The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens

¶162. In their reports to the Security Council on 14 February:

Dr Blix reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of mass destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist, but Iraq needed to provide the evidence to answer the questions, not belittle them.

Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported that the IAEA had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear‑related activities in Iraq although a number of issues were still under investigation.62

¶163. In the subsequent debate, members of the Security Council voiced widely divergent views.

¶164. Mr Annan concluded that there were real differences on strategy and timing in the Security Council. Iraq's non‑co‑operation was insufficient to bring members to agree that war was justified; they would only move if they came to their own judgement that inspections were pointless.63

¶165. On 19 February, Mr Blair sent President Bush a six‑page Note. He proposed focusing on the absence of full co‑operation and a "simple" resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity, with a side statement defining tough tests of co‑operation and a vote on 14 March to provide a deadline for action.64

¶166. President Bush and Mr Blair agreed to introduce a draft resolution at the UN the following week but its terms were subject to further discussion.65

¶167. On 20 February, Mr Blair told Dr Blix that he wanted to offer the US an alternative strategy which included a deadline and tests for compliance.66 He did not think Saddam Hussein would co‑operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as possible. Iraq could have signalled a change of heart in the December declaration. The Americans did not think that Saddam was going to co‑operate: "Nor did he. But we needed to keep the international community together."

¶168. Dr Blix stated that full co‑operation was a nebulous concept; and a deadline of 15 April would be too early. Dr Blix commented that "perhaps there was not much WMD in Iraq after all". Mr Blair responded that "even German and French intelligence were sure that there was WMD in Iraq". Dr Blix said they seemed "unsure" about "mobile BW production facilities": "It would be paradoxical and absurd if 250,000 men were to invade Iraq and find very little."

¶169. Mr Blair responded that "our intelligence was clear that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programme".

¶170. On 24 February, the UK, US and Spain tabled a draft resolution stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 and that the Security Council had decided to remain seized of the matter.67 The draft failed to attract support.

¶171. France, Germany and Russia responded by tabling a memorandum, building on their tripartite declaration of 10 February, stating that "full and effective disarmament" remained "the imperative objective of the international community".68 That "should be achieved peacefully through the inspection regime". The "conditions for using force" had "not been fulfilled". The Security Council "must step up its efforts to give a real chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis".

¶172. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was "clear" that Saddam Hussein continued "to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression".69 It was also "essential to his regional power". "Prior to the inspectors coming back in", Saddam Hussein "was engaged in a systematic exercise in concealment of those weapons". The inspectors had reported some co‑operation on process, but had "denied progress on substance".

¶173. The House of Commons was asked on 26 February to reaffirm its endorsement of resolution 1441, support the Government's continuing efforts to disarm Iraq, and to call upon Iraq to recognise that this was its final opportunity to comply with its obligations.70

¶174. The Government motion was approved by 434 votes to 124;¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 3. MPs voted for an amendment which invited the House to "find the case for military action against Iraq as yet unproven".71

¶175. In a speech on 26 February, President Bush stated that the safety of the American people depended on ending the direct and growing threat from Iraq.72

¶176. President Bush also set out his hopes for the future of Iraq.

¶177. Reporting discussions in New York on 26 February, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote that there was "a general antipathy to having now to take decisions on this issue, and a wariness about what our underlying motives are behind the resolution".73 Sir Jeremy concluded that the US was focused on preserving its room for manoeuvre while he was "concentrating on trying to win votes". It was the "middle ground" that mattered. Mexico and Chile were the "pivotal sceptics".

¶178. Lord Goldsmith told No.10 officials on 27 February that the safest legal course for future military action would be to secure a further Security Council resolution.74 He had, however, reached the view that a "reasonable case" could be made that resolution 1441 was capable of reviving the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990) without a further resolution, if there were strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.

¶179. Lord Goldsmith advised that, to avoid undermining the case for reliance on resolution 1441, it would be important to avoid giving any impression that the UK believed a second resolution was legally required.

¶180. Informal consultations in the Security Council on 27 February showed there was little support for the UK/US/Spanish draft resolution.75

¶181. An Arab League Summit on 1 March concluded that the crisis in Iraq must be resolved by peaceful means and in the framework of international legitimacy.76

¶182. Following his visit to Mexico, Sir David Manning concluded that Mexican support for a second resolution was "not impossible, but would not be easy and would almost certainly require some movement".77

¶183. During Sir David's visit to Chile, President Ricardo Lagos repeated his concerns, including the difficulty of securing nine votes or winning the presentational battle without further clarification of Iraq's non‑compliance. He also suggested identifying benchmarks.78

¶184. Mr Blair wrote in his memoir that, during February, "despite his best endeavours", divisions in the Security Council had grown not reduced; and that the "dynamics of disagreement" were producing new alliances.79 France, Germany and Russia were moving to create an alternative pole of power and influence.

¶185. Mr Blair thought that was "highly damaging" but "inevitable": "They felt as strongly as I did; and they weren't prepared to indulge the US, as they saw it."

¶186. Mr Blair concluded that for moral and strategic reasons the UK should be with the US and that:

"... [W]e should make a last ditch attempt for a peaceful solution. First to make the moral case for removing Saddam ... Second, to try one more time to reunite the international community behind a clear base for action in the event of a continuing breach."

¶187. On 3 March, Mr Blair proposed an approach focused on setting a deadline of 17 March for Iraq to disclose evidence relating to the destruction of prohibited items and permit interviews; and an amnesty if Saddam Hussein left Iraq by 21 March.80

¶188. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that the level of support in the UK for military action without a second resolution was palpably "very low". In that circumstance, even if a majority in the Security Council had voted for the resolution with only France exercising its veto, he was "increasingly pessimistic" about support within the Labour Party for military action.81 The debate in the UK was:

"... significantly defined by the tone of the debate in Washington and particularly remarks made by the President and others to the right of him, which suggested that the US would go to war whatever and was not bothered about a second resolution one way or another."

¶189. Following a discussion with Mr Blair, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that Mr Blair:

"... was concerned that, having shifted world (and British) public opinion over the months, it had now been seriously set back in recent days. We were not in the right position. The Prime Minister was considering a number of ideas which he might well put to the President."82

¶190. Mr Straw recorded that Secretary Powell had advised that, if Mr Blair wanted to make proposals, he should do so quickly. The US was not enthusiastic about the inclusion of an immunity clause for Saddam Hussein in the resolution.

¶191. Mr Straw reported that Secretary Powell had told President Bush that he judged a vetoed resolution would no longer be possible for the UK. Mr Straw said that without a second resolution approval for military action could be "beyond reach".

¶192. Mr Straw told the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on 4 March that it was "a matter of fact" that Iraq had been in material breach "for some weeks" and resolution 1441 provided sufficient legal authority to justify military action against Iraq if it was "in further material breach".83

¶193. Mr Straw also stated that a majority of members of the Security Council had been opposed to the suggestion that resolution 1441 should state explicitly that military action could be taken only if there were a second resolution.

¶194. Mr Blair was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military planners were looking at 12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign; and that Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, was concerned about the apparent disconnect with activity in the UN.84

¶195. Baroness Amos, Minister of State, Department for International Development (DFID), advised on 4 March that Angola, Cameroon and Guinea were not yet ready to commit to a "yes vote" and had emphasised the need for P5 unity.85

¶196. Sir Christopher Hum, British Ambassador to China, advised on 4 March that, if the resolution was put to a vote that day, China would abstain.86

¶197. Sir John Holmes, British Ambassador to France, advised on 4 March that France's main aim was to "avoid being put on the spot" by influencing the undecided, preventing the US and UK mustering nine votes, and keeping alongside the Russians and Chinese; and that there was "nothing that we can now do to dissuade them from this course".87 Sir John also advised that "nothing the French say at this stage, even privately, should be taken at face value".

¶198. Mr Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told Mr Straw on 4 March that Russia had failed in an attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to leave and it would veto a resolution based on the draft circulated on 24 February.88

¶199. France, Germany and Russia stated on 5 March that they would not let a resolution pass that authorised the use of force.89 Russia and France, "as Permanent Members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point".

¶200. The British Embassy Washington reported overnight on 5/6 March that "barring a highly improbable volte face by Saddam", the US was now firmly on track for military action and would deal firmly with any efforts in the UN to slow down the timetable.90

¶201. The Embassy reported that the only event which might significantly affect the US timetable would be problems for the UK. That had been described as "huge – like trying to play football without the quarterback". The US was "therefore pulling out all the stops at the UN". The US fully understood the importance of the second resolution for the UK.

¶202. Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the US would not countenance the use of benchmarks. That risked delaying the military timetable.91

¶203. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 6 March that the argument boiled down to the question of whether Saddam Hussein would ever voluntarily co‑operate with the UN to disarm Iraq.92

¶204. Mr Blair concluded that it was for the Security Council to determine whether Iraq was co‑operating fully.

¶205. In his discussions with President Lagos on 6 March, Mr Blair stated that the US would go ahead without the UN if asked to delay military action until April or May.93

¶206. In his report to the Security Council on 7 March, Dr Blix stated that there had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq since the end of January, but they could not be said to constitute immediate co‑operation.94 Nor did they necessarily cover all areas of relevance; but they were nevertheless welcome. UNMOVIC was drawing up a work programme of key disarmament tasks, which would be ready later that month, for approval by the Security Council. It would take "months" to complete the programme.

¶207. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently increased level of Iraqi co‑operation should allow the IAEA to provide the Security Council with an assessment of Iraq's nuclear capabilities in the near future.

¶208. There was unanimity in calls for Iraq to increase its co‑operation. But there was a clear division between the US, UK, Spain and Bulgaria who spoke in favour of a further resolution and France, Germany, Russia and China and most other Member States who spoke in favour of continuing to pursuing disarmament through strengthened inspections.

¶209. The UK, US and Spain circulated a revised draft resolution deciding that Iraq would have failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 (2002) unless the Council concluded, on or before 17 March 2003, that Iraq had demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active co‑operation in accordance with its disarmament obligations and was yielding possession of all weapons and proscribed material to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

¶210. President Putin told Mr Blair on 7 March that Russia would oppose military action.95

¶211. Mr Straw told Mr Annan that military considerations could not be allowed "to dictate policy", but the military build‑up "could not be maintained for ever", and:

"... the more he had looked into the Iraq dossier [issue] the more convinced he had become of the need for action. Reading the clusters document [a report of outstanding issues produced by UNMOVIC on 7 March] made his hair stand on end."96

¶212. Mr Straw set out the UK thinking on a deadline, stating that this was "Iraq's last chance", but the objective was disarmament and, if Saddam Hussein did what was demanded, "he could stay". In those circumstances, a "permanent and toughened inspections regime" would be needed, possibly "picking up some earlier ideas for an all‑Iraq NFZ".

¶213. Lord Goldsmith sent his formal advice to Mr Blair on 7 March.97