initially informed Mr Blair on 14 March that the UK proposals did not have Chile's support and that he was working on other ideas.127 He subsequently informed Mr Blair that he would not pursue his proposals unless Mr Blair or President Bush asked him to.

¶271. Mr Tony Brenton, Chargé d'Affaires, British Embassy Washington, reported that President Bush was determined to remove Saddam Hussein and to stick to the US timetable for action. The UK's "steadfastness" had been "invaluable" in bringing in other countries in support of action.128

¶272. In a declaration on 15 March, France, with Germany and Russia, attempted to secure support in the Security Council for continued inspections.129

¶273. At the Azores Summit on 16 March, President Bush, Mr Blair and Prime Minister José María Aznar of Spain agreed that, unless there was a fundamental change in the next 24 hours, the UN process would end.130

¶274. In public, the focus was on a "last chance for peace". The joint communiqué contained a final appeal to Saddam Hussein to comply with his obligations and to the Security Council to back a second resolution containing an ultimatum.

¶275. In his memoir, Mr Blair wrote:

"So when I look back ... I know there was never any way Britain was not going to be with the US at that moment, once we went down the UN route and Saddam was in breach. Of course such a statement is always subject to in extremis correction. A crazy act of aggression? No, we would not have supported that. But given the history, you couldn't call Saddam a crazy target.

"Personally I have little doubt that at some point we would have to have dealt with him ..."131

¶276. At "about 3.15pm UK time" on 17 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock announced that the resolution would not be put to a vote, stating that the co‑sponsors reserved the right to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq.132

¶277. The subsequent discussion in the Council suggested that only the UK, the US, and Spain took the view that all options other than the use of military force had been exhausted.133

¶278. A specially convened Cabinet at 1600 on 17 March 2003 endorsed the decision that the diplomatic process was now at an end and Saddam Hussein should be given an ultimatum to leave Iraq; and that the House of Commons would be asked to endorse the use of military action against Iraq to enforce compliance, if necessary.134

¶279. In his statement to the House of Commons that evening, Mr Straw said that the Government had reluctantly concluded that France's actions had put a consensus in the Security Council on a further resolution "beyond reach".135

¶280. As a result of Saddam Hussein's persistent refusal to meet the UN's demands, the Cabinet had decided to ask the House of Commons to support the UK's participation in military action, should that be necessary to achieve the disarmament of Iraq "and thereby the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations".

¶281. Mr Straw stated that Lord Goldsmith's Written Answer "set out the legal basis for the use of force".

¶282. Mr Straw drew attention to the significance of the fact that no one "in discussions in the Security Council and outside" had claimed that Iraq was in full compliance with its obligations.

¶283. In a statement later that evening, Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House of Commons, set out his doubts about the degree to which Saddam Hussein posed a

¶"clear and present danger" and his concerns that the UK was being "pushed too quickly into conflict" by the US without the support of the UN and in the face of hostility from many of the UK's traditional allies.136

¶284. On 17 March, President Bush issued an ultimatum giving Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq.

¶285. The French President's office issued a statement early on 18 March stating that the US ultimatum was a unilateral decision going against the will of the international community who wanted to pursue Iraqi disarmament in accordance with resolution 1441.137 It stated:

"... only the Security Council is authorised to legitimise the use of force. France appeals to the responsibility of all to see that international legality is respected. To disregard the legitimacy of the UN, to favour force over the law, would be to take on a heavy responsibility."

¶286. On the evening of 18 March, the House of Commons passed by 412 votes to 149 a motion supporting "the decision of Her Majesty's Government that the United Kingdom should use all means necessary to ensure the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction".

¶287. President Bush wrote in his memoir that he convened "the entire National Security Council" on the morning of 19 March where he "gave the order to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom".138

¶288. In the Security Council debate on 19 March, the majority of members of the Security Council, including France, Russia and China, made clear that they thought the goal of disarming Iraq could be achieved by peaceful means and emphasised the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.139

¶289. UNMOVIC and the IAEA had provided the work programmes required by resolution 1284. They included 12 key tasks identified by UNMOVIC where progress "could have an impact on the Council's assessment of co‑operation of Iraq".

¶290. Shortly before midnight on 19 March, the US informed Sir David Manning that there was to be a change to the plan and US airstrikes would be launched at 0300 GMT on 20 March.140

¶291. Early on the morning of 20 March, US forces crossed into Iraq and seized the port area of Umm Qasr.141

¶292. Mr Blair continued to state that France was responsible for the impasse.

¶293. At Cabinet on 20 March, Mr Blair concluded that the Government:

"... should lose no opportunity to propagate the reason, at every level and as widely as possible, why we had arrived at a diplomatic impasse, and why it was necessary to take action against Iraq. France had not been prepared to accept that Iraq's failure to comply with its obligations should lead to the use of force to achieve compliance."142

Why Iraq? Why now?

¶294. In his memoir, Mr Blair described his speech opening the debate on 18 March as "the most important speech I had ever made".143

¶295. Mr Blair framed the decision for the House of Commons as a "tough" and "stark" choice between "retreat" and holding firm to the course of action the Government had set. Mr Blair stated that he believed "passionately" in the latter. He deployed a wide range of arguments to explain the grounds for military action and to make a persuasive case for the Government's policy.144

¶296. In setting out his position, Mr Blair recognised the gravity of the debate and the strength of opposition in both the country and Parliament to immediate military action. In his view, the issue mattered "so much" because the outcome would not just determine the fate of the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi people but would:

"... determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation."